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ABSTRACT 
David C. Carlson 
IN THE FIST OF EARLIER REVOLUTIONS:  
POSTEMANCIPATION SOCIAL CONTROL AND STATE FORMATION IN 
GUANTÁNAMO, CUBA, 1868-1902 
(Under the direction of Louis A. Pérez, Jr.) 
 
This dissertation charts transformations in social control mechanisms in a rural 
district of southeastern Cuba during the gradual demise of slavery into the opening decade of 
state formation in the twentieth century.  It examines how changes wrought by slavery’s end 
concurrent with wars of national independence against Spanish colonial rule, and United 
States intervention into that conflict during 1898, shaped the Guantánamo jurisdiction from a 
colonial island frontier to a North American enclave. The study contributes to scholarship on 
shifts in racial constructs, citizenship, labor, and liberalism in New World Diaspora societies 
marked by legacies of coercive labor. 
Dissimilar and distinct military mobilizations of black soldiery were salient factors in 
the last three nations of the hemisphere to abandon their “peculiar institution” of slavery: the 
United States (the Civil War 1861-65), Brazil (the Paraguay War, 1864-70 with final 
abolition by 1888), and Cuba (the Ten Years’ War, 1868-78 with final abolition in 1886).  
This project addresses implications of Cubans of color and former slaves engaged in 
anticolonial mobilizations during the island’s transformation from colony to republican 
nation-state. I argue that the rebellion against the metropolitan state challenged enduring 
local structures of domination and power, confronting but not overturning durable social 
control mechanisms designed to defend property and discipline the colonial order.  By 1895, 
 iv 
a cross-racial and cross-class tactical alliance rekindled the independence struggle against 
Spain and its local sources of power, extracting war taxes from landowners – an incipient 
politics of the social function of property.   
After U.S. occupation, and independence by 1902, that alliance did not last. In the 
newly constituted republic, political unrest that threatened property destruction and sabotage 
at sugar estates met with repression.  The study ends with the first U.S. occupation, by which 
time new social forces and elite social control concerns accompanied Cuban independence 
and post independence politics. 
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To guantanameros everywhere. 
 
 
 
You believe, perhaps, gentlemen, that the production of coffee and sugar is the natural 
destiny of the West Indies. Two centuries ago, nature, which does not trouble herself about 
commerce, had planted neither sugar-cane nor coffee trees there. 
-- Karl Marx, “On the Question of Free Trade” 9 January 1848. 
 
[T]he Cuban question, like the Haytian question of 1796, is that of slave emancipation; and 
it will only be ultimately solved by determining on what footing free labour may be made to 
answer both here and throughout the West Indies. 
-- Antonio C. N. Gallenga, The Pearl of the Antilles, 1873. 
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PREFACE 
Guantánamo, or more precisely, the U.S. Navy base situated in the lower part of the 
bay with its prison for “illegal combatants” from the so-called Global War on Terrorism, was 
frequently in the news from the start of the Afghan war in 2001.  The base chosen to house 
the detention camp constituted the oldest offshore installation maintained by the U.S. 
military, a precursor to a pattern of bases that would be established after twentieth-century 
U.S. wars, in particular the network formed after World War II and during the Cold War.1  
The U.S. base at Guantánamo figured as an early and anomalous “enduring camp” from 
control of the Caribbean and isthmian canal in the first half of the century to the Cold War’s 
end. Such forward positions for the United States eventually formed a militarized global 
architecture of overseas stations and bases, a worldwide network or archipelago of what 
historian Chalmers Johnson has termed a veritable “empire of bases” with at least 725 
military and intelligence posts in some 153 nations.2   
                                                
1 The official USN website for the Guantanamo Naval Station is available online at 
<http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil>. 
  
2 Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 41-42, 151-85 citing the U.S. Department of Defense Worldwide Manpower 
Distribution by Geographical Area, September 31, 2001, available on line at 
<http://web1.whs.osd.mil/DIORCAT.HTM#M05>. Presumably the numbers of personnel and bases have 
increased sharply during the ongoing wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. For a concise account of the 
“Gitmo” base’s incarnation as an offshore prison, see Jane Franklin, “Guantánamo Prison,” in the Historians 
Against the War Pamphlet #3, Torture American Style available online at 
<http://www.historiansagainstwar.org/resources/torture>. See also, David Deutschmann, and Roger Ricardo, 
Guantánamo: A Critical History of the U.S. Base in Cuba (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2005); Amy Kaplan, 
“Where Is Guantánamo,” American Quarterly 57.3 (September 2005): 831-858; Alfred W. McCoy, A Question 
of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2006); David Rose, Guantánamo: The War on Human Rights (New York: The New Press, 2004); and Anders 
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The “Gitmo” base at Guantánamo Bay was originally founded as a coaling station to 
supply the U.S. fleet during the War of 1898, serving as the staging area for the invasion of 
Puerto Rico late in that conflict.  Lease agreements governed its continuous use as a naval 
position in the heart of the Caribbean basin, in close proximity to the Panama Canal, starting 
with the 1901 Platt Amendment, and by further 1903, 1912, and 1934 treaties between the 
United States and Cuba.3  As U.S. naval power expanded, so too did the base: it underwent 
extension during the 1920s build-up, and grew dramatically during the Second World War 
and yet again during the large peace-time Cold War defense budgets that followed the 
Korean War.  It was in this mid-twentieth century period shaped by world wars that the 
surrounding area of Cuba developed a substantial service economy geared toward the base, 
eventually also drawing numbers of Anglophone West-Indian immigrants as base workers.  
Social relationships between Cubans, Caribbean peoples, and North Americans grew into a 
dense web of patterns over time, becoming sundered after the 1959 revolution and 
concomitant rupture in Cuban-American relations.4  Concurrent to this twentieth-century 
service economy’s development, a sex industry infamous throughout Cuba converted much 
                                                                                                                                                  
Stephanson, “A Most Interesting Empire” in The New American Empire: A 21st Century Teach-In on U.S. 
Foreign Policy edited by Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young (New York: The New Press, 2005), 253-75. 
Prisoners at the base began hunger strikes from September 2005 on. In December 2005, a North American 
group of 25 Christian activists hiked to the base’s outermost perimeter in the first protest of the prison, see 
Regina Linskey, Catholic News Service, “U.S. Nun Among Protesters Against Treatment of Guantanamo 
Prisoners,” available online at <http://www.catholicexplorer.com/explore4325/nationworld/us-nun-among-
protesters-a.shtml>. In February 2006 a UN Commission on Human Rights called for the closure of the Gitmo 
prison, see Suzanne Goldenberg, “UN Report Calls for Closure of Guantánamo,” The Guardian, Tuesday 14 
February 2006 online at < http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,1709328,00.html>.   
 
3 Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York, Harper and Row, 1971), 499, 502, 511.  
 
4 For the relationship between the base and the United States’ Cuban policy, see the dissertation and 
bibliography in Mary Ellene Chenevey McCoy, “Guantánamo Bay: the United States Naval Base and its 
Relationship with Cuba,” (PhD dissertation, University of Akron, 1995); and Deutschmann and Ricardo.  
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of the neighboring port town of Caimanera and whole blocks of Guantánamo proper into a 
large red-light district catering to U.S. servicemen.5  
 Guantánamo, then, has been a feature of U.S. strategies of non-territorial empire 
building, “hemispheric defense,” and empire maintenance for much of the twentieth century. 
From its origins in a U.S. project of turning the Caribbean Sea into an “American 
Mediterranean” through global conflicts, to more recent interdictions of drugs smuggling, 
controlling immigrant and refugee flows from Haiti and Cuba, it finally was given a role in 
the twenty-first century as a sort of offshore American Devil’s Island, or as New York Times 
columnist Thomas Friedman once put it after perusing the world-wide negative reaction to 
the United States the “Gitmo” prison had aroused, “Guantánamo is becoming the anti-Statue 
of Liberty.”6   
This dissertation, however, is less concerned with that admittedly important story of 
empire building than with the social, economic, and political changes accompanying the 
waning years of Spanish colonialism, with its processes of gradual emancipation, increasing 
foreign investment, and an emergent Cuban national identity.  The focus remains on Cuban 
historical developments instead of U.S. patterns.  It is less about the global, and more focused 
                                                
 
5 Descriptions of the pernicious and degrading features of this aspect of the base’s service economy are 
many, reference to it even appeared within the 1964 Soviet and Cuban film I am Cuba directed by Mikhail 
Kalatozov in which leering drunken sailors chased a Cuban woman down Havana streets while singing a 
version of “There’ll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight” that included the lyrics: “The sexy broads in old 
Guantánamo give us all we want and never say no/So let’s have a drink/Let’s get tight/ Gobs [sailors] on the 
loose tonight/Here comes the navy, hooray!” See also, Louis A. Pérez, Jr. On Becoming Cuban: Identity, 
Nationality, and Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1999), 238-242.  
 
6 For a detailed “read” of the legal case history and development of the prison with a cursory account, 
or rather, invocation of the base’s imperial history, see Kaplan, “Where Is Guantánamo?”; on the 
“Gitmoization” of prisons and the history of CIA research into coercion, and psychological torture based on 
isolation, sensory deprivation, and so-called “no-touch” torture/”self-inflicted pain” in U.S. counterinsurgencies 
in the Middle East and Central Asia, see McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War 
to the War on Terror. Friedman quotation cited from p. 180. 
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on the intensely local.  Two of the more prominent features of global history include the 
extension of liberal notions of citizenship in societies marked by historical legacies of 
coercive labor and the formation of modern states in formerly colonized parts of the world.  
The former arose in the wake of what Robin Blackburn has termed the overthrow of New 
World slavery—beginning with the 1791-1804 revolutionary experience of St. 
Domingue/Haiti.  The latter lies at the intersections of nationalism, popular mentalities, and 
what historian of Central America Robert Holden refers to as the development and formation 
of modern states, and the “globalization of public violence” in the sense of opponents and 
supporters of state actors and elites internal struggles and frequent resort to violence, in order 
to destroy opposition and delimit the terms of such conflicts.7  
Global patterns remain important, even central, to the narrative, but this study above 
all concerns the development of the region of Guantánamo during the late nineteenth century 
and into the early twentieth century.  As such, it discusses the thirty-year struggle for national 
independence that began with the Ten Years’ War (1868-78) and ended with U.S. 
intervention into the 1895-1898 War of Independence and its repercussions, post-
emancipation society, and the rise of Cuban separatist politics.  If today the U.S. military 
base rooted in the intervention of 1898 and resultant 1899-1902 occupation forms a 
component in strategies of hemispheric and even global hegemony, my dissertation centers 
on the contestation and challenges to colonial authority within a regional and local level 
during the final years of Spanish control.  As a result, the North American base forms part of 
the story quite late.  A reader looking for more information on the background of the base, 
                                                
 
7 Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848 (London: Verso, 1988); Robert H. 
Holden, Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821-1960 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), Introduction, ch. 1.  
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and its long twentieth, and early twenty-first-century history, is referred to the relevant works 
cited in the bibliography.   
 My own intersection with Guantánamo came about in the summer of 2000, when I 
went there thanks to a Tinker Foundation pre-dissertation travel fellowship.  I entered 
graduate school in Latin American History at the University of North Carolina hard on the 
heels of the centennial of the War of 1898.  With an undergraduate background in social and 
labor history, my scholarly attentions centered on history “from below,” that is to say, on 
urban and rural workers, the African Diaspora in the New World, resultant racial constructs, 
the legacies of coercive labor patterns, Caribbean peasantries and rural folk.  I was interested 
in the thirty-year Cuban rebellions against Spain, in the late-nineteenth-century post-
emancipation epoch that shares congruent themes of contestations over the terms of freedom, 
access to land, and autonomy of the emancipated with the U.S. Reconstruction period, and in 
labor history.  I was also fascinated by the earlier history of runaway outlaw slaves, or 
maroons, and in questions of slave resistance more broadly.  A raft of extraordinary books 
and journal articles on related historical themes and issues was being published during the 
same period.8  
                                                
8 A partial listing of sources of inspiration and expanded historical horizons in books would have to 
include George Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin America, 1800-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); 
Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, Rebecca J. Scott, Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and 
Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Ada Ferrer, 
Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 
1999) [hereinafter cited as Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba]; Aline Helg, Our Rightful Share: The Afro Cuban Struggle 
for Equality, 1886-1912 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Fe Iglesias García, Del 
ingenio al central (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1999); Louis A. Pérez, Jr. Essays on Cuban History: 
Historiography and Research (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 1995); and The War of 1898: The 
United States and Cuba in History and Historiography (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); 
Gerald E. Poyo “With All, and for the Good of All”: The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban 
Communities of the United States, 1848-1898 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); and Rebecca J. Scott, 
Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free labor, 1860-1899 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press 2000) [hereinafter cited as Scott, Slave Emancipation].  
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 I resolved to write a regional monograph, or microhistory if records permitting that 
level of detail could be found, on the Guantánamo district in southeastern Cuba.9  In so 
doing, I heeded the explicit call of Rebecca J. Scott and other scholars of the complex 
processes of emancipation, formation of elements of nationality, and the struggle for 
independence, to spatially move closer in, using a different optic than the nation state itself as 
the frame of analysis into distinct, bounded regions and methodologically to utilize “layered 
different kinds of local evidence” on specific identifiable individuals for a view from within 
and from below of these profound transformative years.10 I embraced the proposition of 
                                                
 
9 Microhistory has been associated with Italian and French studies of Medieval or Early Modern period 
social-historical contexts using thick description, and anthropological methods in reconstructing popular-class 
mentalities.  There are also Latin American microhistorical studies, including Mexican, Brazilian, and Cuban 
examples. See Carlo Ginzburg, Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method translated by John and Anne Tedeschi, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989); Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero, eds. Microhistory and 
the Lost Peoples of Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991).  Mexican examples are legion, in 
many cases an outgrowth of regional heimatgeschichte of which Luis A. González González, San José de 
Gracia: Mexican Village in Transition translated by John Upton, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974) was 
but one early sample, and which introduced the descriptive term microhistory in its original 1968 title: Pueblo 
en vilo. Microhistoria de San José de Gracia. Microhistory’s origins, theoretical underpinnings, and application 
in Brazil are the subject of Ronaldo Vainfas, Os Protagonistas Anônimos da História. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 
Campus, 2002). See also, Eduardo Silva, Dom Obá II D’África, o Príncipe de Povo: Vida, Tempo e Pensamento 
de um Homem Livre de Cor (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1997). Rebecca Scott has convincingly 
described Stanley Stein’s Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1958, reprint; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) as a Brazilianist proto-microhistory. 
Microhistorical studies for Cuba include the comparative study of post-emancipation in Louisiana and Cuba: 
Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba After Slavery (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2005) [hereinafter cited as Scott, Degrees of Freedom]; Fernando Martínez 
Heredia, Rebecca J. Scott, and Orlando F. García Martínez, Espacios, silencios y los sentidos de la libertad: 
Cuba entre 1878 y 1912 (Havana: Ediciones UNIÓN, 2001); Rebecca J. Scott, “Reclaiming Gregoria’s Mule: 
The Meanings of Freedom in the Arimao and Caunao Valleys, Cienfuegos, Cuba, 1880-1899” Past and Present 
170 (February 2001): 181-216, and “Reclamar la ciudadanía imponiendo el imperio” Del Caribe, Santiago de 
Cuba (2002): 22-27 and the accompanying interview: María de los Ángeles Meriño Fuentes, and Isel María 
Fernández Companioni, “Los sentidos de la historia: conversación con Rebecca J. Scott” pp. 93-98. See also the 
historiographical essay, Hernán Venegas Delgado, La región en Cuba (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 
2001).   
 
10 See Rebecca J. Scott, “Afterword to the New Paperback Edition” in Slave Emancipation in Cuba, 
295-300; Rebecca J. Scott, Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and Aims McGuiness, eds., Societies After 
Slavery (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2002), 237-242; Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, Rebecca J. 
Scott, Beyond Slavery; Preface to Louis A. Pérez, Jr. and Rebecca J. Scott, The Archives of Cuba/ Los archivos 
de Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003.  Also influential, see “La Guerra Libertadora Cubana 
de los Treinta Años, 1868-98: Research Prospects” in Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Essays on Cuban History: 
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trying to recapture a local and regional character of that history with something of the zeal of 
the recent convert, insistent that the thickly descriptive and analytical, explanatory function 
of historical writing can be united at the level of regional interplay of broader social, 
economic, political, and cultural forces.   
At the same time, my narrative seeks to present the biography of a province about 
which comparatively little has been written. The historiography of Cuba is weighted heavily 
toward the western half of the island – Havana, Matanzas, Cárdenas, Cienfuegos, Las Villas.  
The west has been the locomotive pulling the island into the world system and modernity, 
where sugar ingenios proliferated, slavery expanded, railways were introduced to service 
tropical exports, and the development of the colonial economy were most pronounced 
through the nineteenth century.11 Nevertheless, Cuba’s caboose in the eastern province, 
Oriente, figured as a semi-mythologized point of origins: the site of Cuba’s oldest settlements 
in the colonial period, the place where the independence struggle began, the urquelle of 
Cuba’s oldest folk traditions and music.  Oriente, including Santiago de Cuba and Bayamo, 
was long poorer, generally thought to be archaic, even “backwards,” and more hybridized 
Creole Caribbean, less unadulteratedly Spanish and African than the western half of the 
island from which it was separated by the seigniorial cattle-country of Camagüey.  Oriente’s 
long years of pre-literate oral culture seemed to defy history with its disciplinary conventions 
and emphases on written documentary sources.  This enduring divergence between east and 
                                                                                                                                                  
Historiography and Research, 197-205, with its call for a temporal frame inclusive of the early separatist 
rebellion through 1898 and investigation of the “secondary stratum” of separatist insurgency and politics within 
that historical period.    
 
11 On the historical relationship between railways, sugar, capitalism and technological change in Cuba, 
see Oscar Zanetti Lecuona and Alejandro García Álvarez, Sugar and Railroads: A Cuban History, 1837-1959 
Translated by Franklin W. Knight and Mary Todd, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
Cubans often have likened the shape of their island to a crocodile with its tail in the west, and its head in the 
east, while Paulistas in Brazil have described São Paulo’s industrial park as a locomotive pulling the rest of 
Brazil along behind it.  
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west came about from differing geography and trade winds, and in turn, the prevailing 
political and economic factors.  These factors shaped historical legacies of imperial rivalry 
over the Caribbean in general and the Windward Passage between eastern Cuba and western 
Hispaniola, with Jamaica to the south, in particular.    
<><><> 
The immediate history of the dissertation project began with my first foray to the 
United States National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, guided by recently published 
secondary works, which led me to the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission Records, Record 
Group 76, Entry 352.12  This large corpus of records includes legal depositions detailing the 
claims and counter-claims of 542 cases for restitution from damages during the 1895-1898 
Cuban War of Independence made by U.S. citizens. One particularly rich set of depositions 
and records associated with claim number 120, by Richard K. Sheldon, executor of the will 
of Paul Brooks of Rutland, Vermont served as my initial documentary evidence for the 
district.  Paul Brooks had been an important member of the Anglo-Cuban Brooks and 
Company that owned sugar mills and railways in eastern Cuba; most of the documentary 
record in the archives had been compiled about the destruction of the sugar estate Los Caños 
at the northern shore of Guantánamo.  The depredations against his property had been largely 
committed, or at least initiated, by separatist insurgents, despite attempts by Spanish 
authorities to guard it.   
                                                
 
12 Published sources available at the Library of Congress include Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, 
Claimants’ and Government Briefs, 9 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903), The Final 
Report of the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910). 
Records themselves are in the United States National Archives II, College Park, MD, RG 76, the Spanish Treaty 
Claims Commission Records, Entry 352 [hereinafter cited as USNA, RG 76, Entry 352]. 
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My initial inclination was to use this rich source of records as the basis for a 
microhistorical account of the War of 1898.  I duly went to Cuba that summer to build on 
these introductory clues found in the U.S. records.  That research was reflected in my 
Masters Thesis, and I returned the following summer of 2001 to further delve into Cuban 
archives for a longer and more detailed study.13 I have tried to piece together some aspects of 
the puzzle of events within the late nineteenth century in eastern Cuba from a variety of 
sources.  I returned to Cuba during the summer of 2003, and spent the autumn months in 
Spain visiting the colonial archives in Seville and Madrid, as well as military archives in 
Madrid and Segovia. 
The reader should rest assured however, that while attentive to many political, social, 
cultural, economic, and military aspects of change, I have merely tried to mesh these where 
appropriate rather than write a ponderous and unwieldy “total” history.  Instead, this 
dissertation seeks to limn the emergence of post-emancipation society in a Cuban hinterland, 
one where war and family politics served as ongoing factors within the overarching 
formation of national identities.  I intend for it to shed light on the history of eastern Cuba 
generally, and suggest solutions to the paradoxes of why a pro-Spanish district turned into a 
separatist stronghold by the late nineteenth century, and why a nationalist rebellion 
predicated on a racially inclusive insurgent military gave rise to a bloody repression of black 
political mobilization in the first decade of national independence. 
<><><>    
The twenty-first century reconfiguration of the U.S. base at Guantánamo from a 
detention facility for Cuban and Haitian refugees to an offshore prison in the wake of the 
                                                
 
13 David C. Carlson, “The Cuban War of Independence in Guantánamo, 1895-1898: A Regional Study 
of Insurgency and Intervention” (M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina, August 2001).  
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attacks of September 2001 overtook my ongoing research project on the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries.  As a result, I have necessarily tried to provide more information 
on the origin of the U.S. base in the War of 1898 in the relevant chapter and provided this 
somewhat biographical preface for material that does not properly pertain to the subjects 
encompassed by the dissertation itself.  The origins and intention of this project therefore, 
were not to exploit the notoriety thus associated with Guantánamo, but instead to proffer an 
explanation for how the eastern end of Cuba developed during these years of property 
destruction, conflict, expanding investment, and increasing social change.  Patterns of protest 
underscored by threats against property, and heightened but unrealized expectations 
regarding citizenship and equality – especially for Cubans of color – collided with a system 
of social control that ultimately was girded by direct military and naval means available to 
the colonial power.  The colonial state could reinforce its internal security – and indeed, had 
to – by dispatching troops during crises.  A nominally independent Cuban state, however, 
relied on the United States for external protection, and utilized its own police and recently 
formed military institutions for internal coercion and public violence.   During the Cuban 
Republic, a long-established rebel pattern of insurgency and claims-making directed at the 
state, backed by armed protest and sabotage directed at planters, died hard.  If such politics of 
public violence and property destruction were the means utilized by the separatists in 
achieving the ends of an independent republic, then the continued use of such means into the 
twentieth century after a republic was constituted—especially by a race-based independent 
political party outside established patron-client relations and political machines—led to the 
fury of the so-called Race War of 1912 as the Cuban state-in-formation relied on the recently 
 xxiii 
established Rural Guard, army, and earlier militia tradition to crush rural—and especially 
black—dissent.   
What follows is the history of these civil, racial, and anticolonial conflicts in a Cuban 
hinterland based on research carried out in libraries, national and provincial archives in Cuba 
during summer 2003, and in Spain in the fall of 2003 in addition to the aforementioned 
research trips. 
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CHAPTER I: 
Introduction: Guantánamo—From Cuban Colonial Frontier to North American Enclave 
The magnificent States of the Union of America—in [earlier] times impenetrable forests—
have been transformed by the axe of the colonist.  
From such examples one may deduce that the essential in this is the method; the individual in 
harmony with the collectivity; urging the necessity of seriously pondering [efforts to 
promote] colonization, as the most effective political means of resolving the political 
question of Cuba. [...] 
 The eastern part of the island of Cuba, barely populated before 1869, will remain 
deserted after the sad events that have occurred in the last months of ’68 and the first of ’69; 
and the beautiful ports will only serve as refuge to Pirates and malefactors, if the 
Government ... does not prepare the means to repopulate those fertile lands. [...]  
the Count [of Mompox y de Jaruco], who possesses vast lands in these regions, proposes, if 
the Government approves, to form agro-military colonies of Peninsular and Canary Islander 
yeomen... 
 
-- Project of the Count of Mompox y de Jaruco to Colonize the lands of his property, and the 
State, in the Eastern Department of the Island of Cuba, with Spaniards.  
27 January 1870.14 
                                                
14 Proyecto del Conde de Mompox y de Jaruco para Colonizar los terrenos de su propiedad y del 
Estado en el Departamento Oriental de la isla de Cuba, con Españoles, in Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, 
Sección Ultramar, legajo 92, expediente 48, pp. 1-4 [hereinafter cited as AHN, SU, leg. exp.] This extraordinary 
abortive colonization scheme to “re-Hispanize” districts of the island of Cuba, and enforce the crown’s social 
control against internal enemies during the separatist conflict in the 1860s and 1870s came well after similar 
colonization and fortification schemes for the Bays of Nipe and Guantánamo dating back to at least 1798.  The 
Count’s illustrious aristocrat ancestor, Joaquín de Santa Cruz y Cárdenas, Count of San Juan de Jaruco, future 
Count of Santa Cruz de Mopox, was an influential member of the Royal Economic Society of Friends of the 
Country in colonial Havana, and in Madrid, the Royal Consulate of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, and 
the Royal Commission of Guantánamo.  The latter commission proposed planned cities in the valley of 
Guantánamo, “La Paz,” and “Alcudia,” and elaborate fortifications to wall off eastern Cuba and “avoid the 
dangers of a black uprising like in Haiti” then undergoing the throes of its protracted slave revolution.  See 
Ángel Guriao de Vierna, “El proyecto cubano del Conde de Mopox: Aspectos generales de su organización y 
finanziación”; Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, “Fomento y organización del territorio: Un proyecto perdurable del 
Conde de Mopox y Jaruco”; and the catalog of maps and documents from scientific expeditions housed in 
Madrid’s Archivo General Militar and Museo Naval in Luisa Martin Meras, “Catalogo de la cartografía de la 
comisión Mopox”, and Ana María Vigon Sánchez, “Catalogo de la documentación administrativa y 
organización de la Real Comisión de Guantánamo (1796-1802)” all in Cuba Ilustrada. Real comisión de 
Guantánamo, 1796-1802. 2 vols. (Barcelona: Lunwerg Editores S.A. n.d.), I: 17-42, 53-76, 141-158, 195-216. 
Quote from p. 65.  Further plans for white settlement in the wake of ongoing Spanish American wars of 
independence, and the 1819 cession of Florida to the United States, coincided with the foundation of
 2 
In the present-day Cuban province of Granma, near the city of Manzanillo, there is a 
national monument to the origin of the nineteenth-century wars of independence against 
Spanish colonialism.  At the ruins of the Demajagua sugar estate of Carlos Manuel de 
Céspedes, the “Father of the Nation,” stand both a large ceiba tree whose trunk engulfs an 
edge of the ingenio’s large metal gear wheel, and a stone-built edifice that supports Cuba’s 
liberty bell.15  Unlike the famously cracked, one-ton U.S. example in Philadelphia, the Cuban 
bell was not cast originally to summon political meetings and mark important events. Rather, 
its initial purpose was as a 300-pound sugar plantation bell that tolled once in the early 
morning to signal the start of work for slaves and free laborers on the estate.  Like the U.S. 
bell, however, it is associated with kindred republican political projects: the declaration of 
independence from a European colonial power and the belated efforts to abolish slavery.  As 
North American students sometimes learn in national history classes, the U.S. Liberty Bell 
rang on 8 July 1776 to proclaim the passage of the Declaration of Independence. Less well 
known, perhaps, is that by the early nineteenth century it became a political icon and potent 
image of the unmet promises of liberty for the New York Anti-Slavery Society.   
In Spain’s Antillean colony of Cuba—the “ever faithful isle”—the morning of 10 
October 1868, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, and forty-seven separatist co-conspirators from 
nearby areas of the island’s eastern province, rang the bell at La Demajagua and proclaimed 
the independence of Cuba from Spain. They then freed the thirty-eight slaves who labored at 
the estate, and invited them to form part of an army of a few hundred self-proclaimed Cuban 
                                                                                                                                                  
Cienfuegos by colonists from Louisiana. See Acuerdo sobre población de la Bahía de Guantánamo, reprinted in 
the Revista Bimestre Cubana, Havana, V. 12, (July-August 1917): 263-264.   
 
15 Cubans and some numismatists recall the potent image of the rusting gear wheel swallowed by the 
growing trunk of the enormous tree has been displayed on banknotes at various times in Cuba’s republican and 
revolutionary periods. See illustration: Mapa histórico de Carlos Manuel de Céspedes. Centenario de su caída, 
1874-1974 (Havana: Imprenta Federico Engels, BNJM, ANC, 1974). 
 3 
citizens being mobilized to march on the small garrison of Spanish troops in the nearby town 
of Yara.  This event, known as the Grito de Yara, led to the start of Cuba’s decade-long 
Guerra Grande or Ten Years’ War (1868-1878), which in turn, is recognized as the initially 
unsuccessful progenitor of the protracted movement for Cuban independence. 
 The structure supporting the bell was built during the centenary of the Grito de Yara.  
On 10 October 1968, Fidel Castro unveiled the monument, proclaiming that the 1959 Cuban 
Revolution was the capstone of a single, century-long revolutionary movement that began 
that day a hundred years before.  With the revolution’s 1 January 1959 triumph, according to 
a standard official state-sponsored historical narrative, Cuba had achieved a final 
independence. The first and second wars of independence failed, but hastened the slow 
demise of slavery, which would finally be abolished in 1886. Then, from 1895-1898 pro-
independence fighters—white, black, mixed-race, but united Cubans all—achieved liberation 
from Spain and overt colonialism and exploitation. And at long last, in the twentieth century, 
a revolutionary movement, in this version of events, restored and transformed the nation 
from a semi-sovereign and neo-colonial “pseudo-republic” or mediated republic in many 
ways dominated by, and beholden to, the United States.  The stone monolith bears roughly 
the shape of the Cuban crocodile – an informal symbol of the island – with a series of 
buttresses, each symbolizing important events in the formation of nationality: the Ten Years’ 
War, the successive Little War (1879-1880), the War of Independence (1895-1898) that 
resulted not in Spanish capitulation but in U.S. intervention in 1898, the 1933 revolution that 
overthrew the Depression-era dictator Gerardo Machado, and finally, the 1953 to 1959 
triumph over Fulgencio Batista. It is a historical teleology in stone. 
 4 
 Thus, according to this nationalist and state-centric view, Cuban history has a clear 
trajectory and a fixed point of destination.  There are powerful, even irresistible, elements to 
this nationalist and quasi-Marxist historicist narrative, and while scholars of the islands’ 
history recognize the way such a teleological view of the past frames history in a locked step, 
they have all approached tilting against this windmill with some caution. There is much to 
this understanding of historical developments viewed in light of ongoing presentist concerns, 
which gives it credence and staying power; there are aspects at once intangible and yet 
meaningful, symbolic, and enduring.  And Cuba and the United States are hardly the only 
nations with a received historiography given over frequently to exceptionalism.  History has 
long been handmaiden to the promotion and rehearsal of nationalisms.  While the monument, 
and the history it concretely represents, clearly flatter the revolutionary regime as a definitive 
break with the past, it also suggests important, even essential, continuities with a rebellious 
history, indeed invokes a veritable tradition of revolt as a vital feature of national character.  
Those earlier revolutions are likened to the historical foundations upon which the edifice of 
the thereby legitimated revolutionary state rests.  It resonates with the uneven and unmet 
promises and mixed legacies of liberalism, conceptions of citizenship, and social change in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Like all master narratives, it highlights and 
remembers certain features; others are forgotten or discarded.   
This dissertation project, “In the Fist of Earlier Revolutions: Postemancipation Social 
Control and State Formation in Guantánamo, Cuba, 1868-1902” takes the opening thirty year 
process of national independence of this imposing century-long edifice amid accompanying 
gradual emancipation and the development of capitalist export agriculture systems within a 
nearby eastern province, Guantánamo, as its point of departure.  This district was far more 
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slave-dependent than areas surrounding Manzanillo, and as a result, it was not disposed 
politically to favor independence at the outset since it relied more on the colonial state.  
Where a considerably larger proportion of inhabitants in Bayamo and western Oriente 
initially supported, or eventually rallied to Céspedes’ project, the coffee and sugar-producing 
planters of Guantánamo who dominated local affairs formed a “little Spain” due to their 
typically pro-colonial loyalties.  While the district was far more dependent on slavery than 
nearby areas of the east, the overall population was small and dispersed over a large area of 
some of the wildest terrain on the island.  This feature elicited periodic worries from the 
colonial regime that it should be effectively settled lest foreign interlopers establish 
themselves there.  Eventually, the fear of foreign trespass or acquisition became applied to a 
nativist and Creole nationalist movement advocating independence from the mother colony. 
As the epigraph to this chapter indicated, the pro-Spanish party feared that Céspedes’ internal 
movement of separatist rebels would lodge themselves there unless the zone was literally re-
Hispanized by loyal white peninsular settler-colonists.  This settlement-scheme to bolster 
Spanish social control within the rebellious portions of the colony was apparently never 
carried out, but the understanding of southeastern Cuba as a frontier overlaid by different 
discrete waves of settlers—including refugees from the St.-Domingue/Haitian revolution 
supportive of the continuance of slavery—is crucial to understanding its historical 
development through the processes of gradual abolition, postemancipation, nationalist 
rebellion, and U.S. intervention, as will be seen in subsequent chapters.   
The region of Guantánamo forms a hinterland to Santiago de Cuba—the island’s 
second largest city—in many regards. Taken together, these southern coastal areas of eastern 
Cuba have generally been understood as being politically aligned with colonial Spain when 
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landowners in western and northern Oriente province first revolted against the colonial 
metropolis in the late nineteenth century.  This dissertation’s purview is the social control 
mechanisms over labor and the colony itself during the last decades of colonial rule, and the 
regional sources of nationality in the early twentieth-century years of halting efforts at nation 
state formation. It argues that Cuban separatists challenged some durable local structures of 
social domination and power, transforming them, but not eradicating certain forms, and 
examines implications of the separatist struggle in a frontier region of the colonial and later 
republican nation-state. 
The period covered by this dissertation project, the latter half of the nineteenth 
century in Cuba, was an era of complex societal, economic, and cultural transformations.  
Slavery as the basis for the colonial economy based on agricultural exports came to a gradual 
end, new processes of free labor appeared, and the consolidation of sugar mills into large 
centrales drawing cane from wide areas continued apace.  The period was further marked by 
long standing desultory conflict over the status of Cuba as a colony.  The first modern labor 
strike in the sugar industry in the district of Guantánamo occurred in 1915, and yet, in 
waging the wars of independence, separatists paralyzed agricultural production through a 
concerted campaign of sabotage, economic warfare, arson, and expropriation of property and 
resources.  To tell the story of this nationalist movement “from below” required a temporal 
frame incorporating the earlier Ten Years’ War (1868-1878), which in turn necessitated 
examining the transformations in coffee cultivation, sugar production, and labor patterns 
within both sectors, while tracing the nature of rural policing from one of slave patrols to a 
concerted anti-banditry and counterinsurgent social control role.  The fact that a member of 
this internal militia, the Squadron of Guantánamo, switched sides and became an insurgent 
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leader, and that the first head of the Rural Guard in the early twentieth century was an ex-
insurgent and member of the prominent Brooks family related to regional landowners, 
recommended a study of continuity and change over this period from the regional level.  
<><><> 
The late Antonio Benítez-Rojo described the straits separating Cuba, Hispaniola, and 
Jamaica as the earliest locus of Hispano-Caribbean Creole culture: “all of the island people 
found to the west, east, and south of the Windward Passage constituted the first Creole 
population, culturally speaking.”16 Havana drew all of the outbound ships from the circum-
Caribbean and Gulf Coast into its harbor, from which they would sail on the return voyage to 
Spain.  Settlers in Hispaniola and eastern Cuba, meanwhile, engaged in illicit contraband 
trade with imperial rivals for meat, hides, tallow, and tobacco against the established crown 
monopolies.  Ultimately, in the early seventeenth century, attempts to restrict this smuggling 
led to the removal of the population from the north coast of Hispaniola and the razing of 
disentailed settlements there – known in the history of the Dominican Republic and Haiti as 
“the devastations.”17 This drastic response of depopulation and disestablishment to shore up 
flagging colonial control, perhaps “the harshest collective repression undertaken by Spain 
against its own colonists” during the early colonial period led fatefully to infiltration of the 
area by the foreign elements involved in the ongoing smuggling equation: pirates, 
                                                
 
16  Antonio Benítez-Rojo, The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and the Postmodern Perspective 2nd 
edition, Translated by James Maraniss (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 51.  
 
17 Benítez-Rojo, 46-50. On the depopulation of northern Hispaniola in the early seventeenth century, 
known as the devastaciones, see also Eugenio Matibag, Haitian—Dominican Counterpoint: Nation, State, and 
Race on Hispaniola (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 34-38; Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican 
Republic: A National History (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1998), 42-50. On the divergence between 
eastern and western Cuba in the literature available in English, see Helg, Our Rightful Share, 32-33; Robert B. 
Hoernel, “Sugar and Social Change in Oriente Cuba, 1898-1946,” Journal of Latin American Studies 8 
(November 1976): 217-219; Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902 (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 127.  
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freebooters, and buccaneers – “transfrontiersmen” all.  These interlopers threatened Spain’s 
New World possessions even during truces in ongoing European wars, since the colonies lay 
beyond the “Lines of Amity” drawn up after the end of prolonged religious and political 
conflicts in Europe.18  As a result, Spain lost control of much of the area first to stateless 
transfrontiersmen, later to imperial rivals.  It marked the beginning of a long age of imperial 
struggle over the Antilles and North America. That imperial drive for control would last from 
the seventeenth-century until the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the nineteenth—if not 
1898—but reached particular intensity during the many eighteenth-century wars ending with 
the Seven Years War (1753-1763), the wars of the American and French Revolutions, and 
the Napoleonic period up to 1815.  
The earliest Spanish Caribbean Creole culture survived only in Oriente “after the 
devastations in Hispaniola and the taking of Jamaica by the English in 1655” and one could 
here add the loss of western Hispaniola/St.-Domingue to France in the 1697 Treaty of 
Ryswick, so as a result, “the eastern zone of Cuba remained as the only active seat of culture 
of the Windward Passage type.”19 That is, the Spanish colonial emphasis on urban 
settlements stagnated in the largely ignored Caribbean possessions. There, a sleepy 
idiotismus torpor of rural life predominated, based on largely pre-capitalist subsistence 
farming combined with cattle ranching, animal husbandry, and tobacco production—and 
continued smuggling.  For students of Caribbean history, this early emphasis on tobacco and 
cattle gave way in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to sugar’s engrossment of 
                                                
 
18 The neologism “transfrontiersmen” and description of the Lines of Amity comes from Philip D. 
Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
Ch. 7, “Anarchy and imperial control,” especially p. 92.  
 
19 Benítez-Rojo, 53.  
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arable lands and pasturage, with a servile labor force battening on continuous slave imports 
from Africa.  Cuba’s eastern marches and Santo Domingo retained the earlier mode of living 
and its Creole features the longest.  The ruggedly mountainous, rustic, easternmost district 
would emerge as site of traditions of racial and cultural transculturation and miscegenation/ 
mestizaje. Such creolization came to include religious life through veneration of the Virgen 
de la Caridad del Cobre, Cuba’s patroness, found—as tradition has it—in Nipe Bay by Juan 
Indio, Juan Esclavo, and Juan Criollo and moved to her shrine in the mostly black oriental 
copper mining town of El Cobre west of Santiago de Cuba.20  
The importance of this “ancient history” to the Guantánamo region cannot be 
underestimated. The fact that the earliest period of Spanish colonialism emphasized New 
Spain and Peru, and urban settlement in all of its possessions, left a largely overlooked rural 
eastern Cuba open to alternative settlement projects by imperial rivals and internal challenges 
in the form of bandits, smugglers, but most threateningly for planters, autonomous rebel 
slave communities, or palenques, of maroons.21  This borderlands and frontier quality, in 
turn, serves as an important leitmotif in the history of Oriente, including the Guantánamo 
                                                
 
20 Benítez-Rojo, 52-55, See also, María Elena Díaz, The Virgin, the King, and the Royal Slaves of El 
Cobre: Negotiating Freedom in Colonial Cuba, 1670-1780 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), Luis 
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Press, 2003), II: 530-1; Olga Portuondo Zúñiga, Santiago de Cuba: Desde su fundación hasta la Guerra de los 
Diez Años (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 1996). 
 
21 On the uniqueness of the institution of slave catchers, the Escuadras de Santa Catalina, and its early 
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Rosa Corzo, Runaway Slave Settlements in Cuba: Resistance and Repression, translated by Mary Todd, (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).  The role of this militia as a social control mechanism and part 
of the colonial state adopts the framework of activities characteristic of states enumerated by Charles Tilly: 
making war (against external threats), making states (i.e. repressing internal threats, maintaining social control), 
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Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, Peter B. Evans et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 170-81. On slave patrols as a disciplining body within U.S. slave society, see also Sally E. 
Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2001).     
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district, highlighting as it does the primacy of social control based on the need for a militia 
and rural constabulary as a prop to power relations structured by the plantation model.  Even 
today, faint traces of this enduring preoccupation with military aspects of security may still 
be visible in the unit of Border Guards, and frequent military exercises, the contemporary 
Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces maintain guarding their side of the perimeter of the 117 
square kilometer U.S. military installation at Guantánamo Bay.  Since Cuba is an island, it 
might seem surprising at first that the Revolutionary Armed Forces have a specialized group 
of Border Guards apart from a coast guard and navy.  During the years following the onset of 
the Cuban Revolutionary regime and ruptured U.S.-Cuban relations, various border incidents, 
shootings, and other provocations between U.S. personnel at the base and Cuban guards were 
a potential source of escalation that led to the creation of a dedicated unit to deal with base 
security issues from the Cuban side of the perimeter.  To this day Guantánamo possesses a 
much more visible military presence than other parts of the island as a result of the base 
controlled by the U.S. military on the lower part of the bay.   Still a further frontier aspect 
stemmed historically from the relatively late and peculiar colonization of the largely deserted 
frontier district, relying on external capital from western Cuba and from foreign investors to 
develop the area as a plantation agriculture enclave economy. 
<><><> 
This dissertation’s title, “In the Fist of Earlier Revolutions” is a tribute to the late 
writer Jose Yglesias’ classic 1968 account of life in rural Cuba, written the centennial year of 
those events at La Demajagua, about continuities and changes occasioned by nearly a decade 
of social revolution in Mayarí near the northern coast of Oriente.22 Although a historian 
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writing of a time period such as the late nineteenth century to the turn of the twentieth, from 
which no direct participants in the interplay of events remain, must necessarily rely on often 
fragmentary documentary evidence.  Yet, in some ways, perhaps similarly to his book based 
around first-hand participant observations of the late 1960s, one can strive to adopt a view of 
portentous historical developments from within through using a mosaic of sources—many 
generated in letters and reports from the conflict itself—from the national and regional 
archives in Cuba and Spain as well as materials from U.S. libraries and repositories.  Where 
Yglesias’s subject was the townsfolk’s view of longstanding, repeated patterns of social life 
and clear breaks brought about by the twentieth-century Cuban Revolution that propelled the 
July 26th Movement and Cuban Communist Party to power, a central proposition of this 
dissertation is to view in microcosm the nineteenth-century “provinces of the revolution” in a 
maelstrom of social changes wrought by the emancipation of slavery, the development of 
anti-colonial insurgency, and the transformations of social control during the last thirty years 
of the nineteenth century, into the opening of the twentieth century.  These transformations in 
labor, race, the development of nationality, and conflicts of control and resistance—
contestations over the content and concrete meanings of citizenship—constitute the plural 
earlier revolutions of the title.  But where Yglesias’s book often sought aspects of the larger 
Cuban reality, or whole picture, refracted in the everyday lives of Mayarí’s inhabitants, this 
study also strives to recapture the particularistic, unique regionalisms of the district that have 
become lost in, or overlooked by, a nation-centered historiography.23     
                                                                                                                                                  
22 Jose Yglesias, In the Fist of the Revolution: Life in a Cuban Country Town (New York: Pantheon, 
1968). 
 
23 In addition to the micro-historical concerns outlined in the Preface above, the scholarly questions of 
the dissertation owe much to Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History 
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A premise of the dissertation is that the very geographic insularity of Cuba has largely 
erased important regional distinctions and idiosyncrasies that were much more prominent in 
earlier periods, and in fact, while often overlooked retain no less significance today.  For 
while it has been recognized that Cuba’s transition from a colony principally of military and 
strategic importance to Spain in the eighteenth century to an economic colony based on 
slave-based production of tropical cash-crops for export in the nineteenth century—and 
Fernando Ortiz’s recognition in his classic Cuban Counterpoint that the most important 
historical agents or causative factors for historic change were sugar and tobacco—this 
plantation-based economic trajectory speaks more to the experiences of western Cuban 
districts such as Havana, Matanzas, Colón, Cárdenas, and Cienfuegos.24  In marshalling 
documentary evidence and making claims about island-wide developments, there is a marked 
tendency for historians to draw from many regions that had a pronounced divergent 
individual character in the past.  While it is certainly the case that there are strong examples 
of cultural practices and social features common to all parts of the island, it is no less true 
that the ways in which change occurred at different rates and in different areas necessitates 
the disaggregation of regions of the island, especially in the case of Cuba’s easternmost 
provinces.  This study therefore puts forth a refined regional-level view for understanding the 
momentous changes of emancipation and anti-colonial mobilizations in the face of continued 
pro-colonial opposition and efforts to maintain the control of the metropolis, namely by 
bringing a different lens closer in to how these key transformative conflicts looked within the 
periphery rather than from the economic and social heart of the colony.  The study strives to 
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see how the broad national-level patterns played out on the ground.  And after all, it was in 
the remote east that Cuba’s revolutions first gained traction, a feature that for the cases of the 
nineteenth-century Ten Years’ War, and the “Guerra Chiquita” or Little War, 1879-1880, 
was somewhat perplexing since in the three decades before the 1860s, the development of 
export agriculture amid ever proliferating sugar mills, the rise and fall of widespread coffee 
cultivation, and rising tobacco exports saw a whole series of slave revolts great and small in 
the western districts.25      
 For elites, such slave revolts and other forms of resistance necessitated a vigilant and 
functional system of social control.  Such concerns were not confined to the period of slavery 
alone.  The system that relied on low cost labor sought to control the dimensions and 
parameters of freedom against the exertions for greater autonomy and independence by the 
emancipated.  A further proposition of this dissertation is that the theme of social control 
allows for an analysis of how different social strata—classes, races, genders—interacted in 
ongoing struggles over freedom and citizenship.26  Social control in the title refers to the 
exercise of power and maintenance of hegemony, implicitly and explicitly, to preserve, 
defend, and extend a highly unequal class and racial caste system that determined access to 
land, resources, and social status.  This proposition harkens back to the understanding that 
continual resistance and the threat of social violence was always a hallmark of slave systems 
throughout the African Diaspora in the New World, concisely and memorably phrased by 
                                                
 
25 Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies: A Comparison of St. 
Domingue and Cuba (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 54-61.  Writing of the range and 
scale of rebellion and restiveness, p. 55:“the recorded list of uprisings in nineteenth-century Cuba is 
impressive.” Some of these revolts, including the 1809 Aponte rebellion, and the 1843 Escalera or “Ladder” 
conspiracy—about which, more later—prefigured the Creole revolt for independence by decades.  
 
26 Gad Heuman and David V. Trotman, eds. Contesting Freedom: Control and Resistance in the Post-
Emancipation Caribbean (Oxford: Macmillan Caribbean Publishers Ltd., 2005).  
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nineteenth-century North American abolitionists John Brown and Lysander Spooner as the 
“state of Slavery is a state of war.”   
The emphasis on the exploitation of labor, resistance, and repression inherent within 
the study of social control by colonial, neo-colonial, and national elites has undergone a shift 
from the study of comparative slave systems to postemancipation studies. Social control 
offers historical researchers an important means to analyze the transitions from slavery to 
postemancipation societies. This scholarly concern, as the late historian of the formation of 
racial constructs arising out of labor relations in the colonial period, and of the origins of 
racial oppression of African-descended people in North America stemming from an 
imperative need for social control, Theodore Allen (1919-2005) put it: 
  with regard to the class struggle and social control in general in the Americas,  
attention will need to be given to the resistance and rebellion practiced by the 
African bond-laborers and their descendants, from the moment of embarkation 
from the shores of Africa to the years of maroon defiance in the mountains 
and forests of America; from the quarry’s first start of alarm to the merger of 
the emancipation struggle with movements for national independence and 
democracy four hundred years later.27          
 
In the case of Cuba and the Caribbean, meeting this challenge necessitates a temporal frame 
that straddles the transitions from the dismantlement and disintegration of servile labor forms 
to free wage labor and the processes of gradual abolition and the emergence of 
postemancipation society.  Thus, while a regional history of these societal shifts, this study 
contributes to the Cuban, North American, and Spanish historiography of the crucially 
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important half-century and also to a burgeoning transnational scholarship on a panoply of 
issues arising from the African Diaspora in the Atlantic World and what happened after 
slavery—inclusive of Afro-Latin America and the Reconstruction-era United States.28    
 Of the slave systems in the Americas, those of Brazil and Cuba proved the longest in 
duration.  Brazil’s formed early in the northeastern sugar plantation complex, and remained 
intense into the nineteenth-century with the rise of coffee exports.  Racial slavery was 
introduced early to Cuba, but became strongly associated with the Caribbean sugar 
revolution, and gained greater impetus after the Haitian Revolution.29  The slave system of 
both Brazil and Cuba peaked in intensity during the nineteenth century, and slave owners 
clung stubbornly to the illegal slave trade until it was halted by interdiction, principally by 
Great Britain by 1850 in the Brazilian case, and by internal and external factors including the 
onset of the U.S. Civil War in Cuba.30  Similarities of both cases extended to mutual 
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application of measured emancipation.  In Brazil, from 1871 to final abolition in 1888 
slavery declined due to the so-called Law of the Free Womb, or Rio Branco regulation that 
freed children born to slave mothers.31 In Cuba, a similar gradual freedom edict, the 1870 
Moret law, freed children born after 1868 upon reaching legal adulthood, and slaves over the 
age of sixty.  This prevailed in manumitting slaves over an extended period until an 
“apprenticeship” system (the patrocinado law) in 1880 followed by final abolition in 1886 in 
the case of Cuba.  In this approach they conformed to a Caribbean gradual emancipation 
pattern of 1834-1838 for the British West Indies, 1848 for the French Antilles, and 1863 for 
Dutch possessions.  The lines had first been drawn during slavery’s overthrow in 1791-1794 
in St.-Domingue, followed by the defeat of French attempts to restore slavery from 1802 to 
1804, along the axes of pressures generated by free people of color for greater rights and 
equality, the contradictions of liberalism in the nineteenth century, and the ever present 
possibility, or fear– never entirely remote —of slave rebellion, possibly on the scale of the 
Haitian revolution. The situation of Cuba was marked by upheaval and warfare within the 
colony, which hastened the demise of slavery in Oriente and Puerto Príncipe, as will be seen.  
One feature of a regional study that must be taken into account, is that military mobilization, 
social disruption, and the effects of the wars against Spain assume a greater role in the story 
of emancipation within the island’s southeast than other avenues to manumission and 
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abolition such as coartación, or self-manumission through purchase, which was primarily an 
urban phenomenon, or other features that applied to most other regions, which can create 
undue emphasis and misimpressions of such factors for Cuba as a whole.32 
Nonetheless, while military matters assume an exaggerated role in the story of 
slavery’s end in eastern Cuba than in the sugar monoculture and port city core of the west, it 
is a further premise of this study that warfare played a key explanatory role in the 
transformation of the district. The conflicts of the late nineteenth century also underlay the 
acquisition of not just the lower part of the bay by the United States as a coaling station of 
strategic importance, but an early post-1899-1902 example of U.S. direct investment and 
acquisition of a sugar enclave by 1905, well before U.S. capital outstripped Britain’s as the 
leading source of foreign investment in the second decade of the twentieth century.33  
Political disorders and constant tumult of rebellion were salient leitmotifs of the late 
nineteenth century, and contributed to the nature of electoral politics, rebellion against 
incumbent political figures, and oppositional movements by black Cubans in the early 
twentieth century.  War resulted in population movements, provoked chaos, uprooted 
settlements, destroyed much of the rural economy, and radically altered politics on the 
ground. It was a potent source of collective mobilizations and struggles, causing a range of 
demographic shifts as inhabitants from other districts became drawn to one of the contending 
sides.  
A final word on premises in the study concerns racial constructs, descriptive 
terminology, and place names.  First, beginning with changing place names, for much of the 
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time frame under study Cuba’s easternmost province was named Santiago de Cuba.  In the 
1850s and 1860s this was further subdivided into the jurisdictions—moving across the map 
of eastern Cuba from east to west—of Baracoa, Guantánamo, Santiago de Cuba, Bayamo, 
and Manzanillo, with Holguín along the north coast west of the Bahia de Nipe, and Las 
Tunas to the west along the border of Puerto Príncipe.  In order to avoid confusion with the 
city and jurisdiction of Santiago de Cuba that using these archaic but historically accurate 
terms might incur, the easternmost province is typically rendered as simply “Oriente” in this 
text, which would more properly be the province name for much of the twentieth century 
until the 1976 territorial reorganization.  Similarly, present-day Camagüey province and city 
were both known as Puerto Príncipe during much of the nineteenth-century period under 
study, yet in the dissertation the province is often referred to as Camagüey to distinguish it 
from the city for readers less familiar with the island’s geographic regions.  Similarly, 
Guantánamo today is the name of a province, the capital of the province astride the Guaso 
River, a broad and deep-water bay, and the name of a U.S. military installation at the lower 
portion of that body of water.  Until 1870 the city (then a town) was usually referred to as 
Santa Catalina de Guaso, or Santa Catalina del Saltadero after a set of rapids and falls on the 
river.  Here the dissertation tries to employ a precise descriptor and context of what feature 
identified by Guantánamo is being discussed to avoid confusion.  Other variations from terms 
of the period, and relevant geographic boundaries are defined where appropriate.   
Second, as far as descriptive racial terms are concerned, those employed in Cuba have 
often drawn on a range of features beyond, but inclusive of skin tones and shades including 
hair texture and other phenotypical characteristics that indicate salient African or European 
ancestry to present an often bewildering range of categories.  Much has been written about 
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the “one drop rule” prevalent in U.S. race relations, in which racial constructs posit two 
monolithic races “white” and “black,” and where any visible sign of African genetic 
inheritance rendered one black as far as “whites” were concerned.  Cuban racial 
classifications, particularly in the east, posited a continuum whereby racially mixed persons 
inhabited a third category, but one that was open to overlays of class and given social settings 
and surroundings.  For much of the colonial time period under study, at least until the 1880s, 
social and legal stigma were associated with being a free person of color, and legal 
“whiteness” was demarcated by the use of honorific terms such as “Don” or “Doña.”34 In 
translating Spanish terms to English, “black” refers to the classifications negro or moreno 
while “mixed race” and the un-translated “mulato” appears for mulato or pardo (literally, 
“brown,” “dark,” or “gray”).  The term mestizo also denotes someone of mixed heritage, 
which can cause confusion since the term is usually associated in Latin America to refer to 
Indian/ European mixed-descent.  The ambiguity of the use of term here is deliberate, since 
an Indian population survived in some measure as “indios” in remote mountainous portions 
of eastern Cuba.  The term de color is rendered “of color.”   
 The lexicon of racial terms was generally understood as being rooted in medieval 
Iberian conceptions of “purity of blood laws” being applied in the New World.  With the 
prevalence of African slave labor, these terms denoted the distance from servile condition, 
and the social stigma associated with it.35  Over time, what historian of racial oppression, 
                                                
34 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 41, 55-56.  
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Cuba, and Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba, 8-9. See also Theodore Allen, The Invention of the White Race 
V.1: Racial Oppression and Social Control and V.II: The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America 
(London: Verso, 1994-1997); Andrews, Afro-Latin America; Richard Graham, ed. The Idea of Race in Latin 
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Theodore Allen termed a middle class social control stratum between the enslaved dark-
skinned laboring population and the light-skinned European colonist became interposed to 
maintain order and serve as militia, if need be, given the fear of internal resistance and 
outright rebellion.  In much of the Caribbean, this middle class stratum arose from a 
mediated and partial inclusion of mixed-race or free-status blacks.  In the case of mainland 
British North American colonies, eventually freed indentured Europeans became a yeomanry 
to serve as a buffer against physical Indian attack, and to guard against too much cultural 
syncretism and hybridization that threatened European-derived social norms and identity as 
British subjects.  Importantly, this settler middle social control strata or yeomanry, as a group 
allied by dint of white skin privilege, and racialist solidarity, shared with planter interests vis-
à-vis restive African and African American slave workers.  Thus, in the colonial period, the 
condition of slavery became differentiated from indentured servitude as hereditary lifetime 
bond labor, and children inherited slave status from an enslaved mother.36 Over time, a 
peculiar “white race” construct of great longevity developed in the North American colonies, 
which frequently resulted in white Europeans and their colonist progeny becoming perplexed 
at the sight of a free-colored middle sector of artisans, urban workers, tenants, small farmers, 
and militia in the Caribbean context.37   
The middle social control stratum made up of mulatos and free people of color 
convinced some—casual observers and earlier comparative scholars alike—that slavery 
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somehow did not have the same rigor in some Caribbean and Latin American contexts as 
elsewhere. An example of this confusion over variances in racial formation and explanations 
for it in the nineteenth-century came from a North American visitor, Samuel Hazard, who 
tried to make sense of the racially mixed population of Santo Domingo on Hispaniola: 
It is a conceded and curious fact, that while the early Spaniards of St Domingo 
had been the severest of taskmasters to their negro slaves, as time wore on 
they seem, for some reason or other, to have lost this habit, and their slaves 
were infinitely much better treated than those of the French. This may partly 
be accounted for from the fact that population became so reduced in the island 
at one time, that master and slave relied upon each other for company and 
support, and the chains were in this way gradually lightened.38 
 
The notion that “master and slave relied upon each other for company and support” was a 
misinterpretation of the relative absence of extensive plantations such as existed on the 
French St. Domingue side of Hispaniola, which necessitated a taxing and brutal labor 
discipline and regime directed at obtaining profits for a planter embedded in mercantilist 
capitalist agriculture of absolutist France.  
 The theory of relative lassitude in Iberian slavery persisted in much of the early 
literature of comparative New World slave systems.  But slavery tied to exacting labor such 
as plantation agriculture promoted abuse, resistance, and repression quite irrespective of pre-
conceptions from Europe about people of color or religious and legal attempts to inveigh into 
the treatment of those subject to it.  As Gwendolyn Midlo Hall wrote in her classic 
comparative study of colonial social control concerns in eighteenth-century St. Domingue 
and nineteenth-century Cuba:  
evidence would indicate that a preexisting racial attitude of the people of the 
colonizing nations was not the crucial factor in determining policy toward 
                                                
 
38 Samuel Hazard, Santo Domingo, Past and Present; With a Glance at Hayti (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1873), 102-3 [hereinafter cited as Hazard, Santo Domingo]. 
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emancipation of the slaves and the status of the free colored population, but the 
crucial factors were the sharp internal and external conflicts and tensions which beset 
these colonial societies.39 
 
As she persuasively argued, the economic structure of the economy and the numbers of 
slaves within a given context had far greater explanatory power than traditional conceptions 
regarding race from the Old World. 
As for the composition of the social control stratum, the absence of a yeomanry 
united by racial identification with the master classes resulted periodically during the colonial 
period in creating armed militias of free people of color.  These free people of mixed race 
could be quite privileged in relation to slaves, but generally held in an inferior status to 
whites.  In a number of Caribbean contexts, black and mixed-race troops were used against 
imperial rivals and internal rebels including maroons.40 If attitudes regarding race were not as 
significant than the structure of a given colony, then pre-existing Iberian institutions 
dedicated to the suppression of rural banditry underwent some conversion. Some internal 
policing mechanisms initially transplanted to the Antilles go back to the medieval legal 
codes, the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X.  In this early modern version of men-at-arms 
patrolling roads the Santa Hermandad, a retinue of landowners, was empowered to 
investigate and punish crimes in sparsely inhabited areas, towns of fewer than a hundred 
inhabitants, cases of breaking and entering, sexual assaults, and all acts of rebellion against 
public order and authority.   
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Applied to the suppression of slave revolts and especially organized bands of 
runaways, however, a more formal reliance on standing bodies of armed men became a 
general rule over time.  The demise of Caribbean slavery was first broached by the example 
of the 1791-1804 Haitian Revolution.  Prior to the outbreak of rebellion in France’s most 
valuable colony by free black affranchis or gens de coleur along with the plantation slaves 
themselves, French colonial officials attempted to impose the status of middle social control 
stratum on free and manumitted people of color by creating the maréchausée in 1717, and 
reorganizing it by 1733:  
By the Colonial Government [free men of color in St. Domingue] were 
treated, however, as slaves, being compelled, on reaching the age of manhood, 
to serve for three years in a military establishment, called the Maré Chaussée 
[sic]. This consisted of a certain number of companies of infantry, which were 
chiefly employed as rangers in clearing the woods of “marons,” as runaway 
slaves were called; and though this organization was eventually broken up, 
from the fear that arose that if afforded the people of colour a means of 
knowing their own strength, and of holding general communication with each 
other throughout the island, it was long enough in existence to have that very 
effect.  
Upon the expiration of their terms of service in the Maré Chaussée, 
the mulattoes were also subject to the work of the corvées, a species of labour 
allotted for the repair of the highways, the hardships of which nearly all 
authorities agree in describing as terrible. Although they rendered all their 
military service in the militia of their particular province without pay or 
allowance, being in fact compelled to provide their own arms and 
accoutrements, they were nevertheless entirely deprived of any power to hold 
public office or employment, and were entirely debarred from all manner of 
liberal professions, and even the taint of blood spread to the latest posterity, so 
that no white man of any character ever thought of marriage with them. In the 
courts of justice, also, there was one justice for the white man and another for 
the coloured.41  
 
This passage by a nineteenth-century traveler illustrated the constraints put on free people of 
color in Caribbean colonies.  They were required as a prop for social control, serving as 
manpower for a constabulary or military institution together with other demarcated and 
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delimited social roles. Yet, they could never be entirely trusted by whites in a system of 
racial slavery no matter how great a social distance was maintained between the caste groups.  
<><><> 
Race constructs would undergo different forms, and the meanings ascribed to them 
would shift over the time period after slavery.  The post-abolition experience for Cubans of 
color would draw on previous options opened to the participation of free people of color, but 
also move into new areas and assume new directions.  Social control would be drawn on 
national grounds as Spain attempted to assert control over the colony; for colonial officials, 
race would recede into a more muted concern, one mediated by class conflicts, but still 
remain important within elite social control concerns.  “In the Fist of Earlier Revolutions” 
examines the Cuban trajectory of postemancipation social control and state formation from 
the vantage point of Guantánamo.  It is a narrative history of 1868 to 1902, encompassing the 
watersheds of the Ten Years’ War, gradual emancipation, the War of Independence, and U.S. 
intervention followed by the early years of the Republic.  Nested within the regional focus of 
the narrative description are several related microhistories.   
Chapter I, “Al filo del agua: Guantánamo On the Edge of the Storm,” presents an 
impressionistic portrait of the district on the eve of the Ten Years’ War, when it was a slave-
dependent offshoot of Santiago de Cuba.  It follows Samuel Hazard, the author of the 
observations above about the history of Santo Domingo and policing the St. Domingue slave 
colony by conscription of free people of color, on his journey to the small-scale but island-
renowned coffee plantations in the mountains surrounding the sugar mills of the llano or 
plain surrounding the bay.  The district had been practically deserted through long years of 
earlier colonial history, and had seen an unsuccessful 1741 British invasion during one of the 
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aforementioned eighteenth-century Anglo-Spanish wars.42  Officials discussed various 
proposals to settle the district, but these had lacked urgency until the Haitian Revolution 
raised the prospect of international conflict in the Caribbean, and the spread of anti-slavery 
ideology to other plantation colonies.  In the wake of this crisis, while the plantation model in 
much of the rest of Cuba was invigorated and consciously extended to meet the demands for 
sugar and coffee once satisfied by primarily St. Domingue, Guantánamo and Santiago de 
Cuba received an infusion of French immigration as refugees fled the conflagration.  
Guantánamo remained a frontier district perceived as vulnerable to slave resistance in 
the form of flight and inviting to potential alternative development including subsistence 
agriculture by squatters and the formation of rebel slave communities.  This feature 
stimulated attempts to wall off eastern Cuba from the baneful influence of Haitian slave 
revolution, but also created and reprioritized standing internal social control challenges.  The 
direct presence of Spanish troops as ultimate guarantor of social control was augmented by a 
voluntary rural gendarmerie, or paramilitary body, the Squadron of Santa Catalina de Guaso. 
This militia remained a force within the area even as the number of maroons apparently 
subsided. In turn, the development of sugarcane cultivation and processing, worked by slave 
labor but frequently owned by absentee planters, engrossed some of the most fertile lands in 
the district.  By 1854, a prominent British merchant house, Brooks and Company, introduced 
railway transportation and technology to facilitate the development of the areas’ sugar 
exports, and so a sugar enclave became implanted atop the earlier French and Creole coffee 
plantation society. Isolation from nearby areas, the foreign quality of the French and Creole 
coffee sector, the capital-intensive sugar and railway complex, and the relatively high 
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percentages of slaves—certainly in comparison  to other regions of the pre-capitalist east—
all militated against the region responding favorably to Carlos Manuel de Céspedes’ 
summons to revolt against Spain. 
 Chapter III, “Al filo del machete: ‘Black Arm and Cuban Heart’—The Separatist 
Invasion of Guantánamo” presents the onset of the Ten Years’ War in the Guantánamo 
region, not as a result of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes’ invocation of independence from a 
Spain that itself was undergoing civil war and political instability, but through an 1871 
separatist insurgent offensive directed principally at the coffee sector in the third year of the 
war.  The confrontation between rebels within and without the zone with the district’s 
denizens sets the regional particularity of Santiago and Guantánamo in relief against the rest 
of Oriente province during the rebellion, where there was greater relative support for 
separatism.  Slaves would sometimes take the opportunity afforded by the insurrection 
against Spanish imperial control, but often also sought to distance themselves from it.  And 
given the weakness of the first insurrection against Spain, slaves encountered rebels often 
through forcible induction or demands on their labor by the state-in-formation.  The chapter 
argues that slaves asserted their own autonomy and pursued their own objectives wherever 
possible.  Sometimes their motives were in tandem with rebel objectives, at other times they 
were not.   
The rebels began their attack by assailing pro-colonial loyalists in the region as well 
as Spanish troops, and burning the region’s famous coffee estates scattered in the high-
altitude locales conducive to the crops’ cultivation scattered in forested mountains.  The rebel 
incorporation of the district into the wider rebellion in Oriente and parts of central Cuba was, 
however, not a clear victory for the separatists as is so often described in much of the 
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nationalist historiography.  As historians have noted about the first Cuban war of 
independence, the attempted separatist revolution in the colony elicited a furious 
counterrevolution by peninsular-born Volunteers.  At times this strident, reactionary 
movement broke with the authority of Spanish officials deemed too liberal or indecisive in 
exerting a heavy hand against rebellion.  In a sense, Spain found itself faced with two 
concurrent uprisings against its rule.  Typically, the Volunteers had the upper hand in western 
Cuba, with its huge plantations, black slaves, and Spanish sojourners and migrants, while the 
unprepossessing eastern provinces of mixed patterns of farming and ranching were site of the 
bulk of fighting.  In Guantánamo this civil conflict included Cuban-born pro-Spanish 
integristas fighting against pro-independence separatists from nearby areas of the east. After 
invading the district, separatists failed to carry their offensive operations against the sugar 
sector, which was better protected by the Spanish than the coffee farms in the hill country.  
The scale the rebellion acquired largely overthrew the pre-existing social control militia, and 
forced the Spanish military to assume the role of keeping slaves in check, guarding property, 
and attempting to quash the separatist rebellion.  But the militia, the Squadrons of Santa 
Catalina survived into a new epoch characterized by the social control concern of banditry 
and the emergence of wage labor. 
 The Guantánamo district, for separatists, may have been a late addition in being 
incorporated into the first war of independence, but the slaves in the sugar llano proved 
receptive to separatist appeals—particularly those made by free Cuban leaders of color—in 
the succeeding conflict: the so-called Little War, 1879-1880, which arose to rekindle the 
failed independence struggle.  Those remaining slaves found rebellion plausible when 
freedom was forthcoming to slaves that had risen in rebellion as part of the terms ending the 
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first war.  A Santiago de Cuba-born mulatto rebel leader, Antonio Maceo, had refused to 
surrender his command to the Spanish at Baraguá in 1878 without guarantees of either 
independence for Cuba or immediate abolition of slavery.  Although he was shortly driven 
into exile, slaves took up the opportunity to push for a more immediate amelioration of their 
status than that promised by the Moret gradual emancipation law in 1870.  As mentioned 
earlier, 1880 marked the transition to “apprenticeship”—token wage payments made to 
remaining slaves—while the end of the Little War resulted in many separatist leaders’ exile 
or imprisonment. 
 Chapter IV: “Resettlement, Recovery, and the War of Independence, 1880-1898” 
examines the social changes after the war in the decade of the 1880s as slavery definitively 
came to an end, and the renewal of the anti-colonial armed struggle from 1895 to 1898. This 
was a transitional period where tenancy arrangements and sharecropping emerged after 
slavery with some traditional forms inherited by the white and mixed-race peasantry, along 
with new patterns of settlement and autonomy.  Meanwhile, a capital-intensive sugar sector 
continued to engross arable lands in the cuenca or valley that could be accessed by a network 
of steam trains to central mills.  Class relations became more complex, and the separatist 
cause gained adherents including among some of the former state agents such as Pedro 
Agustín Pérez, an ex-member of the Squadron of Santa Catalina.  By 1895, the separatists, 
re-organized both on the island and in exile through the efforts of José Martí and other 
leaders in the Partido Cubano Revolucionario reinitiated the revolt for independence.   
 The chapter offers an account of insurgency and counterinsurgency and the 
deleterious effects of warfare on the civilian populace.  In marked contrast with the earlier 
conflicts, separatist support was much more pronounced at the outset.  The negotiations over 
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the payment of war taxes—punctuated by periodic destruction of the standing cane by 
repeated fires, and threats of worse to come by Liberation Army leaders and a tax collector 
who, apparently, was a veteran of the Ten Years’ War, and the Brooks and Company 
operating many sugar mills and the district railway under the attempts by the Spanish to 
defeat the renewed insurrection form a microhistory of social-control concerns and elite 
negotiations with rebels over the social function of their property, and attitudes toward the 
formation of a Cuban state that would arise with the Liberation Army’s victory.  As it 
happened, however, the United States intervened in the conflict by 1898. 
 Chapter V: “1898: U.S. Intervention and the First Occupation” traces the onset of 
U.S. Navy operations in Guantánamo, the first place where U.S. troops landed, on June 10, 
1898, during the war that summer between the United States and Spain over imperial 
possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific.  In contrast to most portrayals of the events at 
Guantánamo, which are relegated to a footnote by military historiography of the war because 
the decisive events took place in Manila, Santiago de Cuba, and the diplomatic arenas of the 
United States and Spain, the chapter examines the collaboration that initially characterized 
relations between U.S. Marines and Cuban Liberation Army troops.  Despite the brevity of 
fighting against the Spanish army, the blockade of the island by the U.S. fleet after three 
years of irregular warfare in an agrarian society provoked an enormous humanitarian crisis of 
generalized famine and worsened prevailing outbreaks of disease that had stricken the 
population during wartime Spanish population-removal counterinsurgency tactics 
(reconcentración). The chapter marks the rupture of Spanish control over the island, and the 
reconfiguration of relations between regional elites, rebel leaders, and the North American 
occupiers.        
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 The conclusions, Chapter VI: “‘On Trial Before the World’: Social Control and 
Public Violence in the Mediated Republic” foregrounds the changes of the early twentieth 
century where Brooks and Company was subsumed in 1905 by the National Sugar Refining 
Company of New Jersey as the Guantánamo Sugar Company.  This consolidation of sugar 
under North American control formed an early example of a pattern begun in the 1880s, but 
that accelerated greatly during the first decades of the twentieth century.  In the twentieth 
century the United States would, in the course of a hegemonic role throughout the circum-
Caribbean, assume the ultimate guarantor role for preserving the system prevailing in the 
early Cuban republic, mediated by the protectorate status imposed through the 1901 Platt 
Amendment.  One feature of Cuba’s status would be the naval base on Guantánamo Bay 
made through treaty arrangements in 1903—a forward naval position geared to the U.S. 
projection of power in the wider circum-Caribbean—and locally, the establishment of a 
Rural Guard to suppress rural criminal behavior and defuse internal threats to plantations, or 
even prospects of rural resistance or rebellion to the newly configured republican nation 
state.  Sugar reasserted its central monocrop role that shaped local labor patterns, while a 
post-war land-rush pushed the sugar economy into new areas at the same moment as the rural 
population grew and settlers moved into eastern Cuba generally after the end of the war.  The 
era was also marked by local manifestations of an island-wide large-scale influx of migrants 
and immigrants from Spain.  The study ends on the eve of Cuban national independence in 
1902, mediated by U.S. protectorate status.  It is important to note, however, that on the 
anniversary of the first decade of the inauguration of the republic, an independent all black 
political party the Independientes de Color, led by orientales, embarked on an armed protest 
against the proscription of their movement, to which the republican state responded with 
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wholesale repression against the mostly black and mixed-race rural peasantry carried out by 
the recently constituted national Permanent Army and Rural Guard as well as militia from 
different parts of the island.
    
 
 
CHAPTER II:  
Al filo del agua: Guantánamo on the edge of the storm 
The three great staple productions of Cuba are sugar, the sweetener; coffee, the tonic; and 
tobacco, the narcotic of half the world. 
--Maturin M. Ballou.43 
 
You believe, perhaps, gentlemen, that the production of coffee and sugar is the natural 
destiny of the West Indies. Two centuries ago, nature, which does not trouble herself about 
commerce, had planted neither sugar-cane nor coffee trees there. 
--Karl Marx, “On the Question of Free Trade” 9 January 1848. 
 
For the invalid traveler I can imagine no more perfect country or life than that of the Coffee 
Mountains of the Yateras [Guantánamo]. ... If, in some happy day for the Cubans, their island 
shall be blessed with a more liberal government ... which will be followed by a strong tide of 
emigration, these hills, mountains, and valleys of ... Yateras will be the chosen spots of the 
island; for here, with comparatively little expense and less trouble, can be made the most 
beautiful homes in the world for those fond of rural life and the beauties of nature. 
--Samuel Hazard.44 
 
In the “fall of the year in which” the U.S. Civil War and slavery ended in the United States’ 
break-away southern territories, a thirty-year old Union army veteran-turned-travel-writer 
from Germantown, Pennsylvania, Samuel Hazard, Jr., “a man of superior culture ... highly 
esteemed by all who knew him,” visited much of Cuba, including Guantánamo.45  In 1861, 
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when the great conflict over secession began, he had been invalided for service after joining 
the 6th U.S. Cavalry.  As historian David Brion Davis has written, the protracted and bloody 
nature of the war for the (re)Union assured that slavery would not be preserved; 
accompanying the restoration and reconstruction of the U.S. republic there would be an 
emancipation proclamation by 1863, when, despite health problems, Hazard re-entered 
service as a captain in the 3rd Artillery.46 If, in hindsight, the abolition of slavery in the 
United States was a fortuitous circumstance accomplished during the prosecution of bitter 
sectional conflict—a conflict of which the very question of human bondage uneasily co-
existing within republican institutions was constitutive—then history’s hindsight would also 
indicate that the removal of Cuba’s similarly “peculiar institution” proved a pre-condition to 
the attainment of the island’s independence.47 Hazard’s journey to Cuba—which together 
with Puerto Rico constituted Spain’s two remaining New World possessions—came on the 
edge of a storm: just before the beginning of its first sustained war of independence amid 
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rising interest in renewed and expanding commercial possibilities in the post-war United 
States. 
Hazard’s appearance in Cuba was as convalescent and tourist not as abolitionist.  For 
him slavery formed a backdrop, one among a number of social and political anachronisms 
and curiosities of the isle. Recurrent illness, including tuberculosis, cut his life short at age 
forty-one in 1876, but not before he had visited sanatoria in North America and Europe.  Like 
a good many nineteenth-century North American consumptives, he made a journey for health 
reasons to Cuba.  Much of his resultant travel account offered descriptions of the Cuban 
counterpoint of sugar and tobacco, followed by coffee, that third element in the triumvirate of 
tropical products—the sweetener, tonic, and “narcotic of half the world” mentioned in 
Ballou’s and Marx’s epigraphs to this chapter.  By 1873, he also published his observations 
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, made not long after the conclusion of the War of the 
Restoration (1863-1865) in which a scheme for the annexation and re-colonization of Santo 
Domingo by Spain was thwarted while the United States was preoccupied with prosecuting 
the Civil War and the France of Napoleon III attempted to impose the Austrian Hapsburg, 
Maximilian, as emperor of Mexico.  Spanish defeat abroad and internal domestic instability 
and political crisis emboldened those who had come to see separation of the colony from the 
flagging fortunes and parasitic taxation of the imperial state as desirous. Spain’s failures and 
reversals compounded political instability throughout the nineteenth century, and also the 
exploitation of the remaining colonies.48  It also left a chastened colonial army in the “Pearl 
                                                
48 Gott, 73.  
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of the Antilles” that would brook no challenges from the forthcoming separatist 
insurrection.49   
This chapter follows Hazard on part of his journey, introducing the dramatis 
personae of Guantánamo during the Ten Years’ War, gradual abolition, and on into the end 
of the nineteenth century. It offers a portrait of the region with its social control mechanisms 
designed to buttress plantation agriculture, police and discipline bound labor, and maintain 
colonialism.  It also limns the district’s own particular configuration of the trinity of Cuban 
tropical export crops—sugar, coffee, and tobacco—together with the enslaved African and 
African-descended workforce that cultivated, harvested, and processed sugar and coffee.   
This local slave population combined an amalgam of features—albeit within a Cuban 
cast and context—of what historian of slavery in North America, Ira Berlin, has termed 
North American chattel slavery’s different “generations.”  These cohorts of African and 
Afro-descended peoples’ life experiences were shaped by international, national, and 
regional contexts.  The character of New World slavery underwent transformations including 
the “Revolutionary generations” in the post 1789-1848 period throughout the circum-
Caribbean where gradualist abolition took place in British possessions from 1834 to 1838 
                                                
49 Gott, 73; Mollin, 167, 197-213; Pirala, I: 138-146. Spain had been ejected from the Dominican 
Republic, 1863-1865, thousands of its troops felled by tropical maladies, yellow fever, cholera, and battlefield 
casualties. Spain suffered further reversals during its naval war with Peru and Chile in 1866.  Volunteers in the 
Spanish military from Cuba and Puerto Rico participated in the conflict in Hispaniola, while the Antillean 
colonies bore the brunt of the costs of these, and North African, colonial ventures.  Mollin suggested that 
commanders such as Blas Villate, Count of Valmaseda, Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, and others that waged 
counterinsurgency campaigns later in Cuba, came away from irregular wars and the defeat sustained in 
Hispaniola with hardened attitudes toward colonial revolts. On Weyler’s early military career in the war in the 
Dominican Republic, see John Lawrence Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 154-155.  Tone extends the argument about the humiliated Spanish 
military from failure in the colonies to its deleterious impact in Spanish politics and use against workers in the 
home country into the twentieth century, see Tone, 286-87.  A number of Dominican veterans of the Spanish 
army later emerged as important separatist military leaders, including Modesto Díaz, Máximo Gómez, and Luis 
Marcano, see Mollin, 202. There are several biographies of Máximo Gómez. For this cohort of Dominicans, see 
also, Aldo Daniel Naranjo, and Ángel Lago Vieito. Hijos de la fraternidad: Los Dominicanos en la 
insurrección cubana (1868-1878) (Bayamo: Ediciones Bayamo, 2001).     
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and remaining French islands by 1848, along with the “Migratory” and “Freedom” 
generations of the nineteenth-century U.S. south.50  Caribbean colonies moved from 
strategically motivated coteries of militarized port towns and a population of small farmers 
and European settlers and indentured servants to colonies with economic exploitation and 
slave labor as their raison d’etre.   
Cuba as a whole underwent such a transformation only with the removal of its 
strategic location for Spain caused by the loss of Spanish America and the opportunities 
afforded by trade with an independent North America combined with the overthrow of St.-
Domingue by the many wars within the Haitian Revolution.  Antillean slavery responded to 
each of these portentous developments, and slaves themselves drove various wedges into the 
system.51  Even so, Cuba’s expanding plantations developed a voracious appetite for 
constantly imported African slave labor given the high rates of mortality and low population 
growth.52  But not every locale in the large island developed at the same pace.  The plantation 
                                                
 
50 Ira Berlin employed the concept of distinct cohorts or “generations” to unpack slave experiences and 
history in North America’s chattel slavery contexts, first in Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of 
Slavery in North America (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), and later 
extended his chronology and added new “generations” to explicate the development of southern North 
American slavery through a final two “Migration” and “Freedom” generations in Generations of Captivity: A 
History of African-American Slaves (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003). 
While Cuba’s trajectory could profit from the adoption of a similar organizational temporal frame, the intensity 
of the nineteenth-century slave trade and larger numbers of illegally traded bozales brought directly from 
Africa—all occurring during and after the “Revolutionary Generation” shaped by the U.S., French, and Haitian 
revolutionary experiences certainly complicates the picture. Thus, in Cuba such generations had considerable 
overlap and ran concurrently. 
 
51  There is a large literature on this period and diverse forms of agency among slaves and free people 
of color. Some representative examples include Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-
1848; the essays in David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus, eds., A Turbulent Time: The French 
Revolution and the Greater Caribbean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Philip A. Howard, 
Changing History: Afro-Cuban Cabildos and Societies of Color in the Nineteenth Century (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1998); and Emilia Viotti da Costa, Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood: The 
Demerara Slave Rebellion of 1823 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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revolution that transformed western Cuba lagged in the eastern marches, which retained 
something of its earlier strategic colony quality but with a white (especially in Camagüey and 
in western Oriente), free mulatto, and black population (concentrated in eastern Oriente) of 
small-holding farmers and ranchers.  That is to say that Guantánamo was a tardy addition to 
the already rather late-developing tropical agricultural plantation complex that overtook Cuba 
in the late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth century, at a time of impending decline for 
“the South Atlantic System” in which African-derived labor produced exports in the New 
World for burgeoning capitalist markets, from whence the system derived capital investment 
and technological inputs.53 
<><><> 
A keen observer, Hazard wrote much of the sights and sounds of Havana and its 
urban charms, thickly descriptive facets of street-scenes, cafés, the theatre, cigar smoking and 
manufacture, bullfights, and of various entertainments and amusements of interest to male 
and female sojourners and travelers to the island capital. He also made a circumnavigation of 
the island by train, horseback, and ship that carried him into the eastern regions.  Thanks to 
the timing of his visit, a sense of the social, economic, and cultural life in Guantánamo on the 
eve of the 1868 separatist rebellion suggests key reasons why elites within the district 
initially remained aloof from separatism and the prospect of independence when the war 
broke out in nearby areas of eastern Cuba.  Certainly he wrote much of life and customs 
                                                                                                                                                  
52 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 2, wrote that 523,000 Africans were imported in the fifty-year illegal trade-
period between 1816 and 1867.  Hall cited Ortiz’s similar figures of 385,000 between 1790-1820, a further 
271,659 between 1820-1853, and 200,000 for 1853-1880. As seen in footnote 47 above, Scott, Degrees of 
Freedom, cited Murray: 30,000 in 1859, 25,000 in 1860, 24,000 in 1861, and 11,000 in 1862. 
 
53 Franklin Knight, “Cuba,” in David W. Cohen, and Jack P. Greene, eds. Neither Slave nor Free: The 
Freedmen of African Descent in the Slave Societies of the New World (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1972), 279.  The “South Atlantic System,” subsuming the various “triangle trades” into the Atlantic 
World comes from Knight’s citation of Philip D. Curtin’s early pre-plantation complex work on Jamaica, see fn 
4 in that text.  
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throughout rural districts on the edge of the forthcoming storm of separatist rebellion – 
indeed, as his book went to press, he had to update and revise certain parts, including the 
depth of mutual disdain between native-born Creoles and Peninsular immigrants from Spain. 
Like so many foreign travel accounts, his encounter with the alien, foreign, even exotic, led 
him to all manner of detailed, at times rhapsodic, descriptions of flora, fauna, romantic 
landscapes and natural phenomena, but for the same reason did not overlook the pedestrian, 
ordinary and everyday aspects of the island.  
Not content with a visit to just Havana alone, he also visited other western districts 
such as Matanzas, where, like many nineteenth-century traveling scribes, his choice of 
subjects prefigured and anticipated Fernando Ortiz’s classic Cuban Counterpoint on the 
transformative agency and power of sugar and tobacco for export to foreign capitalist 
markets by detailing sugar estates and offering readers a dense description of its cultivation 
and manufacture.54  After all, the story of Cuba’s western districts for the most part, was 
contiguous with sugar cane.55 He then journeyed from the southern port of Cienfuegos to the 
                                                
 
54 Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint. A detailed account of sugar and its manufacture is beyond the scope of 
the present work. On sugar’s history see Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar 2 vols. (London: Chapman and Hall, 
1949-1950); Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and Power (New York: Penguin, 1985). For sugar in Cuba, see 
Roland T. Ely, Cuando reinaba su majestad el azúcar, 2nd ed. (Havana: Imágen Contemporanea, 2001); 
Franklin W. Knight, Slave Society in Cuba During the Nineteenth Century; Fé Iglesias García, Del ingenio al 
central (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1999); and the magnum opus of Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El 
ingenio: Complejo económico social cubano de azúcar, 3 vols. (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978). 
Classic accounts of sugar’s historical development’s in New World contexts include Philip D. Curtin, The Rise 
and Fall of the Plantation Complex; Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the 
English West Indies, 1624-1713 2nd edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and Stuart 
B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-1835 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985).   
 
55 For a recent qualification of sugar’s predominant ramifications for western Cuba’s development, 
arguing that until the 1840s coffee production was far more significant than Cuba’s historiography might 
indicate, see William C. Van Norman, Jr., “Shade Grown Slavery: Life and Labor on Coffee Plantations in 
Western Cuba, 1790-1845” (PhD Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2005).  Nevertheless, after the 
1840s, sugar swiftly displaced diversified agricultural patterns, see Laird W. Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in 
the Nineteenth Century: The Social and Economic History of Monoculture in Matanzas (Princeton: Princeton 
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picturesque town of Trinidad before he continued his itinerary by steamer to Santiago de 
Cuba to visit both the eastern province’s capital city, and the nearby shrine at El Cobre to 
Cuba’s patron saint, Nuestra Señora de la Caridad del Cobre, with other pilgrims.  Back in 
Santiago he contacted members of the locally prominent English merchant and banking 
house, Brooks and Company, to enquire about visiting the southeastern Cuban district of 
Guantánamo, primarily its “extensive range of hills, known as those of Quibijan,” that is, the 
distant coffee plantations in the Nipe-Sagua-Baracoa massif forming the rugged easternmost 
end of Cuba.56   
It was here, in the cool “Coffee Mountains” that surrounded the valley or plain of 
Guantánamo with its unprepossessing cane-fields and threat of yellow fever that he was to 
reserve some of his most breathless descriptions.  “Fortunately,” he wrote, “since I desired to 
visit the Coffee Mountains, I had a letter of introduction to a member of the large and well-
known firm of Brooks & Co., who treated me in the most cordial manner.” His introduction 
to the influential merchant house went far in “smoothing” his “way as to ship me to the care 
of their house in Guantanamo or [Santa] Catalina. Had it not been for this, I do not know that 
I should have had the great pleasure which I so much enjoyed of passing some time among 
the most beautiful mountains and scenes in Cuba.”57 
                                                                                                                                                  
University Press, 1990) and Scott’s evocative “Cane covered the land ... like an open secret” in Louisiana’s 
southern sugar parishes and much of Las Villas, Cuba, in Degrees of Freedom, 11.  
 
56 Hazard, 51.  On what to call the ranges of mountains and hills, including the Cuchillas de Toar, de 
Sagua, and de Baracoa, among other regional names, scholars have settled on the rather unwieldy “Nipe-Sagua-
Baracoa range” even though locals continue to use various older terms; see “Guantánamo Province” in Luis 
Martínez-Fernández, et. al., Encyclopedia of Cuba: People, History, Culture 2 vols. (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 2003), I: 24.  
 
57 Hazard, 459.  
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Brooks and Company 
Hazard took the 10:00pm overnight steamer from Santiago, a Brooks and Company 
innovation, to be awoken early the next morning by the “steamboat waiter” with the query 
“Café solo ó con leche, Señor?” at the “exceedingly large and beautiful sheet of water” 
formed by Guantánamo Bay.58 He then rode with a company clerk in the first-class train car, 
operated, like the steamer service, by Brooks and Company. The train ran three times a week 
up and down the sixteen miles from the bay when the zafra, or sugar harvest, was not in 
season.  Those busy harvest months necessitated daily train service to and from the frenetic 
activity of the smoke belching mills, and the dingy dock-town of Caimanera with its sea-
water evaporation pans and salt-raking works to “the little village of Santa Catalina de 
Guaso, also known as the ‘Saltadero,’ from there being a fall in the waters of the neighboring 
stream.” The train chugged across the valley, or llano, of “low, marshy ground” and “thick 
scrubby forest.”59 He approvingly related the “excellent railroad, which is constantly busied 
in carrying the immense quantities of sugar, coffee, rum, and molasses raised and made in 
this section of the country, and for which Catalina is the depot.”60 He did not tarry long in 
Santa Catalina, which, “a rather small place ... about seventy-five miles by land from 
Santiago” possessed but “one church, some few well-built houses” and had about two 
thousand inhabitants, but with “a battalion of soldiers stationed there.”61  The soldiers formed  
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a dual security component of both reinforcing the social control mechanisms designed to 
ensure planter authority and also to guard the coast from interlopers.  By 1870, after his visit 
and two years after the separatist standard of revolt had been raised in Oriente province, the 
town of Santa Catalina with its 1,681 inhabitants was renamed “the very illustrious and loyal 
ayuntamiento of Guantánamo.” It would maintain a garrison of 600 men-at-arms.62 [See 
illustration, “Arms of Guantánamo.”] 
While Hazard made preparations for his visit to the coffee estates in the hills, he 
chatted with a Brooks and Co. functionary, the Scot “Mr. [James Santiago Forbes] 
McKinley,” who told him that when “he first went there, eighteen years ago, the place was a 
very small one indeed” but that with the construction of the railway and dock facilities at 
Caimanera in the 1850s, “the produce of the back country sought this place as the most 
convenient outlet ... a permanent depot for the coffee and sugar of the district,” both 
produced mostly by un-free workers, “until now the business done there is quite enormous 
for so small a place.”63  As historian Pedro Pablo Rodríguez pointed out, after several false 
starts and failed colonization schemes, “interest in Guantánamo appeared in the epoch of the 
development of slave plantations in Cuba” so that it “grew as an appendage of Santiago, 
which, without the spectacular leap of a century occurring in [western Cuba’s sugar lands],  
was nevertheless sustaining growth of agricultural exports of sugar and coffee” unlike much 
of the rest of traditional, and even pre-capitalist, Oriente province.64 
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 The importance of Hazard’s initial regional contact, the family-run capitalist 
enterprise Brooks and Company, was noted in an 1869 press account, three months into the 
Ten Years’ War.  A North American journalist wrote, “The District of Guantanamo has 
within twelve years been converted from an almost barren waste into a busy and thriving 
colony.” 65 The transformation decisively shaped an earlier plantation model that, re the 
epigraph by Marx to this chapter, made the cultivation of sugar and coffee in the district 
appear like its natural destiny.  It arose from the British merchant house, Brooks and 
Company’s construction of a railway, shipping piers, and introduction of coastal steamers 
between Caimanera, the town of Guantánamo, and the sugar mills of the district just as 
McKinley told Hazard. The firm’s transport infrastructure and externally oriented investment 
overlay the oldest Creole families of the district, which included many descendants of French 
refugees from nearby St.-Domingue who had fled the Haitian revolution and established 
coffee plantations in the hills.66  The Brooks and Co.’s enclave built “roads through the 
                                                                                                                                                  
64 Pedro Pablo Rodríguez, La primera invasión (Havana: Ediciones Unión, 1987), 12.  
 
65 “Santa Catalina, Cuba,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization V. XIII, No. 627, New York 
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construction at Caimanera includes Ferro-carril y Muelle del Estado de Guantánamo y de la Caimanera, in 
AHN, SU, leg. 198, exp. 7; Propiedad del ferrocarril de Guantánamo, 1856, in Archivo Histórico Provincial de 
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66 On French immigration from St.-Domingue, see Jorge Berenguer Cala, La emigración francesa en 
la jurisdicción de Santiago de Cuba (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 1979); Duvon C. Corbitt, 
“Immigration in Cuba” Hispanic American Historical Review 22 (May 1942): 280-308; Hall, 125-127; Knight, 
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valley and over the hills, threw bridges over the river, imported machinery for the sucaries 
[sic, sugar mills]” and “in order to keep the labor supply in pace with the increase in 
production, imported [Chinese] coolies, established agents in the town, supplied the planters 
with the means of cultivating the land, receiving a mortgage on the crops.” As a result, 
resident managers of Brooks and Company became “little princes, and, having large 
outstanding debts to collect, their interests are wrapped up in the continuance for a time of 
slavery as the only means of realizing the results of their outlay.”67  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 1996), ch. 4; and Thomas, pp. 129, 131. Estimates for the total number of immigrants 
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<><><> 
By the time of Hazard’s visit just previous to the outbreak of the Ten Years’ War, 
Guantánamo had a population of 5,268 whites, 5,515 free people of color, and 8,638 slaves.68  
This demographic picture, of approximately 27 percent white, almost 30 percent free persons 
of color, and 44 percent enslaved made the district the single most slave dependent in eastern 
Cuba.69  There were almost two slaves for every white inhabitant. And on many plantations, 
especially the larger coffee and sugar estates, slaves greatly outnumbered white or mixed-
race owners and overseers. The three jurisdictions making up Guantánamo: Sagua de 
Tánamo on the northern coast, enclosing the watershed of the Sagua river flowing north to 
the Atlantic, and Tiguabos and Yateras, to the west and east respectively of the Guaso river 
flowing south to the large bay on the Windward Passage included some of the most wild and 
inaccessible terrain on the island. Still farther east, the lush jungle and banana, coconut, and 
cacao-growing district of Baracoa with 11,277 inhabitants—43 percent white, 43 percent free 
people of color, and 14 percent slave—existed around a remote port on the Bay of Honey, so 
isolated from the rest of Cuba by heavily forested rugged terrain that it figuratively formed 
something of a separate island—indeed at times Creoles suspected of sedition by colonial 
officials were temporarily internally exiled to the town.  The Table 2.1 below, drawn from 
Hazard’s “Gazetteer” of Cuba indicated Guantánamo’s population by each of its three 
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jurisdictions, while Table 2.2 presents an age pyramid of the population by sex, race, and 
servile condition: 
Table 2.1 
Population of Rural Guantánamo jurisdictions:  
Tiguabos, Yateras, and Sagua de Tánamo, 1867 
Jurisdiction White 
population 
Free population 
of color 
Slaves TOTAL 
Tiguabos 1,639  1,866 
 
4,847 
 
8,352 
 
Yateras 574 
 
1,195 
 
2,761 
 
4,530 
 
Sagua de 
Tánamo 
2,526 
 
1,664 
 
594 
 
4,784 
 
Total 
Guantánamo 
5,268  
[5,313] 
5,515  
[5,727] 
8,638  
[8,561] 
19,414* 
[19,619] 
Source: Data from Hazard, 563-579. Numbers in brackets indicate data from Pezuela, 
II: 500. *The missing 1,748 people from the total for all Guantánamo presumably represents 
the 1,134 to 1,681 inhabitants from the population of Santa Catalina del Guaso, reflected in 
Pezuela’s census, which became the city of Guantánamo in 1870. 
 
Table 2.2 
Sex, Age, and Race, Guantánamo, 1859-1860 
A. Men 
Race Age 1 
to 15 
Age 16 
to 25 
Age 26 
To 40 
Age 41 
To 60 
Age 61 
to 80 
Age 81 
to 90 
Age 
91 to 
100 
Age 
100 + 
White 
[Includes 
Asians] 
1,253 573 878 396 100 5 0 0 
Free People 
of Color 
1,404 498 646 334 129 18 1 4 
Slaves and 
Emancipados 
1,722 873 1,131 695 220 20 2 0 
TOTAL 4,379 1,944 2,655 1,425 449 43 3 4 
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B. Women 
Race Age 1 to 
15 
Age 16 
to 25 
Age 26 
to 40 
Age 41 
to 60 
Age 61 
to 80 
Age 81 
to 100 
Age 
100 + 
White 
[Includes 
Asians] 
1,098 420 396 181 31 0 0 
Free People 
of Color 
1,267 517 472 264 76 12 1 
Slaves and 
Emancipadas 
1,518 707 1,014 552 184 6 1 
TOTAL 3,883 1,644 1,882 997 291 18 2 
Source: Data from Pezuela, II: 498-499. 
 
As may be seen, Tiguabos and Yateras were much more oriented to the plantation model 
with substantial slave populations but also a large mixed population, while the northern 
interior of Sagua de Tánamo was majority white guajiros and mixed-race peasants who 
farmed food crops, tended pigs, reared domesticated animals, and grew tobacco for market 
on small plots.70  
Hazard wrote that Cuban planters did not want a continuance of slavery, “but, 
hitherto, they have wanted a compensation for their slaves, and a system of free labor that 
would enable them to work their valuable estates.”71 That is, a long declining system of 
rising-cost servile labor, which producers of tropical exports had nevertheless come to see as 
a competitive advantage after final abolition in the British West Indies between 1833 and 
1838, would have to be replaced by one that approximated the returns, economic and 
psychological, they had hitherto commanded.72  Many powerful purveyors of exports such as 
                                                
70 For tobacco in Cuba, see Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar; and Jean Stubbs, Tobacco 
on the Periphery: A Case Study in Cuban Labour History, 1860-1958 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985).  
 
71 Hazard, 554.  
 
72 On Cuban and Brazilian planters’ likely benefit from final abolition in the United Kingdom’s 
Caribbean colonies, see Davis, 85-86. On the expansion and competitiveness of Cuban plantation-produced 
sugar concurrent with decreasing production in the British West Indies, see Hall, 28.  
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sugar, and those with aligned interests, had long recognized that slavery was faced with 
irreversible and inevitable decline, even if, as Davis has pointed out “planters in Cuba and 
Brazil” retained assurance as late as “the 1860s and 1870s that slavery would last several 
more decades.”73 The issues for them were how precipitously it would come to an end and 
whether compensation could be obtained.  Coercive labor had pervaded social relations, 
economic arrangements, and the very culture of the island throughout Cuba’s development 
but most especially the precipitous rise of the plantation complex in the nineteenth century.  
Throughout the period slave populations continuously declined through excessive mortality 
rates—particularly those on sugar mills—exacerbated by a grim regimen of constant 
overwork, ghastly health conditions, disease, highly uneven gender ratios between mostly 
male and female slave populations that prevented natural increase, and even factors such as 
high rates of suicide.74  As a rule, only on coffee plantations, some other types of farms, and 
a few sugar estates did the slave population undergo natural increase. Without continual re-
supply of captives, the labor force on the majority of Cuban plantations waned rapidly.75  
Since at least 1817, repeated treaties had been signed by Spain to abolish the slave trade, and 
by the 1850s and 1860s even the lucrative, long-lasting illegal trade had drawn to a close.  
Prices for slaves climbed precipitously, and “the supply of labor in that respect [was] not up 
to the demand.” Hazard indicated “Coolies have been introduced, and the plan has worked 
well for the planters, though it is death almost to the” Chinese, almost entirely from 
                                                
 
73 David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 325.  
 
74 Hall, 18-20. For more on slave and indentured worker suicide see Pérez, To Die in Cuba, ch. 1.  
 
75 Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 117.  
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Guangdong province, thus transported to the island as indentured workers.76  Nevertheless, 
agricultural labor remained in short supply without access to African slavery.   
In so linking slavery to the labor required for rural estates in Cuba, Hazard was 
certainly on the mark for the Guantánamo region.  An undated rural census probably 
composed sometime in the decade before his visit, in all likelihood just before the Brookses 
organized the building of the railway between Caimanera and Santa Catalina in 1856, 
showed two-thirds of Tiguabos and Yateras slaves laboring on coffee farms (cafetales), while 
twenty nine percent worked on sugar mills on the plain.  The remainder of slaves, five 
percent of the total, mostly worked on livestock farms of one type or another (115 
individuals), other types of agricultural enterprises (118), or toiled alongside free peasant 
cultivators on tobacco vegas (48).  This regional demographic pattern was distinct from 
averages for Cuba as a whole, where in 1862 some 47 percent of slaves labored on sugar 
mills, while 7 percent were involved in coffee cultivation (see Table 2.4 below.)  The 
distribution of slaves in the 1850s in Guantánamo’s slave-dependent Tiguabos and Yateras 
districts appears in Table 2.3 below, while the estimated 1862 place of residence and type of 
labor for all Cuban slaves—making up approximately 27 percent of Cuba’s population at the 
time—appears in Table 2.4: 
Table 2.3 
Distribution of Slave Population by Place of Residence, Guantánamo, ca. 1854 
TOTAL number of slaves 
[Jurisdictions of Tiguabos and Yateras] 
5,337   [100 %] 
1. Sugar 1,559  [29 %] 
a.) Numbers of sugar slaves in steam  
Or water-powered mills 
          1,377    
          [88 percent of total for sugar] 
b.) Numbers of sugar slaves in  
Ox-powered trapiches 
          165     
          [11 percent of total for sugar] 
                                                
 
76 Hazard, 554.  
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TOTAL number of slaves 
[Jurisdictions of Tiguabos and Yateras] 
5,337   [100 %] 
2. Coffee 3,497  [66 %] 
3. Cattle and livestock raising 115  [2 %] 
4. Sitios, other farms, and tobacco vegas 166  [3 %] 
Source: Data from Padrón de fincas rústicas del partido de Tiguabos, propietarios, dotación, 
producción y rentas and the similarly titled associated padrón for the partido de Yateras, ANC, 
fondo: Gobierno General, leg. 388, nos. 18510 and 18511, s.f.77 
 
Table 2.4 
Distribution of Slave Population by Place of Residence, Cuba, 1862 
Residence Males Females Total Percentage 
total of 
slaves in 
island 
Slaves as 
Percentage 
of 
Residents 
Male 
slaves per 
100 
Female 
slaves 
Sugar 
plantations 
109,709 62,962 172,671 47% 79% 174:100 
Towns 37,014 38,963 75,977 21% 15% 95:100 
Stock 
farms 
20,414 11,100 31,514 9% 35% 184:100 
Coffee 
plantations 
14,344 11,598 25,942 7% 77% 124:100 
Small 
farms 
(sitios) 
14,253 10,597 24,850 7% 11% 135:100 
Tobacco 
plots 
11,622 6,053 17,675 5% 15% 192:100 
Small 
farms 
(estancias) 
4,220 2,698 6,918 2% 8% 156:100 
Ranches 4,311 1,909 6,220 2% 18% 226:100 
Other  2,675 1,500 4,175 1% 19% 178:100 
Other 
farms 
1,655 769 2,424 1% 20% 215:100 
TOTAL 220,217 148,149 386,366   149:100 
Source: Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba, 12. 
 
                                                
 
77 These two padrones appear in the Archivo Nacional de Cuba without dates.  By relating the 
information on these documents to other censuses, tax records, and an 1867 list of Chinese indentured workers 
in Guantánamo that includes the years of their contracts they had fulfilled appearing in the Archivo Histórico 
Nacional in Spain (AHN, SU, leg. 76, exp. 5, Guantánamo, 1867. Relación de Asiaticos contratados ecsistentes 
en esta Jurisdicción [sic]), I surmise that the padrones date from sometime in the first half of the 1850s, before 
the construction of the railway. Until a more precise date can be adduced for the documents, I have therefore 
indicated that they are “ca. 1854.”  
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Thus, overarching aggregate labor patterns for the slave workforce in Guantánamo were 
quite different from elsewhere on the island even if the nature of labor on rural estates was 
similar.  The region was more dependent on slavery than any other area of Cuba’s east. 
Island-wide, by mid-century slaves were generally concentrated on sugar mills, at least for 
close to half of them.  In Guantánamo, such indeed was the lot of about a third of bound 
laborers.  But while island-wide the number of slaves resident on coffee plantations had 
diminished to seven percent, in Guantánamo almost two-thirds of the region’s enslaved 
workers were to be found on such fincas.  Very few worked on other types of farms or 
ranches, let alone in towns.  The majority of slaves in Guantánamo produced coffee and 
sugar at their legal owners’ behest; those two crops were explicitly reliant on the labor of 
bondsmen and bondswomen.  
<><><> 
 
The development of exports emanating from Cuba’s nineteenth-century plantation 
boom came at a time of marked economic stagnation for most of independent Latin America.  
Much of the continent came under the sway of Great Britain’s expanding trade and informal 
empire.  Hazard’s initial contacts, the Anglo-Cuban Brooks and Company—founded in 1845 
by Thomas Brooks, Richard Stephen, James Wright, and Luis Augusto Verbrugghe from an 
earlier merchant house, Wright, Brooks, and Company—came to include the male 
descendents of Thomas Brooks.  He was a wealthy early nineteenth-century English 
merchant with interests in Havana and Santiago de Cuba married to a Cuban woman of 
French/St.-Domingue ancestry: Rosa Despaigne Duconge.78 In 1853, chief stockholders 
                                                
 
78 On the 20 September 1845 founding of Brooks and Company, see José Sánchez Guerra, El azúcar 
en el valle de los ingenios guantanameros (1532-1899) (Guantánamo: Editorial El Mar y la Montaña, 2003), 33. 
[hereinafter cited as Sánchez, El azúcar en el valle de los ingenios guantanameros]. See also Zanetti and 
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Thomas Brooks, Richard H. Beattie, William Adams, Thomas Alexander Brooks y 
Despaigne, and José Nariño obtained the crown authorities’ permission in Havana to build a 
railway from Santa Catalina to Caimanera.79  Joined by several estate owners, they 
assembled a bound labor force to build the regions first railway from among emancipados—
Africans taken from illegal slave ships and nominally freed after years of labor on public 
works projects, but frequently re-enslaved through various forms of legalistic chicanery—
and slaves rented out from among those that appeared in the padrón in Table 2.3 above.80  
Further extension of the railway was placed on hold throughout the Ten Years’ War (1868-
1878) and the Little War (1879-1880) but in the depression years of 1883 and 1884 the 
railway branched to the west to the sugar mill town Soledad, and to the eastern hill-country 
and coffee towns of Jamaica and Felicidad in Yateras.81   
To facilitate agricultural exports and technological inputs, the Brookses managed 
infrastructural and transport services connecting Guantánamo, Caimanera, and Santiago de 
Cuba including the railway and various related enterprises.  Eventually members of Brooks 
& Co. also obtained influential consulships for eastern Cuba: Frederick Ramsden, an amateur 
naturalist, was Consul of Great Britain at Santiago from 1850 to 1898 and also a member of 
the firm.  By the late nineteenth century, Paul Brooks would be Vice-Consul of the United 
                                                                                                                                                  
García, 66, 232. I am grateful to José Sánchez Guerra, the historian of Guantánamo for graciously sharing with 
me an unpublished manuscript, “La Brooks y Compañía,” El Managüí (Guantánamo), Sección de Historia 
Comité Provincial del PCC de Guantánamo. 
 
79 Ibid.  
 
80 For emancipados and indentured workers on the railway, see the aforementioned 31 October 1860 
letter in Libro de Actas de la Junta Directiva del Ferro-carril de Guantánamo, Enero 1859-Febrero 1917, AEPG, 
GSC. Mention is made of forty Guantánamo emancipados being “consigned to public works” in De la 
consignación de 40 bozales de los aprehendidos en Guantánamo a las obras públicas del depto. Oriente. Fecha 
[Santiago de] Cuba, diciembre 15, 1857 al 6 febrero 1858, AHPSC, GP, leg. 554, exp. 13, Materia: Esclavitud.  
  
81 Zanetti and García, 139-140.  
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States in Guantánamo; Theodore Brooks would hold the same position for the United 
Kingdom. Still another, Robert Mason, would serve as Consul of China, likely the result of 
previous railway experience there, but possibly also involving the supply of indentured 
workers to the Caribbean from Guangdong province before the Chinese imperial government 
halted the supply of low-cost laborers in 1874 because of the rampant exploitation and abuses 
the labor system entailed.82  Brooks and Co. officers thus held important consulships for 
nations involved in trade relations with Spain’s Cuban colony, which not only allowed them 
better to oversee export and import trade, but also gave the firm potential backing from 
powerful interests in addition to the declining metropolitan state’s authority. 
 
The llano: Sugar 
This sparsely populated frontier district grew into a classic enclave economy 
developed along the lines of the Caribbean plantation complex.  In an earlier colonial period, 
it had elicited little development or attention apart from periodic security concerns stemming 
from the failed British military expedition in 1741, the early-nineteenth-century era of Latin 
American Wars of Independence, and the 1819 U.S.-Spanish Adams-Onís Florida and Gulf 
Coast boundary treaty, all of which spurred abortive Spanish schemes to promote white 
soldier-colonist settlement.  By the early nineteenth century the suitable terrain surrounding 
the bay was home to small-scale, slave-based cotton, indigo, coffee, and sugar enterprises, 
but by the mid-nineteenth century the plain, or llano, was well on its way to being remade by 
sugar monoculture.  After the railway was built, the zone practically functioned as a 
                                                
 
82 Information comes from the later War of Independence (1895-1898), see “Martínez Campos’s Plans 
– Probability that He Will Place the Army in Pando’s Charge. A Receipt Given for Prisoners. Gomez Visits 
Santa Clara as a Fruit Vendor – British Citizens in Trouble Appeal in Vain to Their Consul,” NYT, 12 
December 1895. p. 14.  
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landlocked sugar and coffee island connected by rail and steamer traffic to maritime trade 
through Santiago de Cuba, and the wider world system.  Most trade was conducted with the 
United States, followed by France and then Great Britain.83   
Steam-powered machinery and train transport made sugar, like elsewhere in Cuba, a 
factory in the fields with its curious hybrid of high-technology inputs, seasonal wage labor, 
and slave workers.  Expanding production, increased economic rationality, and the use of 
technology apparently did little to ease the lot of slaves who faced a workday of up to twenty 
hours during the grueling fieldwork required throughout the six-month zafra harvest 
season.84  Investors built or upgraded larger mills, which included private narrow-gauge 
railways hauling sugar cane from distant collection points in sprawling, extensive fields to 
the increasingly complex grinding, filtration, clarification, and other sugar-making operations 
of the sugarhouse.  Trains then carried barrels and large boxes and crates of finished sugar 
products to private shipping piers on the bay or the main line and its port connection at 
Caimanera.  The Brooks & Co.’s fortunes grew apace the expansion of export production, 
weathering the lean years of economic crises of periodic stagnation, depression, and labor 
crisis brought on by the scarcity of slave labor and low population growth.85 By the start of 
the 1868 rebellion, “Thomas Alexander, Paul, Luis, Theodore and Ernest August Brooks” co-
                                                
 
83 Pezuela, II: 510.  
 
84 Hall, 17-19, discussed how mechanization did not alleviate the grueling nature of many tasks. See 
also Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio for technological sophistication, and labor regimes on sugar estates in Cuba.  
 
85 Sánchez, El azúcar en el valle de los ingenios guantanameros, 34. 
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owned the “ingenios Santa Cecilia, Romelié, Los Caños, San José, San Sebastián [in 
Santiago], and Flor de Bano.”86  
By the 1860s, these and other sugar mills in the llano of Guantánamo accounted for 
twenty percent of Oriente’s sugar, while those in greater number in Santiago produced 
another sixty-six percent.87 As a whole, however, Cuba’s easternmost province only 
contributed fifteen percent of the island’s total sugar output.88 Taken together, then, the 
Santiago region and its Guantánamo satellite produced the great bulk of the primitive east’s 
sugar and were site of the region’s physical plant and investments in land and labor of the 
frequently absentee “slave power” bourgeoisie.  Sugar may not have become the forest-
felling, land-engrossing latifundia colossus of Cuba’s west, but it increasingly absorbed flat 
and rolling arable land in these country districts, while the heavily forested broken uplands 
remained the province of mixed small-holding patterns and medium-sized agricultural 
enterprises dedicated to subsistence horticulture, pastoralism, tobacco cultivation, and a rural 
middle-class engaged in coffee farming with slave labor on their manor-like estates.     
Slaves’ lot on the sugar plantations could vary widely, but the nature of the crop itself 
required an intensive and exhausting repetitive schedule of fieldwork tasks.  Land had to be 
constantly cleared, new sugar plantings tended, hoed, and weeded.  Slaves dug ditches, built 
cane-breaks and fences, erected buildings, and cut cane.  During the half-year grinding 
season cane had to be cut and trimmed, stacked, then hauled to the sugar house as quickly as 
possible to preserve its sugar content and avoid rot or spoilage.  The character of such labor 
                                                
86 Ibid. 
 
87  Sánchez and Campos, Los ecos de la Demajagua, 8; Sánchez, El azúcar en el valle de los ingenios 
guantanameros. 
 
88 Zanetti and García, 101.  
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has been alluded to in many descriptive accounts, and reports of twenty-hour workdays were 
common.89  Sugar’s labor system drew heavily on primarily male bond workers.  Planters 
were often loath to “waste” money and resources rearing slave children to young adulthood, 
preferring to extract work from any laborer they owned.90  Gender imbalances on Cuban 
plantations, which typically had a preponderance of males with fewer women particularly in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century before the decline in the illegal trade, were 
notorious.  Similarly, an attitude that slaves were an expensive drain on planter incomes 
unless constantly placed under observation and set to work fostered a propensity to fill every 
conceivable period of the day with endless busy tasks to be performed.  Late at night, or even 
early in the morning, exhausted slaves would be locked in barracks or barracoons to sleep.  
There was often not much autonomy left to slaves in such systems, but what little they 
possessed was jealously preserved.  Sundays offered little by way of rest, but slaves worked 
on their own account and projects, tended their private cultivations, and met for opportunities 
to socialize, barter, and perform religious rites or observances.      
The same rural census that provided the numbers of slaves in the 1850s in the tables 
above, also detailed nine steam or water powered ingenios and eleven antiquated ox-powered 
trapiches in which teams of tethered animals moving in a circle provided the motive power 
to turn rollers to crush the sugar cane.  The sugar mills, owners, estimated acreage under 
cultivation, power-source, and number of slaves resident at these Guantánamo mills appears 
in the Table 2.5 below, while the consolidating and expansive effects of the railway on the 
sugar sector, with eleven steam powered and two water powered mills by 1860—
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90 Hall, 24-28.  
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unfortunately without data on the numbers of slaves on dotaciones of the mills—are 
aggregated in Table 2.6:  
Table 2.5 
Sugar Mill, Owner, Acres Cultivated and Uncultivated, Power plant, Number of Slaves in 
Tiguabos and Yateras, Guantánamo, ca. 1854. 
Sugar Mill Owner Estimated 
Acreage- 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated 
Mill 
Power source 
Slave Dotación 
San Idelfonso D. Pedro Ma. 
Cardona 
400  
1,199.88 
Steam 120 slaves 
3 Chinese  
Perseverancia D. Salvador 
Alverny 
366.63  
1,416.53  
Steam 123 
Monte Sano D. Ruperto 
Ledesma 
400 
1,416.5 
Steam 99 
Santa Rosa D. Lorenzo Jay 666.6 
3,333 
Steam 220 
Santa Fé D. Eugenio Larré 266.64 
1,066.56 
Water 140 
Isabel D. Teodoro  
Brooks 
199.98 
2,466.42 
Steam 200 
Santa María D. Félix Durruty 333.3 
2,466.42 
Steam 140 
San Miguel D. Vinent y 
Compañía 
166.65 
2,166.45 
Steam 130 
Esperanza Sres. Moré y  
[José] Baró 
399.96 
1,033.23 
Steam 191 
Santa Ana Santiago  
Poumier 
50 
unknown 
Oxen 38 
Margarita D. Victor 
Lachaise 
66.66 
166.65 
Oxen 13 
Santa Inés D. Guadalupe 
Malletá 
33.33 
266.64 
Oxen 5 
San José D. Ramon Pérez 16.67 
999.9 
Oxen 5 
Sinforosa D. Manuel  
Malletá 
16.67 
283.305 
Oxen 3 
San Fermín D. Fermín  
Choreans [?] 
16.67 
149.985 
Oxen 5 
Manantial D. Fermín  
Toreaux 
166.65 
1,166.55 
Oxen 43 
N. Fortuna Da. Luisa Girar  
[Giroux?] 
8.3325 
unknown 
Oxen 35 
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Sugar Mill Owner Estimated 
Acreage- 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated 
Mill 
Power source 
Slave Dotación 
Purial Luis Thaureau 66.66 
266.64 
Oxen 18 
San José D. José Fournier 166.65 
466.62 
Oxen 14 
1 Chinese 
Confluente D. General  
Espalter 
166.65 
unknown 
Water N/a 
TOTAL  
Slaves in Sugar 
   1,559 
4 Chinese  
Source: Data from Padrón de fincas rústicas del partido de Tiguabos, propietarios, dotación, 
producción y rentas and for the partido de Yateras, ANC, fondo: Gobierno General,  
leg. 388, nos. 18510 and 18511, s.f. (Acreage estimates from caballerías, with 1 caballería = 
33.2 acres.) 
 
Table 2.6 
25 Guantánamo Sugar Mills, 1859-1860, after introduction of railway. 
Sugar Mill Owners Estimated Acreage, 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated 
Mill 
Power source 
San Idelfonso Sres. Cardona & 
Jovellar 
633.27 
833.25 
Steam 
Perseverancia D. Salvador Alberni 333.3 
1,333.2 
Steam 
Monte Sano Sres. Ledesma & 
Baidaji 
399.96 
733.26 
Steam 
Santa Rosa D. Lorenzo Jay 399.96 
2,499.75 
Steam 
Santa Fé D. José Faure 199.98 
1,866.48 
Water 
Isabel [Yateras] Widow of  
Couronneau & Assoc. 
266.64 
3,799.62 
Steam 
Santa María [Yateras] D. Félix Duruthy 499.95 
1,999.8 
Steam 
San Miguel [Yateras] Sres. Vinent & Co. 433.29 
999.9 
Steam 
San Juan [Yateras] D. Juan Moulié 0 
399.96 
Steam 
Esperanza Sres. Baró & Moré 733.26 
1,766.49 
Steam 
Hermitaño Da. Margarita  
Fournier 
8.33 
333.3 
Oxen 
Naranjo [Margarita] D. Victor Lachaise 33.33 
199.98 
Oxen 
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Sugar Mill Owners Estimated Acreage, 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated 
Mill 
Power source 
Naranjo  D. Ramon Pérez 83.325 
1,166.55 
Oxen 
Sinforosa D. Felipe Malletá 16.655 
333.3 
Oxen 
Manantial Heirs of D. Thaureau 99.99 
1,066.56 
Oxen 
San Juan D. Fermín Thaureau 16.655 
1,133.22 
Oxen 
Purial Widow Fournier 66.66 
299.97 
Oxen 
Banito D. Miguel Pérez 33.33 
233.31 
Oxen 
San Pedro D. Félix Ferrier 50 
333.3 
Oxen 
Filipinas D. Esteban Sierra 83.325 
6,599.34 
Oxen 
San Francisco D. B. Rey 0 
1,166.55 
Steam 
Soledad 
[formerly a coffee 
and cotton estate, see 
Table 2.10 below.] 
D. Gregorio Malletá 0 
1,333.2 
Steam 
Confluente Widow of Fabré 208.3 
366.63 
Water 
Coco  
[Sagua de Tánamo] 
Sres. Biens & Reed 99.99 
233.31 
Oxen 
Unión 
[Sagua de Tánamo] 
Sres. Ramos & Rigal 99.99 
233.31 
Oxen 
TOTALS Steam-powered 
Ingenios 
Ox-powered 
Trapiches 
Water-powered  
Ingenios 
25 Guantánamo total 
2 Sagua de Tánamo 
19 Tiguabos 
4 Yateras 
11 
n/a 
7 
4 
12 
2 
10 
n/a 
2 
n/a 
2 
n/a 
Source: Data from Pezuela, II: 502; Carlos Rebello, Estados relativos a la producción 
azucarera de la Isla de Cuba, formados competentemente y con autorización de la 
Intendencia de Ejército y Hacienda. Cuba. (Havana: n.p., 1860), 94-95. (Acreage estimates 
from caballerías, with 1 caballería = 33.2 acres. Total cultivated cane lands: 4,795.2 acres, 
uncultivated: 31,263.54 acres.) 
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The tables indicate the transformation of earlier sugar establishments utilizing St.-Domingue 
type oxen or water-powered machinery to crush and grind cane by the introduction of rail 
technology into the district along with steam engines as the motive force for sugar factories 
rising out of the cañaverales of the llano.   
 
The monte: Coffee 
“After the [sugar] ingenios,” Hazard imparted, “the cafetales are the most extensive 
agricultural establishments carried on in Cuba.”  Their “size varies from one hundred to one 
thousand acres, or even more in the mountains” while the dotación of resident slave workers 
“employed in the low country is as high as one hundred, but generally averages to every one 
thousand acres about fifty or sixty negroes.”91 Some two-thirds of slaves in the Guantánamo 
district lived and worked on such coffee farms.  Despite the local prominence of coffee 
cultivation, its production lagged behind even those regions where sugar had subsumed and 
overtaken coffee in western Cuba earlier in the century,” at one time ... as largely cultivated 
... as is at present sugar cane.”92  Coffee had boomed in western and parts of central Cuba 
from an 1827 peak in production of 20,000 tons, to some 12,000 tons yearly until the 
1840s.93 In the 1860s production in Cuba had dropped to 8,000 per year, but, as historian 
                                                
91 Hazard, 480.  See also Van Norman, “Shade Grown Slavery: Life and Labor on Coffee Plantations 
in Western Cuba, 1790-1845,” 9, and the concluding chapter. Present-day Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo 
provinces grow most of Cuba’s coffee for both internal consumption and export.  
 
92 Quote from Hazard, 479. For a recent detailed social and cultural history of coffee plantations in 
western Cuba’s Vueltabajo, from whence both the slave-based cafetal production of the bean and cafecito/tazita 
consumption of the beverage in Cuban life originated, see Van Norman, “Shade Grown Slavery: Life and Labor 
on Coffee Plantations in Western Cuba, 1790-1845.” See also Thomas, Cuba, ch. X.  
 
93 Thomas, 129.  
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Hugh Thomas wrote, the plummet in production was in western Cuba, while in the east, 
production continued to rise from 1846 into the 1860s.94 
Like much agricultural production in Cuba’s eastern province, coffee cultivation by 
slave labor remained archaic and the quality and quantities of it were inferior to those grown 
elsewhere on the isle.   Even within Oriente province itself the amounts produced by slave 
cultivators in Guantánamo were less than nearby areas, including the numerous coffee farms 
surrounding El Cobre and Santiago in the rugged Sierra Maestra range.95 In 1861, San 
Antonio de los Baños in the Vuelta Abajo, an area in decline west of Havana that had been in 
the forefront of coffee production during the booming 1820s and 1830s, produced two-and-a-
half times more coffee from its 84 cafetales—one estate more than in the Guantánamo 
region.96  In spite of the small-scale of coffee production in the zone, Hazard wrote “the 
mountains of Guantanamo are now considered the coffee regions of Cuba, and there the 
cultivation is on the increase, while in other places it has decreased.” For both struggling 
coffee growers, and upwardly mobile would-be cafetaleros, the availability of suitable land 
in the frontier district promised a continuance of coffee cultivation’s particular culture in 
Cuba within an overarching late-nineteenth-century age of slave and serf emancipation, the 
extension of sugar monoculture, and of dispossession, migration, and the proletarianization 
of labor.  Slavery remained central to this cash crop, but Hazard thought that modernization 
and technical sophistication were making inroads: “In the past few years, owing to the 
                                                
 
94 Thomas, 132. 
 
95 In 1867 there were 112 cafetales in El Cobre in the Sierra Maestra to the west of Santiago, see list of 
Fincas rústicas, 30 Noviembre 1867 Angel María Chacón, in AHN, SU, leg. 4957, Censos Generales, 1874-
1879-1887, Provincia de Santiago de Cuba.  
 
96 Pérez de la Riva, El café, 78-82; Rodríguez, 17, 18.  
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gradually increasing scarcity of negroes, many improvements have been made in the use of 
labor-saving machines, some of which are worked by steam-power in lieu of the old-
fashioned way of working by water-power.”97  
The coffee grown in Tiguabos and Yateras was mostly for consumption within Cuba 
itself, while some surplus was exported to France. Hazard repeated the then-current notion 
that the decline of Cuban coffee exports stemmed from 1848 with “the United States placing 
an almost prohibitory tariff on Cuban coffee in favor of Brazil, which empire receives our 
flour and grain at a nominal tariff” but that in any case, it was “certain that many of those 
who formerly planted coffee now make sugar” due both to the great instability and constant 
fluctuation of coffee prices, and because the cultivation of sugar used the planters’ “large 
number of hands to greater advantage.”98  
Historians such as Thomas have argued that sugar displaced coffee because it was 
much more profitable, that coffee estate owners could not as readily afford the expense of 
slaves, and rising Brazilian competition in the 1840s combined with high tariffs on Spanish-
produced goods entering the United States from 1834 on.99  Labor was central to why 
Brazilian production won out in U.S. markets over Cuban competition for other longer-term 
reasons.  Lower transport costs for tropic commodities shipped from port cities would 
seemingly make Cuba’s proximity to the Gulf Coast commercial center of New Orleans at 
the terminus of the Mississippi riverine system, and thus U.S. internal and urban markets, an 
incomparable natural advantage.  But the 1817-1820 Anglo-Spanish bans on the Trans-
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Atlantic slave trade north of the equator, reinforced by similar treaties in 1835, drove up the 
cost of illegally traded slaves in the Caribbean despite often lax enforcement.100 While slave 
prices declined relative to those in the United States in the 1830s, suggesting “labor market 
saturation” during sugar’s rise, scholars of slave prices found that threats to the illegal trade 
created “sharp upward fluctuations in prime-age female relative to male slave prices” as 
owners tried to adopt a system conducive to natural increase instead of the earlier pattern of 
continual imports.101 Meanwhile, in Brazil—both closer to sources of slave labor supply in 
West, Central-West, and even Southeast Africa, and facing comparatively fewer restrictions 
of the Portuguese and Brazilian-controlled illegal-trade— prices remained generally stable 
from “1835 and 1850” in both markets, but the cost of women slaves in Brazil did not rise as 
steeply during the decades before the trade’s final suppression in the 1850s.102  Fragmentary 
data from Vassouras in Rio de Janeiro’s coffee zone suggested that slave prices were higher 
than in Rio de Janeiro, so future research may indicate regional variations in the cost of 
slaves before they rose in the 1850s.103  Then too, Brazil saw a substantial internal slave trade 
that reallocated large numbers of agricultural laborers from the sugar sector in the declining 
northeast to the coffee zones of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.  Something the opposite 
occurred in western Cuba: coffee production was particularly hard-hit by a series of 
destructive hurricanes in the 1840s, leading coffee planters there to sell off their slaves to the 
                                                
 
100 Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 325-26, further emphasizes the role of British finance capital and 
investment in promoting Brazil’s coffee boom.  
 
101 Laird W. Bergad, Fé Iglesias García, and María del Carmen Barcia, The Cuban Slave Market, 
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sugar barons, or even switch to sugar cane cultivation themselves, in place of restarting 
coffee production, which unlike sugar required several years before the trees would bear 
harvestable quantities of coffee-cherries.104  Henceforth, coffee in Cuba would no longer be 
as it was—“as largely cultivated in the valleys and plains as” by the 1860s, “sugar-cane, yet 
now the portion of the island where most of the coffee-raising is done is in the district and 
neighborhood of [Santiago de] Cuba, and in the jurisdiction of Guantanamo” where “the land 
[was] to be had for a song.”105  The cheapness of land in sparsely populated marginal frontier 
districts of the east thereby gave coffee cultivation in Cuba a new lease on life. In fact, coffee 
planters in the district had far more of their capital invested in their slave labor force, by-and-
large, than in land much like antebellum U.S. slaveholders in the cotton fields, rice lowlands, 
tobacco farms, and sugar estates of the rural south. 
 
 
                                                
 
104 On this cycle of storms, see the environmental history, Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Winds of Change: 
Hurricanes and the Transformation of Nineteenth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001); Van Norman, Introduction, 117-118, 182, 232.  Hall, 30, discussed the transfer of 38,000 Cuban 
slaves from the western coffee sector to sugar cultivation by the late 1840s—concurrent with the introduction of 
Chinese indentured workers, especially in the 1850s, as a transitional form of labor.  On coffee plantations in 
Vassouras and the Paraíba valley in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil that exhibited a particularly rapacious and 
exploitative attitude toward the natural environment and the slave-laborers who worked them during Brazil’s 
coffee export boom, see the classic study by Stanley J. Stein, Vassouras: a Brazilian Coffee County, 1850-1900, 
2nd ed.  See also Warren Dean, With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Coastal 
Forest, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).  In the first half of the nineteenth century, the British 
colony Ceylon was for a time the leading producer of coffee, where, according to Gregory Dicum and Nina 
Luttinger, The Coffee Book: Anatomy of an Industry from Crop to the Last Drop, (New York: The New Press, 
1999), 30-31: “By 1869 approximately 176,000 acres of rainforest had been destroyed solely for the cultivation 
of coffee” until the fungal disease, coffee leaf rust, hemileia vastatix struck that year.  For a time the ravages to 
the crop were offset by brining additional lands into coffee production before switching to tea cultivation.  By 
the 1870s, Brazil moved into first place, followed by growing production in Central America and Latin 
America.  See Dicum and Luttinger; and see also the global coffee history, Mark Pendergrast, Uncommon 
Grounds: The History of Coffee and How It Transformed Our World, (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 17-44, 
for coffee rust, 43-47. 
 
105 Hazard, 479.  
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<><><> 
As Hazard left the llano’s “flat country behind” during his journey to Yateras’ 
cafetales, he encountered muleteers, “from some of the invisible labyrinths of road, followed 
by the head of some coffee-laden mule emerging around the curve, and, perhaps, succeeded 
by twenty or thirty others, all with their loads of coffee following their leader, to whom they 
are attached head and tail.” He remarked the “transporting of the coffee to market is a 
business of itself, and is generally carried on by some native Indian, the owner of large 
numbers of mules, though on some of the estates where horses are plenty the proprietors send 
down their own trains.”106 At the time of his visit, at least one of these Indian mule-drivers, 
Policarpo Pineda Rustán, had turned to banditry, operating with a group of bandoleros as 
highwaymen in the mountainous fastness.107  There was no indication from his travel book 
that Hazard heard of such matters, but this criminal’s trajectory will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapter.    
The presence of Indians performing such transport tasks, and working as herdsmen 
and pastoralists providing beasts of burden to the district’s agricultural enterprises, while 
slaves performed gang and task labor on plantations, offered a clue to how labor, class, caste, 
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during the Ten Years’ War see Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 55-57, 121. Banditry in Latin American contexts has 
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Richard W. Slatta, Bandidos: The Varieties of Latin American Banditry (New York: Greenwood Publishing, 
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and race were intertwined within the local social hierarchy. Table 2.7 below indicates that not 
just race per se, but also color was correlated to servile status.  
Table 2.7 
7,841 Guantánamo Slaves Classified by Sex and Race, ca. 1860 
325 Urban slaves: 
Race Male Female Total 
Pardo [mixed] 23 29 52 
Moreno [black] 129 144 273 
7,516 Rural slaves: 
Race Male Female Total 
Pardo [mixed] 96 91 187 
Moreno [black] 3,874 3,455 7,329 
TOTAL:  3% Pardo, 97% Moreno -- 53% Male, 47% Female -- 96% Rural, 4% Urban. 
 
Source: Data from Félix Erénchun, Anales de la Isla de Cuba: Diccionario administrativo, 
económico, estadístico y legislativo, 3 vols. (Havana: Imprenta Antillana, 1857-1861), 1643. 
 
The data did not indicate what portions of the ninety-seven percent of black (moreno) slaves 
were Creoles or African-born bozales, but fully ninety-six percent lived and worked in the 
countryside. Just 325, or four percent of the total, worked as domestics or artisans in towns. 
Only three percent of 7,841 slaves in the region in 1860 were listed as being of mixed race.  
It is impossible to know at this remove whether blackness was so indelibly associated with 
servile condition that slaves were simply understood to be “black” while free people of color 
were “socially whitened” in the census data. Informally people probably made further 
distinctions between traditionally free people and those more recently freed—that is 
manumitted slaves and their descendents would sometimes be held as socially lower in status 
than older free mixed-race families.  Whites in privacy, as the most racially privileged group 
of whatever class, likely tended to lump most people of color together, but those same people 
did not always recognize any unity of shared oppression or necessarily express social 
solidarity.  The mindsets produced by internalized colonialism’s “social constructs”—racial 
oppression and its supporting racialized logics and ideologies as a means of hierarchization 
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and social control—would prove difficult to socially de-construct or eradicate, and there was 
a tendency for families of color to stigmatize darker skin tone even among their own 
progeny.108   
Put more simply, the social construction of race was somewhat different from the 
prevailing monolithic black/white pattern, the North American “one drop rule” whereby any 
visible trace of African ancestry made one “black.”  In the United States racial miscegenation 
socially produced “black” children, subject to enslavement in perpetuity—lifetime hereditary 
bound labor—if born to a slave mother.  In much of Latin America racial miscegenation 
produced “lighter” or “less black” children.  In short, whites had the greatest relative racial 
privileges and advantages, and were encouraged by the racialist logics of unequal power 
relations to view any and all persons of visible African ancestry as lower in social status.  But 
among people of color, a split often was maintained between black and mulato or pardo, 
which has resulted in confusion as to whether race in Cuba was conceived as a bi-partite 
“white/black” system like that of the United States, historically, or a tri-partite 
“white/mixed/black” system.109   In eastern Cuba distinctions were maintained often between 
skin tone and shade, between brown and black, between free and freed, between nominally 
Christian and animist, between Cuban-born and African-born—and even within families and 
                                                
108 Indeed, the freedom struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth-century United States and beyond had 
unifying terms such as “negro,” and “colored,” and later “black” thrust on them by the dominant society, while, 
to quote Scott, Degrees of Freedom, 283, fn 18, in Cuba “Equal rights activists ... often adopted instead the 
phrase de color (of color), by which they intended to refer respectfully and inclusively to all people of African 
descent.”   
 
109 Much indeed has been written about different racial constructions and their change across time. An 
accessible synthesis is Andrews, Afro-Latin America. As for the frequent invocation of racial oppression and 
racist discourses in Cuba’s 1895-1898 war of independence examined in the historical literature, Scott, Degrees 
of Freedom, 309, fn 37 characterized as “Considerable energy has been devoted by historians to trying to figure 
out ‘the’ role of racism and distinctions of color in the war for independence” and proffered “Ada Ferrer’s 
dynamic and dialectical interpretation in Insurgent Cuba” as “one way out of the impasse.” I tend to agree and 
subscribe to the same nuanced approach, while acknowledging previous scholars’ attempts at greater precision.     
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households.110  At the same time, historically free families of color often were tied through 
kinship, social, and economic relationships to manumitted and enslaved persons and 
networks.  As a result, such free people of color in the east were cognizant of how the 
association of blackness with slave condition could affect their social status.   
Guantánamo was a region starkly stratified by race, class, color, gender, and even 
comportment and carriage.  The social scale’s extremes of wealth and poverty were 
correlated with race.  The social hierarchy was especially apparent on the coffee fincas with a 
mass of bonds-people resident in huts or a barracks beside the timbered and tiled homes of 
the owners.  Among the “very gentlemanly French planters” Hazard described their morning 
rituals and customs: “the little ones go off with their governess, and we leave Madame in 
charge of the establishment.”111  On the coffee farm itself, “there are sometimes 
administrators... in general they are managed by the proprietor with the assistance of the 
mayoral, who may be white, but who is generally the most intelligent negro on the place.”112  
The slaves themselves formed mostly a backdrop to his account, but he indicated that the 
sorting of coffee was “done by the negro women ... twenty or thirty of these women in their 
oddities of dress, or even the scarcity of it, picking away from the great piles of beans before 
                                                
 
110 For nineteenth-century race relations, social inequality, sexual values, norms of honor and virtue, 
see Verena Martínez-Alier (Stolcke), Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba 2nd ed. (Ann 
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them ... keeping up all the time a monotonous chanting” or collective work song.113 Coffee 
picking and various other agricultural tasks were performed “by the hands on the place, —
men, women, and children all going through the rows, each one with two bags and a 
basket.”114   
Food and subsistence needs provided another venue for expressing the social distance 
and class gulf between the masters, slaves, and peasants. More elaborated, European-derived 
table customs, cutlery, and styles of cuisine prevailed among planters with a few Creole 
adaptations such as the absence of bread and utilization of native foods and fruits at the table.  
For slaves, the diet was spartan and rudimentary, although more varied than that consumed 
on sugar estates.  The plantain, “constitut[ed] the principal food of the negroes on the sugar 
and coffee estates” while the coconut palm, “important not only as shade for the coffee, but 
for the thousand and one uses it is put to besides ... bears a large and important share in 
sustaining the life of the lower-classes, negroes, etc.” From it they even made “a species of 
wine, which they make into ardent spirits; from the fruit [coconut] they get their cups, lamps, 
and oils.”115 Others described relatively ample food grown by slaves themselves that 
supplemented the dried salted tasajo beef or bacalao salt cod, plantains, yucca, or other 
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114 Hazard, 484.  Van Norman contended that as a general rule coffee farms in western Cuba had more 
balanced gender ratios and larger numbers of children than would be found commonly on sugar ingenios. 
Harvesting, sorting, and other tasks required greater manual dexterity so that—like cotton in the southeastern 
United States—coffee was a crop conducive to child labor. See Van Norman, 123, 135, 139-143, 206. Padrón, 
46, makes similar claims about coffee in Cuba’s east, although mostly without evidentiary supports, and 
straying into questionable claims of coffee slavery being mediated by the proximity of owners residing on their 
own estates. On cotton and child labor, see Hall, 153. 
 
115 Hazard, 495, 496. 
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starchy food crops frequently provided on the coffee farms.  The production of food, along 
with most of the household tasks were feminized types of labor typically done by women. 
Rural white and mixed-race countrywomen—la guajira—were probably little 
different in many regards from those Hazard described in western Cuba closer to Havana: 
“not so talkative as the husband” performing much of the productive and all the reproductive 
labor and household tasks, able “to mount a horse, though she usually rides with her husband, 
sitting.... upon the neck of the horse.”116 Women in the countryside faced few employment 
options given the absence of industry and few institutions that allowed for social mobility. 
Attachment to the extended family or to men in the capacity of fulfilling endlessly repeated 
domestic labor tasks such as child rearing, and supplementary labor inside and outside the 
household was typical. Given the relative weakness of the church, formal marriage was often 
disregarded by peasants and small-scale ranchers in favor of informal unions—a pattern that 
would persist well into the twentieth century. Various forms of independent self-
employment, operating as market women, sewing, peddling, or preparing food represented 
some of the options or alternatives open to women in this agrarian patriarchal society.  Men 
almost always controlled property, but cases of widowhood sometimes conferred economic 
power, property ownership, and concomitant social status on women. 
Whites were disproportionately over-represented as the privileged owners of major 
properties, while poor whites, long-free, and more recently freed people of color owned food 
crop farms, stock farms and small ranches, apiaries, and tobacco plots (vegas).  Free people 
of color owned rural and urban properties, but wealthier whites controlled the more valuable 
estates commensurate with greater privilege.  A census from about the time of Hazard’s visit 
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enumerated eleven steam powered sugar mills, two of them water-powered a la St.-
Domingue (and both owned by French Creoles), and twelve ox-powered trapiches on the 
plain.  Eighty-three cafetales, some eight percent of the 996 total in the country, but 
supplying only four percent of the total coffee production, dotted the hillsides.  Forty-three 
haciendas and thirty-one stock raising farms supplied beasts of burden and transport: horses, 
donkeys, mules, and castrated oxen to haul cartage and sugar cane.  Table 2.8 below presents 
something of a social pyramid with the 298 tobacco plots worked by many rural people of 
color represented together with un-free workers performing labor on estates, as well as on 
their own rozas or conuco vegetable gardens and animal pens, in the category of “farming” 
below. The relative lack of laborers is perhaps indicative, or at least suggestive, of the scale 
and prevalence of forced labor patterns within the district: 
Table 2.8 
Occupation and Race:  
Whites and People of Color (Both Free and Enslaved), Guantánamo, 1861  
Occupation Whites People of Color 
[Enslaved and Free, 
Mulato and Black] 
TOTAL 
Owners/proprietors 175 116 291 
Farming  
[includes many 
slaves] 
1,271 6,848 8,119 
Shop-
keepers/commerce 
135 4 139 
Manufacturers 1 5 6 
Mechanics/Artisans 418 476 894 
Occupation Whites People of Color 
[Enslaved and Free, 
Mulato and Black] 
TOTAL 
Professions 17 5 22 
Laborers 71 253 324 
TOTAL 2,088 7,707 9,795 
Source: Rodríguez, 21, data assembled from Pezuela, II: 498. In addition, Pezuela 
included “3 ecclesiastics of all classes,” 52 active and retired civil servants, and 105 active 
and retired military—all whites, and 28 “pobres de solemnidad,” half white and half “of 
color” for a total of 188 in addition to those listed in the table for 9,983 total of Pezuela’s 
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population figure of 19,619.  It would seem that the majority or even all of the people listed 
in the economically active population table were male. 
 
A set of tax records from 1861 listed sixteen sugar mills in Tiguabos, three in Yateras.  In 
addition there were seventy-four cafetales, forty-one “haciendas de crianza” for rearing 
livestock, sixteen pastureland potreros, 144 other farms: “sitios de labor y estancias,” 243 
tobacco vegas, and four apiaries (aside from clusters of bee-hives that were often tended on 
cafetales for pollinating various flowering plants and providing marketable quantities of 
coffee flower honey and beeswax, and still others similarly maintained on small farms).  
Sagua de Tánamo on the north coast, and drawing white peasant colonizers and free black 
settlers from the Holguín district, had but two primitive sugar mills, both quite small, forty-
one haciendas de crianza, two potreros, five sitios de labor, but 334 tobacco vegas.117 Semi-
peasant subsistence cultivators and settlers in Sagua and other marginal areas thus turned to 
tobacco as a source of revenue. Given the use of honorifics such as “Don” and “Doña” that 
were restricted to legally white residents at this time period, out of a total of 802 taxed rural 
landowners, 430 had “Don” while 46 were “Doña” for 476 total presumed white proprietors.   
In addition, thirteen estates were operated by groups of descendents as an inheritance or as 
caretakers, leaving 265 men without the title and 48 women proprietors without and thus, 
some 313 total free black or mixed-race taxed property owners.  All the taxed owners of 
sugar mills and coffee estates were identified with the honorific, as were the majority of more 
valuable estates.  Out of the sixteen ranchers and potrero pasture owners in Tiguabos and 
Yateras, only four were not so identified as legally white.118 
                                                
117 Libro talonario para la recaudación del impuesto municipal sobre fincas rurales en Guantánamo, in 
ANC, Archivo: Miscelánea de libros, año: 1861, sin legajo, no. de orden: 2.588, Fincas rurales. Impto. de. On 
tobacco cultivation, see Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint and Stubbs, Tobacco on the Periphery. 
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This mixed population stratified by race and class lived dispersed over a wide area. 
The availability of land and low population density led to a pattern of endogamous, more 
self-reliant groups of families, “closed to the extreme of forming true clans ... with the 
correspondent forms of patriarchy” and patron-client networks whereby clients deferred to, 
or followed, the male heads of these extended family groups.119  The weight of tradition, 
custom, and familial authority in this patrician and patriarchal setting must be emphasized in 
analysis of conceptions of honor and gender roles in nineteenth-century Guantánamo society.  
At the same time, the very independent nature of rural life placed women in a setting far 
removed from the lot of urban white upper-class women—held as a societal ideal—confined 
and secluded within the household.  Such urban white women could not go out unsupervised, 
“not even attend church” which, in Hazard’s Anglo-Protestant view, they attended “for 
pastime, it being their only hour of freedom from the shackles that custom throws around 
them.”120  
<><><> 
Given patterns of comparative isolation of the population, dispersal in the often 
rugged terrain, self-sufficiency, and the relative lack of manufactured goods in the 
countryside led to a keen popular knowledge and lore about various uses for natural 
resources from the local environment.  The rural poor contrived musical instruments for their 
changüí social gatherings from salt-cod packing crates (turned into drums and African-
derived lamellaphone instruments), vegetable scrapers, agricultural implements, skillets, 
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spoons, old jugs—even the dried jawbone and teeth of a pack animal (el quijano)—in short, 
from any piece of scrap.  Rural guantanameros practiced a few distinctive regional 
idiosyncrasies, including using the brightly luminescent flying beetle associated with coffee 
producing uplands, the “cucullo” (cucuyo) as artificial illumination, “it is said, by anxious 
lovers, at their stolen nocturnal rendezvous; and it may be for this reason they are such great 
favorites with the ladies, who wear them in their belts, their hair, and under their thin, gauzy 
dresses, which they wear of an evening; the effect, as may be imagined, is as novel as it is 
beautiful.”121 
A further source of regional distinctiveness was the vernacular linguistic diversity. 
The Brookses and French Creole coffee planter Enrique Lescaille hosted Hazard, who was 
astonished to be addressed by “out-of-the-world” slaves in the “Coffee Mountains of 
Yateras” with “bon jour, maitre” and asked by slave women sorting coffee in a mixture of 
Spanish and French “‘Dame medio, maitre’ give me five cents master.”122  The French 
language, or its kin, patois cubain, continued to be spoken alongside Spanish, while numbers 
of Catalan merchants in the town of Guantánamo added to the region’s polyglot linguistic 
hierarchy.  Within the town of Santa Catalina del Guaso itself, the Table 2.9 below of 
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122 Hazard, 438-39, 459-95, especially 488-91 for French patois/ kreyòl spoken by some Yateras 
slaves. In the Padrón essay, Franceses en el suroriente de Cuba, 63, Haitian influence in Cuba arising from 20th 
century immigration is differentiated from “French Creole” or patois cubain, which Padrón asserted may still be 
spoken in regions of the Cauto river and around Gran Piedra east of Santiago de Cuba. This claim renders 
comprehensible the statements of a tourist guidebook from the 1920s: “The dialectic lingua franca employed by 
dull wits of African descent [sic], and certain of the Cantonese, is almost too crippled to speak of in connection 
with pure Castilian. The student has to be well grounded in the language to understand much of it, particularly 
when mixed with the creole French brought over from Haiti in the last century, and frequently heard in Oriente 
prov[ince]. Many Haitian words are current in the vernacular here” and “Formerly there were so many cafetales 
in the region [Yateras] that it was known as Coffee Mts. district. A bizarre French patois is spoken in some 
places, and French names are prominent. It is said that some of the half-castes in the Yateras country have the 
blood of the Cuban aboriginals in their veins,” T. Philip Terry, Terry’s Guide to Cuba, Including the Isle of 
Pines; With a chapter on the Ocean Routes to the Island—A Handbook for Travelers (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1926), 31, 415.  
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nationality and sex, taken from a Spanish census, suggests the Atlantic World’s wider 
cosmopolitan links and connections with Guantánamo: 
 
Table 2.9 
Nationality and Sex, Urban whites, People of Color (Slave and Free, Mulato and black 
[Pardos y Morenos]), and Emancipados, Sta. Catalina de Guantánamo, Cuba 1859-1860 
Origin Men Women TOTAL 
“Of this church” 
[locals] 
217 314 533 
Spain 125 67 192 
France 85 95 180 
“This Island” 
[Cuba] 
104 61 165 
England  
[including Jamaica] 
9 4 13 
The United States 6 N/a 6 
Mexico 6 N/a 6 
Yucatán 1 1 2 
Emancipados 
[Africa] 
18 12 30 
Other locales of the 
island [sic] 
5 2 7 
Total 576 556 1,134 
 Source: Pezuela, II: 503. 
 
The origin of separate languages within the rural district arose from its disparate 
discrete waves of migration and comparative recent settlement, but the survival of these 
ethnic and linguistic divisions indicated some degree of ethnic chauvinism, exclusion, 
isolation, and social control inherent in the plantation system despite the presence of a large 
free population of color.  There is some evidence that hundreds of African bozal captives 
continued to arrive in Guantánamo as late as 1860 according to a British consular dispatch 
concerning the activities of the illegal slave-ship, the Javernies, seized off the African coast 
with 819 slaves aboard and records indicating previous human smuggling runs to 
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southeastern Cuba.123  Slave speech was often dismissed as “jargon,” but it suggested a 
language akin to Haitian Kreyòl.124  Writing of his coffee planter host, Hazard wrote: 
[Because Lescaille was] French, therefore by birth, educated in the United 
States from a boy, and living constantly amongst Spaniards, he had the happy 
faculty of being able to speak either French, English, or Spanish, as a mother-
tongue, in addition to which he spoke the Creole dialect, – a compound of vile 
French and some little Spanish, which is the usual language of the negroes and 
the plantation.125  
 
A Spanish census recorded, “almost all of the oldest families in Santa Catalina originated in 
the immigration from Santo Domingo and have French last names [.] [T]hat language is as 
usual in this area as it was in the former French part of [Hispaniola].”126 
 This marked French influence, it must be emphasized, was equally prominent in 
Santiago de Cuba and its environs.  Furthermore, Santiago boasted a much larger population.  
Another travel account indicated “the revolution in San Domingo ... gave the first great 
stimulus to the culture of the coffee plant in Cuba” when “refugees from the opposite shore 
sought shelter wherever they could find it ... large numbers made their new homes in the 
eastern department of Cuba” transforming the “lands which had been idle for three and four 
centuries into smiling gardens.”127  Much like Cienfuegos, founded on Cuba’s southern coast 
in 1819, another French infusion arose after the transfer of Louisiana to U.S. control after 
1803.  In addition to Cuba’s east, the initial wave of immigration, arising from the great slave 
                                                
 
123 Bosch and Sánchez, 64, 82. See also, Guerra, I: 26. 
 
124  Robert B. Hoernel, “A Comparison of Sugar and Social Change in Puerto Rico and Oriente, Cuba: 
1898-1959” (Ph.D. dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1977), 123; Emilio Bacardí y Moreau, Crónicas de 
Santiago de Cuba 10 vols. (Madrid: Gráficas Breogán, 1973), III: 218.  
 
125 Hazard, 464.  
 
126 Pezuela, II: 507.  
 
127 Ballou, 243.  
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revolution in St.-Domingue, and then leavened by post-Napoleonic war arrivals migrated and 
re-migrated to New Orleans, Charleston, Havana, and other regions in the wider Gulf Coast 
and circum-Caribbean basin.128   
French cultural influence in the arts, popular culture, the opera and theater, dance, and 
styles of dress marked the age throughout much of Latin America, but in eastern Cuba such 
forms and practices could not be extricated from the actual presence of French and Franco-
Haitian migrant families and their descendents. Just a few years before Hazard’s visit, a 
Santiago newspaper article series, Lo que fuimos, celebrated the courtly manners and refined 
styles of dress brought by francophone immigrants, decrying in Cuba “the acceptance of 
americanism of the United States” that displaced French “urbanity and culture” with an 
“aristocracy of money [emphasis in original].”129  Proximity to the United States offered a 
cultural, social, and economic pole for much of Cuba, but the east was both more Caribbean 
hybrid and French; Hazard did notice quite a few “articles direct from France” and, “made 
only for this market [Santiago]... at extraordinarily low prices.”130  The rural census predating 
both Hazard’s trip, and the newspaper’s series on culture and noblesse oblige indicated a 
profusion of French surnames among coffee planters in Guantánamo, divided into the 
separate jurisdictions of Tiguabos and Yateras in the Tables 2.10 and 2.11 below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
128 Suggestive of a broader francophone Caribbean pattern, see for example the children of Eulalie 
Mandeville and Eugène Macarty who moved to Santiago de Cuba to start coffee farms before returning to New 
Orleans in Scott, Degrees of Freedom, 21. 
 
129 Portuondo, 206, quoting “M.M.N.” in El Marino “Lo que fuimos,” 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 January 1862.  
 
130 Hazard, 440.  
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Table 2.10 
32 Tiguabos Cafetales, Owner, Acreage Cultivated and Uncultivated, Number of Slaves, 
Guantánamo, Cuba, ca. 1854 
Coffee farm Owner Estimated 
Acreage- 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated 
Slave dotación 
El Dorado D. Gregorio 
Planche 
91.66 
510.95 
58 
La Luisa D. Félix 
Arnaud 
199.98 
1,066.56 
114 
Olimpo D. Antonio 
Carbonell  
99.9 
399.96 
78 
Indiana  83.325 
249.98 
70 
Oasis  99.9 
1,399.86 
48 
Alegría  133.32 
499.95 
50 
Chaumier D. Agustín 
Ybonet [Ivonet] 
133.32 
566.61 
64 
Carlota D. José Cagnet 133.32 
366.63 
37 
María Luisa D. Juan 
Loustanan 
266.64 
299.97 
87 
Soledad 
[later converted 
to a sugar 
estate] 
D. Gregorio 
Malletá 
116.655 
199.98 
190 
San Juan Hodelin 
Brothers 
66.66 
333.3 
31 
Belona Fernando 
Toreau 
66.66 
1,266.54 
24 
Cuneira Hodelin 
Brothers 
133.32 
433.29 
60 
Reunion Luis E. Oscar 133.32 
933.24 
72 
San Emilio Luis Ernesto 133.32 
433.29 
112 
Celina Luis Bombout 133.32 
533.28 
55 
Emilia D. Luis Tarosay 133.32 
199.98 
140 
Alma D. Hipólito 
Daudinot 
116.655 
183.315 
46 
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Coffee farm Owner Estimated 
Acreage- 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated 
Slave dotación 
Recompensa Hodelin 
Brothers 
133.32 
133.32 
46 
S. Luis D. Luis Tarosay 133.32 
499.95 
90 
Romaná D. Miguel 
Morasin 
[Moracen] 
133.32 
499.95 
42 
San Esteban D. Teodoro 
Brooks 
33.33 
66.66 
80 
Santa María D. Carlos Coste [blank] [blank] 
San Pedro  199.98 
266.64 
160 
N. Soledad Da. Margarita  
Brum 
116.655 
216.65 
46 
San Juan de  
Bellavista 
Da. Lucía 
Daudinot 
116.655 
566.61 
46 
Sitio D. Juan Bec 11.1 
25 
6 
Hermanos D. Hipólito 
Daudinot 
116.655 
549.95 
46 
Yemen D. Adriano 
Daudinot 
116.655 
666.6 
47 
Isabelita D. Martín 
Vizcay 
133.32 
866.58 
80 
Unión D. Ana Aguirre 50 
116.655 
25 
Rosita D. Carlos 
Lauverin 
16.665 
50 
14 
TOTALS 54,347 
arrobas* 
coffee 
3,532.98 cult. 
12,965.37 uncl. 
2,064 
1 Chinese 
Average 
dotación: 
  64.5 Slaves 
Source: Data from Padrón de fincas rústicas del partido de Tiguabos, propietarios, dotación, 
producción y rentas, ANC, fondo: Gobierno General, leg. 388, no. 18511, s.f. (Acreage estimates 
from caballerías, with 1 caballería = 33.2 acres. *An arroba was approximately 107 lbs.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
Table 2.11 
36 Yateras Cafetales, Owner, Acreage Cultivated and Uncultivated, Number of Slaves, 
Guantánamo, Cuba, ca. 1854 
Coffee Farm Owner Estimated Acreage- 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated 
Slave dotación 
Cubana D. Cayetano 
Ysalgué 
99.99 
233.31 
24 
Dios Ayuda Da. Lucía Felipe 
[Phillips] 
50 
166.65 
37 
Perla D. Juan Duvergé 166.65 
333.3 
82 
Santa Teresa D. General Espalter 116.655 
166.5 
70 
Perú D. Juan Carrera 16.665 
633.27 
12 
Confianza D. José Lassalle 16.665 
133.32 
4 
Ninfa D. Eugenio 
Dinesure 
199.98 
399.96 
98 
Valparaíso D. Juan Eugas 99.99 
899.91 
72 
Monte Alto Da. María del 
Caridad Soler 
16.665 
99.99 
8 
San Fernando D. Fernando Pons 66.66 
266.64 
38 
Unión [Illegible] 133.32 
[Illegible] 
20 
Ermitaño D. Enrique Lescaille 133.32 
199.98 
36 
Chaumier D. Luis A. 
Constantin 
16.665 
99.99 
17 
Monte Verde D. Federico 
Lescaille 
133.32 
333.3 
118 
Victoria D. Edmundo 
Reygondeau 
99.99 
266.64 
36 
Bella Vista D. Juan Begué 99.99 
333.3 
40 
Bella Vista D. Pedro Daisson 33.33 
66.66 
10 
Naranjos D. Eduardo Chivas 99.99 
199.98 
 
54 
Las Gracias D. Victor Savon 133.32 
133.32 
26 
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Coffee farm Owner Estimated Acreage- 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated 
Slave dotación 
Palmarito D. Artur Limon 66.66 
133.32 
15 
Joben María [sic, 
Joven María] 
D. Juan Dumé 33.33 
99.99 
14 
Amistad D. Lencio Turcas 133.32 
366.63 
89 
Felicidad D. Isidoro Bayú 
[Bayeux] 
199.98 
599.94 
55 
Campo Hermoso D. José A. Morales 50 
166.65 
20 
Méjico D. Pedro Oscar 
Durevé 
66.66 
166.65 
40 
Noely D. Raimundo 
Baquet 
50 
199.98 
14 
Monte S. Juan Da. Juana Mena 16.665 
66.66 
30 
Carolina D. Federico Preval 25 
33.33 
6 
Valdor D. Jorge Preval 25 
66.66 
22 
Clarita D. Jorge Preval 50 
199.98 
28 
Santa Isabel D. Emilio 
Reygondeau 
66.66 
66.66 
62 
Cedro Gordo D. Emilio 
Reygondeau 
99.99 
199.98 
64 
Chalet D. Emilio 
Reygondeau 
133.32 
333.3 
39 
Polía [Folie?] D. Pedro Boulí 41.66 
99.99 
12 
Esperanza D. Numá 
Reygondeau 
133.32 
199.98 
71 
Mont Friendship 
[Amistad] 
D. Fernando Pons 
[Félix Durruthy] 
133.32 
199.98 
50 
TOTALS   1,433  
Average dotación:   40 slaves 
Source: Data from Padrón de fincas rústicas del partido de Yateras, propietarios, dotación, 
producción y rentas, ANC, fondo: Gobierno General, leg. 388, nos. 18510, s.f. (Acreage 
estimates from caballerías, with 1 caballería = 33.2 acres.) 
 
The data suggest the French, Creole, and Spanish cafetaleros possessed an average dotación, 
or slave work force, resident at each cafetal of 64.5 for estates in Tiguabos, and 40 in 
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Yateras.  By the time of Hazard’s visit, he thought that “fifty or sixty” bonded agricultural 
workers were required to cultivate every thousand acres. Elsewhere he estimated that on 264 
acres, “two hundred thousand [coffee] trees can be planted” producing about “sixty-two 
thousand five hundred pounds of coffee” that would command a “nice little return of fifteen 
thousand dollars” if coffee prices were at twenty-five dollars for 100 pounds. “From that, of 
course, have to be deducted the expenses” of running the estate, transport, and so forth.131 
  Slave laborers grew coffee seedlings, which were then “carefully and regularly 
weeded” every month “for two years; at the end of which time those plants that have attained 
to the height of thirty inches are cropped” and stunted. By the end of three years the coffee 
tree began “bearing in small quantities; at the end of the fourth year” the trees had matured 
and gave a yearly harvest “for twenty-five or thirty years’ at the end of the sixth or seventh 
year, they require[d] pruning; and after ten years, they” only produced a harvestable crop 
“every alternate year.”132 
 Slaves performed a variety of tasks with each season, including introducing new 
plantings, extending cultivation, diverting watercourses for irrigation and as a power source 
for machinery, clearing land, and performing gang and task labor as required on the estate.133 
                                                
131 Hazard, 481.  
 
132 Hazard, 482. For a detailed account of coffee cultivation and everyday life on a range of western 
Cuban cafetales, including the isle’s single largest at Angerona west of Havana, see Van Norman, especially 
chs. 2 and 3. For coffee production in other Latin American contexts, see William Roseberry, Lowell 
Gudmundson, and Mario Samper Kutschbach, eds, Coffee, Society, and Power in Latin America (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1995). For the Caribbean, see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Coffee Planters and 
Coffee Slaves in the Antilles: The Impact of a Secondary Crop,” in Ira Berlin, and Philip Morgan, eds., 
Cultivation and Culture: Labor and the Shaping of Slave Life in the Americas (Charlottesville, VA: University 
of Virginia Press, 1993).   
 
133 A full description of coffee cultivation, the erection of farm buildings, patterns of gang and task 
labor, and other aspects of the life of bond workers is beyond the scope of the present work. For a more 
extensive treatment see Van Norman for colonial western Cuba, and Stein for Vassouras in the state of Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil.  
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As with sugar, the crop shaped the nature of work and its rhythms and pace.  Farm work was 
difficult, and workdays could—and often did—last fifteen hours, but they compared 
favorably to what often prevailed on the sugar mills, especially in the long harvesting and 
grinding season.134  In late February until April or “even up to June” the trees were in flower.  
By September through November, throughout the rainy and hurricane seasons, the harvest 
season occurred. Overseers set the amounts each harvest hand had to pick, stipulating 
rewards for quotas met and meting out sanctions or punishments for failure. On many 
cafetales an ox or mule-powered pulping mill, while wealthier coffee estates used  steam or 
water-powered pulping mills in a circular track overrode the dried coffee cherries to remove 
the pulp, or in the latter case, so it could be washed off and removed from the beans after 
fermentation for half a day.  Other slaves raked the cleaned beans out onto “secaderos, or 
drying floors ... large stone basins, quadrangular in shape, about fifty or sixty feet long ... 
arranged in a sort of terrace, ... about three feet from the ground, built of stone, with plastered 
floors” and built in such a way “to drain off the water in case of rain.”135 In such squalls or 
storms, the beans would be raked up and covered with a small thatched roof to protect them 
until the rain ceased. Various other operations, some involving the pulping-mill again, 
processed the dry fruit and their seeds—the beans—for the operations of sorting, sifting, 
packing, shipping, and transport to market.  
The labor the slave workforce performed included not just cultivating and harvesting 
the coffee, but also frequently upland “rice, plantains, potatoes [sic, viandas—as a variety of 
starchy root vegetables such as yucca, malanga, boniato, potatoes, etc. eaten in Cuba in lieu 
                                                
 
134 Hall, 18; Van Norman.  
 
135 Hazard, 483-86.  
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of bread are known], cacao or chocolate, and all kinds of fruit ... planted in the same fields 
with the coffee in order that the trees may eventually afford the shade which the coffee plant 
requires.”136 These crops allowed for greater food self-sufficiency, often shaded the coffee 
trees, and provided a lucrative source of revenue for internally marketed produce—especially 
important while the planters awaited full harvests given the nature of the crop.  These 
cultigens suitable for internal markets or subsistence also served as a crucial hedge or social 
safety valve during periods of economic downturn, low coffee prices, crop failures, disease 
outbreaks, and other mishaps.   
Like sugar mills, the coffee estate also had “its batey, or square ... not generally so 
extensive as on the sugar-estates, consisting of the casa de vivienda, or dwelling-house, the 
tendales, or store-houses, ... stone terraces for drying the coffee, the stables,” the slave 
barracoon or cluster of thatched bohío huts, “and the coffee-house where the fruit is prepared, 
this being generally the largest of the structures.”137 At times, cacao beans for the 
manufacture of chocolate would be grown in exportable quantities. Still other cafetales 
gained renown for their plantains, mangos, oranges, limes, or other fruits and vegetables. 
Hazard’s hosts took him to see their friends’ and relatives’ estates. He found the 
“Monte de Verde, the finest estate in this section of the country ... situated in a lovely valley, 
‘midst surrounding hills” with a “large and handsome” dwelling house, replete with both 
flower and “fruit and vegetable gardens” that were “large and very fine” having cultivated 
                                                
 
136 Hazard, 480.  
 
137 Hazard, 480-481. It appears that slaves on coffee farms lived in either a group of independent huts, 
or a barracoon of one to four large thatched buildings, sometimes with multiple rooms. See the brief study by 
Zoe Cremé Ramos and Rafael Duharte Jiménez, Barracones en los cafetales? (Havana: Publicigraf, 1994).  For 
a fuller discussion of slave housing on colonial coffee farms over time see Van Norman, especially chs. 3 and 4.  
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even “the strawberry.”138 The padrón from the decade before his visit, did indeed list 
Federico Lescaille’s Monte Verde as having the largest dotación in Yateras: 118 slaves. He 
also noted “one or two fine estates belonging to the Rousseau family, who at one time 
resided in the United States, and their places” bore the state “names of Virginia and 
Alabama.”139  “The loveliest place, however” in his estimation, “was the one known as the 
‘Orangeries’ [sic, Los Naranjos], which, high up among the mountains, was itself built upon 
a plateau” with “a fine stone house, built something in the style of some of the Swiss chalets, 
and finished in its interior with the beautiful polished wood of the country” with, 
furthermore, “a splendid view of the adjacent mountains and the valley beneath.”140 
 The Franco-Cuban Creoles, Béarnaise, Spanish, and Catalan proprietors were 
haughtily proud of their intensively worked splendid estates and seigniorial life-style.  For 
those descended from petit blancs, ruined grand blancs, and some refugee gens de coleur, or 
“affranchis” from Haiti, their fortunes had been rebuilt from the losses that their French and 
Franco-Haitian forbears had incurred.  Over time they had built up privileged positions and a 
manorial lifestyle either in residence in urban centers, or at their country estates at the old 
professions of managing sugar-making and coffee culture in the vicinity of Santiago, moving 
                                                
 
138 Hazard, 479.  
 
139 The author can attest that Virginia still exists as a town in present-day Guantánamo Province, as do 
many of the old cafetales, including Carolina, Dios Ayuda, and others.  I am grateful to José Sánchez Guerra, 
the historian of Guantánamo, for alerting me to the existence of extant ruins from the epoch as well. See the ruin 
of Los Naranjos in Diego Bosch Ferrer, and José Sánchez Guerra, Rebeldía y apalencamiento: Jurisdicciones 
de Guantánamo y Baracoa (Guantánamo: Centro Provincial de Patrimonio Cultural, 2003), 22-23. In addition 
to the UNESCO World Heritage site of Cafetal Isabelica at Gran Piedra near Santiago de Cuba with its 
museum, Padrón, 64, mentioned ruins of “Fraternidad ... near Ramón de las Yaguas; ‘Kentucky,’ apparently 
founded by migrants from New Orleans; ‘La Indiana,’” whose destruction will be discussed in the chapter on 
the Ten Years’ War, as well as El Olimpo, Tres Arroyos, Gran Sofía, Amitié, Villanueva, La Linne, Providence, 
and other traces of the old coffee estates. [See photo “Cafetal La Isabelica.”]   
 
140 Hazard, 472-73.  
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east in some cases to the comparatively empty frontier and forests primeval of Guantánamo.  
Cuban historian José Antonio Portuondo cited Emilio Bacardí’s description of one Catalan-
owned cafetal near Santiago as “one of the most splendid ... one of the gardens of the so-
called French colony ... the house, almost a palace [replete with] a library, billiards room, its 
own school, chapel, etc.”141  They also brought with them notions of slave discipline, social 
control, and policing from the old colony of their forebears, just across the Windward 
Passage from the territory of their new plantations.   
As Hazard unfailingly indicated, “This is the same district where, before the present 
troubles, runaway negroes, deserters, and convicts had collected, and uniting together for 
protection, were fortified in such a way in those wild mountain passes” so that it was 
difficult, if not impossible “to dislodge them.”142  Again, such was the border-like quality of 
southeastern Cuba, demonstrating the cultural and spatial metaphors of frontier and their 
social control implications for this end of the island, distant from Havana’s—let alone 
Madrid’s—authority. 
 
Cimarronaje: The Social Control Problem Posed by Maroons 
By the time of Hazard’s description, he had somewhat overstated the actual 
prevalence and continuing viability of this form of fugitive slave activity as a plausible form 
of resistance.143 Certainly all forms of passive and active slave struggle, from the sudden and 
                                                
 
141 Portuondo, 205 citing Emilio Bacardí Moreau, Crónicas de Santiago de Cuba vols. I, II, and III.  
 
142 Hazard, 475-476. On geographic and demographic features of eastern Cuba conducive to the 
establishment of fugitive settlements, see La Rosa, 75, 140. 
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extemporaneous to the carefully planned and executed, remained constant preoccupations for 
slave owners throughout the island.  Outright rebellions and sudden uprisings appeared to be 
far more common in western Cuba, while flight into the interior, with fugitives thereupon 
banding together in the wild, became somewhat more frequent in Cuba’s east than elsewhere 
due to geographic and demographic conditions.144 Nevertheless, any resistance from slaves—
either real or perceived, violent or evasive—imposed social control demands on the slave 
system and its social hierarchy and norms. The mere existence of fugitive bands of runaways 
implied internal subversion: slave owners could be thwarted successfully and there was the 
intolerable-to-masters possibility that ex-slaves could attain a rough sort of independence 
without the consent of authority figures.145  The exaggeration of slave flight reflected the 
perceived dangers posed to the system by both petit marronage – temporarily absconding 
from the plantation – and grand marronage – attempted permanent flight into the interior: 
                                                                                                                                                  
143 La Rosa, Runaway Slave Settlements in Cuba, 178-217, maintained that anti-maroon patrols and 
expeditions declined because there were ever fewer numbers of maroons.  He wrote that the last mention of 
such a counter-maroon operation was mounted in 1864, near El Cobre, p. 217.   
 
144 La Rosa, 9-11, 95-98, 129-139. Southeastern Cuba, especially the regions around Guantánamo and 
Baracoa, had traditionally been viewed as sites conducive to slave flight, including grand marronage, with the 
formation of palenques relatively more widespread than elsewhere. See Bosch and Sánchez; Zoila Danger Roll, 
Los cimarrones de El Frijol (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 1977); José L. Franco, “Maroons and Slave 
Rebellions in the Spanish Territories” in Price, ed. Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas, 
2nd ed., pp. 35-48; La Rosa, Runaway Slave Settlements in Cuba; Francisco Pérez de la Riva, “Cuban 
Palenques” in Price, ed. Maroon Societies, pp. 49-59; John Glanville Taylor, The United States and Cuba 
(London: Richard Bentley, 1851), 226-331, partially quoted in Louis A. Pérez, Jr. ed., Slaves, Sugar, and 
Colonial Society: Travel Accounts of Cuba, 1801-1899 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Books, 1992), 
114-116. On slave-hunters or rancheadores in western Cuba, see Cirilo Villaverde, Diario del rancheador 
(Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1982), and Demoticus Philalethes [a pseudonym], “Hunting the Maroons 
with Dogs in Cuba” from Yankee Travels Through the Island of Cuba (New York: Appleton and Co,, 1856), 38-
42 reprinted in Price, ed., Maroon Societies, 60-3.  
 
145 Hadden, 141-43; La Rosa, 198. For maroons in other circum-Caribbean contexts, see Richard Price, 
ed. Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas; see also Captain John Gabriel Stedman’s 
narrative of anti-maroon expeditions by African-born “Coromantee rangers” and Dutch marine infantry in 
Surinam in the late 1700s: Richard Price and Sally Price, Stedman’s Surinam: Life in an Eighteenth-Century 
Slave Society (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992). On maroons in Haiti see Jean Fouchard, The 
Haitian Maroons: Liberty or Death, trans. by A. Faulkner Watts (New York: Edward W. Blyden Press, 1981).  
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There are two kinds of runaways; those who merely leave on account of some 
temporary pique, or fright, and others who really start thinking to get back to 
their country. The former seldom stay away long, and generally lurk about the 
house itself, and are mostly soon caught or come back of themselves. But the 
others, who try to get away entirely, have a different idea, for as they came by 
sea, so do they expect to get back to Africa by land, and always make for the 
east.146 
 
Well before Hazards’ visit, the foreign visitor cited above, John Taylor, had written of 
the phenomenon of slave resistance assuming the form of cimarronaje, or maroonage, from 
the Spanish term for turning feral.  Easternmost Cuba, this earlier visitor reported, had 
“[c]ollections of wild Indians, or negroes,” who formed hidden inaccessible communities, 
and which, “so established, are called Palenques, and the people, ‘Apalencadoes.’[sic, 
apalencados].”147 “For the capture of what is called a ‘cimarrón simple,’” a mere runaway, 
that is, “any slave found wandering more than twelve miles from his master’s house without 
a passport, a reward of four dollars is recoverable from the owner,” he wrote,  “and many 
poor Spaniards turn a penny by looking out for such chances.” “The Palenques” however, 
necessitated “a different regulation. Sometimes they form themselves in more accessible 
districts, and a settlement of runaways is termed a palenque when there are more than seven 
congregated.”148 In order to deal with hidden pockets of such fugitive runaways or maroons, 
the old Spanish militia tradition practiced by the oldest Creole families underwent a 
transformation from armed retinues raised among the planters themselves into a volunteer 
militarized police force dedicated to undertaking regular slave patrols. 
                                                
 
146 Taylor, 226-31.  
 
147 Taylor, 226-31.  “Palenque” literally means palisade or wood-fence.  “Apalencado” was thus a 
person resident in a palenque. 
 
148 Taylor, 226-31.  
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This farthest southeastern end of the island, as stated earlier, lay in close proximity to 
Haiti, site of slave revolution feared as a contagion.  Every now and then officials viewed the 
imposition of crown control and authority over this largely deserted and long ignored area as 
an imperative.  Such occasional imperial defensive directives in turn fomented various 
schemes, which typically could not be carried out, to promote white settlement in general, 
and military colonization in particular.  Persistent smuggling and the existence of a lawless 
milieu of illegal slave trading, piracy and privateering that accompanied the end of the 
Napoleonic wars and the South American wars of independence fed imperial fears.  Illicit 
commerce was rumored to provide a link between maroons and Haiti or Jamaica.149 The 
early nineteenth century with its political instability and slave-based economic surge saw 
many slave uprisings in western Cuba, and considerable maroon activity in the east.  Large 
palenques such as El Frijol between Guantánamo and Baracoa and Muluala near Santiago 
were sources of planter concern and preoccupation.150  In a recent synthesis surveying the 
contours of the Afro-Latin American experience one historian has likened the effort at 
maroon suppression “a continuing battle” in the years 1815-1838 by professional slave 
hunters “many of them free blacks and mulattoes.”151 As fears of uprisings and rebellions 
assumed the form of a more indiscriminate repression of blacks and mixed-race people 
generally in the wake of the Escalera conspiracy of the 1840s, so named after the practice of 
tying suspects to ladders to be tortured, social control came to rely much more on policing 
                                                
 
149 Franco, “Maroons and Slave Rebellions in the Spanish Territories” in Price, ed. Maroon Societies, 
43, rehearsed this view, citing ANC, Correspondencia de los Capitanes Generales, leg. 139, no. 1.  
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racial boundaries drawn between whiteness and blackness instead of servile condition. 152 
Whatever fears Haiti and full-scale race war may have exerted in the Cuban imaginary, it was 
often the aggregate of myriad localized dreads of localized slave rebellion, and vengeful 
responses by oppressed slaves at the level of each plantation and district that informed social 
control responses. 
In much of the island poor white farmers could form a yeomanry, serving as a 
bulwark to the plantation system in the same way poor whites in the U.S. south formed a 
social control stratum aligned with planters and slaveholders defined by racial oppression of 
people of color. Indeed, throughout colonial Spanish America the espada ancha, or gentry’s 
short sword, was a gendered emblem of social rank for rural, legally white, male proprietors, 
becoming adapted over time into more of a tool and less of a weapon in the form of the 
ubiquitously carried machete.  As a traveler wrote, “when [the Monteros or yeomanry] stir 
abroad, in nearly all parts of the island, they are armed with a sword, and in the eastern 
sections about Santiago, or even Cienfuegos, they also carry pistols ... the arming of the 
Monteros has always been encouraged by the authorities, as they form a sort of militia at all 
times available against negro insurrection, a calamity in fear of which such communities 
must always live.” Even though the guajiro countryman—as white self-employed peasants 
and some rural free people of color were called—was “rarely a slaveholder” he was 
“frequently engaged on the sugar plantations during the busy season as an overseer, and, to 
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his discredit be it said, he generally prove[d] to be a hard taskmaster, entertaining an intuitive 
dislike to the negroes [sic].”153  
Nevertheless, in the trackless east a more organized patrol system had to be created 
instead of simply relying on informal methods such as rural guajiros—“poor [white] 
Spaniards”—ever on the lookout for reward opportunities by returning runaways “sought by 
hue and cry.”  A regular slave patrol was created from one of the disciplined militia 
Squadrons of Fernando VII established in Cuba during the wars of independence in Latin 
America.  Adopting a longue durée view of parapolicing from Mediterranean origins one 
could view the antecedents of militia service in the Spanish empire deriving from the Santa 
Hermandad road patrols of Iberia’s medieval epoch.154  In the case of Guantánamo, it seems 
that hereditary control of this Squadron was passed down to males in the extended Pérez 
family—one of a number of old settler families with features of rural clans—of the old 
Indian village, San Anselmo de Tiguabos.  The Escuadras de Santa Catalina formed a 
southeastern Cuban analog of the maréchausée slave hunters of St.-Domingue and used their 
intimate knowledge of the local terrain in behalf of their planter patrons.   
Fruitful comparisons could be made between patterns of behavior of fugitive slaves 
forming maroon communities in the wider circum-Caribbean, and Afro-Latin America, 
which demonstrate broad similarities.  A surfeit of unoccupied land seems to be a pre-
condition or objective factor for this form of slave resistance, as suggested by the Jamaican 
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154 Hall, 75-77, noted that in sixteenth-century Cuba “a hermandad of masters” pursued runaways, but 
was shortly replaced by rancheadores using trained dogs.  She cited Würdeman and Ortiz that monetary 
rewards for the capture of runaways elicited denunciations and captures by other slaves. She also referred to 
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cockpit country in the early 1700s, the borderland between St.-Domingue and Santo 
Domingo on Hispaniola, and most especially the survival of maroons in mainland colonies 
such as Surinam and Brazil.  After all, fugitives had to be able to get away to someplace free 
of scrutiny for maroonage to be a plausible form of resistance.  Imperatives of survival, 
evasion, and escape led many fugitives to swamps or densely forested mountains, preferably 
in a sparsely settled region, yet sometimes not so far removed so that contraband or illicit 
trade could be conducted with free communities.  Most instances of palenque/ quilombo (as 
palenques were known in the Lusophone South Atlantic system) formation were 
accompanied by factors that arose from profound political and economic instability as well. 
The Luso-Dutch wars in seventeenth century Brazil, the 1655 English seizure of Jamaica 
from Spain, and the various Anlgo-French and Anglo-Spanish inter-imperial struggles in the 
Caribbean fomented fissures and ruptures in plantation and mine discipline that slaves 
exploited, and often led to the military mobilization of free people of color and slaves.   
While broad similarities in maroon communities’ formation across colonial contexts 
can be shown, the repressive response of planter societies exhibits more variation to the 
security and social control problem such rebels posed.  Eastern Cuban maroon activity and 
the paramilitary cuadrilleros who pursued them bore resemblances to the quilombos and the 
so-called “bush captains” or capitães do mato who hunted fugitive slaves in Brazil, although 
in the latter case many such bush captains were free blacks or people of color.  Brazil’s sheer 
size and variegated terrain offered fugitive runaways the ability to form quilombos in areas 
ranging from mountains to jungles to coastal mangrove swamps.  Eastern Cuba’s mountain 
ranges and forests formed potentially ideal terrain for such refuges.  In Brazil’s urban locales 
there were even gang-like temporary autonomous zones composed of denizens of the city’s 
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demimonde, slaves plying the streets or operating workshops in their masters’ behalf who 
absconded from their job sites, and more permanent runaways.  In a documentary collection, 
historian of Brazilian slavery Robert Conrad conveyed a range of slave resistance from 
individual flight to the formation of quilombos to various revolts.155 An 1824 report from Rio 
de Janeiro’s Chief of Police suggests the conundrum faced by slave societies throughout the 
Diaspora in suppressing maroonage.  He complained that ordinary soldiers and police could 
not approach rebel encampments without giving the game away: “when the assault begins the 
blacks (and the deserters who live among them) have already been informed and have 
abandoned the place where they were thought to be hiding out.”156 Meanwhile, he decried in 
irritation that the “so-called bush captains, which the town council appoints, are worthless” 
claiming that they moonlighted as slave-stealers, kidnapping non-fugitives and selling them 
as contraband.157 He recommended procuring the services of specialists, in this scenario, 
“foot soldiers and bush captains” who pursued both diamond smugglers and runaways in 
Minas Gerais.  In the case of Guantánamo, something like a specialized body of men at arms 
would be maintained for such suppressive duties.  Similarly, an 1853 Brazilian report on the 
destruction of quilombos in Maranhão that had been formed initially during the 1835-1840 
Balaiada liberal revolt indicated that a special troop of soldiers was utilized, undertaking a 
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long counter-maroon campaign.158 Quite like colonization schemes proposed for 
Guantánamo the report recommended “a military colony” be established to prevent the 
maroons regrouping.159   
Present-day Brazil has villages of maroon descendents, often recognized by the 
Federal Government.  A definitive answer as to whether some Cuban towns in the 
countryside may have a similar heritage, alluded to by Francisco Pérez de la Riva, must await 
further research, but certainly the place names Palenque and Palenquito are quite common in 
the southeastern districts.160  It would seem that if such communities eluded the colonial state 
that they ultimately melded with the free rural population of color—especially during the 
long Ten Years’ War.  Returning to maroonage and its suppression in Cuba’s east, John 
Taylor published an account of maroon activity there in 1851, just two years before the 
northern Brazilian case just mentioned.      
A somewhat hyperbolically sensationalized, even at times jocular account from 
Taylor nevertheless illustrated aspects of maroonage, as well as continued sabotage and 
truculently defiant behavior on the part of at least one unknown black woman rebel resisting 
re-enslavement by a white bounty hunter:  
one of a party for catching Apalencados [that is, a cuadrillero or rancheador],  
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had managed to separate himself from the rest; being doubly confident, 
inasmuch as he carried, besides the usual rapier, a double-barreled percussion 
gun. As he was going along quietly through the wood, he heard the voices of a 
man and woman in conversation. He immediately burst through the bushes, 
and stood in front of them demanding surrender, and presenting his gun. The 
man, instead of complying, was making off, when the white man, knowing he 
could not catch him while encumbered with his gun, pulled the trigger, but the 
cap only exploded! On this the woman, turning round in another direction, 
called out, “Francisco come out! White man gun no powder got!” [sic] Now 
behold three adversaries; the men armed with swords, the woman with a long 
knife! However, not this time did his gun prove faithless; he quietly put on a 
fresh cap, and, as there was no help for it, took a deliberate aim at each of the 
men, whom he shot in turn, and afterwards capturing the woman, not without 
some trouble and a few wounds, made his way back to his party.161  
 
Under no circumstance could the slave system tolerate maroons defying involuntary 
servitude.  Motivations of slave patrols included an authoritarian, racial and ideological 
component, and the profit motive.162  The return of runaway slaves to bondage, or their 
descendents who had been independent subsistence cultivators, was fraught with difficulties, 
of course.  Adult rebels proved difficult to assimilate within a plantation’s dotación.  The 
foreign author above added to his account that “A good many children are captured in these 
[anti-maroon] expeditions” and reported “The rest of the negroes look with supreme 
contempt on these Palenque people, and really think it a disgrace to have been there. I have 
often heard them twit” a former maroon  “woman on her origin.” “As for her,” he added,  
she was one of the greatest furies and most completely intractable creatures 
one could conceive. She had really no end of paramours; and she carried her 
familiarities with them to such a scandalous degree, that [she was] placed ... 
under some restraint or other; in revenge for which she actually set fire to 
[the] house, which was burned to the ground, with much valuable property! It 
was her anxiety to include [her owner] in the conflagration, which saved him, 
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162 La Rosa, 198, emphasized the ideological and political needs of the systems, arguing that such anti-
maroon patrols were very expensive to undertake, the numbers of captives taken small, and the profit to be 
made from the sale or return of the captives controlled to only eight pesos per runaway. It would seem, 
however, that those participant in such expeditions received pay and forms of remuneration and privileges for 
their services. Future research may reveal other calculi in greater detail.    
 95 
for she set fire to the thatch just above where he slept, and the crackling of the 
flames awoke him, but if she had chosen another part, he might easily have 
been suffocated. In consideration of this proof of her warm feelings, he 
disposed of her to a sugar estate, where she would hardly have a chance to 
play such pranks, her propensities being known.163  
 
Again the threat of sale to a sugar plantation, in this case carried out against an intransigent, 
rebellious woman appeared as a threat held over slaves in other settings as a form of 
punishment beyond floggings, the stocks, and other cruel corporal punishments used in slave 
discipline. 
<><><> 
In July 1830, Antonio de León of Mayarí commanded a military operation of 
specialized slave hunting militia to locate and destroy four palenques including Muluala and 
a satellite village, Bumba near the Río Frío: 
I hid long enough for the lieutenant [with two scouts and thirty of fifty armed 
men]  to emplace himself, and in a half hour I began the attack. A few steps 
forward and I found myself in a ditch full of pointed sticks. However, we 
overcame this first obstacle without being heard. The second obstacle seemed 
insuperable: this was the climbing of a steep, rugged hill ... which had two 
very narrow, winding paths that we followed, endlessly. ... at a turn of the path 
we encountered a Negro who, armed with a machete, attacked the first man in 
line. The latter, having already loaded his gun, fired a shot, whose report was 
heard throughout the rocky area. The Negro tried to run away but was too 
badly wounded and bleeding to go far. The sound of the shot caused the other 
Negroes on the hill to disperse. These then fled to the opposite side of the hill 
overcoming cliffs that have to be seen to be believed. We redoubled our pace, 
but when, out of breath and tired we reached the top, the only traces of them 
we could find were the pieces of cloth caught on the thorns in the bushes.164   
 
The fugitive slave hunters discovered seventeen huts with thirty beds, “spread out that it is 
only possible to surprise 2 or 3 at one time” and “built so low that they cannot be seen over 
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the bushes” to render them very difficult to detect.165 The pursuers of runaways were 
informed by a captive that the maroons traded beeswax and forest products for clothing, 
tobacco, and tools, and de León expressed fear that should they “get the firearms (which they 
now lack)” that their position would be impregnable.  Such campaigns, and the Caribbean 
history of similar persistent problems such as the eighteenth-century Maroon War in Jamaica, 
suggested the geographical and environmental factors that created the need for a rural 
constabulary to prevent an internal challenge to slave holders’ authority and developmental 
ambitions for the zone.  
The social and political origins of the Squadron of Santa Catalina, thus arose in this 
“absolutely undeveloped” state of Guantánamo’s rugged mountains and “woods ... 
frequented by runaway slaves and the few aboriginal Indians [in Cuba]” as well as its 
proximity to Haiti.166  Its intended social control function included defense of the region from 
transfrontiersmen such as squatters, indigent “vagrants,” and maroons who posed a potential 
internal subversive challenges of alternative independent settlement.  The Squadron also 
guarded against encroachment by imperial rivals. The effective colonization of southeastern 
Cuba languished for decades; a few Creole families raised cattle and food crops for local 
consumption. The settlement of the region in the early nineteenth century came in the form of 
French and Franco-Haitian immigrants, intent on reestablishing Caribbean plantations.  They 
brought with them social attitudes and institutional prerogatives molded by other colonial 
contexts and the Code Noir for resuscitating plantation agriculture for export and the internal 
market even as slavery entered into decline and diminished supply.  
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Founded as an anti-maroon paramilitary to suppress runaway settlements, the 
Squadron of Santa Catalina formed a locally recruited slave patrol unlike the haphazard 
patrol and police systems elsewhere on the island. It was neither made up exclusively of 
whites, like most slave-hunters (called rancheadores) in western Cuba, nor composed of 
Peninsular Spaniards and their immediate descendents, as were most volunteer militia units.  
White settlers formed a preponderance of such volunteers after 1850 in much of Cuba after 
the bloody and far-reaching suppression of conspiracy among free people of color and 
generalized fears of slave revolt amid rumors of abolitionist plots in western Cuba’s Escalera 
conspiracy in 1843 and 1844. Thereafter whites, typically Spanish-born peninsulares, 
predominated in most militia in the colony, with certain exceptions such as a few separate 
mixed-race pardo and free black moreno battalions, typically based in cities.167  
In Guantánamo, scions of the oldest families of the district inherited the command of 
the paramilitary force.  The Pérez family of the Tiguabos region, which apparently arrived 
sometime in the seventeenth century, and may well have formed part of the militia that 
resisted the British and North American incursion during the War of Jenkins’ Ear in the early 
1700s, exerted something of the social roles of a regionally prominent caudillo leadership.  
Miguel Pérez Céspedes, born the first year of the nineteenth century, recruited his retainers 
for militia service from among whites and free mestizos, frequently impoverished Indians 
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from San Anselmo de Tiguabos or Yateras.168  Indeed, rumors circulated that Pérez’s own 
trigueño (“wheat colored”) complexion was the product of European-Indian racial 
miscegenation.169  
Pérez and the Squadron of Santa Catalina ranged far and wide through the most 
remote mountains and inaccessible forests of southeastern Cuba hunting for maroons, with an 
ex-slave tracker, Simón, from the Felicidad cafetal frequently by his side.170 Armed with a 
brace of pistols or a blunderbuss, a machete, a cudgel, and a rope lasso – the cuadrilleros 
crept stealthily through the dense foliage from different directions, hoping to surround the 
maroons before the alarm sounded – avoiding the spiked pits used for defense.  When 
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pursuing individual fugitives in the bush they used specially bred tracker dogs. In such a 
campaign in 1848, they surprised a well-organized palenque, Todos Tenemos, with fifty-nine 
houses and thirty-five hut-like storerooms. Two maroons were killed resisting the slave 
hunters, one of whom they had wounded with a spear. Pérez’s group took “200 sacks of rice 
and 625 pounds of jerked meat ... ‘a church with a sham altar on which there was a piece of 
wood with which [the maroons] had tried to portray Christ’” was seized as well.171  In 
subsequent yearly maroon-suppression campaigns in 1849 and 1850, Pérez’s troop used the 
settlements they had previously discovered as base camps. They captured twenty-six and 
killed seven maroons in two years.  
 
 
Conclusions: 1868, A Cuban Republic-in-Arms vs. A Cuban Vendée 
 
Thus, at the time of Hazard’s visit easternmost Cuba presented a vista of 
anachronistic contrasts.  Like the beehive emblazoned on its coat of arms, the town of Santa 
Catalina/Guantánamo was abuzz with commercial activity attendant to the sheaves of plants 
framing the worker-bees swarming around the centerpiece: “sugar, the sweetener; coffee, the 
tonic; and tobacco, the narcotic.”  The Brooks and Company’s infrastructural innovations in 
transport and sugar production augmented a modern capitalist sugar and railway complex. 
This industry formed an enclave in the valley with merchants in towns and its outlet to the 
wider world system through the bay.172  In the interstices, a mixed and often primitive 
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agricultural economy coexisted, while in the hill country coffee cultivation by slave labor and 
pre-capitalist traditional patterns of land tenure, usufruct rights, and social customs 
predominated.  Some subsistence farmers and small-scale ranchers supplemented their 
income by participation in seasonal modes of employment for wages. Still others engaged in 
forms of tenant farming arrangements.  
The Guantánamo region had long been marginal to colonial development in Cuba.  
As a result of this lengthy neglect, and the earlier period of Spanish colonialism’s emphasis 
on urban settlements, a racially mixed population developed over time in this rural hinterland 
engaged in the Hispanic Caribbean’s traditional pursuits of farming, cattle ranching, and 
tobacco cultivation.  Slavery was practiced, but over an extended period Creole society 
became racially mixed with a large free population of color resulting from manumissions and 
natural increase among the population.  Of the 14,153 people of color in the district by 1862, 
39 percent were free; 61 percent were held as slaves. Like in nearby Santo Domingo, the 
earlier systems of racial hierarchy and racial oppression of African-descended people that 
had arisen from application of Spain’s ancient religious-conflict-derived purity of blood and 
caste laws in the context of the New World, and the social relations of slave and master were 
muted somewhat by the crown’s military necessity of maintaining control over the largely 
deserted frontier.   That is to say, the relative status of free people of color rose when they 
were vital to the political and military functioning of the colony against external and internal 
challenges. 173 Various schemes of developing military colonization, or encouraging white 
settlement, never came to fruition.  With the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the resolution 
of the protracted contest over Haiti in a rebel slave victory over European colonial powers, 
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but also resulting in internecine black and mulato civil wars, the relative lassitude that once 
characterized racial constructs and race relations within the district changed as it too 
followed a plantation-driven development model more characteristic of Cuba’s west than 
other regions of the east.  
Eventually this region with its pre-capitalist, multi-racial, rural colonial society, along 
with a surviving indigenous Antillean population in some inaccessible areas, had become 
overlaid in the early nineteenth-century by a wave of French and Franco-Haitian settlement.  
This movement of francophone migrants—propelled by the pull factors of Cuban 
development and availability of land, expelled by the push factors of the Haitian revolution—
had a significant social, cultural and economic impact on Cuba as a whole, but in the case of 
Santiago de Cuba and the district around Guantánamo it was a particularly transformative 
and decisive infusion.  The pre-existing Creole “society with slaves” became a would-be 
“slave society” at their behest with changed racial privileges and exclusions, even as the 
continued viability of slavery itself seemed ever increasingly in doubt.  Many in this cohort 
dedicated themselves to ancien régime type pursuits in the recently overthrown St.-
Domingue-style: a plantation complex of sugar and coffee cultivation performed mainly by 
enslaved African and black Creole agricultural hands.  By and large they viewed their slave 
workers like other slaveholders in the circum-Caribbean, with a Janus-headed mixture of 
dread and fear with concomitant brutality and attempts to modify, discipline, and exert 
control over their behaviors, and a paternalistic, patronizing view of them as their loyal peons 
or serfs contentedly residing on their estates.  Race making assumed new forms as racist 
attitudes and distinctions hardened, manumissions grew less frequent, and rights of people of 
color became curtailed.   
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The political instability occasioned by the revolutionary and migration generations of 
slavery gave rise to resistance to the implantation of the changed regime and its exacting 
labor relations and stifling constraints, principally in the form of fugitive slave flight and 
maroonage. In turn, the instability led to the social control transformation of the Squadron of 
Santa Catalina militia as a slave patrol bolster and prop to slaveholder authority.  A 
reactionary colonial labor and race relations tempered the vaunted civilization brought to 
eastern Cuba by the French influx even while republican and liberal currents of sovereignty, 
citizenship and duty to the state, and the Rights of Man swept the Americas. Hippolyte Piron, 
a Santiago de Cuba Frenchman, wrote in 1876 during the Ten Years’ War to a French 
metropolitan audience, perhaps with a degree of exaggeration or emotive rhetorical flourish, 
that over many years for their compatriots in southeastern Cuba: 
[Being an overseer of a slave dotación] is the vile employment agreeable to 
their hard hearts, and we fulfill [such tasks] with feeling, exercising them with 
an unchecked cruelty; they display more wickedness than the Spaniards, the 
Cubans and the Creoles. The greater part of these men so determined are 
béarneses ... The French nation, apart from honorable exceptions, is sadly 
represented in Cuba; an opinion has been formed there as false as it is 
unfavorable. Those distinguished Frenchmen [in Cuba] one finds generally in 
the city; they are doctors or businessmen.174 
 
The resultant complexity and tensions of the local social composition and 
constellation of Creole identities—mestizo, black, and white, Spanish/Catalan, African, 
French—and the relative isolation from areas outside of nearby Santiago gave rise to a 
distinctive regionalism in southeastern Cuba.  Contradictory and conflicting trends in this 
ruggedly mountainous satellite of Santiago de Cuba largely prevented, or at least 
complicated, emergent national consciousnesses and identities like those occurring and 
                                                
 
174 Portuondo, citing Hippolyte Piron, L’île de Cuba; Santiago—Puerto Príncipe—Matanzas et la 
Havane (Paris: n.p., 1876).  
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percolating through elite and popular sectors in western Oriente.    Overland communications 
were difficult, tending to make endogamous rural communities’ outlooks insular.  Low 
population density implied that land for subsistence agriculture could be had, which lessened 
agrarian conflicts and pressures outside the llano while generally leading to small-holder 
mentalities hostile to assaults on property-rights, as well as a conservatism that looked 
askance at rapid political, social, or cultural changes. 
In sum, when Carlos Manuel de Céspedes raised the standard of separatist revolt in 
late 1868, unleashing a train of events that would begin the processes further eroding slavery 
and adding to pressures for gradual emancipation on the island amid military conflict and 
Jacobin republican claims, much of guantanamero society remained stolid defenders of 
slavery, initially chary or outright hostile to his summons.  As historian Volker Mollin 
described, “the Ten Years War was a war of regions, a war on a regional scale” while the 
regionalism exhibited by Oriente and Puerto Príncipe provinces itself “constituted a political 
response to a cultural, social, and economic reality characterized by the weak relations 
existing between different regions isolated one from the other.”175  As many people in 
western Oriente rallied to the separatist state-in-formation, and while sectors of Puerto 
Príncipe’s inhabitants followed suit, albeit under their own regional leadership, Guantánamo 
remained a backward-looking district for the most part.  In the enfolding revolution it was a 
counterrevolutionary eastern Cuban Vendée.176  The revolution would be carried from 
without into the district by means of invasion.  In this reactionary district generally opposed 
to separatism, slave owners stubbornly clung to their way of life based on the exploitation of 
                                                
175 Mollin, 93-94. 
 
176 Francisco Ibarra, Cronología de la guerra de los Diez Años (Santiago de Cuba: Instituto Cubano 
del Libro, 1976), 81; Hortensia Pichardo, Facetas de nuestra historia (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 
1989), 124-27.  
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un-free labor, adapting the social control mechanism of the fugitive slave patrolling militia, 
Pérez’s Squadron of Santa Catalina, to a pro-Spanish integralist paramilitary.  As over 8500 
slaves worked primarily on the region’s 25 sugar mills, 11 of them larger “centrales,” and 87 
cafetales, Guantánamo became the most slave-dependent district of eastern Cuba.  The 
historical experience of the region set it apart from the western jurisdictions of Oriente 
province where separatist support would prove initially strongest.177  Table 2.12 below 
portrays the race and servile condition of the population of western and eastern Oriente 
province before the outbreak of rebellion, showing that those sub-regional jurisdictions in the 
east where opposition to separatism was greatest were generally those most dependent on 
slave labor: 
Table 2.12 
Estimated Population and Race, western five jurisdictions of Oriente – greater initial popular 
support for separatist insurrection, ca. 1868. 
Jurisdiction Total 
Population 
Percentage 
“White” 
Percentage 
“Free 
Coloured” 
Percentage 
Creole and 
African-born 
Slave 
Bayamo 33,555 51 40 9 
Jiguaní 17,814 70 26 4 
Holguín 51,828 78 13.5 8.5 
Las Tunas 6,820 60 33 7 
Manzanillo 26,431 52 42 6 
TOTAL 
western 
Oriente 
 
~137,000 87,385 
64 % 
38,911 
28 % 
9,200 
7 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
177 Mollin, 304.  
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Table 2.13 
Estimated Population and Race, eastern three jurisdictions of Oriente – weaker initial popular 
support for separatist insurrection, ca. 1868. 
Jurisdiction Total 
Population 
Percentage 
“White” 
Percentage 
“Free 
Coloured” 
Percentage 
Creole and 
African-born 
Slave 
Santiago de 
Cuba 
96,028 29 37 34 
Guantánamo 19,619 27 29 44 
Baracoa [most 
isolated zone] 
11,277 43 43 14 
TOTAL 
eastern 
Oriente 
~127,000 37,979 
30 % 
46,276 
36 % 
49,699 
39 % 
 
SUMMARY: 
W. Oriente: ~137,000 64 percent “White,” 28 percent “Free Coloured,” 7 percent Slave 
E. Oriente: ~127,000 30 percent “White,” 36 percent “Free Coloured,” 39 percent Slave 
 
Source: Data from Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, Guerra de los Diez Años, 1868-1878,  
2 vols. (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1972), I: 26-27, 32. See also Ferrer, 
Insurgent Cuba, 55. 
 
The social control regime had been geared to impede manifestations of slave resistance, and 
to prevention of alternative settlement by fugitives in the countryside. When the colonial 
authorities were confronted with political rebellions and divided loyalties in Spain shortly 
followed by separatist uprisings in Oriente, and Camagüey and with supporters in Matanzas 
and western Cuba as well, the counterinsurgent and stridently pro-peninsular Volunteers 
swept up the pre-existing counter-subversive role of the Squadron of Santa Catalina against 
rural bandits and maroons.  Nevertheless, there was some marginal support even in 
Guantánamo when war ushered in strains on bondage and attachment to the colonial state.178 
 
 
                                                
178 Sánchez and Campos, Los ecos de la Demajagua, 3.  
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<><><> 
Samuel Hazard left Guantánamo by night.  He did not egress as he arrived: aboard the 
first-class train carriage accompanied by a Brooks & Co. clerk; instead he clambered onto a 
railway handcar cranked “by two sturdy” black workingmen for the trip back to Caimanera 
and the return steamer to Santiago. From there he sailed along the north coast back to 
Havana, stopping briefly at the isolated slumbering port of Baracoa, and at Nuevitas and 
Puerto Príncipe in Camagüey.  Upon his return to the United States, he wrote the paean to the 
“perfect country ... of the Coffee Mountains of the Yateras [Guantánamo]” quoted in the 
epigraph to this chapter: “ If, in some happy day for the Cubans, their island shall be blessed 
with a more liberal government” then an enterprising colonist or entrepreneur could make 
“the most beautiful homes in the world for those fond of rural life and the beauties of 
nature.”179  Just a few years later, in 1868, the long brewing storm of separatist rebellion that 
emerged from the incapacity to bring “a more liberal government” to the isle broke over the 
social and physical landscape of eastern Cuba, including the southeastern zone around the 
cuenca of Guantánamo with its tobacco plots, sugar mills and coffee farms—its racially and 
ethnically-mixed agrarian population, its masters and slaves, and its colonial paramilitary 
constabulary.  The following chapter’s narrative returns to Guantánamo during the 1871 
separatist insurgent “invasion” of the district, and examines the fortunes and misfortunes of 
the Tiguabos-based Pérez family, particularly Miguel Pérez of the Escuadras and his nephew 
Pedro, confronting a group of free black separatist rebel leaders from nearby Santiago de 
Cuba.
                                                
179 Hazard, 476-77.  
  
 
CHAPTER III: 
Al filo del machete: “Black Arm and Cuban Heart”—The Separatist Invasion of Guantánamo 
 
The violent death of the septuagenarian runaway slave-hunter and militia officer, 
Miguel Pérez Céspedes, and seven soldiers May 25, 1871 in a skirmish at Ojo de Agua in 
distant Guantánamo was an event important enough to be included in Blas de Villate y de las 
Heras, the Count of Valmaseda’s bi-monthly field report from the captain-general’s 
headquarters in Havana to the Ministry of War in Madrid. It even made the “Telegraphic 
Brevities” section on the front page of the New York Times.180 Spanish military sources 
related that “the brave commander of the Squadron [of Santa Catalina] Don Miguel Pérez, 
one of the bravest officers in this army, and who, in spite of his seventy years had displayed 
during all of the campaign ... an incredible activity for his age” had encountered rebels while 
reconnoitering near the smoldering ruins of the San Luis coffee plantation, hunting for the 
band that had attacked him and burned his own cafetal, Canaan, and taken his slaves three 
                                                
 
180 Parte de Novedades, 15 Junio 1871. Conde de Valmaseda. Comandancia General de Cuba, Archivo 
General Militar de Madrid (formerly the Servicio Histórico Militar), caja 2547, carpeta 21.8.1, p. 28-30 
[hereinafter cited as AGM-M, caja, car.]; “Telegraphic Brevities,” New York Times, 7 June 1871, p.1 
[hereinafter cited as NYT]. Detailed accounts of insurgent attacks on Pérez’s coffee farm, Canaan, and the 
Galilea estate, 22 May, as well as his death in battle, appear in Sobre la creación de una Columna al mando del 
Comandte. Don Miguel Pérez, Jefe de la línea de Guantánamo, Mayo 1871, and Partes y diario de operaciones 
de la columna al mando del Comdte. Don Miguel Pérez, Jefe de la línea de Guantánamo, in Archivo General 
Militar de Segovia, 6a y 8a Secciones (Ultramar, Capitanías y Gobiernos Militares), 18-R. (Guerra de Cuba, 
Guerrillas, Bandolerismo, Claves de Generales), legajo 53, 55 folios [hereinafter cited as AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-
R. leg.]. For Pérez’s death, see especially letters from Tiguabos by Felipe Plaza bound in Sección 3a. Acción 
ocurrida el día 25 de Mayo en Ojo de Agua y acontecimientos del Comte. D. Miguel Pérez. The attack on 
Canaan and removal of the slaves there appears in Ataque del Cafetal Canaan por los insurrectos, 22 Mayo 
1871. 
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days earlier. A Havana periodical reported the death of the “Chief of the Squadron of 
Guantánamo Don Miguel Pérez y Céspedes who at seventy-one years of age, gave fifty-four 
in service to Spain.”181 A Cuban exile wrote to a friend from Kingston, Jamaica: “The death 
of Miguel Pérez has been a great triumph for the patriots because this man was the most 
important jefe ... in this demarcation.”182  
Insurgents had ambushed Pérez in the third year of anticolonial rebellion immediately 
prior to invading the pro-Spanish district of coffee and sugar plantations in southeastern 
Oriente province.183  That 1871 invasion of Guantánamo would have important ramifications 
on the future strategy of Cuban separatists waging an unequal struggle against the colonial 
metropole, seeking to impose nationalist propositions of a future independent state or a 
progressive republic.  Against the intransigence of the colonial state apparatus, and with the 
                                                
 
181  Abelardo Padrón Valdés, Guillermón Moncada: Vida y hazañas de un general (Havana: Editorial 
Letras Cubanas, 1980), 152, cites Juan Palomo Havana, 16 April 1871, 256.  See also Regino Boti Barreiro, 
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González Puente, Mayor General Pedro A. Pérez (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1967); and Sánchez and 
Campos, Los ecos de la Demajagua, 76.  
 
182  Rodríguez, 49, citing letter of José Joaquín Palma to Hilario Cisneros, in Biblioteca Nacional José 
Martí, Colección Cubana, Colección de Manuscritos Ponce, no. 115. 
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1977), 38; Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, Guerra de los Diez Años, 1868-1878, 2 vols. (Havana: Cultural, 1950; 
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Ten Years’ War, see Raúl Cepero Bonilla, Azúcar y abolición (Havana: Editorial Cenit, 1948, reprinted in 
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Mambisa (Havana: Instituto Cubano del Libro, 1972); Volker Mollin, Guerra pequeña, guerra olvidada 
(Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 2002); Louis A. Pérez, Jr. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 5; and Antonio Pirala y Criado, Anales de la guerra de Cuba, 3 
vols. (Madrid: F. González Rojas, 1895-1898). On Cuban-born and Spanish-born insular inhabitants’ 
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contrarevolucionario en la Guerra de los Diez Años (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996); Pirala; and José Joaquín Ribó, 
Historia de los voluntarios cubanos 2 vols. (Madrid: Imprenta de T. Fortanet, 1872-1876). On the Ten Years’ 
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Robert, “Slavery and Freedom in the Ten Years’ War, Cuba, 1868-1878” in Slavery and Abolition 13, No. 3 
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military campaign flagging under sustained Spanish repression, a group of insurgents 
committed to a more immediate emancipation of slaves than the movement’s civilian leaders, 
including several free black santiaguero officers such as the twenty-six year old mulato 
Lieutenant-Colonel, Antonio Maceo, and his younger brother, José, and led by the 
Dominican-born general Máximo Gómez, emulated the great Liberator of South America, 
Simón Bolívar’s 1813 “War to the Death Proclamation.”184 Henceforth, areas of Cuba’s 
eastern province that had not rallied to the Republic in Arms would be compelled to enter the 
revolution by force.  Neutrality was no longer an option.  Tactics of property destruction – 
using the arsonist’s torch against properties supplying the Spanish with material support, 
exportable cash crops, and taxable revenues – would be carried out systematically.   
                                                
 
184 Bolívar issued the decree calling for death to Spaniards and Canary Islanders who were not actively 
supporting Venezuelan patriots against royalists, in part to signal that Spain’s bellum romanum extirpation of 
the rebellion would be met with similarly  “uncivilized” means. See John Lynch, The Spanish American 
Revolutions, 1808-1826, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), 203-4, and Robert L. Scheina, Latin 
America’s Wars: Volume I: The Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899, 2 vols. (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), I: 
27. After Bayamo fell to Spanish troops and integralist voluntarios in early 1869, Count Valmaseda exceeded 
his authority under the relatively liberal captain-general Domingo Dulce, and issued a proclamation that read, in 
part, “You well know that I have pardoned those who have fought us with arms ... you know as well that many 
of the pardoned have gone against me. ...[Before] such ingratitude, such villainy, it is no longer possible that I 
be the man of yesterday ... whomever is not with me is against me, and so that my soldiers know how to 
distinguish you [from rebels], hear the orders I have given: Every man, over the age of 15 ... found outside his 
residence, without a justified reason for doing so, will be pasado por las armas [shot]. Every house that is not 
inhabited will be burned ... Women not residing in their respective fincas or houses, or those of their parents, 
will be concentrated in the towns of Jiguaní and Bayamo, where their maintenance will be provided for: those 
that refuse to go will be removed by force...” Thomas, Cuba, 252 citing Pirala, I: 552. Count Valmaseda’s 
subsequent rule as captain-general from December 1870, vowing to “pacify” the island made extension of the 
rebellion imperative for Gómez and other military leaders. A copy of the proclamation appears reproduced in 
Máximo Gómez, El viejo Eduá, o mi último asistente (Havana: Instituto Cubano del Libro, 1972), 109.  
Carlos Manuel de Céspedes proclaimed “War to the Death” 18 February 1869: “the conduct of the 
enemy has not changed, but rather has been aggravated by further acts of cruelty and barbarism ... obliging me 
to accept war without quarter ... Blood for blood, execution for execution, extermination for extermination.” 
The actual decree called for summary execution of integralist Creole volunteers, seizure of property of the 
Republic in Arms’ enemies, offered a bounty to Spaniards turning over weapons and materiel, but urged that 
wounded or captured enemy soldiers in uniform be spared and well treated. Article five resembled Bolívar’s 
most explicitly: “the present war of independence does not recognize neutrals ... who is not with us shall be 
considered an enemy.” See Manifiesto sobre el decreto de guerra a muerte, La Larga, February 18, 1869, and 
Decreto de guerra a muerte, 18 February 1869 in Fernando Portuondo del Prado and Hortensia Pichardo Viñals, 
eds. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes: Escritos (Havana: Instituto Cubano del Libro, 1974), 152-55.    
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Furthermore, this cohort of Jacobin rebel officers tried to outflank the liberal 
metropolitan government’s 1870 gradual emancipation edict that had yet to be enacted 
against opposition by the staunchly reactionary Peninsular settlers’ integrismo movement 
dominating Cuba’s internal politics.  That decree was the Moret Law, which ostensibly freed 
slave children born after September 1868, and elderly over the age of sixty.  Some Cuban 
separatists thereby moved to decree complete abolition in December 1870.185  The exigencies 
of war implied justifications to the rebels for an attempted, or at least proclaimed, rural levée 
en masse: all citizens of Cuba Libre, whites and blacks –including ex-slaves or libertos, owed 
the nascent Republic in Arms either military or agricultural labor.186   
 
Separatism and Indemnified Abolition 
The offensive to extend separatist military operations into pro-Spanish integralist 
zones thus represented a radicalization of eastern insurgents in the faltering revolution begun 
on 10 October 1868 by planters, cattle-ranchers, and landowners in Bayamo, Manzanillo, and 
Puerto Príncipe in the center and east of the island.  These elite rebel leaders of differing 
political persuasions mobilized their kinsmen, retainers, clientele, and enlisted both poor 
urban and rural folk – including whites, free mestizos, and blacks – to achieve political 
objectives of gaining independence or some form of union with the United States.187  The 
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September 1868 overthrow of the monarchy in Spain and resultant political instability in the 
colonies seemed a propitious moment to reformists and separatists, coming hard on the heels 
of the failure of a portion of the island’s Creole planters and aligned clienteles to secure from 
the metropolitan government either substantive reforms, or parliamentary representation in 
the Spanish Cortés, and thus to directly alter Cuba’s colonial status.188  Their conflict began 
as a “limited war for limited goals.”189  While many separatist leaders opposed slavery, and 
                                                                                                                                                  
187 On the contradictions of annexationism—once an early-nineteenth-century refuge of Cuban slave 
owners against the threat of Spanish collusion or compliance with British abolitionism’s demands—and 
independence-minded nationalism within Cuban communities resident in the United States, see Gerald E. Poyo, 
“With All, and for the Good of All”: The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the United States, 1848-1898 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), chs. 2 and 3. See also Ada Ferrer, “Armed Slaves and Anticolonial 
Insurgency in Late Nineteenth-Century Cuba’ in Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan, eds. Arming 
Slaves (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 317-18 where annexationism among separatists arose as an 
alternative to surrender and a salvation against class and race war that might have followed in the wake of mass 
mobilizations carried out to further the insurrection: Ferrer quoted Céspedes: “[I]n the minds of a majority of 
Cubans ... is always the idea of annexation as a last resort, in order to avoid the abyss of evils which they say 
would lead to a war of the races.” In 1873, the Ten Years’ War mid-point, Irish New York Herald journalist, 
James J. O’Kelly, interviewed Calixto García, who described insurgent political ambitions as subject to the ebb 
and flow of internal and external events: “We desire to be independent, but, if this is impossible, we wish to 
attach ourselves to some strong government that will be able to guarantee to us liberty and order, so that we 
may develop in peace the resources of our country.”  There was talk of “a large party in favor of annexation to 
the United States” in the “Central Department ... but in the Eastern Department the main idea has been 
independence” while English influence suggested “the formation of a confederation of the Antilles” in 
opposition to annexation so that “hopes were held out that England would abandon Jamaica, as she abandoned 
the Ionian Islands, in order to facilitate the formation of the confederation of the Antilles.” Doubtless with a 
view to influencing Anglo-phobic U.S. popular opinion, he wrote that this project was gaining ground out of 
disgust with “the manner in which the United States has acted toward” Cuban separatism, i.e. non-recognition 
of Cuban belligerency, which Spain’s recent enemies such as Peru had granted, and strict enforcement of the 
Neutrality Act and support of treaty obligations with Spain. See James J. O’Kelly, The Mambi-Land, or 
Adventures of a Herald Correspondent in Cuba (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1874), 217-18.  
 
188 Thomas, 237-40.  
 
189 Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 125. See also Thomas, 246-50, and Guerra, 30-32. 
For Carlos Manuel de Céspedes’s ambivalent 27 December 1868 pronouncements on slavery after freeing his 
thirty slaves at La Demajagua, see “Freedom and Slavery” trans. by Aviva Chomsky, in Chomsky, Barry Carr, 
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slaves of neutral owners were to be treated as sacrosanct private property, slaves of counter-revolutionaries 
were liable to be confiscated, slaves could be loaned to the patriots, maroons in palenques were declared free, 
but more recent runaways were to be returned to their owners. See also, Ferrer, “Armed Slaves and Anticolonial 
Insurgency in Late Nineteenth-Century Cuba,” 309, who noted that while there would be no compensation paid 
pro-Spanish owners, the decree effectively “encouraged only manumission” rather than abolition per se. See 
also Portuondo and Pichardo, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, 144-45. 
 111 
some had freed their own slaves, they generally favored ending the institution gradually and 
with indemnification paid to owners after independence had been achieved.   
Their dilemma was similar to President Abraham Lincoln’s in the recently concluded 
U.S. Civil War: he had postponed emancipation until 1863 in part to keep Delaware, 
Maryland, and Kentucky—frontline slave states all—in the Union.  Lincoln had also 
contemplated gradual abolition based on some form of compensation to owners for their loss 
of private property.190  In both cases slavery was a crucial underlying issue, just not the 
primary concern for elite white political leaders. Cuba’s eastern separatist leaders hoped to 
placate or win over the far wealthier and much more influential planters in the western “king 
sugar” districts of Havana, Matanzas, Cárdenas, and Las Villas by deferring abolition.  For 
Lincoln, the overriding concern had been mobilizing an amply racist white citizenry for 
restoration of the Union; for Cuban separatists it was finding a basis for white and black 
Creole unity against forms of racial and national oppression exercised by Spain’s local 
constituencies and the metropolitan state, which was itself undergoing profound political 
instability.  
But while many, indeed most western planters, remained integralists loyal to the 
Spanish colonial system, separatist hesitancy around the “social question” – slavery and how 
precipitously it should be ended – eroded support among many free blacks, and even those 
slaves familiar with insurgent decrees.  Enduring divisions and factions arose among the 
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rebels.  Some were regional and personalist in nature, others more political.  Slavery and 
abolition proved a crucial originating factor in many of them.  A November 1868 insurgent 
decree threatened the firing squad for robbery, wanton destruction, and attempts to “stir up 
and remove” the tied labor force from plantations of pro-separatist owners.191 Cattle ranchers 
in seigniorial Camagüey, lacking rural partisans and foot soldiers, and desirous of material 
and political support from a United States that looked askance at slavery’s continuance in the 
Americas after the U.S. Civil War, separately proposed abolition in February 1869 with 
indemnification to be paid at a future, unspecified date.192  Rebel politicians, mostly from the 
center of the island, meeting to write the republican constitution at Guáimaro in April 1869, 
attempted compromise by abolishing slavery immediately, without indemnification, but ruled 
that ex-slaves owed wage labor to their former masters, and with the proviso that Cuba would 
seek annexation to the United States.  Later, representatives failed to ratify the constitution.  
The de jure treatment of freed slaves (libertos) required them to continue to perform menial 
corvée labor, either for their masters or for the state-in-formation under the Reglamento de 
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  5. Those who are not [fit for service], for the duration of the war, will continue a dedication to the 
same work that they presently perform in order to keep properties in production, and contribute in that way to 
sustaining those who offer their blood for the common liberty, an obligation that corresponds in the same 
manner to all those CC [Cuban Citizens] now free, exempt from military service, whatever their race.  
  6. A special regulation will prescribe the details for the fulfillment of this decree.”   
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libertos in force from 6 July 1869 until 25 December 1870.193  De facto, their treatment 
depended on the whim of insurgent officials and highly variable local circumstances.194 
 
Escalation of the War 
In several counter-offensives to suppress rebellion, Spanish troops and integralist 
volunteers swept through eastern Cuba and seized and confiscated the properties of rebel 
suspects.  During military operations, collaborators and sympathizers of the insurrection 
faced arrest, deportation, exile, and even summary execution, while their houses and farms 
were often burned.195 A correspondent describing counterinsurgent practices in central Cuba 
during the high-water mark of the conflict wrote that not only were “Insurgents ... with arms 
in their hands” summarily shot, but also “unarmed fugitives whom terror ... had driven into 
the woods” and even “others who had remained quietly at home, but who were suspected of 
sympathy with the rebel cause.”196  In 1873, the Irish adventurer and New York Herald 
                                                
 
193 Scott, Slave Emancipation, 47. Hortensia Pichardo, ed., Documentos para la historia de Cuba, 2  
vols. (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1977): I: 380-82.  
 
194 Cepero Bonilla, “Azúcar y abolición” in Escritos históricos, ch. 12, “En Guáimaro no se emancipó 
al esclavo” argued that the Cuban insurrection was not explicitly abolitionist until 1871. See also Foner, Antonio 
Maceo, 33; Robert, 195; Scott, Slave Emancipation, 48.  For a strong qualification of this view, arguing that 
many slaves themselves immediately began forcing the issue when the conflict began, see Ferrer, Insurgent 
Cuba, ch. 1.   
 
195 For an analysis of this counter-revolutionary repression arguing that it went well beyond actual 
Creole separatist supporters, and constituted a radical socio-economic program designed to “re-Hispanize” 
Cuba, see Alfonso W. Quiroz, “Loyalist Overkill: The Socioeconomic Costs of ‘Repressing’ the Separatist 
Insurrection in Cuba, 1868-1878” in Hispanic American Historical Review 78, No. 2 (May 1998): 261-305. On 
pro-colonial volunteers, see Domingo Acebrón. See also the pro-separatist journalist impressions of O’Kelly, 
especially 44-53, 107.  
 
196 Gott, 80, quoting Antonio C.N. Gallenga, The Pearl of the Antilles (London: Chapman and Hall, 
1873; reprint ed., New York: Negro University Press, 1970), 164-65.  Gallenga’s description of Sancti-Spíritus 
and Las Villas, both to the west of the Spanish army’s Jucaro-Morón trocha erected to contain the insurrection 
to Camagüey and Oriente, suggests the origins of the later 1896-1897 counterinsurgency population removal 
strategy known as reconcentración imposed by Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau.  Tone, War and Genocide in 
Cuba, 195-196, scrupulously separated the “long-term precedents and immediate precursors” of 
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correspondent, James O’Kelly, an anti-British Fenian and therefore of pro-separatist, anti-
colonial politics, described how “Spanish columns marched and countermarched through the 
desolate regions, burning whatever miserable leaf-covered shanties they encountered, 
wreaking vengeance on the wounded, the sick, and the weakly ... hunting like bloodhounds 
the ill-armed and wretchedly supplied soldiers of the Cuban republic” in much the same 
fashion as earlier the maroons had been pursued.197  As the conflict escalated, marked by a 
growing pattern of reprisals and a shift to irregular warfare, which pitted colonial settler 
militias and regular troops against separatists operating among urban and rural populations 
motivated primarily by self-preservation, the warring parties’ use of coercion and compulsion 
by force became explicit.   
In spite of elite separatists’ hazy and limited reformist political goals, the age of 
Clausewitzian total war had arrived in Cuba. With the sugar mill owners around Santiago 
pledging an extra “10,000 pesos to the Spanish authorities for the purpose of ‘exterminating 
the revolution’” Gómez, an emergent rebel tactician due to his Spanish military background, 
picked promising officers that had distinguished themselves in the earlier fighting such as the 
free mulato Antonio Maceo and devoted his combatants to habitually eluding Spanish 
columns in favor of meticulously prepared ambushes, and most importantly it was thought, 
sabotaging agricultural production by subjecting plantations to the torch.198  In early 1869 the 
lawyer-cum-president Carlos Manuel Céspedes authorized José Morales Lemus—who 
                                                                                                                                                  
reconcentration, seeing its origins in Cuba in early 1870 as a result of the internally displaced refugees within 
Puerto Príncipe and Santiago that arose from the insurgent strategy targeting rural property, and further, 
Weyler’s term as captain-general of the Philippines, 1888-1891, where the population removal strategy was 
undertaken on Mindanao against a “low-level guerrilla insurgency.” See pp.157-58.   
 
197 O’Kelly, 107.  
 
198 Foner, Antonio Maceo, 30.  
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originally commanded separatist conspirators in Havana who had been disrupted and 
devastated by Volunteer repression financed by Spanish merchants, shopkeepers and 
migrants—to issue letters of marque in order to encourage would-be privateers to raid 
Spanish commerce—even though such practices, once emblematic of warfare within the 
Caribbean basin, had been rendered illegal by prior international agreements.199  In effect, the 
Liberation Army dispersed into smaller, swiftly marching groups that preyed privateer-like 
on Spanish commerce and sources of revenue at the source: the plantations themselves.  One 
1869 insurgent offensive, north of Santiago, burned fifteen cafetales and twenty-three sugar 
mills.200  The question of what to do with the slave workforce naturally arose and suggested 
to the rebels a means of harnessing able-bodied recruits.  If irregular warfare directed at 
economic targets, the many immobile estates scattered in eastern Cuba, resembled a guerre 
de course waged on land, then another feature involved acquisition of recruits and labor.  
Whereas past maritime conflicts had relied on the press gang to forcibly recruit sailors, 
impressments of slave dotaciones would provide the separatist army with manpower.  Slaves 
not evacuated by their masters, or not fleeing on their own initiative, were incorporated into 
the insurrection.  In many cases slaves required little encouragement, as some accounts 
                                                
 
199 Autorización a Morales Lemus para expedir patentes de corso, 1 April 1869, in Portuondo and 
Pichardo, 171. An actual letter of marque in very deteriorated condition appears in Patente de Corso cogida a 
los insurrectos con muerte de su propietario, AHN, SU, leg. 4933, tomo 5, no. 96, which reads in part, “Carlos 
M. de Céspedes, president of the republic of Cuba, in use of the faculties which have been invested in him by 
the power of the revolution, issues this Carta Patente de Corso in favor of Arturo M. Casimajou, who in virtue 
of this letter is authorized to arm one or more ships ... C[itizen] Arturo M. Casimajou will proceed to crew and 
arm them ... with at least a third part Cubans and two-thirds foreigners ... [He will] proceed in privateering 
operations under the Cuban flag, against any ship flying the Spanish flag, strictly subject to the international 
laws established and recognized by the civilized nations. ...” 8 July 1869 “The President, C.M. de Céspedes –
The Secretary of War, F[rancisco] V[icente] Aguilera.”  
 
200 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 56; Gott, 79. See also “Cuba. Eighteen Plantations Burned by the 
Insurgents—Flight of Cuban Bandits,” NYT, 7 February 1869, p.1: “The insurgents have burned eighteen large 
plantations in the Eastern Department, Cholera of a very violent type is prevalent in the insurrectionary district 
... Cuban prisoners, PARRA and ANNOYA, were killed by troops, or volunteers, while attempting to escape 
from Guantanamo.”  
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indicate that numbers left for the conflict or struck out on their own.201  Certainly all 
evidence suggests that many among the sizeable population of free people of color in Oriente 
formed a significant core of separatist support.  
The ethnic composition of the rebellion drew on whites and free people of color, as 
well as many slaves, in a multi-racial military.  But this mixed force also coexisted with long 
entrenched expectations of racial hierarchy and social order from a slave society. With that 
social system becoming upended by the rebellion, and the features of class war in mobilizing 
poor people into rebellion becoming manifest in insurgent ranks, even if under elite direction, 
concerns about race and class participation became pronounced.  In an unexpected micro-
historical coincidence, both a Spanish prisoner of war, Antonio del Rosal y Vázquez, and the 
Irish New York Herald journalist James O’Kelly—who had served in the French Foreign 
Legion in Mexico in the 1860s, interviewed and accompanied the emperor of Brazil Pedro II 
on his state visit to the United States, and had organized an Irish ambulance corps in France 
during the Franco-Prussian War—found themselves in Calixto García’s encampment in 
western Oriente province in 1873, the fifth year of the conflict that was transforming Cuba.202  
This allows a cross-examination of separatist combatants from the perspective of an enemy, 
and from a separatist partisan of anti-colonial sympathies, albeit well after the 1871 invasion 
of Guantánamo had taken place, and in a different district of Oriente province.  The Spanish 
infantry captain—a source hostile to the separatists to be sure—who was spared and held 
                                                
 
201 See Ferrer, “Armed Slaves and Anticolonial Insurgency in Late Nineteenth-Century Cuba,” 307-10 
on both “forced and voluntary induction” and “indescribable enthusiasm” by libertos within separatist military 
ranks.  
 
202 Biographical information on O’Kelly from Fernando Ortiz’ 1930 introduction to James J. O’Kelly, 
La tierra del Mambí (reprint; Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2001), 7-59.  
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captive for two months by the mambises, and ultimately released in a prisoner exchange, 
wrote:  
 The immense majority of the insurrectos that I have seen are blacks and  
mulatos, yet despite this there are a growing number of whites, of which 
almost all are chiefs or officers. Despite the apparent harmony and fraternity 
that prevails among them, a terrible race hatred shows through among some ...  
    For a white to be a simple soldier, it would have to be because he was 
branded a coward, while it would be necessary for a man of color to be very 
accredited to merit promotions ... Aside from whites and indigenes of color, 
there are in the ranks a small number of Chinese and a few deserters from our 
[Spain’s] army. ...  
    There are few quarrels among themselves, but on the other hand, the 
instinct for rapine is very developed among them: nothing is as pleasing to 
them as the golpes or attacks on towns, because in them they may satisfy their 
thirst for plunder: they destroy anything in their path, even without any 
necessity to do so, only for the pleasure to destroy. ...  
    [A]ttacks [on towns] can be considered as payment for the troops because 
pillage is permitted: each has a right to what he steals, while officials get half 
of what their assistants seize.203  
 
O’Kelly’s observations echoed the description, although with a more optimistic and 
egalitarian portrayal of race relations among the rebels: 
  About one-third of the fighting men are white, and the majority of the other  
                                                
 
203 Antonio del Rosal y Vázquez de Mondragón, Los mambises. Memorias de un prisionero (Madrid: 
Imprenta de Pedro Abienzo, 1874), 7-8, 13, 40.  A spy generated an almost obsessively detailed 26 October 
1869 list of the general whereabouts of 4,710 insurgents—4,000 of them armed—from Puerto Príncipe 
(Camagüey) to Nuevitas appearing in Memoria reservada de los campamentos de la insurrección en la 
Jurisdicción de Puerto Príncipe, formada hoy día de la fecha por un testigo presencial que viene observando los 
planes, movimientos y conducta de la insurrección desde el día 19 del corriente año, AHN, SU, leg.4933, tomo 
5, no. 91. The variability of conditions prevailing in armed separatist camps in Camagüey’s cattle country and 
cane fields was quite apparent, ranging from “El Monitor” with “twenty blacks,” commanded by a black captain 
to “El Peralejo” composed of a hundred whites, blacks, and Asians “armed with carbines and long smooth-bore 
muskets” under command of a one-armed “very despotic and cowardly Colonel Pedro Recio,” who, it claimed, 
his own men had tried to kill.  The locations of newspaper presses as a source of rebel propaganda were 
carefully recorded, including the papers El Cubano Libre, República Cubana, El Mambí, and Libertad. It 
claimed Manuel de Jesús Valdés “published a sheet defending the fusion of the white and black races. ... and 
calling the blacks blood brothers [hermanos carnales]” [emphasis in original]. It also discussed workshops, 
armories, rural ranches, and caves with weapons and munitions stored within, “Monte Oscuro” with a hundred 
blacks whom one “Captain Ramón Parto Recio (Canary Islander) treats with a ram-rod,” puertoprincipeño chief 
Ignacio Agramonte Loynaz, later killed in action 11 May 1873 at Jimaguayú, who was characterized “one of the 
most despotic and bloody” leaders, together with many separatists from Havana and western Cuba who had 
made their way to rebel zones. On Chinese participation in the Liberation Army, see Juan Jiménez Pastrana, Los 
chinos en las luchas por la liberación cubana, 1847-1930 (Havana: Instituto de Historia, 1963).   
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two-thirds are of color other than black, all shades of brown predominating. 
There were some half-dozen Chinamen, one of whom acted as aid surgeon. 
The most perfect equality exists between the white and colored races ... and 
although a majority of the officers are white, a very large portion are 
colored.204 
 
Elsewhere, O’Kelly observed that the separatist Liberation Army burned property, destroyed 
farms, lived off the land, expropriating what they could, and systematically denied food to 
civilians and garrisons in Spanish-controlled towns.205 The contending parties battled each 
other in a protracted rural guerrilla war.  The Spanish and their supporters relocated to towns 
and hunkered down for a lengthy, if intermittent siege, for the most part, while separatists 
and their support base dispersed in the remote countryside. 
 Military attacks and the destruction of estates in Oriente, however, made little impact 
on the island’s economy as a whole.  By the end of the year the most prosperous and 
significant sugar mills in western Cuba brought in a bumper crop. The 1868 zafra was 
749,000 tons, a considerable jump from the 597,000 tons of sugar ground the year before, 
and Cuban sugar production remained high at 726,000 tons for both 1869 and 1870.206   
                                                
 
204 O’Kelly, 221.  
 
205 O’Kelly, especially chs. 8, 15, 17, and 18. 
 
206 Thomas, Appendix XIII, 1562 gives world production figures for cane sugar derived from Noel 
Deerr’s two-volume The History of Sugar of 1868: 1,759,000 tons (749,000 for Cuba), 1869: 1,728,000 tons 
(726,000 for Cuba), 1870: 1,662,000 tons (726,000 for Cuba). Only by 1871 did sugar production diminish, 
with 1,697,000 tons of cane sugar worldwide and a drop in Cuban production to 547,000 tons. Cuban economic 
historian, Julio Le Riverend, traced the wholesale destruction of Central and Eastern Cuba’s agrarian economy 
but noted that for Western Cuba, “on the contrary” there was a slight increase in production, and the 
establishment of newer sugar mills, many more modern centrales, such as “some twenty-five more than existed 
in 1862” in Colón in 1874. To Le Riverend, the data from the war years suggest “the ingenios eliminated in 
Central and Eastern zones were of scant importance” and that production capacity could largely be made up by 
the far more intensive sugar cultivation found in Havana, Matanzas, Colón, and to a lesser extent the central 
districts of infrequent insurgent depredation in Las Villas and Cienfuegos. See Julio Le Riverend, Historia 
económica de Cuba (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1985), 455-56. This excess productive capacity 
was central to Spanish military strategy of confining the insurgency to the traditional and primitive eastern end 
of the island for the duration of the Ten Years’ War. Something similar occurred on a smaller scale in 
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Some insurgents responded by prohibiting the harvesting of sugar cane, backed by a decree 
to fire fields under cultivation.207 And yet other elements of the separatist leadership mostly 
shrank from attempting to impede sugar harvesting in its western heartland and sought to 
dissuade and prevent armed followers from that drastic course of action.  Such a policy 
would alienate potential supporters, outrage influential business and planter elites, and turn 
public opinion—both within Cuba and abroad—against the separatist rebellion as Spanish 
propaganda demonstrated the sheer waste and wanton destruction it caused and played on 
long-standing anxieties of slave revolt to paint the cause as a race war.  
Nevertheless, these forms of irregular warfare suggested to Gómez the trajectory of 
bringing the revolution by “fire and blood” to Guantánamo and thereby extending the poorly 
                                                                                                                                                  
Guantánamo where the insurgents would largely be forced to operate in the mountains—where they devastated 
the coffee sector—but were excluded or expelled from the sugar sector on the better-protected plains. 
 
207 Foner, Antonio Maceo, 34. Property destruction tactics assailing plantations directly, as well as 
appeals to blacks, appeared in the handbill Proclama de la Junta Libertadora de Color, Imp. del Negro 
Laborante, Habana, 1 Octubre 1869, in AHN, SU, leg. 4933, 2a parte, libro 4, doc. 96 (also quoted in Ferrer, 
Insurgent Cuba, 39). The identical handbill also appears in the Real Academia de Historia, Madrid, Colección 
Fernández Duro, leg. 6, doc. 79, cited in Scott, Slave Emancipation, 56. The version in AHN reads, in part, 
“The blacks are the same as whites/ ... The Cubans want the blacks to be free/ The Spaniards want the blacks to 
continue being slaves/ ... The blacks are not fools, they have a big heart and fight together with the Cubans/ 
When the Cubans that are fighting pass by where the blacks are; then the blacks can go with them to be free/ 
When the Cubans who are fighting are far from the blacks; then the blacks will run away and go with the 
Cubans; but first they burn the sugar mills/ ... In the sugar mills the blacks do not have anything more than 
leather [cuero, the lash], and all the money is taken by the master in order to let it go to the Spaniards/ If the 
sugar mills are not burned, and the harvest is completed, all the money from the harvest will be taken by the 
Spaniards and then the Spaniards will send very many soldiers, with many rifles and cannons to kill the Cubans 
and the blacks will remain slaves forever/ The time to fight has come. It is better to be in the hills fighting 
together with the Cubans so that all men, blacks as well as whites, shall be free, than to be working as slaves/ 
Viva la libertad! / Fire to the sugar mills and everyone to the hills, to fight against the Spaniards!”  
A similar, less simplified, more formal announcement of the decree, El Comité Republicano, Habana, 
10 Diciembre 1869, in AHN, SU, leg. 4933, 4a. parte, libro 6, doc. 1 [pasted in the back of Revista Política] 
reads, in part, “Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, President of the Republic, has ordered that all Cubans, loyal to the 
cause of the homeland and obedient to its Government, should set fire to the cane fields and the tobacco 
harvests, to dispel the enemy, and deprive them of resources taken from here to make war on us. Every Cuban 
must respect and carry out the order of the first Magistrate, and it is necessary to execute it rapidly and 
punctually so that the entire world can see we are united and resolute in sacrifice. ... Each Cuban (white, or 
black; for all are equal) need not announce to anyone his projects ... No more fear! War to Spain, and long live 
Cuba! Fire and blood into all parts [of the island]. We will burn today, and tomorrow we will be free and 
Cubans.” The actual 10 October 1869 circular, “Notificando la resolución de destruir las fuentes de riqueza del 
enemigo” appears in Portuondo and Pichardo, 196-97, citing Justo Zaragoza, Las insurrecciones en Cuba 2 
vols. (Madrid: 1873), II: 808.  
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armed and equipped insurrection, which was increasingly threatened by impending defeat, 
particularly as large numbers of rebels in the province of Camagüey surrendered.208 But first, 
local pro-colonial constituencies and state agents in nearby regions of the east would have to 
be confronted. 
 
Cuba Española: Miguel Pérez and the Squadron of Santa Catalina 
In attacking Miguel Pérez, the rebels eliminated a local leader who embodied Spain’s 
control over the colony, and the maintenance of slavery and social hierarchies within it. Pérez 
had ample experience and detailed knowledge of the region’s topography as an accomplished 
runaway hunter within the Guantánamo district – precisely his “fifty-four [years] in service 
to Spain,” and by dint of being the local militia leader.209 
Over time, the story of Pérez’s death received romantic nationalist embellishments. 
According to one variant, in an exchange of letters Miguel Pérez had taunted the free black 
Cuban officer, Guillermo Moncada, writing: 
  To Guillermo Moncada, where he may be encountered: 
Mambí: The day is not far off when, over the battlefield drenched in your  
blood, the flag of Spain will be raised over the shreds of the Cuban banner. 
 
Moncada’s rejoinder written on the reverse said: 
  To Miguel Pérez y Céspedes, where he may be found: 
  Enemy: I say the hour [as opposed to the day] draws near when we will  
cross swords. I do not boast, rather I promise, that my black arm and Cuban 
heart have faith in victory.  I am sorry that a lost brother imposes upon me the 
sad opportunity to take the edge off my machete. But, until Cuba shall be free, 
this same evil is just.210  
                                                
 
208  Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 43-54. 
 
209 Padrón, Guillermón Moncada, 30, 149-52 implicitly argues that the elimination of the leader of the 
Squadron of Santa Catalina was the intent of Gómez’s orders to Moncada.  
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Irrespective of whether this exchange occurred, or was merely apocryphal, the very real duel 
between the seasoned old slave hunter and free black carpenter turned insurgent officer 
certainly resonated with each telling and retelling of it postwar.  Those born on the island had 
long been conscious of certain shared commonalities.211  In many cases, particularly in 
eastern Cuba, the “big war” (Guerra Grande) concretely politicized such nascent identities 
formed from a complex pastiche of local sources and affirmations. The story of Moncada—
“Big Bill” or Guillermón—dueling with the royalist cimarronero, Pérez, symbolized the 
demise of an internal social control mechanism at the hand of a free black Jacobin in the 
colonial history of the Guantánamo district.   
Moncada’s 1871 ambush of Pérez had been a death prefigured by the 1869 killing of 
a subordinate (and relative) in the Squadron of Santa Catalina, Francisco Pérez, at the hands 
of the Yateras Indian bandit, José Policarpo Pineda Rustán, known simply as “Rustán.”212 
                                                                                                                                                  
210  Padrón, Guillermón Moncada, 149, citing Boti, Guillermón, 69-70. See also Miguel Varona 
Guerrero, La Guerra de Independencia de Cuba, 1895-1898, 3 vols. (Havana: Editorial Lex, 1946), I: 554, 
citing Boti. In this rendition of Moncada’s (popularly nick-named “Big Bill/ Guillermón” or the “ebony giant/ 
gigante de ébano”) reply is simply “my arm and my Cuban heart (No me jacto de nada, pero te prometo que mi 
brazo y mi corazón de cubano tienen fé en la victoria).” The reader may therefore judge whether both “arm” 
and “heart” were modified by the adjective cubano or if “black arm and Cuban heart” was implicit in 
Moncada’s letter to Pérez, who understood his opponent to be a free black with an African-born mother and/or 
grandparents, or whether Moncada’s blackness was a more recent addition to the story. The fallen Miguel Pérez 
was succeeded by his son, Santos, who commanded the Squadrons of Guantánamo until his death 16 February 
1890. 
 
211 Mollin, 278-308, 321-52; Olga Portuondo Zúñiga, Criollidad y patria local en la nacionalidad 
cubana, (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 1994), 6-13.  
 
212  Diego Bosch Ferrer and José Sánchez Guerra, Rebeldía y apalencamiento: Jurisdicciones de 
Guantánamo y Baracoa (Guantánamo: Centro Provincial de Patrimonio Cultural, 2003), 42; and Sánchez and 
Campos, Los ecos de la Demajagua, 55. On Rustán, see Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 55-7, 121; Gonzalo de Quesada 
y Aróstegui, “Policarpo Pineda Rustán,” in Páginas escogidas (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1968), 
267-73; and José Sánchez Guerra, Rustán: Coronel Policarpo Pineda Rustán y su participación en la Guerra de 
Diez Años (Guantánamo: Sección de Investigaciones Históricas Comité Provincial del PCC, 1990).  An 1869 
insurgent list of 420 rebels, Relación nominal de los individuos vecinos de la Jurisdicción de Guantánamo que 
han tomado parte en la insurrección voluntariamente o forzados, así como los instigadores y auxiliarios de la 
misma, fecha en dicha lugar a 15 mayo 1869, in ANC, fondo: Asuntos Políticos, leg. 59, exp. 61, lists Rustán, 
36-years of age, along with ninety-two rebels in the district of Yateras – presumably his bandoleros, but claims 
he was from the jurisdiction of Baracoa. 
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This mule-driver turned bandit had been pursued throughout the old maroon country of the 
district since 1863 by the rural gendarmerie and the Civil Guard after he had beaten the 
lieutenant governor in retaliation for having been flogged in punishment for striking his 
abusive Catalan merchant employer.213  With the outbreak of hostilities, Rustán had allied his 
band of brigands with the insurrection, taking his fugitive skills of evasion to their side in 
much the same, if opposite, way as the Pérez family’s counterinsurgent role had been adapted 
and incorporated by the metropole to confronting the separatist insurrection. Indeed, 
Moncada had been made a subordinate of the “primitive rebel” or quasi-maroon Rustán after 
Pérez’s Squadron pursued, harried, and drove them out of the district in 1869. 
During the last Cuban war of independence – the 1895-1898 war – José Martí 
conflated the stories of the two Pérez’s deaths during the Ten Years’ War in his campaign 
diary on 23 April 1895 as he passed through Guantánamo, just twenty-six days before his 
death in action at Dos Ríos near Bayamo. That earlier duel in a past war had remained in the 
local oral culture or folklore traditions of the district, but had not affirmed the triumph of 
emergent cubanía (“Cuban-ness”) within a nationalist discourse over identification with the 
colonial metropole—no “black arm and Cuban heart,” no inclusive professions as fellow 
Cubans of “lost brother,” no statement of regret over lamentable means (“the sad opportunity 
to take the edge off my machete”) and necessary ends (“Cuba shall be free”) as had 
Moncada’s purported letter exchange with the old slave hunter, even if the result was similar. 
Instead it was a squalid local vendetta: “Policarpo put the other Pérez’s [Francisco’s] balls on 
his face like a pair of glasses.”214 An apparently disconcerted Martí, who in the years after 
                                                
 
213 Sánchez and Campos, Los ecos de la Demajagua, 68-69.  
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the Ten Years’ War and Little War had labored mightily to forge a fragile unity among 
separatists in exile, had asked rhetorically at the time, “but why do these Cubans fight against 
Cubans?”   
As has been seen, the regional distinctiveness of prevailing economic and social 
relations and concomitantly unformed elements of nationality in a sparsely settled frontier 
were key reasons for divergence in the case of Guantánamo.  And the separatists constituted 
a minority, even in many parts of Oriente.  Separatism was politically and militarily weak, 
and divisions existed within the provinces of the revolution as well as between regions.  
<><><> 
In a 1914 novel about nineteenth-century coffee plantations in Oriente province, 
Emilio Bacardí made frequent reference to both the French or at least “frenchified” 
(afrancesado) culture of the masters and the patois cubain “mumbo-jumbo” [sic] of the 
slaves.215 In the fictional account of the tragic saga of the Delamour family and coffee estates 
near Gran Piedra between Santiago and Guantánamo, the slave work force held a meeting 
with a rebel emissary urging them to desert their master and join the revolution. After hearing 
about “Cuba Libre” the eldest among them responded with “Cub lib; sá sá yé sá? [Cuba 
Libre, what thing is that?].”  Upon being informed that Cuba in arms would break the 
shackles of slavery and burn and destroy the institution in its lair, the plantations themselves, 
the elder responded: “Pá bulé isí. Met nu sé bon met. Pesón pa pi alé [There’ll be no burning 
                                                                                                                                                  
214 José Martí Pérez, José Martí: Selected Writings, edited and translated by Esther Allen (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2002), 389.  
 
215 Emilio Bacardí Moreau, Vía Crucis (Barcelona: Imprenta Luisa Torres, 1914) 1a parte “Páginas de 
ayer,” 30, 32-5. See also French patois spoken in urban Santiago de Cuba in 2a parte “Magdalena,” especially 
the character Teodulo Pinaud, a tailor, aka. Musiú Popot.   
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here. Our master is a good master. No one will go away].”216 Bacardí’s intent in writing such 
a passage was open to differing interpretations, of course, and may well have been similar to 
the mythology of the loyal, docile, self-effacing, humble, irresponsible but genial slave 
stereotype found frequently in slave societies throughout the Diaspora, and prevalent in much 
U.S. Southern “lost cause” literature.  He seemingly emphasized a serf-like dependency of 
slaves as feudal vassals in this patriarchal, patrician, and pre-modern bound labor system 
whereby slaves lived in thatched villages near the manor-like dwelling-house, store-rooms, 
and coffee pulping mill: “the cafetales were palaces; the [brick or stone and plaster] drying 
yards and aqueducts recalled the works of the ancient Romans.”217  
 Whatever Bacardí’s authorial intentions, informed speculation of competing motives 
suggests that slaves responded warily to entreaties or overtures from any quarter. The master 
class, descended from those who fled the largest slave revolt in history, the Haitian 
revolution with its resultant race war, saw themselves locked in permanent conflict – even 
approaching a state of ongoing domestic war – with their chattels.218 Bound laborers 
understood first hand the arbitrary authority, wanton treatment, and severe abuse masters 
were capable of.  They would closely analyze, watch, and wait before jeopardizing their 
                                                
 
216 Bacardí, Vía Crucis, 133-5. See also Mollin, 351-52. The induction of slaves as soldiers or laborers 
for the insurrection often included some type of explanation of separatist goals and abolition, see, for example, 
Ferrer, “Armed Slaves and Anticolonial Insurgency in Late Nineteenth-Century Cuba,” 312. 
 
217 Bacardí, Vía Crucis, 1a parte, 30. Elsewhere the author describes slaves bringing serf-like tribute to 
their master in the form of crops, piglets, produce, and so forth from their conuco cultivation plots during a 
social gathering on the plantation, 50-55. 
 
218 On the impact of events in Haiti in Cuba, see Navarro González-Ripoll et. al., El rumor de Haiti en 
Cuba: Temor, raza y rebeldía, 1789-1844 (Madrid: CSIC, 2005).  See also, Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of 
Colonial Slavery; David P. Geggus, ed., The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2001).  
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given social circumstances arrived at through precarious negotiation of the long-prevailing 
plantation system.219   
Then too, the relative scarcity of bozales from the 1840s on due to the increasing 
interdiction of the illegal trade had driven up the prices for slave laborers, and encouraged 
some masters to promote natural increase among slaves.  The children of slaves, held 
perpetually in bondage, promised planters a self-reproducing caste of servile laborers such as 
worked the antebellum U.S. South’s cotton fields.  The encouragement of families among 
slaves could serve masters a social control mechanism: unruly, recalcitrant, or rebellious 
behavior placed not only the individual but also the enslaved person’s dependents in 
jeopardy.  But at the same time the economic situation of the cash-strapped master class often 
enabled slaves to negotiate material improvements and ameliorate some aspects of their 
situation and living standards, allowing some small measure of hard won autonomy over 
their lives and labor—a circumscribed shift toward share-cropping and tenancy arrangements 
prior to emancipation.  Our modern views of slavery and its grotesquely unequal power 
relations have fixated on its salient coercive and often appallingly violent, cruel aspects. As a 
result there has been emphasis on exploitation and resistance.  Modern mentalities shaped by 
antislavery ideologies but tempered by Gramscian notions of the functioning of hegemony 
nevertheless are discomfited and rebel at the notion that people accede—at least outwardly—
to the system. Forms of accommodation arose when people were trapped within a world of 
hardscrabble existence and limited available options, inhabitants of an environment where a 
                                                
 
219 By “negotiate” I mean a wide range of behaviors—compromises within highly unequal social 
systems—structured by an often narrow and constrained set of social circumstances. My definition corresponds 
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person could see others at first hand, or certainly imagine all too readily, in more dire 
circumstances. In such a setting, one could come to cling to any tenuous relationship as a 
source of security—even seeing the site of one’s constrained and limited existence as home 
and hearth.220      
This wary and cautious slave and peasant conservatism does not negate or refute 
ongoing resistance, which many scholars of slavery have rightly emphasized, but merely 
adds consideration of individual and collective cost-benefit analyses and motives into 
discussion of slave participation in the separatist armed struggle. Certainly many slaves 
harbored long simmering grievances and even pent-up rage at the systemic violence and 
daily humiliations and exploitations they were often subject to.  Such people could be quite 
receptive to the opportunity the insurrection afforded for powerful motives of revenge, 
settling accounts, resistance, or running away.  But the risks of joining a ragged persecuted 
band of rebels often seemed far too great for any reasonable expectation of returns. The point 
is that slaves pursued their own motives when they could.  Sometimes these could be in 
concert with the rebels, at other times in conflict.221  An 1869 North American magazine 
article acknowledged, “A sort of general encouragement may have been given to the 
insurgents for the purpose of intimidating the Spanish Government into gradual rather than 
an immediate emancipation. But,” it went on to state, “it is not surprising, considering that 
                                                
 
220 On patterns of and possibilities for family life and creolization on coffee farms in an earlier colonial 
period, extraordinary forms of petit maronage, and patterns of resistance including full-scale slave rebellions in 
western Cuba, see Van Norman, chs. 4 and 5.  Provocatively, on p. 139 the issues are raised of a slave “moral 
economy” in which bozales could see the labor regime on some cafetales as approximating forms of labor 
approximating or more akin to certain types of agricultural labor and slavery practiced in Africa than the 
regimes prevailing at other plantations, especially sugar ingenios.   
 
221 As but one example among many, see Robert, “Slavery and Freedom in the Ten Years’ War, 1868-
1878,” 181-82, where Cienfuegos sugar slaves denounced an unpopular overseer to the Spaniards as a seditious 
insurgent supporter. The authorities in turn, had him arrested in spite of the absence of evidence.   
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the negroes have had all pluck knocked out of them, and dread firearms, and therefore could 
not join in a simultaneous rising – it is not surprising, we say, that a handful of regular 
soldiers sufficed to quell the outbreak of insurrection in Guantanamo.”222  
 If such were the carrots and sticks hindering and conditioning underlying slave 
responses to insurrection, what this rather glib analysis missed was that the “handful of 
regular soldiers” was, in fact, primarily the local militia, the Squadron of Santa Catalina with 
an intimate knowledge of the terrain and a long counterinsurgent pedigree.  It was also 
premature, written as it was before the 1871 invasion.  A journalist who visited these same 
coffee districts later wrote: 
[French Creoles] must have been far from thinking that their new country also 
was to fall a prey to the same evils, and in a great measure from the same 
causes as those from which they escaped. For the Cuban question, like the 
Haytian question of 1796, is that of slave emancipation; and it will only be 
ultimately solved by determining on what footing free labour may be made to 
answer both here and throughout the West Indies.223 
 
As runaway slave activity declined by the mid-nineteenth century, and external 
capitalist investment from Brooks and Company allowed for the consolidation of steam-
powered sugar mills, by 1858 the Squadron had become a rural gendarmerie.  Members 
served two months out of the year.224 Despite their typically humble social backgrounds, it is 
likely that those incorporated into the Squadron were subject to the separate court fueros and 
enjoyed privileges attendant with service in the disciplined militia.  Service implied 
distinction and rank, or impunity, within the community.  Maroon activity may have 
diminished, but as late as 1863 municipalities in the district expended $150 gold pesos to 
                                                
 
222 Harper’s, 11.  
 
223 Gallenga, 149.  
 
224  Pezuela, II: 266. See also Rodríguez, 57.  
 128 
continued patrols.225  Clearly both the ongoing threat of successful maroon flight, and the 
actual existence of small palenques remained a social control concern.   
Anthropologist Gabino La Roza has indicated that in eastern Cuba “vagabond 
runaway slaves” and “runaway slaves living in settlements,” as he termed slave resistance 
leading to actual outlaw ex-slave encampments or more permanent hidden rebel villages—
which may be simplified by using the French term grand marronage to incorporate both 
tactics—largely disappeared by the mid-nineteenth century with changing social 
conditions.226 Much the same shift earlier occurred in western Cuba, where maroon presence 
had been eliminated by the green tide of cane cultivation in Matanzas earlier in the 
nineteenth century.227  For that matter it also became less prevalent in the antebellum United 
States where runaways from border-states frequently sought refuge in free labor states or in 
Canada with the passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act.228 Nevertheless, in Cuba, the 
increasingly high price of slaves amid declining supply meant that individual runaways 
commanded a much higher bounty from owners.229  But while the masters’ social control 
solution to maroon activity in the coffee sector lay in effective repression combined with 
modifying servile labor to a form of semi-feudal serfdom – essentially allowing their laborers 
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led by Pérez in 1852, which captured fifteen maroons but at the cost of seven slave “hunters wounded on 
stakes,” and a further call for operations to be undertaken by the lieutenant-governor of Guantánamo in 1857. 
 
226 La Rosa, 7-8, 207.  
 
227 Bergad, 83; Mollin, 71.  
 
228 On U.S. slave patrols, with some comparative treatment of the Anglophone Caribbean, see Hadden. 
For slave resistance and flight in U.S. Southern contexts, and on slave patrols, see also John Hope Franklin and 
Loren Schweninger, Runaway Slaves: Rebels on the Plantation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
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to live in a closely supervised village tied to the finca – the rigid conditions of the sugar 
plantation and its exploitative labor demands at harvest time imposed different constraints. 
The expansion of sugar on the plain ineluctably led to other social control challenges. 
The aforementioned 1869 article underscored the geographical distinction between 
the “lofty range of mountains” and the “pestilential” hot llano “studded with ‘sucaries’ [sugar 
mills], the mountains with ‘cafetals’ [coffee plantations].”  It listed “Potosí ... the largest and 
most scientifically managed” coffee farm, “with 200 slaves” and the “largest sugar estate ... 
‘Esperanza,’” absentee-owned by the wealthy Havana-based planter “Mr. Bardow [sic, José 
Baró Blauxard]” with “400 male employés, many of which are coolies and the remainder 
slaves.”230  An 1867 list of 120 single male “Asiatics” or Chinese indentured workers in 
Guantánamo indicated that twelve worked on the railway, two as domestics, and 106 in the 
countryside, ninety-seven of them at Esperanza – their eight-year indenture contracts 
stipulating a twelve-hour workday for food and lodging, at a pay scale of four pesos per 
month purchased in Havana by Baró who had made his fortune from the illegal slave trade.231   
On 28 January 1868—months before Céspedes’ Grito de Yara initiated the Ten 
Years’ War—during the sugar harvest, eighty of these Chinese “mutinied” over mistreatment 
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by their foreman. Arming themselves with “hoes, mattocks, knives, and machetes,” they fell 
back to their living quarters at the sounding of the alarm by “the pairs of rural guards” placed 
in the fields to prevent cane fires and patrol the roads.232 The lieutenant governor and a 
detachment of troops arrived to find slaves and indentured workers at odds, each group 
fearing what the other might do, and what would befall them because of the work stoppage.  
The Chinese indentured workers turned over their weapons, and some black slaves and free 
wageworkers made accusations about especially guilty parties.  The lieutenant governor’s 
report indicated that these laborers worked at the best finca in the district, with better food 
and conditions than many. Those identified as culpable “were punished with ten or twenty 
varazos.”  Three ringleaders were put in irons.  The Squadron of Santa Catalina could 
effectively buttress planter authority on the invigilated sugar mills of the plain and pursue 
fugitives in the remote mountains. The outbreak of war would initially demonstrate their 
counterinsurgent utility in further reinforcing the social control of the colonial state. 
<><><> 
The onset of the Ten Years’ War led to the Squadron’s full mobilization, with 
separate units commanded by different members of the Pérez clan. Miguel’s son, Santos, led 
one column. A nephew, Pedro Agustín Pérez y Pérez, was in charge of another.233  The 
                                                
 
232 Expediente manuscrito que trata del amotinamiento de ochenta asiaticos contratados en el ingenio 
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Squadron’s repressive tasks and patrol functions resembled counter-maroon sweeps much as 
before, ranging out into the most inaccessible hills to ferret out likely insurgent encampments 
– called prefectures by the rebels themselves, but labeled simply “camps” or even palenques 
by Spanish forces.  Initial slave flight, incorporation into rebellion, or opportunity for flight 
created by political unrest that was originally not explicitly abolitionist meant the conflation 
of insurrection, slave flight, and the rekindling of maroon activity may not have been too 
wide off the mark. 
The start of the rebellion drew battle lines between the sugar enclave and export 
coffee sectors and the semi-peasant small holders, squatters, and tenant farmers in the 
mountainous periphery of the region.234  Marginal rural supporters of the separatists along the 
north coast communicated with insurgents in Holguín. These pro-separatist elements 
achieved some small military victories, briefly seizing Tiguabos and other towns, until late 
November 1868 when they launched a haphazardly organized frontal attack on the city of 
Guantánamo itself.  The Squadron and other colonialist militia repulsed the poorly armed 
rebels with considerable losses.  This defeat of the insurrectos was followed by a 
counterattack on their encampment, which killed and captured more of the rebels and ejected 
the dispersed remnants from the district.235  At the beginning of the war, it seems that the 
affair was mostly confined to white Cubans, with some involvement of free people of color 
on both sides.  As the conflict developed, however, there was a tendency for the loyalties of 
orientales of color to be questioned, where racial identification became correlated with either 
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a more white integralism versus a more mixed-race separatist profile.  Separatist insurgents 
made some incursions from time to time, foreshadowing the major depredations that would 
follow in 1871, such as a December 1868 raid on the cafetal San Fernando between the 
cantons of Monte Líbano and Yateras close to Guantánamo where thirty slaves—presumably 
mostly men—were seized by 153 rebels.236  Nevertheless, the district remained for the most 
part a bulwark of Spanish colonialism within Oriente province.  Reinforced by regular 
troops, the colonialist paramilitary concentrated on the outlaw Rustán’s band.  In mid-1869 
they surprised and apparently annihilated a filibuster expedition from the schooner 
Grapeshot, which was attempting to land weapons, munitions, and republican banknotes 
supplied by Cuban exiles in the United States.237  
Little about the ill-fated Grapeshot filibuster expedition to Guantánamo can be 
known with certitude, but it is suggestive of the efficiency of the Escuadra paramilitary 
social control mechanism in reinforcing the local authority of the colonial state, and 
underscores the reputation of the district as a “little Spain” during the Ten Years’ War. The 
old runaway slave patrol militia became adapted to emerging counterinsurgent roles against 
threats posed by local insurgents, those operating from nearby areas of Oriente province, and 
external separatist backers.  The paramilitary mobilized against the appearance of the foreign 
filibusters; it would appear that all, or at least most of the crew and smugglers aboard 
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attempting to reach the insurrection were captured and executed. The ship was likely the 
“schooner” mentioned in a New York Times article “which brought” 100 men from New 
York and Jamaica to a remote landing spot at Baitiquirí just to the east of Guantánamo Bay:  
“The men appeared to be composed of Americans, Dominicans and Cubans.” Betrayed by a 
“negro guide” who  
informed the commander at Guantanamo, while a mounted ordenance [sic, 
ordenanza] informed the garrison at Baracoa. Before mid-day 700 men, 
composed of troops, volunteers and country people who were forced to 
accompany the troops were at hand. The filibusters were surrounded, and 
although outnumbered, fought desperately. ... a large number were killed, 
among them the reputed leader of the expedition. Several were captured and 
taken to Santiago de Cuba to be executed there. The others ... escaped. At 
latest dates they were still at large, although letters from Santiago de Cuba, 
written by Spaniards, announced that they were captured.238  
 
The article further listed the seizure of 400 Remington rifles, two small artillery pieces, 
“three cart-loads of baggage,” munitions, and “over two millions of unsigned patriot currency 
of the denominations of one, two, five, twenty, and fifty dollars ... Private letters received 
later state that every man belonging to the expedition was either killed or captured.” The 
paper also reported a “second expedition, composed of 150 men” that  “landed in the 
jurisdiction of Guantanamo and joined the [insurgent] forces in the interior unmolested” but 
gave no further details. The article’s author, one “Quasimodo,” impugned several Spanish 
newspaper stories about the progress of the war as distorted, exaggerated, and inaccurate.  He 
described a battle at the Nuevitas railroad between insurgents and “colored Havana 
volunteers” where “About sixty of these volunteers had deserted and joined the Cubans.”239 
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Some survivors of the Grapeshot expedition may have been rescued by Rustán and 
Moncada’s force.240 
<><><> 
Many local integralist volunteers were from the laboring classes, lending an intra-
class character to district political loyalties.  Yet other indications suggest that participation 
in the separatist armed struggle bore the hallmarks of peasant rebellion and class war. Most 
in Guantánamo either remained indifferent or passive to pro-independence appeals, or 
arrayed against the separatists. Many inhabitants identified the regional particularistic 
interests of their patria chica with the integralist colonial nationalism of Cuba Española.  But 
some poor whites, mestizos, and free blacks in the semi-peasant periphery drew battle lines 
against the land-engrossing sugar enclave in the valley and the slave-based coffee sector in 
the mountains.   
A May 1869 report on the insurrection from the lieutenant governor listed 419 men 
and one woman as “having taken part in the [separatist] insurrection, voluntarily or 
forcibly.”241  The twenty-three year old single woman from Tiguabos was “dressed as a man 
in the way of the insurrectos” and in official custody, as were a considerable number of the 
others.242  She and about 170 of those listed had the honorific “Don” indicating that they 
were considered legally white, while about 250 without the title were presumably black or of 
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mixed race.  Eighty-nine percent had “from the countryside” listed as profession, while six 
percent were artisans of some sort – cobblers, tobacco workers, tailors, building masons.243 
Fewer than one percent were substantial property holders, although it is likely that many 
campesinos listed from Sagua de Tánamo had a tobacco vega or subsistence farm.  Only 
forty-eight were originally from the immediate environs of Guantánamo/ Tiguabos, while 
fully eighty-eight were from Sagua de Tánamo on the trackless, wild north coast. A further 
eighty hailed from nearby Mayarí, and around forty originally came from Holguín in mostly 
white western Oriente province. Sixty-five were from the rainy, lush jungle-country 
surrounding isolated plantain, banana, and coconut-producing Baracoa on the easternmost tip 
of the island, and roughly a similar number came from Santiago. Fifteen were Catalans, 
Canary Islanders, Galicians, or from other regions of Spain.  Two were listed as African 
born, but may have been manumitted before the war, while two Creole blacks, a thirty-three 
and a thirty-eight year old, were described as slaves.   
While the solitary list is anecdotal, it is nevertheless suggestive that many of the 
insurgents in the district came from peripheral areas marked by small-holding farms and 
peasant subsistence cultivation, underscoring Eric Wolf’s thesis on twentieth-century peasant 
revolts being caused by a restive peasant sector being overridden by agrarian capitalist forces 
and the engrossment of land by investors or gentry tied to a larger economic system.244  It 
certainly seems a logical and reasonable extrapolation that the list of persons killed, 
surrendered, pardoned, imprisoned, or awaiting further disposition suggests that the 
                                                
243 Ferrer also uses this document; juxtaposing it with a similar insurgent list from Camagüey to 
contrast the disparate social origins and class composition of rebel forces by region early in the conflict, see 
Insurgent Cuba, 55-56.  
 
244 Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).  
 136 
Squadron had largely checked the insurgency locally.245 The insurrection gained ground in 
western Oriente province and Camagüey, but remained stymied in Oriente’s slave-dependent 
east. In the rest of Cuba, Peninsular Spaniards and integrista volunteers quashed with a heavy 
hand manifestations of separatism—real and imagined.   
As Spain’s colonial army prepared to erect a barrier across the narrows of Puerto 
Príncipe to physically separate western Cuba’s civilization from Camagüey and Oriente’s 
“barbarous” primitive frontier, latent schemes for the settlement of the region with a 
yeomanry of white Spaniard soldier-colonists arose again as mentioned in the epigraph to 
Chapter I:  
The eastern part of the island of Cuba, barely populated before 1869, will 
remain deserted after the sad events that have occurred in the last months of 
’68 and the first of ’69; and the beautiful ports will only serve as refuge to 
Pirates and malefactors, if the Government ... does not prepare the means to 
repopulate those fertile lands. ... the Count [of Mompox y de Jaruco], who 
possesses vast lands in these regions, proposes, if the Government approves, 
to form agro-military colonies [of] Peninsular and Canary Islander yeomen.246  
 
The Count of Mompox y de Jaruco’s 1869 colonization plan showed no indication of detailed 
knowledge of the situation on the ground in Guantánamo.  Indeed, at the time it was 
submitted, the local supporters of the “integrity of Cuba Española,” that is, the maintenance 
of the Antillean colony with metropolitan authority in Spain, appeared to have the upper 
hand.  If military colonists were not forthcoming, then the agricultural colonists already 
present became further militarized.  Aggressive patrols combed the hills, while the 
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restrictions on movement inherent in the slave plantation regime with its pass system, 
curfews, and barracks—typically with an armed guard posted in front—hindered contacts 
between bond laborers and the rebels.  Since plantations were the chosen battlegrounds of the 
insurgents, concomitantly planter oversight increased.  In the meantime, planters fortified 
their estates with large kerosene-powered spotlights for illumination at night, loopholes and 
embrasures for firearms, watchtowers, and a ring of blockhouses against the mambí 
insurgents.247 Militia and eventually growing numbers of regular troops manned the defenses 
of property, and it was not entirely unknown for “the most trusted of the slaves” to be armed, 
“though with inferior weapons.”248  To observers, the rural landscape assumed a positively 
medieval aspect as forts, army posts replete with stockades and battlements, watchtowers, 
                                                
 
247 On estate fortifications during the Ten Years’ War, see O’Kelly, The Mambi-Land, 120-121. The 
term mambí is thought to have originated during the 1864-1865 War of the Restoration in the Dominican 
Republic, where it was first applied to black insurrectos by Spanish troops as an epithet. It may derive from a 
Congo or Angolan word mbi meaning “bad man,” or it may be a reference to a specific Dominican rebel. The 
name was used in Cuba during the Ten Years’ War, and taken up by the rebels themselves. See Gott, 73; Philip 
Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of U.S. Imperialism, 2 vols. (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1972), I: 31; and Fernando Ortiz’s 1930 introduction to James J. O’Kelly, La tierra del mambí 
(Havana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2001), 8.  On blockhouses, see Mollin, 201, fn 209, which claimed that 
the system of blockhouses originated with France’s Imperial Grand Army in Haiti, and from there were again 
built by the same army to contain and control Spanish guerrillas during the 1808 Peninsular War in Iberia. Post-
1830 French colonial practice in Algeria further stimulated the diffusion of the tactic and physical architecture 
of social control in other colonial contexts. The Spanish army had envisioned a fortified line, or “trocha” 
including many such blockhouses during the War of the Restoration in the Dominican Republic, but did not 
build such an elaborate defensive system until the Ten Years’ War in Cuba. John Lawrence Tone, War and 
Genocide in Cuba, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 157, described trochas first being 
built in colonial campaigns in the Philippines, 1888-1891.  See also Tone, 118-19, 167-68, 184-85, 188-89.  In 
Cuba the Spanish army envisioned that the Trocha across the narrows of Jucaró-Ciego de Ávila-Morón would 
isolate the insurgents in the less-developed and economically less-significant east, keeping them out of the 
western districts of the isle. See also, Tamara Blanes, Fortificaciones del Caribe (Havana: Editorial Letras 
Cubanas, 2001), 162-178,195-210; José Manuel Guerrero Acosta, El Ejército Español en Ultramar y África 
(1850-1925): Los soldados olvidados del otro lado del mar (Madrid: Acción Press, S.A., 2003), 29, citing 
projected trocha plans for Santo Domingo in AGM-M, Collección General de documentos, leg. 5-4-12-4. 
Further research may find that barbed wire—invented separately in France in 1867 and in the United States in 
1874—and later installed as part of the trocha in Cuba was used to fence off western Cuba from separatist 
rebellion in Oriente before it found widespread use in the late 1870s on the North American western frontier. 
For barbed wire’s political history and the social control “management of space,” see Olivier Razac, Barbed 
Wire: A Political History trans. by Jonathan Kneight (New York: The New Press, 2002). 
 
248 O’Kelly, 119-22.  
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and blockhouses dotted the countryside with a militarized defensive architecture of social 
control.   The coffee planters would shortly learn, however, that the Spanish were ill-
disposed to defend four percent of Cuba’s coffee production—physically scattered in 
difficult, barely accessible mountainous terrain—especially when twenty percent of eastern 
Cuba’s sugar in the more readily defended Guantánamo valley was at stake.  Nevertheless, 
despite such ambiguities and unforeseen effects of war and mobilization, it would seem that 
instability generated by the conflict began to have undermining effects on slavery.249       
 A 17 April 1871 letter from the lieutenant governor of Guantánamo – eighteen days 
before Pérez’s death – bore something of the imprimatur of the runaway catcher’s modus 
operandi if not direct evidence of his participation in the capture of slaves it described.250  
Responses to a government request to list the name, master, and current location of captured 
slaves presumed to have tried to join the insurrection or emanating from overrun insurgent 
prefectures recorded 270 such slaves, 166 of them from the Tiguabos region, and 104 from 
Yateras.  This anecdotal list like the aforementioned intelligence on local insurgents in 1869 
offers little at first glance apart from noting that these bound laborers, irrespective of their 
motives or circumstances of flight from their often French owners, apparently did not have 
“all pluck knocked out of them” after all.  But as it is set against other records it is evidence 
of the erosion of slavery in the district.  It is striking that most of the almost three hundred 
                                                
 
249 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, ch. 1; Robert; Scott, Degrees of Freedom, ch. 4, especially pgs.94-108.  
 
250 Esclavos presentados en el Departamento procedtes. de la insurrección, 17 April 1871, AHPSC, 
GP, leg. 563, exp. 29, docs. 1-7, año 1871, materia: Esclavitud. Operation reports bearing Miguel Pérez’s 
signature appear in Columna de operaciones de Guantánamo, Diario de las operaciones practicadas en la 
primera quincena del mes de la fecha, AGM-M, caja: 5803, exp. 5803.68, p. 1-5, and the aforementioned record 
in AGM-S, 6a y 8a, leg. 53, 55 folios. 
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slaves were from coffee plantations isolated in the mountains.251  Only thirty came from the 
steam-powered sugar mills Perseverancia and Santa Fé, and seven from the ox-powered 
trapiche San José on the plain.    
Apart from where they had lived and worked, and the fact that they had run away or 
been taken from their plantations there was no indication of motives or if they had returned 
through happenstance, random capture, or even as some kind of cadre intent on carrying the 
rebel message of Cuba Libre or news and details of the government’s Moret Law provisions 
on emancipation to their isolated or cautious fellow slaves.  As was the practice in Cuba, the 
slave “presentados” appeared only with first names: slaves did not have family surnames to 
be recorded, although they sometimes appeared with the owner’s surname, or rarer still, their 
profession. All on the list had male names, except possibly one or two difficult to discern, 
which would be in keeping with an insurgent tendency to induct or compel male slaves into 
the insurrection.252 Their ethnicity was not recorded either, and the names were Spanish or 
French, although provocatively one who was simply “Africa” might have been an African-
born bozal.  Frustratingly, there was no indication of whether they were impressed into the 
insurrection, or if they heeded insurgent propaganda appeals and fled their owners, or if they 
simply took advantage of dislocation and unsettled conditions to pursue their own motives, 
perhaps attempting to reunite with family members elsewhere—or even if some among these 
                                                
 
251 That the slaves were returned to their actual owners rather than placed in some sort of deposit was 
strongly suggested by the correspondence between the property named and the owners in the tax records from a 
decade earlier, Libro talonario para la recaudación del impuesto municipal sobre fincas rurales en Guantánamo, 
ANC, ML, año 1861, sin legajo, no. 2,588, Fincas rurales. Impto de. Moving farther back chronologically, there 
was further correspondence between properties and owners from a circa mid-nineteenth century agricultural 
census, Padrón de fincas rústicas del partido de Tiguabos, propietarios, dotación, producción y rentas, and del 
partido Yateras, ANC, GG, leg. 388, exp. 18511 and exp. 18510, sin fecha [ca.1854?]. 
 
252 See Ferrer, “Armed Slaves and Anticolonial Insurgency in Late Nineteenth-Century Cuba,” 325, fn 
12.  
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fugitives represented a rekindling of maroon activity amid the instability and social strains 
provoked by the conflict. Nevertheless it is indicative of a hemorrhage from the dotaciones 
coincident with the separatist war and the effects of the Moret law freeing children and the 
elderly.   
Table 3.1 below shows age, sex, occupation and civil status of slaves in 1871.  From 
approximately 8,500 slaves postwar, by the third year of the conflict, and the first year of 
manumissions under the Moret law, the number appeared to have fallen to 6,800. 
Table 3.1 
Age, sex, occupation and civil status of slaves from an 1871 padrón. 
Age and sex: 
Jurisdiction From 1 
to 15 
years of 
age 
Male / 
Female 
From 16 
to 20 
years of 
age 
Male / 
Female 
From 21 
to 40 
years of 
age 
Male / 
Female 
From 41 
to 50 
years of 
age 
Male /  
Female 
From 51 
to 60 
years of 
age  
Male /  
Female 
Total by 
sex 
Male /  
Female 
Total 
Guantánamo 1,048 
707 
497   
445  
1,625   
1,428 
119   
416 
215   
300 
3504 
3296 
6,800 
Oriente and 
Camagüey 
6,333 
6,092 
2,769 
2,465 
9,243 
7,957 
2,313 
3,022 
2,223 
1,467 
22,881 
21,003 
43,884 
 
All Cuba 38,647 
33,340 
16,534 
14,034 
69,694 
51,170 
11,672 
15,591 
15,710 
8,700 
164,791 
122,835 
287,626 
 
Occupation and civil status: 
Jurisdiction Countryside Domestic 
service 
Married Widowed Single TOTAL 
Guantánamo 6,096 704 0 1 6,799 6,800 
Oriente and 
Camagüey 
33,867 10,017 455 220 42,809 43,884 
All Cuba 231,790 55,820 10,000 2,330 274,890 287,220* 
 Source: Data from Spain, Ministerio de Ultramar, Cuba desde 1850 á 1873. 
Colección de informes, memorias, proyectos, y antecedentes sobre el gobierno de la isla de 
Cuba, relativos el citado período, que ha reunido por comisión del gobierno D. Carlos de 
Sedano y Cruzat (Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1873). *In some cases the totals do not match, 
indicating, perhaps, cases where status was unknown or incomplete. 
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There are other sources that give insights into the chart of apparent runaways.  Five 
months before the 17 April 1871 list, two slaves named Felipe and Santiago from the San 
José cafetal between the cantons of El Toro and Monte Líbano, had claimed to Spanish 
interrogators that they had naïvely followed the orders of their overseer, Eduardo Pochet, into 
insurgent ranks. In their case, they were not returned to their owner, José Fournier, but set 
free because they alleged they had been bamboozled by a seditious superior to whom they 
owed deference, and because they had subsequently served Spanish authorities faithfully.253 
In April however, Gerónimo, Raimundo, Irene, Marcelino, José Caridad, and Agapito from 
the same coffee plantation were returned to the owner Fournier.254  Had they been motivated 
to run away because Felipe and Santiago had gained freedom collaborating with pro-Spanish 
elements? Had they similarly claimed they had been duped or coerced into rebellion by an 
insurgent sympathizer? There was simply no evidence from which to reconstruct their 
motives in absconding from their plantation.  Neither was there evidence of what role they 
may have performed in insurgent ranks. Perhaps they had been set to work at menial tasks 
and come to view the insurrection with disfavor.255  Maybe they had tried to elude labor 
demands from any and all overseers, separatist, integralist, or neutral.  
 
                                                
 
253  David Sartorius, “Limits of Loyalty: Race and the Public Sphere in Cienfuegos, Cuba, 1845-1898” 
(PhD. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2003), 63.  
 
254 Esclavos presentados en el Departamento procedtes. de la insurrección [sic], AHPSC, GP, leg. 563, 
exp. 29, año: 1871, materia: Esclavitud.  
 
255 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 32-37.  
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The General and the Assistant 
 Some insights into the mobility of slaves during the war, and an example of a liberto 
from a Guantánamo cafetal joining the insurgency, may be gained from one of the personal 
servants, known as “asistentes,” maintained by insurgent officers.  One such ex-slave, 
Eduardo, who served in such a role with Máximo Gómez himself instead of as a combatant 
in separatist ranks for much of the Ten Years War had his story written down by Gómez 
many years after the war.  Eduardo, or simply “old Eduá,” was originally “from the cafetal 
‘San Juan,’ Guantánamo.” He left for the war at the “beginning” when, according to Gómez 
writing in a facsimile of his subaltern’s voice, “one Rendón took us out of [the coffee farm], 
and I left very sad because I left my woman and two little children.”256 Gómez, a veteran of 
the Spanish army in the Dominican War of the Restoration, had ably employed his 
knowledge and experience of his ex-comrades-in-arms to ambush and defeat a Spanish 
column early in the war at Venta del Pino close to the impromptu rebel capital of Bayamo.257  
As historian of Spain John Tone has described, Cuban rebels gunned down the Spaniards 
from ambush at near contact distance, before overrunning the survivors, machetes in hand.  
The rebel victory bought the capital of Cuba Libre four months of time, and earned Gómez 
promotion to general.258  
The experiences of ex-slave Eduá and the town of Bayamo after that brief, and for the 
separatists, heady four months took a rather different turn.  Gómez described conversations 
with his servant that suggest he was in western Oriente’s Cauto river valley, possibly one of 
                                                
 
256 Gómez, El viejo Eduá, o mi último asistente, 27.  
 
257 Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 61-62.  
 
258 Ibid. Similarly, O’Kelly lauded the military actions of Modesto Díaz, another Dominican veteran of 
the Spanish Army, for his role in halting another column during the same period, see p. 283. 
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the few libertos who survived the staggering, bloody separatist defeat at El Saladillo 7-8 
January 1869 at the hands of the Count of Valmaseda.259 There an attempt at a set-piece 
regular battle by insurgent general, Donato Mármol, part of a desperate bid to halt the 
Spanish troops and integralist voluntarios of the “Crescent of Valmaseda” moving against 
rebel-held Bayamo, pitted 4,000 blacks—including many recently freed slaves armed only 
with machetes or pikes (chuzos)—and some 500 other orientales: whites and people of color 
poorly armed with an ad hoc assortment of antique blunderbusses, fowling pieces, and 
muskets—against the rifles and artillery of Valmaseda’s column composed of Spanish line 
infantry and integralist volunteers from western Cuba.  Over 2,000 separatist combatants 
were slain on the field.260  
The defeat imposed on separatists waging armed struggle the necessity of irregular 
warfare.  Fire—candela—brought by the incendiary torch, shortly became a preferred, even 
iconic, insurgent weapon for waging a scorched earth campaign—especially after many 
inhabitants of Bayamo razed their town before the metropolitan colonial army seized it. The 
hapless liberto Eduá remained with Mármol’s forces until the insurgent leader’s death from a 
tropical fever, when many of the troops under his command either followed the holguinero 
chief, Calixto García, or dispersed, deserted, and melted away.  Eduá was numbered among 
the latter, and became, in effect, a maroon dwelling in a cave until he joined Gómez as one of 
his asistentes.  As O’Kelly candidly, if coarsely, noticed a few years later, “assistants were 
                                                
 
259  Gott, 77. 
 
260 Guerra, I: 79-81. For a persuasive critique of Cuban military historiography, including its muted or 
absent treatment of Liberation Army defeats and reversals, as well as an account of the battle, see Mollin, 82-
83, 86, and fn 230.  
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all as black as the ace of spades.”261 These assistants’ labor in pitching camps, hauling 
supplies or wounded soldiers, foraging, cooking, and other menial non-combat tasks was one 
of the perquisites and privileges of rank within the separatist military.262   
 
Cuba Libre 
The replication of highly unequal power relations in insurgent encampments often 
came into conflict with the rough and ready sort of equality caused by propinquity internal to 
the rebel army’s ranks and zones under its control in the subterfuge and refuge offered by the 
backlands.  The Spanish officer held captive in western Oriente by Calixto García’s 
mambises in 1873, the same period as O’Kelly’s visit with Céspedes, wrote that almost all 
the combatants had been wounded at some point, they hardly ever had adequate food, and yet 
they could march great distances.  The Spanish prisoner observed they could be “generous” 
with what little they had: three or four sharing a smoke for example.  They “blindly obeyed 
the officers” often performing duties with “a ridiculous gravity.”  Discipline was strict.  
Officers frequently imposed corporal punishment, beating subordinates with the flat of a 
machete (dar plan). Still others were bound with cords in uncomfortable, awkward, stressful 
positions in a humiliating punishment clearly derived from slave stocks.  As for off-duty 
                                                
 
261 O’Kelly, 223.  
 
262 Gómez, El viejo Eduá, 18-29; Rosal y Vázquez de Mondragón wrote that insurgent first and second 
lieutenants generally had one assistant, captains two, lieutenant-colonels and colonels three, brigadiers four, and 
major-generals and members of the Chamber of Representatives had access to the labor of five such assistants, 
see p. 20.  A report found in Operaciones. Diario de los practicados por la Columna de operaciones de 
Guantánamo, Enero-Marzo 1871 in AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 49, 14 folios, contained information about 
insurgent dispositions, some of military value, and other details such as the preferences of García and Gómez 
for white horses, provided by a black deserter, one Quintilio Bertot, who claimed to interrogators that he had 
been an assistant, “tired of fatigues and penalties he suffered” from Gómez himself. On assistants see also 
Ferrer, “Armed Slaves in Anticolonial Insurgency in Nineteenth-Century Cuba,” 308. 
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activities during respite from constant foraging and interminable forced marches, friendly 
foreign observer and Spaniard foe alike agreed that one “of the most striking features of the 
Cuban character ... is the passion for dancing.”263   
The Spanish captive typecast the rebels in gendered language—as had other 
nineteenth-century observers of Cuban social customs—to be “high aficionados of dances, 
which they enjoyed as much as women.”264  O’Kelly likened the “passionate joy while 
moving to the dreary, sensuous measure of the native danza” as resembling in some way “the 
craze of the opium eater.”265  But class comportment and color intervened.  Officers danced 
separately from the ranks. As for the assistants and other lower-class black Cubans, closer to 
the social conditions of involuntary servitude, O’Kelly ethnocentrically described neo-
African dances, in which, to his perception: 
 It required an effort ... to convince one’s self that the spot where one stood  
was in America, and not in the African jungle. A group of black men were 
gathered around some dancers, who moved about with strange, uncouth 
motions to the monotonous chant of musicians, who seconded their vocal 
efforts with loud clapping of hands ... This was the Voudou dance, a religious 
ceremony, kept up by the African blacks ... Most of the colored people [sic] 
turned up their noses at this ceremonial dance and pretty freely characterized 
the people who took part in it as savages,—barbaros; but, except for its 
uncouthness, there was nothing offensive or repulsive, if we omit its utter 
stupidity [sic].266   
 
                                                
263 O’Kelly, 221. Ferrer, “Armed Slaves in Anticolonial Insurgency in Nineteenth-Century Cuba,” 
314-15, expands on discipline and punishment in courts martial adapting punishments inherited from slavery. 
Of course coercive punishments and corporal punishments were common to military, naval, and slave 
discipline. 
 
264 Rosal y Vázquez de Mondragón, 8, 11-14. On social customs and dance, see also O’Kelly, 189-91, 
221-223. 
 
265 O’Kelly, 221-223  
 
266 O’Kelly, 223.  
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The actual presence of women in prefectures and social proximity of whites and 
blacks horrified the aristocratic Spaniard’s upper-class masculine notions of decorum, 
civility, and order: “they have women, but not many, and these are ugly, dirty and untidy”: 
 They usually arrive at the camps of the fuerza [combatants], but do not  
accompany them on their raids, with the exception of eight or ten who do not 
merit the rating of women, such is their look that they do not appear 
[feminine].267  
 
His description of rustic hovels that sheltered insurgents in the backlands claimed a typical 
“poetic interior of a rancho mambís [sic]” consisted of a squalid, rudimentary thatched hut 
with hammocks or beds of tree branches, littered with a broken pot, gourd implements, a 
mortar and pestle for pounding and grinding coffee, “a rifle that does not work,” and “as 
many machetes as there are males, ... a domesticated jutía [a type of tree-dwelling rodent 
indigenous to Cuba] sentenced to die one day not far off.”268 It seemed to him and other 
observers of the day that the rebellion had caused eastern Cuba to revert even further, or 
entirely retrogress, to a wild and primitive state. 
Being isolated in the woods removed the insurgents from sources of clothing and 
shoes, which contributed to a ragged, semi-savage cast and countenance. The salient 
importance of costume and attire as not only a class marker but also as a dividing line 
between notions of civility and barbarism to nineteenth-century mentalities placed armed 
separatists in Oriente squarely within the ranks of the uncivilized.  Slaves in the countryside 
had typically worn a once or twice yearly issued outfit of work clothes that was mended and 
patched until it was literally falling to pieces.  Highborn and low-class insurgents, whites and 
                                                
 
267 Rosal y Vázquez de Mondragón,18.  
 
268 Ibid, 19.  
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blacks, now found themselves reduced alike to similar levels of privation.  On certain levels, 
life in rebel camps came to resemble that in maroon palenques.  
The wife of a ruined Louisiana sugar planter who relocated after the U.S. Civil War 
to a similar vocation on a sugar estate in Matanzas wrote that in the 1870s she met an “officer 
of the Spanish army, who had been stationed in the extreme eastern part of the island” who 
told the migrant North American southerners “he was astounded to see, during some raids on 
insurgent camps, how primitive, indeed, how near to Adam and Eve, the country people 
remote from settlements were. He saw women, with even less adornment than Eve was 
constrained to wear, picking wild rice and digging roots in the wilderness.” If the rebels did 
not shelter in “rocky caves, their abodes are rude huts that scarcely deserve the name. 
Literally existing from hand to mouth, they toil not, neither do they spin.”269 For his part, 
pro-separatist partisan O’Kelly expressed “some relief” on his first encounter with civilian 
denizens of Cuba Libre to find: 
 After all the stories told me about savage negroes [sic], ignorant as ferocious,  
wandering naked in the woods, respecting no laws, human or divine, and 
merely stopping short of cannibalism, it was some relief to me to be able to 
look around and find myself surrounded by persons of gentle, and even 
polished manners. It is true that clothing was rather scanty, but there was 
enough for decency, and in this favored clime little more is needed ... Indeed, 
considering that very many of these people had been slaves, —all of them 
except De la Torre were colored, —their conduct contrasted very favorably 
with what I have since observed among the white Catalans and Castilians who 
contemptuously look upon them as barbarians and negros sueltos, or to 
translate the idea, ‘runaway niggers [sic].’270   
 
Many in insurgent prefectures were barefoot, or went about shod in improvised 
sandals. Some rebels were “completely nude, while others have as their only garment a bit of 
                                                
 
269 Eliza Moore Chinn McHatton Ripley, From Flag to Flag: A Woman’s Adventures and Experiences 
in the South during the War, in Mexico, and in Cuba (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1889), 148.  
 
270 O’Kelly, 182-83.  
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rag held by a belt that covers them to mid-thigh.”271 The Spanish captive encountered one 
nearly naked, shoeless insurgent with only “a rifle, a cartridge-box, a spur on the right foot, 
and a rayadillo [blue and white pinstriped Spanish uniform] jacket ... elegantly cut and open 
in front.”272 O’Kelly was probably not describing the same mambí when he recollected a 
“strapping brown man ... the impersonation of heroic patriotism” clad only in “the rim of a 
straw hat, through which appeared the crown of a woolly head, and something resembling a 
ragged and scanty dishcloth was bound around his loins. A rifle and cartouchière completed” 
his “costume.”273  The only common possessions of the rebels that could be likened to any 
semblance of a uniform were an “enormous sack called a jolongo” worn on the back for 
carrying equipment and food items, and a hat of some sort. Officers, identified by rank 
insignia, many of whom carried a metal whistle, or a fotuto made from a conch shell for 
giving signals in camp and during battle, repeatedly patched and stitched their torn and 
threadbare clothing, while “some, like brigadier Maceo and his secretary Pedro Martínez, 
[were] able, I do not know how, to dress with a certain elegance.”274  O’Kelly’s view 
reinforced such observations: 
 [Some separatist combatants] were in a frightfully ragged condition. ...  
                                                
 
271 Rosal y Vázquez de Mondragón, 31.  
 
272 Ibid.  
 
273 O’Kelly, 220.  
 
274 Rosal y Vázquez de Mondragón, 21, 28, 32. See also Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 22-28, 33-34, 55-58, 
61-62. A 1 October 1869 list of regulations to be observed by Prefects in rebel zones or prefectures appears in, 
Reglamento que deben observar los Prefectos para un Regimen y mejor Gobierno, AHN, SU, leg.4933, tomo 6, 
no. 41. It demanded that rebel officials group all families and individuals found in a zone, sending any fit for 
military service to armed insurgent units, while organizing the cultivation and distribution of food crops.  As 
servants of the Republic, Prefects were to suppress and persecute “robbery, arson, rape,” and other crimes, 
enforce social control for the separatist polity, and seize swine or cattle belonging to enemies. Cattle could be 
taken from pro-separatists if a receipt was provided for future payment. It also called for special attention to the 
provision of salt and clothing—two necessities in scarcest supply.  
 149 
Measured by the standard of my expectations, the force was well clothed and 
equipped; for the Spanish officers told me so many stories of the wretched 
condition of the Cubans that I expected to find soldiers and officers in 
uniforms closely resembling that of our first parents on leaving Paradise. ... 
All of the officers were well dressed, and some even tastefully. ... All were 
scrupulously clean.... In the ranks there was more diversity, and many of the 
soldiers were not alone ragged, but very nearly naked.275  
 
<><><> 
A minority of the population in Cuba as a whole, and locally in Guantánamo too, 
sided with the different manifestations and varied projects of separatism.  Where the 
separatists had broad popular support in Camagüey and western Oriente, regionalism, 
political patronage, factionalism, and racial divisions militated against unity.  A majority of 
civilians in Guantánamo remained passive, hesitant, or non-committal. Still others actively 
supported a continuance of colonial hegemony.  Those inhabitants engaged in armed struggle 
living in the manigua often became radicalized through their participation in the rebellion.  
New York-educated Fernando Figueredo, who served as Céspedes’ private secretary until the 
president of the Republic in Arms’ divestiture and removal from office by a vote of rebel 
Representatives in 1873, wrote with some bitterness in the 1880s 
[It] would require volumes to be able to describe the atrocities committed by 
[integralist] Cuban volunteers against the patriots [i.e. separatists]; fearful that 
the Spaniards would doubt their loyalty, they exaggerated their role and 
became true furies against their brothers. The principle Corps ... were the 
                                                
 
275 O’Kelly, 220.  O’Kelly and Rosal y Vázquez de Mondragón differed a bit in description of the 
Liberation Army’s armament by the fifth year of the war. Both noted numbers of unarmed personnel or those 
armed only with machetes. O’Kelly, 219, out of 400 men found “one-third of the whole number were armed 
with breech-loading rifles, the others” with Civil War-surplus “Springfield and Enfield muzzle-loading rifles.” 
Rozal y Vázquez de Mondragón, 26, found that “[the enemy] affirm most armaments are taken from us [i.e. the 
Spanish forces]. Almost all their firearms are rifled and of the Remington [breech-loading] system; some 
Peabody [breech-loaders privately purchased for volunteers by Spanish clubs and integrista planters]; very few 
Berdan [a converted Spanish army rifle-musket] ... few are the [muzzle-loading] percussion rifles used by the 
fuerza ... smoothbores and shotguns have passed down to the majáes [or, in Cuban Spanish, majáses, e.g. 
noncombatants].” Ammunition sent to Spanish troops and integralist volunteers in 1873 included metallic 
cartridges for Remington, and Peabody rifles and carbines, and paper cartridges for Model 1857 rifle muskets.    
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Squadron of Guantánamo, the volunteers of Bicana and of Büecito; the former 
in Manzanillo, the latter in Bayamo, in Oriente.276  
 
Thus the rebellion seemed in many regards an intra-local civil conflict and an inter-regional 
war, pitting an armed minority against the colonial state’s local military and para-police 
social control bodies in a situation where no “town, however insignificant, did not lack its 
section of [integralist] volunteers, all [composed of] Cubans.”277 In such a setting of shifting 
loyalties, desertions, defections and switching sides were frequent occurrences. But former 
combatants from pro-Spanish militia “were a constant source of disturbances and quarrels” 
for the separatist military since 
  [They] demanded rations equal to what they had with the Spaniards, and  
some even asked to be paid for their services ... growing tired of our [the 
Liberation Army’s] manner of living, with its privations and sacrifices, they 
would go back over to the enemy’s [the colonial state’s] camp. ... To impress 
the Spaniard’s with their change of loyalties having been with us ... they 
would assassinate the chief and take his head as a trophy in order to be well 
received; or they would take our weapons along with theirs to hand over, and 
sometimes seduced our soldiers [to turn themselves in].278 
 
The Spanish also had many occasions to question the loyalty of Cuban-born militia.  
Defections from integralist ranks were frequent, and while soldiers’ salaries were usually 
several months in arrears, the situation was aggravated when it came to the back pay for 
Creole volunteers.  A November 1876 Spanish army report bemoaned the “penury” that 
undermined the struggle against the insurgency in Guantánamo and Baracoa: “in the sites in 
which before were [located] the palenques of the black cimarrones there is the danger of ... 
zones of cultivation, whose inhabitants in great part are inclined to the insurrection or already 
                                                
 
276 Fernando Figueredo Socarrás, La Revolución de Yara, 1868-1878 (1902, reprint; Havana: Editorial 
de Ciencias Sociales, 2000), 241.  
 
277 Ibid.  
 
278 Ibid.  
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in coexistence (convivencia) with the insurrectos ... the cause of the disaffection of [the 
population] are very complex” but included “lack of tact of some local authorities and the 
abandonment” of some movilizados “from the penury of the State.”279Martínez Campos 
urged “the imperious necessity of sustaining the guerrillas and movilizados of the country” 
lest they “engross the enemy ranks,” and especially because the Creole integralist militia had 
detailed knowledge of “the monte and other localities.”280  As will be seen later, defections to 
the rebel side would eventually come to include some key members of the Squadron of 
Guantánamo itself. 
To separatists in arms, the “privations and sacrifices” endured in the woods and 
mountains became a badge of distinction and source of self-identification.  Forms of artisan 
and peasant republicanism emerged within separatist circles from the participation of such 
elements within the insurrection, despite more elite leaders’ attempts to control policy.  
Inevitably, ineluctably, separatists came to develop intentions and aspirations of a post-war 
settling of accounts including land and wealth re-distribution at the expense of pro-Spanish 
elements to benefit a more egalitarian future Cuban state.  
<><><>  
 A set of reports on insurgents captured or taken into custody from nearby Santiago 
during the heavy blows struck against the rebellion there list men, women, and children, 
white, black and mixed race, slave and free who had been in prefectures or following mambí 
columns.  In one case, a group in September 1871 made up of people from Jutinicú near 
                                                
 
279 Informe sobre el Estado de la Guerra hasta el Mes de Noviembre (1876), AGM-M, caja 2552, car. 
24, sub-car. 24.1.1, no. 1, pp. 47-52; and Ejército de Operaciones de Cuba. Estado Mayor. General Sección 3a., 
AGM-M, caja 2552, car. 24, sub-car. 24.3.1, no. 14, pp. 1-8.  
 
280 Ejército de Operaciones de Cuba. Estado Mayor. General Sección 3a., AGM-M, caja 2552, car. 24, 
sub-car. 24.3.1, no. 14, pp. 1-8. 
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Santiago and Guantánamo was brought into prison.  The blacks, Agustín and Ignacio, were 
“sent back to the Señores Brooks y Compañia” presumably their former masters.281 
Returning to the aforementioned April 1871 runaway coffee-farm slave list one final 
time, what was perhaps most striking emerged from juxtaposing it with August Spanish 
military reports on the rebel invasion of Guantánamo. For there was near exact 
correspondence of the coffee plantations and owners named in both sets of documents: 
Cafetal Luisa owned by Félix Arnaud, Pedro Planche’s El Dorado, four estates in the canton 
of El Toro including the Indiana, Oasis, Alegría, and Olimpo, co-owned by the Thomases 
and Antonio Carbonell, the San Juan de Buena Vista and Cafetal Yemen of Don Adriano 
Daudinaut (Daudinot), Santa María del Cusco of Pablo Lamot, the Chinese and slave-owning 
sugar baron José Baró’s cafetal Eliseo, and the Celina.  These cafetales, along with the 
Soledad and Alma not mentioned in the report, were precisely those about to bear the brunt 
of Máximo Gómez’s offensive: the invasion of the Guantánamo jurisdiction in early 
August.282 
 
 
                                                
 
281 Relación nominal de los presentados, procedentes de la insurrección en este ppdo. a mi cargo desde 
Yaguas. 1o. de Marzo del presente Año, contained in Expediente manuscrito que contiene relaciones de los 
hombres presentados en los distintos partidos de la región procedentes del campo insurrecto, asi como de los 
capturados por diferentes jefes de columna. Palma Soriano y otros lugares, Marzo 2 al 18 Diciembre de 1871, 
AHPSC, GP, leg. 735, exp. 7, año 1871, Materia: Guerra del 1868.  
 
282 Sucesos producidos por los insurrectos en los cafetales del Toro [Jurisdicción de Guantánamo] Mes 
de Agosto 1871, AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R., leg.56, 23 folios.  The owner of Yemen coffee plantation, Adrian 
Daudinot, his brothers, and two employees had a shootout with rebels or bandits in January 1871, which may 
have afforded the slaves Rufino, Eduardo, Segundo, Laureáno, Isidoro, Victoriano, and Macsimo, mentioned in 
AHPSC, GP, leg. 735, exp.7, the opportunity to escape, or possibly their forced removal from the estate.  The 
skirmish at Yemen is contained in Partes de Novedades, 15 de Enero 1871, AGM-M, caja 2546, carpeta 21.3 
Partes de Operaciones del Mes de Enero, sub-carpeta 31.3.3. While rather far-fetched and improbable, there is 
also at least the possibility that some among the captured slaves returned to the cafetales could have deliberately 
returned as cadre to subvert discipline on the plantation and prepare the dotación for the rebel invasion of the 
district. 
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The Invasion 
 According to a report forwarded from Tiguabos by the military commander of 
Guantánamo to the head of the department, at four in the morning, just before dawn 22 May 
1871, a sentinel outside the old maroon-hunter Miguel Pérez’s cafetal, Canaan, heard noises 
in the dark. Fifteen integralist “movilizados” lay sleeping in hammocks at the estate while 
another fifteen were stationed in the Galiano coffee farm commanded by Pérez’s son, Santos, 
just a quarter league away.  The sentry called out “Halt! Who goes there?” Instead of the 
expected shouted countersign: “Spain!” the answering cry was “At them!”  
Up to two hundred rebels led by Rustán’s replacement, the “so-called Colonel 
ringleader Nicolás Pacheco” swiftly overran Canaan, killing eleven of the soldiers who 
scrambled out of their hammocks in confusion. The report claimed that Lieutenant Lorenzo 
Ruiz, Miguel Pérez, and Miguel Castellanos “made some resistance” that the writer classified 
“heroic”: the aged Pérez, apparently with bullet wounds in the left hand, fired his revolver, 
killing Pacheco and another rebel before “miraculously saving himself.”283  On hearing shots, 
Santos led the garrison at Galiano to the aid of his father and the troops at Canaan. Similarly 
challenged by a guard, they countersigned with “Spain!” whereupon they promptly came 
under insurgent attack, but they repulsed the charge.  The report expressed certainty that the 
integralist troops had inflicted considerable losses on the rebels, but this could well have 
been an attempt to mollify or mitigate the incident, “a true surprise with all its horrors” that 
                                                
 
283 Ataque del Cafetal Canaan por los insurrectos, 22 Mayo 1871, which appears in duplicate in legajo 
53, Sobre la creación de una Columna al mando del Comandte. Don Miguel Pérez, Jefe de la línea de 
Guantánamo, Mayo 1871 and Partes y diario de operaciones de la columna al mando del Comdte. Don Miguel 
Pérez, Jefe de la línea de Guantánamo, AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R., leg. 53, 55 folios. 
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included the destruction of Canaan, Galilea, and a third coffee estate, together with removal 
of the slave dotación from Pérez’s farm.284   
 Integralist soldiers took the remaining dotaciones of slaves from the other nearby 
coffee estates and the abandoned body of rebel chief Pacheco to Tiguabos.  The slain 
Pacheco’s sister, and an uncle with whom he “had lived for eighteen years,” positively 
identified his remains.285 Just eight days later twenty-five integralist militia would use “two 
large bottles of aguardiente” to wash and take for burial their commander Pérez’s badly 
decomposed and “mutilated cadaver [upon] which the murderers [separatist combatants] had 
vented [their wrath], hacking it with machetes from the feet to the head ... cutting off the 
ears,” after which, the body had lain to rot for 48 hours on the hill at Arroyo Pelado.286  
As stated above in the introduction to this chapter, three days after the attack at 
Canaan, at approximately five in the afternoon 25 May 1871, the three “cafetales San Luis 
1o.[primero], San Luis 2o. [segundo], and that of the widow of Bombous” had been burned.  
A column of “48 or 50” of Pérez’s force “followed the tracks of the enemy from ... where 
they had camped overnight [from signs of] campfires and remains of birds that were eaten 
there.”  The “small phalanx” (falange) continued on, climbing to the top of a hill until they 
                                                
284 Ibid.  A Table accompanying this legajo from 26 April 1871 indicated there were 12 regular army 
officers and 173 troops, together with 3 militia officers and 166 members of the Squadron based at Vínculo, 
Tiguabos, Macuriges, Santa María de Agüero, Jarahueca, Mayarí Arriba, Sagua de Tánamo, and with the local 
“Contraguerrilla” for a total of 15 officers and 339 soldiers who had to guard convoys and perform similar 
duties. It advocated at minimum nine more officers and 251 extra soldiers to augment troop strength in the 
perimeter of Guantánamo. The death of “Pacheco who substituted for Rustán in command of the most important 
band” was reported in Count Valmaseda’s Parte de Novedades, 30 Mayo 1871, AGM-M, caja: 2547, car. 
21.7.2, no. 6, p. 69-70. The actions of Miguel Pérez in persecution appear in carpeta 21.7.2, no. 6, p.84. 
 
285 Ibid. 
 
286 Letters Dando cuenta detallada de los sucesos habidos en las lomas y rio de Arroyo Pelado el 27 del 
actual, Guantánamo, 30 May 1871, and Dando conocimiento sobre los fuenerales ... Comte. D. Miguel Pérez, 
Guantánamo, 30 May 1871 from Felipe Plaza to commanding general of department in Sobre la creación de una 
columna al mando del Comandte Don Miguel Pérez de la línea de Guantánamo, AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 53.     
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met their quarry—in number.  The report about the recovery of Pérez’s remains indicated 
that he and a smaller group became cut off from the main force.  Rather dramatically, it also 
said, “the trees were mute witnesses of this bloody drama—there were not any that were not 
cut and nicked by the lead that our brave soldiers fired ... against the cowardly, traitorous, 
and despicable enemy.”  Outnumbered eight to one, some of the integralist militia from 
Guantánamo ran short of cartridges, whereupon the rebels shouted “al machete! They are out 
of ammunition!”  It was supposed that Pérez tried to rally his troops: “Come on lads! [arriba 
muchachos] the column is almost here” when “a bullet in the head made him fall lifeless.”287 
His, and seven other slain soldiers’ bodies were abandoned on the hill. Later, Guillermo 
Moncada was rumored to have sent the sword and rank insignia of Pérez by special courier to 
Gómez.288   
 1861 tax records indicated a San Luis 1o (primero) cafetal owned by Luis Tarrosay 
and the “segundo” San Luis owned by Luis Bombous that very likely correspond to those 
burned a decade later, which act immediately precipitated Pérez’s fatal anabasis.  The widow 
Bombous owned cafetal San Juan, which was the rural locale where old Eduá had left “his 
woman and two little children” when he departed for the war.289  Eduá joined Gómez just 
two months after the cafetal burned, ten days before the main August rebel offensive against 
Guantánamo began.  The 27-30 May reports two months before did not indicate what befell 
the slave dotaciones of the burned estates, but Eduá never reunited with his family during the 
Ten Years’ War: after most separatists surrendered at Zanjón in 1878, Gómez offered his 
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288 Padrón, Guillermón Moncada, 30.  
 
289 Gómez, El viejo Eduá, 27; Libro talonario para la recaudación del impuesto municipal sobre fincas 
rurales en Guantánamo, ANC, ML, año: 1861, sin leg., no. 2.588, Fincas rurales. Impto de. 
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assistant a place alongside his own family as they prepared to depart Cuba for years of exile 
abroad.  A tearful Eduá chose to remain in Cuba in order to look for his own missing 
dependents.290          
The old pursuer of fugitives and bane of maroons, Miguel Pérez, was laid to rest “in a 
sumptuous internment” in a “well soldered zinc casket” paid for by the Spanish circle of 
Guantánamo, replete with a solemn mass.291  Locally, news of Pérez’s death according to the 
report, “caused a profound sensation in all, or the immense majority of inhabitants, without 
distinction of colors.”292 With Pérez dead, separatist rebels assailed the coffee plantations 
scattered through the mountains that he and the Squadron of Santa Catalina had once 
defended from the potential subversion or threats posed by maroons and resistance through 
slave flight.  Locally, the arrival of abolitionism in the district through invasion from 
neighboring areas of Oriente, underscored by Pérez’s violent death, came to be viewed in 
retrospect as something of a micro-historic regional watershed. Where the Squadrons had 
previously ranged into the remotest reaches—ever on the offense—looking for concealed 
maroon palenques, by 1871 they defended the beleaguered fortified cafetales and patrolled 
the plain with flying columns against rebels.293  
                                                
 
290 Gómez, El viejo Eduá, 37-38.  
 
291 Sobre la creación de una columna al mando del Comandte. Don Miguel Pérez de la línea de 
Guantánamo, AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 53. 
 
292 Ibid.  
 
293 Operaciones. Diario de los practicados por la Columna de operaciones de Guantánamo. Enero-
Marzo 1871, AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 49, contains a captured rebel correspondence from Key West and from 
Ana de Quesada in New York to her husband, Carlos Manuel Céspedes, some in code, other messages 
translated, and a letter from Luis Marcano to “Citizen Colonel Jesús Pérez,” which may have been taken from 
the pardo prisoner Florencio Díaz, caught holding a “long smooth-bore musket” by the integralist guerrilla of 
Bueycito. Also reports of military actions—not only by the Squadron but by several units—near Santiago and 
Guantánamo such as February 24: “...an individual carrying viandas was seized, eight large huts were burned, 
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Separatist general Gómez had gradually accumulated enough munitions, men, and 
materiel to resume aggressive actions for a campaign season.  In June he supervised the 
distribution of Remington and Spencer rifles from two supply expeditions emanating from 
Jamaica and Venezuela, and a few Latin American internationalist volunteers who arrived to 
help eject Spain from its remaining New World colonies.  The Venezuelan party landed from 
an old Scottish-built Confederate side-wheel blockade-runner left over from the U.S. Civil 
War: the specialized smokeless anthracite coal-burning smuggling ship re-christened the 
Virginius, which two years later would be the cause of a diplomatic and political crisis and 
near war between the United States and Spain over Cuba when it was captured on the high 
seas and the Spanish military in Santiago executed fifty-three pro-separatist expeditionaries 
and crew including some U.S. citizens.294  
Gómez also had to contend with strong Spanish countermoves in the wake of the 
death of the leader of the Squadron of Santa Catalina.  Three battalions of insurgent infantry 
led by black santiaguero officials including Moncada, and the Maceo brothers, Antonio and 
José, repulsed two attacks by crack Spanish cazadores (light infantry) at positions atop the 
hills la Galleta and Estacada nearby Santiago in July.295 Four hundred of these rebels, 
                                                                                                                                                  
and plots destroyed...” March 4: “...passing the last plantations of the Sta. Ysabel cafetal, and after a good 
reconnaissance of its surroundings ... a small encampment was destroyed....” March 5: “...surprised a black 
woman and a ‘mulatica’ captured the latter ... the former got away and as a consequence [of the capture], five 
men and the mother of said mulatica ... destroying three ranchos ... leaving all in complete destruction after 
having recorded and registered the circumferences of the cited place with an object to see if it would be possible 
to capture [others].”    
 
294 Enrique Buznego Rodríguez, Gustavo Pedroso Xiqués, and Rolando Zulueta Zulueta, Mayor 
General Máximo Gómez Báez: Sus campañas militares. Tomo I (1868-1878) (Havana: Editora Política, 1986), 
48-49. For more on the diplomacy and near outbreak of war between the United States and Spain over Cuba in 
1873 after the seizure of the Virginius, see Richard H. Bradford, The Virginius Affair (Boulder: Colorado 
Associated University Press, 1980).  The executions came to a halt in November 1873 when Frederick W. 
Ramsden, the consul of Great Britain and member of Brooks & Co., summoned commander Sir Lambton 
Lorraine of the sloop-of-war HMS Niobe from Jamaica, which threatened the bombardment of Santiago de 
Cuba. 
 
 158 
together with about six hundred women and other civilian camp-followers forming the 
improvised “impedimenta”—the medical, commissary, convoy, and quartermaster services of 
the column—moved from the mountains at Estacada to a camp amid the food crops and 
untended groves of the abandoned Armonía coffee farm.296  
The opening battle of this force’s invasion of the district, the storming of the fortified 
Indiana cafetal, proved to be the costliest for the insurgents.  Apparently emboldened by the 
success in July, Gómez rather incautiously and uncharacteristically initiated a frontal attack 
across ground dominated by “the plantation house, converted into a fort, composed of two 
floors, pierced with loopholes ... [painted in] loud colors” and defended by “close to two-
hundred men – whites, blacks, and mulatos, including some Frenchmen; but the 
sharpshooters” in the redoubt were “forty-five soldiers of the Squadron of Guantánamo” 
according to the standard somewhat florid nationalist account written in the 1880s.297 It was a 
civil war within the separatist war against Spain. Two multi-racial Cuban-born militias 
                                                                                                                                                  
295 Buznego et. al., 49-52; Rodríguez, 50-5, cites Pirala, II: 190.  See also Sánchez and Campos, 77; 
Manuel de la Cruz Fernández, Episodios de la revolución cubana (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 
1990), 140. Rodríguez, 61, asserted the five-hour running battle at la Galleta, 6 July 1871 left 118 Spanish 
casualties, including 38 dead, of 272 members of the 4th Battalion of Cazadores de San Quintín. Bacardí, in Vía 
Crucis, portrayed a Santiago comparsa referring to the defeat, dressed as vultures and complete with biscuits, 
“galletas,” suspended on strings during Carnival later in July. Spanish after-action reports indicate that they 
sustained 37 dead, 52 wounded, including the commanding officer, and 22 injured. Found in “Batallón 
Cazadores de San Quintín No. 4 – Columna de Operaciones” in Noticias sobre la penetración del enemigo en la 
Jurisdicción de Guantánamo, bound with Sucesos producidos por los insurrectos en los cafetales del Toro, Mes 
de Agosto 1871, AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 56, 23 folios.      
 
296 The roles of women in rebel prefectures and the “impedimenta” of columns of soldiers bear much 
similarity with the Mexican soldaderas during the 1846-1848 war against the United States, nineteenth-century 
civil wars, the war against the French intervention, and the Mexican Revolution in the early 20th Century. Like 
asistentes, they served as the source of food and provisions, cared for the soldiers, and carried extra equipment, 
allowing the combatants to move faster. For fruitful comparisons see Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation: 
The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 76-79, 190, 239-
40, and Shirlene Soto, The Emergence of the Modern Mexican Woman: Her Participation in Revolution and 
Struggle for Equality, 1910-1940 (Denver: Arden Press, 1990).   
 
297 “La Indiana” in Manuel de la Cruz Fernández, Episodios de la revolución cubana (Havana: 
Editorial de Ciencias Sociales,1990), 135-41, quoted in Buznego et. al., 52-55; Rodríguez, 62; and, without 
attribution, Varona, I: 552.   
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confronted each other – one separatist, the other integralist.  Cuba’s war of independence 
would prove an internecine conflict between rebels and so-called ‘loyalists’ who rejected 
separatist demands and values, in addition to Spanish troops, exactly as in mainland South 
America’s wars of independence half a century earlier. The integralist marksmen in the fort, 
armed with recently imported American Peabody rifles and double-barrel shotguns, repelled 
repeated insurgent attacks.   
After sustaining losses of sixty to seventy soldiers, and expending much of the 
munitions, powder and shot intended for the entire offensive, Gómez prepared to order his 
troops to retreat and disperse.  Antonio Maceo realized that his younger brother, José, lay 
gravely wounded on the field.  Earlier in the war he had lost his father, Marcos, and his 
sixteen-year-old brother, Julio, to enemy action; an older half-brother Justo had been 
executed.   
According to nationalist hagiography based on an account by María Cabrales, 
Antonio Maceo’s wife, two days after Céspedes’ 1868 Grito de Yara the men folk of the 
Maceo family donated the family’s firearms to the rebellion while Antonio, José, and Justo 
volunteered for republican service.  Mariana Grajales Cuello, the matriarch of the family, 
was to have taken up the icon of Jesus Christ from the household altar and sworn them all to 
“kneel before Christ, who was the first liberal man who came to the world, and swear to free 
the homeland or to die for it.”298   
At cafetal Indiana, Maceo refused to leave without José, leading a group of insurgent 
veterans including Flor Crombet, the scion of a free coffee-farming family of color from El 
                                                
 
298 Quote from Foner, Antonio Maceo, 18. Renderings of the incorporation of the Maceos in the 
rebellion include Foner, Antonio Maceo, 18, Pérez, To Die in Cuba, 108, and Stubbs, “Social and Political 
Motherhood of Cuba: Mariana Grajales Cuello” in Engendering History: Caribbean Women in Historical 
Perspective edited by Verene Shepherd et al. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).   
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Cobre, back to the stronghold.299  They retrieved José, and managed to set fire to the main 
fort building of the coffee finca.300  A nationalist narrative of the battle written in the 1880s 
claimed that the defenders chivalrously let the woman of the house out to be escorted from 
the fray by the decorous rebels, but that they vowed to “burn to a crisp before surrender.”301 
The mythologized account had them fighting to the bitter suicidal end as the house burned 
around them. Spanish military documents claimed two lieutenants and a handful of men 
escaped after their ammunition was exhausted, and the house engulfed in flames.302   In any 
case, the insurgent victory was pyrrhic: costly in casualties, and ruinous in the amount of 
materiel expended.  The tenacious defense of the doomed cafetal apparently contributed 
considerably to preventing the Liberation Army from carrying on to the main chance: into the 
sugar zone in the llano.  Gómez never contemplated a similar attack on a prepared position.   
One primary objective of this phase of the offensive, however, was tersely noted in 
the margins of the Spanish report.  Insurgents had burned the Indiana and ten other coffee 
plantations, presumably inducting, incorporating, or press-ganging most of the dotaciones of 
                                                
 
299 Buznego et. al., 54-55. As for the Maceo family, Antonio and José Maceo’s mother, Mariana 
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slaves into their ranks.303  Another sixteen such coffee estates fell in quick succession, 
although many of their owners may have abandoned them beforehand.304  In some cases 
slaves would have taken advantage of the chaotic situation to flee.  Many ran off to join the 
insurrection, while still others tried to simply evade danger.  Counterattacks on camps by 
integralist and Spanish forces sometimes “recovered the negradas [sic, the dotación of 
slaves]” of some cafetales.305  In several cases masters took their slaves with them in their 
evacuation to cities such as Santiago and Guantánamo where they sold off their chattels in 
order to obtain cash from sugar mills in the valley or from western Cuba’s slave dealers who 
were short of cane cutters and other sugar workers, but bringing in record harvests.  Of 
course, rumors of being sold and seeing families and communities broken up generated 
further slave resistance and flight.  It was during such moments that the rhetoric of liberation 
prophesied or promised by Cuba Libre could persuade commitment. In still other cases, 
masters may have finally acceded to the manumission of some of their remaining workers.  
The irregular war initiated by rebellion sundered the fragile and contingent bases of social 
stability.  Foreseen and unanticipated effects overtook planters, slaves, and free peasants with 
a force beyond their volition.  For planters, the consternation produced by the insurgent 
invasion and threat of ruination was reflected in a Havana newspaper: 
Will reinforcements arrive in time to halt these enemies of order and the 
riches of the country that continue their vandal system of hostilities on the rich 
sugar mills of that flourishing jurisdiction? Guantánamo is one of the most 
                                                
 
303 Ibid.  Buznego et. al., claimed twelve coffee fincas burned the first two days of the insurgent attack, 
4-6 August 1871, 77. 
 
304 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 56.  
 
305 Partes oficiales para la primera quincena de Septiembre de 1871, AGM-M, caja: 2547, car. 21.11, 
no. 2. and Parte de operaciones, 25 de Septiembre de 1871, AGM-M, caja: 2547, car. 21.11.1, no. 4.  This 
selection of reports also includes the Indiana cafetal battle, although with numerous inaccuracies.     
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productive regions of this Department. In its countryside are situated the 
largest sugar mills of the region and it would be truly painful if the destructive 
charred brand made this magnificent emporium of production likewise 
disappear, that until now has been saved.306 
 
Ultimately the plea to protect the sugar mills, at least, was heeded. 
The irruption of rebels in the district led colonial authorities to reinforce Spanish 
troop strength. The sugar enclave and its railway gave the metropolitan government the 
means to bolster the mills of the llano.  To this environmental factor of the terrain was added 
a complex architecture of social control in the form of blockhouses garrisoned by squads of 
militia or soldiers. The Spanish military and armed vigilantes set about fortifying strategic 
sites, building a fortified line or trocha of watchtowers and small forts enclosing the plain.307 
 
A Decade of War, 1871-1880  
In 1871 General Arsenio Martínez Campos, who would later restore the Bourbon 
monarchy to civil war-wracked Spain in 1874 before being promoted later to the captain-
generalship of Cuba in 1878, was put in charge of defending eastern Oriente. Even captain-
general Count Valmaseda himself visited the zone from headquarters in Havana 4 September 
                                                
 
306 Rodríguez, 63, quoting the stridently integralist Havana paper, Diario de la Marina, 26 August 
1871.  
 
307 [See illustrations “Octagonal towers for Guantánamo, 1874” and “Spanish Blockhouse from Cuba’s 
Wars of Independence, Central Argeo Martínez {formerly Esperanza}.”] For the trocha in Guantánamo, see 
Deposition of Ernest August Brooks p. 19 , and Deposition of Theodore Brooks, p. 74, in United States 
National Archives II, College Park, MD, Record Group 76; Entry 352, Claim no. 120 (Sheldon).  The trocha 
did not apparently include fenced enclosures, but rather a patrolled zone with a series of forts and guarded 
positions making use of terrain features such as watercourses, hills, and rivers. An 1895 military map at the 
Spanish Army Servicio Geográfico del Ejército, Madrid, displays a “Línea de Circunavalación” that probably 
corresponds with the trocha around the llano. Mapas sobre las Antillas, Sección de Ultramar, Cuba, H. 1895 
“Guantánamo, llano de los ingenios Yateras y el Zoco”, por el Ejército Español. Ao. J-T.10 C.2a. 337 Rollo 25.  
For the fifty-mile trocha built across the narrows of Júcaro and Morón through Ciego de Avila in the Ten 
Years’ War, followed by a western line built between Mayana and Mariel during the 1895-1898 war in Cuba to 
isolate the insurgents, see Michael Blow, “The Trochas,” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 10: 
4; (Summer 1998): 46-51. Detailed drawings, blockhouse blueprints, and a map of the main trocha appear in 
SGE, SU, Cuba, 1895 “Plano general de la Trocha” Camagüey, Ao. J-T.10 C.1a. 257. 
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1871.308  Martínez Campos vigorously pursued the rebels in the mountains and protected the 
capital-intensive sugar properties on the plain.309  There were numerous skirmishes with 
Maceo and Moncada’s forces, and the harried separatist rebels frequently dispersed, 
extending operations where they went throughout the zone’s mountains as far as Baracoa.    
All the same, Martínez Campos increasingly came to view the situation as one that would 
have to be resolved by political rather than purely military means.310 In 1877 and 1878, upon 
his return from Spain, when he assumed the captain-generalship for the island, he would ably 
exploit the bitter internal divisions and flagging morale of the separatists while offering 
limited political reforms to bring about defections followed by the surrender of the bulk of 
separatists in arms at Zanjón near Sibanicú in Camagüey.  A journalist in the early 1870’s 
described the situation in easternmost Cuba: 
Every place in these districts is virtually an encampment. At Santiago, where 
is the chief command of the Eastern Department, life and property are 
somewhat safer; yet the beautiful coffee plantations established there and at 
Guantánamo by French fugitives from the Negro Insurrection of Hayti at the 
close of the last century, have in a great measure disappeared; and what 
cultivation still survives depends for safety on the immediate protection of the 
troops – a protection precarious at the best of times, and in return for which 
the wants of soldiers have yet to be supplied, and their comforts attended to: 
                                                
 
308 Rodríguez, 66-80. On Martínez Campos, see Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, ch. 9 
 
309 The disposition of Spanish 4th Division troops including 37 “Gefes,” 562 officers, and 10,991 men 
in early 1873 appears in Comandancia General 4a División, Estado General de fuerza del Mes de Enero 1873, 
AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 151, 21 folios. This large document indicates units operating in columns, as well as 
each small contingent occupying forts and postings at sugar mills and coffee estates. Troops of the “Cuba” and 
Reus regiments, as part of their duties throughout Santiago de Cuba’s environs, guarded Guantánamo’s sugar 
mills: “San Yldefonso [sic],” Monte Sano, San Pedro, Santa Rosa, Soledad, Santa Fé, Nueva Fortuna, San José, 
Perseverancia, Esperanza, La Isabel, San Miguel, Santa Ana, Romelí[e], San Antonio, San Carlos, San Vicente, 
Santa Cecilia, Confluente, and the cafetales Prenda, María Luisa, Hermitaño, Virginia, San Fernando, Bella 
Vista, Palmarito, Naranjo, Perla, Clarita, Termópilas, Mégico, Ana Matilde, Potosí, as well as various other 
posts in towns. The “Flying Counterguerrillas” composed of Cuban and Spanish-born integralist volunteers in 
Bueycito, Bicana, and the Escuadras of Santa Catalina also appear together with other local militia, including 
about 350 militiamen “de Color.”   
 
310 Ibid, 120.  
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for it is only by cheerfully submitting to be plundered by friends that the 
proprietor may hope to escape being pillaged by enemies. And even when no 
immediate danger arises from the approach of the Insurgents, the military 
authorities compel the planter either to maintain a large garrison at his own 
cost for his defense – the ordinary number is sixty men, volunteers or regulars 
– or else to remove all his movable property; to gut and un-roof his house, lest 
it should afford shelter and become a stronghold to the rebels.311 
 
The grim situation in the countryside of irregular warfare in an agrarian society was reflected 
in reports to the Lieutenant Governor of Guantánamo.312  Many cafetales lay abandoned, and 
so it was urged that integralist and Spanish troops burn them in order to deprive their use by 
the rebels.  A letter of 5 September urged that cafetales that neither been abandoned, nor 
fortified should forthwith be reinforced.  Under “Article 1” each should construct “two or 
more defensive towers” where during an attack, the “bozadas y negradas [sic, the African-
born and Creole slave dotación]” could be housed and “defended by armed movilizados” in 
adequate number.313  Article 2 obliged the militia to live in the fort and maintain vigilance at 
all times, and recommended whistles as a means of making alarm signals. Article 3 required 
that “every dawn [madrugada]” before the slaves were let out to begin work, “two 
movilizados and one or two blacks or dependents of the finca of more confidence will 
scrupulously reconnoiter the woods and pathways” looking carefully for “recent signs and 
footsteps” and posting a group of advanced scouts while work proceeded.  Furthermore, a 
thousand cartridges were to be deposited in the “fort of the fincas” for each “system that the 
[militia’s] armament consists of.”314 In 1873 O’Kelly visited a Santa Isabel coffee farm near 
                                                
 
311 Gallenga, 145-46.  
 
312 Letters to the Lieutenant Governor of Guantánamo and Martínez Campos, 4 and 5 September 1871 
in AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 57, 24 folios.  
 
313 Ibid.  
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Santiago, guided by “a reformed rebel, black ... our approach being announced by a loud 
barking of dogs, the garrison of six men got under arms in the little tower which acted as a 
citadel, while the fluttering lights told the tale of a household startled by the somewhat 
untimely visit.”315 He observed “one dangerous feature to the Spanish government in these 
fortified mills and their armed garrisons” consisted of the practice that an “immense majority 
of the men are Cubans and people of color, who, at bottom, have more sympathy with the 
insurgents than with the Spaniards.”316 The contingent loyalty to the colonial state by blacks 
arose, he thought, from their being “so thoroughly frightened by the defeats and sufferings 
during the first disasters of the insurrection, that they are afraid to take part with the men in 
the field, although in many instances an active correspondence is maintained between these 
posts and the insurgents.”317 
Planters well understood the threat posed by inchoate rebellion, political disorder, and 
desultory warfare to their rural properties and slaves, resulting in a tendency to ship their 
bound laborers to the west.  Within the llano protected by the military outposts of the trocha 
and flying columns of colonialist troops, ruined coffee planters frequently sold off any 
remaining slaves to sugar plantations.  Unknown numbers of slaves rebelled and joined the 
insurrection, or were pressed into service by the separatists. Statistics suggested a total loss in 
slaves within the district of approximately 47 percent between the years of 1871 and 1878.318 
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315 O’Kelly, 127-30.  
 
316 O’Kelly, 121-23. 
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318 Olga Portuondo Zúñiga, “La región de Guantánamo: de la producción de consumo a la de 
mercancias.” Del Caribe 10 (1987): 18; Rodríguez, 119-21.  
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If the figure of 8,561 slaves within Guantánamo before the war represented an accurate 
statistic, then the direct and indirect losses in servile laborers during the conflict approached 
58 percent.319 Table 3.2 below illustrates the shift in bound labor from coffee to sugar while 
Table 3.3 suggests the blow struck by the separatist rebellion against the local institution of 
bondage and its social control measures: 
Table 3.2 
Decline in overall numbers of slaves in Guantánamo, increased proportion in sugar mills, 
Ten Years’ War.  
Years TOTAL Coffee Sugar mills Percent in sugar 
mills 
1862 8,561 4,219 2,356 27 % 
1874 4,037 605 2,814 69 % 
Source: José Sánchez Guerra, El azúcar en el valle de los ingenios guantanameros (1532-
1899) (Guantánamo: Editorial El Mar y la Montaña, 2003), 35. 
 
Table 3.3 
47 % Decline in Regional Slave Population – Ten Years’ War. 
Year Male Slaves Female Slaves Total 
1871 3,504 3,296 6,800 
1878 1,714 1,864 3,578 
Source: Olga Portuondo Zúñiga, “La región de Guantánamo: de la producción de consumo a 
la de mercancias.” Del Caribe 10 (1987): 18. 
  
As may be seen in Table 3.2, some twenty-seven percent of slaves lived and labored on sugar 
mills in the 1860s. By the middle of the Ten Years’ War, over two-thirds did, and the 
numbers of slaves on sugar ingenios had grown even though slaves had declined by more 
than half. 
An unforeseen consequence of the rebellion and its suppression was to undermine 
rural stability in subjecting ill-defended or unprotected properties to the torch, while leaving 
the sugar enclave relatively untouched.  Destruction wrought by the war, and the loss of labor 
                                                
 
319 José Sánchez Guerra, El azúcar en el valle de los ingenios guantanameros, 35-36.  
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in Guantánamo during the Ten Years’ War disproportionately wrecked subsistence farms, 
tobacco vegas, and the fortified coffee estates scattered in the mountains, while causing 
relatively less destruction to the more valuable, and hence, better-protected sugar plantations. 
Slave resistance and flight increased, despite planter attempts to keep them under increased 
scrutiny and supervision within their barracks.  The linear view of slave incorporation into 
mambí ranks prevalent in some accounts appears overstated, but certainly many Creole 
slaves found themselves in the insurrection, or within rebel prefectures hidden in inaccessible 
locations much like old maroon palenques. Of approximately 4,037 slaves remaining in the 
district by 1874, almost 1,500 of the 2,814 laboring on sugar mills worked in the nine largest 
steam-powered ingenios.320  Table 3.4 indicates the distribution of this population: 
 Table 3.4 
1874: 
Districts Sugar mills: steam 
and ox-powered 
Slaves Percentage 
Yateras 15 1,775 63 
Tiguabos 9 1,020 36 
Sagua de Tánamo 
[North coast] 
1 19 -- 
 
Owners Sugar mill Slave dotación 
José Baró La Esperanza 557 
Pons y Dancoura Santa María 141 
Brooks and Company Soledad 138 
Limonta and Brooks and 
Company 
La Isabel 135 
Widow of J. Faure Santa Fé 101 
Jean Rancoules  San Carlos 101 
José D. Bueno San Miguel 121 
José D. Bueno Confluente 100 
Sucesión Jay Santa Rosa 94 
TOTAL  1,448 [53% of total] 
Source: Sánchez Guerra, El azúcar en el valle de los ingenios guantanameros, 36. 
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After almost a decade of conflict, only eighteen out of some 83 pre-war coffee farms 
remained, all but one of these in Yateras. A scant twenty-one tobacco vegas were spared in 
Sagua de Tánamo, out of over three hundred pre-war. Numerous small food-crop farms, 
apiaries, cattle, horses, mules, and donkeys had all been lost.321  The Table 2.5 below lists the 
twenty sugar mills and eighteen coffee farms appearing in an 1878 municipal padrón of rural 
fincas: 
 Table 3.5 
Twenty sugar ingenios and eighteen cafetales in Tiguabos and Yateras, Guantánamo, Cuba, 
at end of Ten Years’ War, April 1878 
Estate type Estate name Name of Owners 
Sugar Soledad Brooks and Co. 
Sugar Santa Rosa Jay heirs 
Sugar Santa Fé Faures heirs 
Sugar San Yldefonso [sic] D. Joaquín Jovellar 
Sugar San José Fournier heirs 
Sugar Perseverancia Alberni heirs 
Sugar San Pedro Brauet and Co. 
Sugar Monte Sano Ledesma and Bardafí 
Sugar Esperanza D. José Baró 
Sugar San Miguel Heirs of D. José D. 
Bueno 
Sugar Ysabel Brooks and Limonta 
heirs 
Sugar Santa María D. Fernando Pons 
Sugar Confluente Heirs of José Bueno 
Sugar Santa Cecilia D. Arturo Simón y 
Lucía 
Sugar San Vicente D. Juan Rancoles 
Sugar Romelié D. Santiago 
MacKinlay and 
Assoc. 
Sugar San Antonio D. Luis Redor and A. 
Lescaille 
   
                                                
 
321 Ibid, 36-7. No cafetales are listed at all for Tiguabos, and only seventeen in Yateras, in an 1878 
Padrón municipal de fincas rústicas para el año de 1878 a 1879 in ANC, ME, leg. 4098, no. An. Buznego et. al. 
stated 117 coffee farms in Guantánamo and nearby zones of Santiago fell victim to the insurgent invasion from 
mid-1871 to January 1872, 67. 
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Estate type Estate name Name of Owners 
Sugar La Luisa D. Emilio Larlabous 
and Assoc. 
Sugar San Emilio D. Emilio Charlot 
Sugar Prosperidad Ysalgué heirs 
Sugar San Carlos Mestre and Gorgas 
Coffee San Fernando D. Fernando Pons 
Coffee Méjico Durive and Lafargue 
Coffee Virginia Tomás and Santiago 
Rousseau 
Coffee Naranjos Chibas brothers 
Coffee Bella Vista D. Juan Begué 
Coffee Ermitaño D. Enrique Lescaille 
Coffee Perla Da. Juana Duverger 
Coffee Jagüí D. Jorge Preval 
Coffee Cubana D. Valentín Sans 
Coffee Palmarito Da. Juana Menas 
Coffee Campo Hermoso D. José A. Morales 
Coffee Dios Ayuda Da. Lucía Lafargue 
Coffee Las Gracias D. Pedro Luis 
Guibert 
Coffee Diamante Widow of Kolb 
Coffee Sta. Rita D. Juan and Adriano 
Gaulhiac 
Coffee Victoria D. José Carreras 
Coffee Monte Alto D. Alejo Bazelais 
Coffee Antonio [Sagua de 
Tánamo] 
Revé and Soto 
Source: Data from Ayuntamiento de Guantánamo, Padrón municipal de fincas rústicas para 
el año de 1878 a 1879, ANC, Miscelánea de expedientes, leg. 4098, no. An. Note that 
Comandancia General 4a División, Estado General de fuerza de Mes de Enero 1873, AGM-
S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 151, 21 folios listed the sugar mills and cafetales San Fernando, 
Mégico [sic], Virginia, Naranjos, Bella Vista, Hermitaño, Perla, and others occupied by 
detachments of troops. 
 
Much of the district, especially peripheral rural and mountainous zones, had suffered 
ruination and immiseration. The separatist struggle against colonial rule had roughly shoved 
eastern Cuba from semi-feudal mixed farming with some large estates to a more bourgeois 
pattern of landowners able to afford effective protection, ruined farmers, and of dispossessed 
landless workers. Wage work at sugar mills in the valley offered one of the only means of 
remuneration and source of scarce capital to start over for many rural residents, displaced and 
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dispossessed by the war, and thus converted into a semi-proletariat.  While many rural 
denizens valued their autonomy and some form of subsistence farm, wage labor was vital to 
obtain but limited to sugar and the few towns. 
The local sugar sector in the valley survived the war relatively unscathed in 
comparison with other parts of Oriente province. Out of some two thousand sugar mills in the 
entire island in 1860, only 1,190 remained by 1877.322 A good measure of the decline may be 
accounted for by the consolidation and extension of decentralized production under the new 
central cultivation system, relying on contracted colono tenant farmers to provide the main 
mill with sugar in exchange for a percentage of the crop. The drop also reflected the ruination 
of eastern and central rural districts as a result of the conflict. Where fighting had been 
concentrated, a great many mills had been destroyed. But in Guantánamo, pro-Spanish 
militias, regular troops, and patrols supplemented by a fortified line of blockhouses and 
security forces on the largest estates had effectively transformed the sugar district into a 
Spanish bastion.323  The sugar harvest, or zafra was made every year.  Table 3.6, below, 
presents the number of sugar mills at the outset and near the end of the Guerra Grande: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
322 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., “Vagrants, Beggars, and Bandits: Social Origins of Cuban Separatism, 1878-
1895,” American Historical Review 90 (December 1985): 1093. See also Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and 
Revolution, 127.  
 
323 Some of the orders for detachments guarding sugar mills appear in Instrucciones sobre la quema de 
Ingenios y sus zonas y disposiciones acerca de las contraguerrillas [documento mecanografiado, no. 18] in 
Comones. sobre operaciones, destacamentos, y otros servicios de campaña, AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 334. 
See also, Remitiendo copia de las instrucciones para evitar en lo posible la quema de cañaverales por el 
enemigo en la zona del Llano, and Copia que se cita, AGM-S, 6a y 8a, 18-R, leg. 331.  The sugar mills did 
suffer various cane-fires, cattle thefts, and other depredations. Some of the incidents of relatively minor 
damages are contained in various subcarpetas from 1875, 1876, 1877 and 1878 in AGM-M, caja 2550 and caja 
2552.  
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Table 3.6 
Jurisdiction and Number of Sugar Mills Before and late in Ten Years’ War. 
Camagüey [Puerto Príncipe] 
and Oriente [Santiago de 
Cuba] Provinces 
Sugar mills, 1861 Sugar mills, 1877 
Camagüey 100 0 
Manzanillo 26 2 
Holguín 63 4 
Bayamo 26 0 
Santiago de Cuba 100 39 
Guantánamo 23 20 
TOTAL 338 65 
Source: Anton Allahar, The Sugar Planters of Colonial Cuba (Toronto: Two-Thirds 
Editions, 1982), 233. 
<><><> 
By late 1871 Gómez left Maceo in charge of the offensive in the region against 
Martínez Campos while he urged the civilian republican leadership to allow him to both 
reinforce Maceo to drive into the low-country’s sugar llano, and to carry out a Guantánamo-
style invasion on a far larger scale, proposing to extend the revolution into the richest sectors 
of western Cuba.  He argued that invading the sprawling sugar lands of Las Villas, 
Cienfuegos, Matanzas, and Havana itself was a necessity for the armed movement to be 
carried out before Spanish troops could arrive in large numbers from ongoing civil conflicts 
in Iberia itself to squelch the insurrection contained within the primitive and underdeveloped 
east of the island.  At around the same time, he extolled the example of Guantánamo as 
suggesting the means to overthrow Spanish control and undermine the local structures that 
supported colonial rule. He and other rebel chiefs articulated a defense of their property 
destruction tactics, ascribing to them explicit leveling and redistributive purposes – a strategy 
that would include both a means and an end:  
Cubans: In order to powerfully refute the principal sustainers of Spanish 
domination in this Island, who assure that there has not been much 
[attributable to] our immortal Revolution, it has fallen to the brave patriots of 
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the Division that I have the honor to command to invade and devastate the 
jurisdiction of Guantánamo ...  
It is not my intention, however, to boast of such devastation and arson [.] On 
the contrary, I lament it with all my soul.  I only see such evils as necessary 
evils. ...  
[T]he proprietors of that jurisdiction materially and morally supported the 
tyranny that the good Cubans fight against; it was cruelly necessary to deprive 
such means of support [to the metropolitan state].  ...  
[M]any of [tyranny’s] spontaneous and forced servants believed that the 
reconstruction [they desired] to give to the Colony – a feudal and sterile 
reconstruction that consists of reuniting the population in castles ringed by 
hamlets and plots was attainable; and it was cruelly necessary to demonstrate 
[that was] ... chimerical ...  
 
Enough irresolution Cubans! In place of supporting here oppression, helping it 
filled with regret, and dying at its hands when one least expects it, instead of 
immigrating abroad to groan in shame and expire from hunger; come over to 
our side. Come [with us] to triumph over Spain, fulfilling the will of God who 
has given this century its character of the emancipation of América, or die 
cleansed by this divine aspiration.  
 
Your compatriot and friend, Major General Máximo Gómez 
 
October 24, 1871324 
 
The uncompromising nationalist view of Gómez that civilians who remained in areas 
controlled by the Spaniards lacked sufficient revolutionary ardor or mettle, of being 
irresolute—not standing with the “good Cubans,” or supporting the yoke of Spain “filled 
with regret”—betrayed the defensiveness of the flagging separatist movement, as perhaps did 
the grim professions of the cruel means of waging anti-colonial war as being, in the final 
analysis, ultimately necessary.  Spanish propaganda constantly reiterated that the callous 
separatist movement had created the conditions of a race war, and pointed to the wanton 
                                                
 
324 Buznego et. al., 63-64, citing La Revolución de Cuba. New York, 18 November 1871; Rodríguez, 
131-4 quoting Gómez in Ramón Infiesta, Máximo Gómez (Havana: Academia de Historia, 1927). This 
statement of Cuban proto-nationalism is suggestive of Barbara Ehrenreich’s interpretation, informed by 
Benedict Anderson, that the nation “is nothing ... without a past. Even brand-new nations attempt to situate 
themselves within some long-standing tradition (the human struggle for freedom and self-determination, for 
example),” see Barbara Ehrenreich, Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1997), 199. 
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destruction of valuable property as beyond the pale of legality, justification, and humanity 
and entirely without any legitimacy.  Whatever the merits of separatism, they were an armed 
minority, the line of reasoning went, and as the separatists were manifestly incapable of 
winning against the colonial state, it was thereby illegitimate and unjust for them to remain in 
the field.  It was they who were to blame for the nature of the war, the same logic implied.  
Such claims made inroads among the civil population within the colony, especially in the 
west, and also informed public opinion abroad.  O’Kelly responded to the claims of Spain’s 
supporters with vituperative and strident invective, claiming: 
  Much indignation is given vent to by Spanish officials and their foreign  
nigger-whipping [sic], sugar-worshipping sympathizers, noble Saxons, free 
Americans, and other worthy representatives of civilized communities, 
because the Cuban patriots burn down plantations which furnish the principal 
revenue to their Spanish enemies, and which are turned into actual forts, 
garrisoned by Spanish soldiers, but it never for a moment enters the minds of 
these defenders of property and its sacred rights that it is also a crime against 
civilization and humanity to burn down the leaf-thatched hut of the Cuban, 
and his young family—for young families are numerous in Cuba Libre—to 
die of starvation.325   
 
Meanwhile, Antonio Maceo in command of separatists in Guantánamo, as historian 
Ada Ferrer has noted, attained an almost mythic status for people of color, embodying, as she 
put it “the link between antislavery and anti-colonialism” or black Cubans’ simultaneous 
struggles against racial and national oppression.326  As she has demonstrated, the salience of 
slavery initially insulated eastern Oriente from western Oriente’s separatist appeals.  But 
once numbers of free people of color joined the movement to combat national oppression as 
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colonial subjects and racial oppression as once-marginalized Afro-descended people, those 
districts became separatist redoubts.   
Late in the war, as Martínez Campos’s strategy of promised reforms in the future 
combined with improved counterinsurgency tactics led to large-scale surrenders and 
defections, an incident in the peregrinations of rebel representative Figueredo from Holguín 
to Guantánamo offered an indicator of how districts with the most African-descended 
inhabitants had become the separatists’ final holdouts. Figueredo, accompanied by his wife 
suffering thorns in her bare feet while carrying their young child “with incredible 
resignation,” walked cautiously by candlelight, fearful lest they encounter integralist soldiers 
or ex-insurgents who had gone over as pro-autonomists to the Spanish side.  Joined by a 
French “Lieutenant of Guantánamo,” Monsieur José, and several other men and women, the 
small group continued searching for Maceo.  Scouts of the column were instructed to 
approach anyone encountered surreptitiously, getting close enough “if they were black” to 
hear them speaking, “and if they spoke in French ... they would be the troop of Maceo.” 
Writing of the successful search for Maceo in the late 1880s, Figueredo added “We had come 
to such an extreme in that parenthesis of the Revolution, that patriotism was shown by the 
color of skin! Oh! The caprices of the Cuban Revolution!”327   
<><><>  
Integralist volunteers and Spanish arms effectively repressed and quashed separatist 
rebels throughout the island, especially in the towns, isolating the separatist Liberation Army 
to the eastern provinces where a lengthy process of attrition and exhaustion led to inexorable 
insurgent defeat.  Multifarious factional disputes, material privation, and declining morale 
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sapped the faltering and failing revolution’s strength.  By 1878 most remaining rebel leaders 
accepted Spanish terms and surrendered.  At a meeting in Baraguá near Santiago between 
Martínez Campos and Maceo, the remaining group of radical officers with Maceo refused to 
surrender without attaining independence or the complete overthrow of slavery. But after the 
bulk of the rebel army surrendered, the full weight of the Spanish military was brought to 
bear on the holdouts. 
 Part of the treaty ending the war, the February 1878 Pact of Zanjón, freed 16,000 
former slaves and indentured workers who served in the insurrection, as well as several 
hundred who had served Spain in some capacity.328  The remainder awaited the gradual and 
occasionally arbitrary application of laws permitting coartación whereby self-manumission 
or purchasing children or relatives out of servitude for a set price could be attained, as well as 
new regulations granting freedom to sexagenarians and children born after 1868. Granting 
liberty to former slave rebels was a portentous development: as Ferrer has written “with 
rebellion legally recognized as the precursor of freedom, the intermediate emancipation 
offered by the colonial government, and accepted by rebel leaders ... was not likely to 
cohere.”329 Slaves who had not gone over to the insurrection now found it opportune to do so. 
And in many cases, the ability to join up had been mediated by gender: a tendency to use 
slaves for military labor often left women behind on the plantations, or sold to other areas or 
towns. After the long war there was ample recognition that things, including traditional forms 
of corporal punishment and methods of inculcating labor discipline, would not be as they 
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were before. Arsenio Martínez Campos circulated a reminder to his brigade commanders that 
use of the whip to flog and punish slaves had been outlawed under article 21, of the Law of 
July 4, 1870.330 Vindictive treatment by overseers as word spread that slavery, while subject 
to legal constraints from the Moret Law and other regulations, would continue in peace time 
threatened to lead to further slave rebellion and flight.   
Awareness of these legal codes and rights is suggested from a suit brought by a free 
black woman, Caridad Duran, against the administrator of the Santa Rosa sugar mill in 
January 1878.  She brought the law to bear in behalf of her son Nelson who, still held on the 
plantation, had been beaten and threatened with sale to another estate.331 Families among 
slaves had historically afforded owners a means of social control over their bondsmen and 
women: the threat of sale or retribution against relatives was conscious and deliberate.  As 
slavery came to an end it was bound laborers who frequently used the provisions of laws and 
codes against the master class.  A situation in which some family relations were free and 
others still held in bondage created a web of social connections that could be used to create 
spaces of autonomy or liberation from some of servitude’s onerous burdens.  Similarly, the 
deaths of the woman María Luisa and her son, apparently from a disease outbreak, while 
rented out to the San Carlos sugar estate generated a series of inquiries and reports into the 
conditions prevailing for the dotación remaining at the mill, and those rented for labor.  It 
was claimed that all were treated equally, fed eight small or six large plantains a day, along 
with salt cod and other good food—sometimes with rice and beans—an issue of clothing 
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every six months, and a rest period during the heat of the day from 11:00am until 1:30pm.  
The representatives of San Carlos claimed that only stocks were used to punish recalcitrance 
and infractions.332 
Since slaves had been set free for rebelling against Spain and their erstwhile master’s 
authority, slaves who remained made claims to rights. Slaves who had practiced attentisme—
going through the motions of remaining at work for their masters, remaining apparently 
noncommittal—now confronted a new prospective avenue for freedom.  Many did not 
hesitate, but struck out to join the rebels at the last minute to be included in the final 
settlement.  Antonio Maceo, sent into exile, gained renown for his “Protest of Baraguá” and 
refusal to surrender without guarantees of independence and the abolition of slavery, but the 
protest was given continual substance by black orientales who stood to lose the most from 
the separatist surrender at Zanjon.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, when another separatist rebellion broke out in August 
1879 led by disaffected insurgents, including Moncada and José Maceo, the sugar mills 
experienced a renewed wave of political and labor unrest.333  The Little War, as the conflict 
came to be termed from its short duration, and not from the initial scale of the uprising, 
which was wider than the start of the Ten Years’ War, received support among sugar slaves 
as well as some of Guantánamo’s traditional defenders of the status quo: Miguel Pérez’s 
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nephew, Pedro Agustín Pérez, defected to the Liberation Army along with about a hundred 
members of the Squadron of Santa Catalina.334   
Why Pedro Agustín Pérez defected to the separatists after their defeat remains 
something of a mystery, open to speculation.  It may be that the offers of land and other 
social benefits extended to insurgents to encourage their surrender, rehabilitation, and 
resettlement in the wrack and ruin of post-war Oriente, and to promote their continued 
adhesion to the Zanjón agreement were more generous than aid extended to Spain’s local 
allies.  Pérez’s biographer, González Puente asserted that the bayames insurgent chieftain 
Silverio del Prado had been given a post-war botella as a customs official in the district by 
the Spaniards, and that he had convinced Pérez to join the separatist cause.335  Such may be 
the case: the patriarch del Prado had gone off to war in 1868 with his retinue of clients and 
extended relations and kinfolk in much the same way as the Pérez clan, although in his case 
he had joined Céspedes.  It may also be the case that Pérez had tired of pursuing runaway 
slaves, since evidence strongly suggests that slave flight increased greatly during the Little 
War. 
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In October 1879, during that conflict, slaves mutinied – or better, went on strike – at 
Esperanza, much as the Asian indentured workers had the decade before.336  Spanish soldiers 
arrested ten from a group of slaves insisting that an unpopular overseer be removed.   The 
arrests, in turn, provoked a riot, which the troops suppressed, threatening the Roman-style 
decimation of the mutineers if need be and making further arrests.  In addition, an October 
1879 list indicated that almost three hundred slaves, including 158 men and 89 women – 
mostly from sugar mills – had run away from their barracks, hiding in cane fields or joining 
the ranks of the insurrection.337  A 19 January 1880 ciphered telegram from the chief of the 
first brigade in Guantánamo revealed a new and portentous rebel tactic: “José Maceo 
requests that each sugar ingenio, in order to not be destroyed, [must pay] twelve thousand 
cartridges and two hundred ounces [of gold].”338  
The rebel attempt to reinvigorate the defeated independence struggle failed after 
almost a year of fighting due to war-weariness, and because a preponderance of support from 
restive slaves aroused whites’ fears of social upheaval.  Insurgent leaders had to confront 
often hostile white reactions, and, as historian Ferrer has demonstrated, effective Spanish 
capitalization on the black mobilization in the conflict.  In an open letter from the Cuban 
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Revolutionary Committee, 26 September 1879 to Spaniards resident in Cuba, Calixto García 
and José Lamadriz acknowledged that numbers—a majority—of rebels were black.  Yet, the 
authors wrote “where are the deeds, one could suffice, that prove that the groups of black 
insurrectos commanded by Maceo, Guillermón, and Crombet have assassinated whites 
without distinction? ... [None] Because all is a shameful lie ... to retard Cubans in defense of 
their cause, implanting a supposed common danger for the white race.” It was Spaniards and 
“certain cubanos españolizados (pro-Spanish Cubans)” who, the letter argued, “with the end 
of continuing to live at the expense of the work of the blacks ... in the shadow of the Spanish 
flag, protector of slavery” were engaged in “evil intentioned” propaganda designed to 
discredit the uprising as an  “insurrection of blacks [emphasis in original].”339 Yet, in an 
interview with General Calixto García—a white Cuban leader from Holguín in western 
Oriente province—in the New York Herald where he was asked “Do you fear the ascendancy 
of the colored people?” he contradictorily replied:  
No, because the whites outnumber the colored people, and while not 
discriminating against them as a class, yet, by means of superior 
intelligence, hold a wholesome ascendancy at least in public affairs. In 
everything else both races are equal, civilly and socially, with only the 
line drawn by education in social intercourse.340   
 
As in the Ten Years’ War, it would be black Cubans, in many cases, who would be the last 
holdouts within the insurrection. A list of runaways, surrendered rebels, and prisoners 
compiled by the Spanish military in January 1880 in the Guantánamo jurisdiction listed 148 
rebels including Pedro A. Pérez and others presumably emanating from the Squadron of 
                                                
 
339 Annex no. 1 to dispatch no. 185, La Independencia ORGANO DEL PARTIDO CUBANO 
INDEPENDIENTE, Año VIII, New York 26 September 1879, AHN, SU, leg. 4938, exp. 3, no. 96. 
 
340 Cuba’s Struggle. Recent Movements of the Revolutionists in the ever faithful isle and their plans 
for the future—interview with General Calixto Garcia. New York Herald clipping appearing in AHN, SU, Cuba, 
Gobierno, leg. 4938, exp. 3, no. 179.   
 181 
Santa Catalina, together with 278 slaves from San Antonio, Isabel, La Luisa, San Miguel, 
San Fernando, and Romelié sugar estates.341   By June 1880 Guillermo Moncada and José 
Maceo surrendered at San Idelfonso in Guantánamo along with their retinue of “370 
supporters, the vast majority of whom were Cubans of color and 168 of them runaway 
slaves.”342  
The contrast in the start of the Ten Years’ War in the district and the social 
composition of rebels in the Little War is interesting. In 1871 separatists from Santiago de 
Cuba had invaded the district, and eventually came to command the allegiance of free people 
of color and many slaves freed from coffee farms. By 1879 it was slaves remaining in the 
sugar mills who grew restive and often supported the insurrection. Postwar narratives of the 
Ten Years’ War and the successive Little War tended to blur the motivations of Maceo’s 
group from the Protest of Baraguá and the latter slave flight into a more heroic nationalist 
history, relatively free of the ambiguities and often bitter divisions prevalent at the time. 
  
Conclusion: War and Abolition, 1868-1880 
The years of fighting from 1868 through 1880, with their tumult and disruption and 
their accompanying political and military mobilizations, had gravely eroded the institution of 
slavery in Cuba as a whole, but especially so in the east, including the most slave dependent 
jurisdiction, Guantánamo. Slaves had been incorporated into the insurrection, and many had 
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achieved their liberation through taking part in nationalist rebellion.  Others exploited 
fissures that appeared in the social control of the slave system opened by the long decade of 
instability and turmoil.  Still others found themselves sold off from many smaller properties, 
and in some cases to entirely different parts of the island.  The social control of slaves by 
masters had come increasingly to rely on elaborate security measures backed by the direct 
presence of Spanish troops, while planters were frequently forced to offer improved material 
incentives and even monetary remuneration to the remaining bound workers.343   
By 1880 Spanish legislation replaced slavery with “apprenticeship,” (the “patronage 
law”) where planters would make token wage payments to their patrocinados.  When final 
abolition came two years ahead of the patronage law’s envisioned 1888 expiration, fewer 
than 30,000 remained in bondage island-wide.344    Significantly, an enduring pattern had 
been established whereby plantation workers, largely incapable of creating organizations to 
ameliorate their social and working conditions, found sabotage and nationalist 
insurrectionary movements plausible responses and outlets to disaffection and grievances.  A 
tradition of armed uprisings, and taking to the monte against governmental authority was to 
be reiterated in “1879, 1895, 1906, 1912, 1933, and 1956” somewhat as the edifice unveiled 
by the Cuban revolutionary state at Demajagua in 1968 celebrating “100 years” of 
revolutionary continuity would have it as mentioned in the introductory chapter, but hardly 
the pat teleology as we have also seen.345   
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Within Cuban national historiography, the large-scale coda to this local micro-history, 
and hence overarching meaning ascribed to it, occurred in 1895, when the deferred struggle 
for independence led to another nationalist insurrection with Gómez and Maceo as military 
leaders.  They organized a column in Oriente province, which crossed Spanish defensive 
lines, invading and torching the vast western sugar districts within the year.  Locally, within 
the history of the region of Guantánamo, something of the momentous changes in personal 
political identifications was writ into the conflict between Miguel Pérez and Moncada.  At 
the turn-of-the-twentieth-century, Guantánamo writer, Regino Boti, likened the clash “a 
hand-to-hand struggle sustained by two armies as if they had taken the form of two men, two 
aspirations, two antagonistic tendencies, two principal opposites: the Republic and the 
Monarchy.”346  Yet Miguel’s nephew, Pedro Agustín Pérez embodied something of the 
momentous changes in personal political identification.  He began his career as a member of 
his uncle’s pro-Spanish paramilitary force only to switch sides at the start of the Little War – 
placed under the command of his uncle’s nemesis, the black official of humble social 
background, Guillermo Moncada.  By 1895 Pedro A. Pérez became insurgent chief of the 
district, where sugar plantations were subjected to payment of war taxes to a rebel treasury 
department backed by threats of property destruction irrespective of owners’ political 
loyalties.347 This paradoxical transformation in political loyalties of a former integralist 
officer offers a clue to the micro-politics of how war-formed identities transformed some 
Cuban rural districts. Nowhere in Oriente was the transformation more acute than in 
Guantánamo. From a rustic reactionary Vendée opposed to the revolution begun in 1868, by 
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the time of the Little War the old haunts of the maroons had become pockets of popular 
separatist nationalism among free black communities. Wrote one observer of Cuba in the 
1880s: 
Miles upon miles of thrifty plantations, with all their buildings and 
machinery, were laid waste, and remain so to this day. 
Since 1876 there have been roving bands of insurgents in existence, 
causing the authorities more or less serious trouble, leading them at times to 
make serious attempts at their entire suppression. But the mountains and half-
inaccessible forests of the eastern department still serve to secrete many 
armed and disaffected people, whose frequent outbreaks are made public by 
the slow process of oral information. The press is forbidden to publish any 
news of this character. Thus it will be seen that, although the spirit of liberty 
may slumber in the island, it is by no means dead, nor is the intense hatred 
which exists between the home-born Spaniard and the native Cuban growing 
less from year to year. [...]  
 
The region where the insurgents have always made their rendezvous, and 
which they have virtually held for years, is nearest to Guantanamo and 
Santiago. This mountainous district is the resort of all runaway slaves, 
escaped criminals, and those designated as insurgents. These together form at 
the present time a roving community of several hundred desperate men. These 
refugees, divided into small bands, make predatory raids upon travelers and 
loyal planters, as we have described, to keep themselves supplied with the 
necessities of life other than those afforded by the prolific hand of Nature.348
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CHAPTER IV: 
Resettlement, Restoration, and the War of Independence, 1880-1898 
The production of coffee in this district is confined to the country surrounding this port 
[Santiago de Cuba] and Guantanamo, and is not sufficient to-day to supply the markets of the 
island. As these two ports are the centers of the only coffee producing districts, coffee is 
imported into the island from Porto Rico, and lately even from the United States. This state of 
affairs has been brought about by various causes. The first is the lack of capital to restore the 
old coffee estates destroyed during the first and second revolutions in 1868, 1878, and 1880, 
respectively. Then, during the prosperous years of the Cuban sugar industry, when the 
attention of every one was drawn to the cultivation of sugar, coffee growing was neglected 
and sugar-making was taken up. […]  
War, such as devastated the island seven and twenty years ago, is, in my opinion possible no 
more; even if possible it will be confined to other parts of the island. […]  
It is a wonder to me that American capitalists do not turn their attention to this 
industry. The climate can only be equaled in the south of Europe. As a winter resort the 
coffee-growing district of this province is unrivaled. Fevers natural to tropical countries are 
unknown here. The scenery is magnificent, vegetation beautiful in its tropic splendor, the 
rivers always full of water, and game, deer, wild pigs, and all sorts of fowl in abundance. 
Even our home fruits and vegetables thrive here, and with very little outlay it is possible to 
transfer all American home comforts to these mountains. 
The remaining descendants of the old French planters, who still live on the estates 
they have been able to retain, are hospitable and generous to a fault, and are generally well 
educated and refined. 
 –Otto V. Reimer, United States Consul, Santiago de Cuba 11 October 1887.349 
 
Despite U.S. Consul Otto Reimer’s enthusiasm for the mountains between Santiago 
de Cuba and Guantánamo, which echoed Samuel Hazard’s boosterism of the zone’s potential 
in the years before the Guerra Grande began, and his similar keen interest in coffee, here 
expressed in the insistence that coffee production could be restarted to supply North 
American and Cuban coffee drinkers, peace never returned entirely to Oriente province after 
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the defeat of the separatist movement.  Social control concerns for the colonial state 
remained paramount. Many restive peasant subsistence cultivators, small farmers and 
ranchers, ex-slaves, and slave “apprentices” resettled the despoiled countryside and rebuilt 
households in the wake of the wars. Quite a few remained loyal to separatist politics; the 
conflict had the effect of hardening and entrenching popular political sympathies.  Colonial 
politics had been transformed into a liberal autonomist movement and a conservative party 
favoring the maintenance of centralized colonial control.  But under the surface there 
remained a separatist strata that would develop during the almost two decades before conflict 
over the status of Cuba resumed. By 1895, there would again be a pro-independence revolt, 
gaining ground early on among the social milieu of Oriente province first.350  By then the 
social base would be different in composition, and there would be no slavery since 
application of the Moret gradual emancipation law, self-purchase through coartación, and 
final abolition by 7 October 1886 accompanied the rise of wage labor systems and seasonal 
work patterns in rural areas of the island.   
Surveying the immediate post-war 1880s, an early twenty-first century political 
lexicon would have likened eastern Cuba a “failed state.” The decade throughout Cuba was 
one of grinding poverty and economic depression. In key regards the fate of the east, 
especially in comparison with western Cuba, was to fall even further into economic 
destitution and social retrocession.  Much of the fighting, pillage, and utter destruction had 
occurred in Camagüey and Oriente province.  Devastation from warring groups had spilled 
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over the Spanish army’s trocha into Sancti Spíritus and Las Villas. Western Cuba, including 
Matanzas, Cárdenas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio had not escaped violence, deportations, and 
repression, however, its form and character were different.  Cuba’s west was wracked by 
debt, unemployment, and depression, but largely spared the disruptions and depredations of 
armed conflict apart from considerable peninsular settler violence and repression of Creoles 
from the pro-Spanish irredentist integralist volunteer movement.  It remained home to the 
sugar monoculture economic centerpiece of the colonial economy.  The 1880s, however, 
were years fraught with problems of stagnation, low productivity, and increased foreign 
competition in sugar.  The situation in Oriente province, according to a Cuban economic 
historian, was as if civilization itself had to be reintroduced.351  A historian of Spain likened 
the colonial authorities’ actions in the interwar years after the cessation of hostilities as 
approaching collective punishment of the colony itself: “seventeen years of malign 
neglect.”352  
The post-war agrarian base of the Guantánamo district, apart from the sugar estates of 
the llano, lay despoiled, torched, ruined, and in a state of abandonment between the fires of 
contending armies.  During the fighting properties great and small owned by small-scale 
farmers and planters, pro-separatist, pro-reform, and pro-Spanish integrista alike, had been 
leveled or burned out completely. Some, accused of supporting the insurrection had lost their 
property to destruction by Spanish forces or through seizure by vengeful colonial authorities.  
Feuds, cronyism, family politics, and interpersonal enmities enmeshed with the overarching 
politics further complicated the picture.  Social control concerns, while becoming 
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complicated by the rise of anticolonial politics and armed insurgency, had only become more 
marked with the insurrection and the social shifts that prevailed afterwards. 
Suspicious political loyalties, support for bandits, and ongoing security concerns in 
the remote northern coastal zone of Sagua de Tánamo led Spanish Colonel Alberto Morera to 
send a list of “Inconvenient neighbors due to various concepts” in May 1880 to the military 
governor of Santiago de Cuba province, Camilo Polavieja.353 The list compiled 27 presumed 
disloyal men, thirteen with the honorific “Don” and fourteen without.  Two were born in 
Spain, one was Catalan; the remainder were Cuban born.  Each bore a description of 
suspicions and accusations against them. At the end, ten men were designated “exile from the 
Island advisable [conviene su destierro de la Isla],” and another man recommended for 
removal to Tiguabos, from where he came from originally.  Sixteen were marked with a 
small cross by their names and the annotation “his disappearance/ removal advisable 
[conviene su desaparición].”354 Certain considerations were apparently made for two of the 
ten for whom exile was recommended. One, a youth, “may have been seduced” on account of 
his age and inexperience, while an elderly man had his status similarly contingent on his 
advanced age. Some had made utterances such as they had “washed their hands in the blood 
of Spaniards,” others were accused of thievery and criminal activity. Most were assumed to 
be separatists, while “in this area several men revolted under the orders of so-called Perico 
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[Pedro A.] Pérez, together with a party of thirteen” others risen in arms against Spain’s 
authority.355 
Many Cuban separatists had gone into exile at the end of the Ten Years’ War. 
Spanish General Camilo Polavieja, governor of the eastern province during the Little War, in 
turn, carried out a heavy repression against black Cuban separatists in Oriente. Guillermo 
Moncada was imprisoned for a time in North Africa. Calixto García served a sentence in 
Spain itself before being amnestied. José Maceo would escape from prison in Morocco, flee 
to Algeria, and thence to France.  Rumors of still another separatist conspiracy in Oriente 
after the Little War had been suppressed saw a wave of deportations of 256 black orientales 
to Spain’s equivalent of the French Guiana “Devils’ Island,” the African penal colony of 
Fernando Póo in the Gulf of Guinea.356 Something of the character of Polavieja, described by 
Benedict Anderson as “severely Catholic” and widely admired within Spanish military and 
conservative political circles for his “probity, loyalty, and military toughness” was perhaps 
visible in a telegram sent during the repression of the 6 December 1880 separatist conspiracy 
in Santiago:  
 Most urgent 
 To Comandante [José] Moraleda 
 
 [Santiago de] Cuba 
The Douverges must not escape. Take them alive or dead; it might be more 
convenient if they are dead. Take from this telegraph station the reel of tape 
that deals with this business including everything from now until later. 
Polavieja.357 [emphasis in original] 
                                                
 
355 Ibid.  
 
356 Helg, Our Rightful Share, 50-54.  
 
357 Letter from Governor of Santiago de Cuba province, General Camilo García Polavieja y Castillo to 
Comandante José Moraleda, 6 December 1880 in AGI, SD, leg. 8, R2, D4, Correspondencia particular D. José 
Moraleda, no. 4, Mayo-Noviembre 1880-1881, 453.  It was Camilo Polavija who, as captain-general of the 
Philippines during the suppression of the Filipino Katipunan nationalist movement signed the execution order of 
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Polavieja seemed to believe that sooner or later Spain would have to grant autonomy or even 
independence to Cuba, but also thought that any such move for decolonization should be on 
the terms of the colonial metropolis. By the early 1890s he would be captain-general of 
Cuba, where he would use his experience gained in Oriente in an island-wide bandit 
suppression campaign.  In the meantime, with a shaky peace in place and a liberalized 
politics operating free of earlier restrictions, Cuba as a whole, and even distant Guantánamo 
underwent remarkable transformations during the 1880s and the first-half of the 1890s.  Part 
of this development lay in the emphasis noted by Consul Reimer of “the attention of every 
one was drawn to the cultivation of sugar, coffee growing was neglected and sugar-making 
was taken up.”358 
 
The llano: Sugar and the Brooks and Company 
The war's deleterious economic effects also hastened the demise of indebted sugar 
and coffee planters in myriad cases.359  The 1880s saw the decline of many sugar estates with 
the fall of sugar prices, the growth of cane and beet sugar production worldwide, and the 
ongoing scarcity of labor.  In the postwar setting, amid gradual abolition and foreign capital 
expansion, Cuban sugar production underwent a revolution in which larger, technologically 
intensive and much more expensive centrales acquired cane from estate-owned lands and  
                                                                                                                                                  
José Rizal, the writer and nationalist, on 30 December 1896. See Anderson, Under Three Flags: Anarchism and 
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colono growers.  Some relatively large sugar enterprises became converted into satellites of 
the central, their owners into colonos growing sugar cane to be processed in the main mill. 
Throughout this decentralized transition within sugar production, converted former ingenios 
and tenant farmers alike grew and harvested cane under contracts with the central mill.  In 
Guantánamo, twenty surviving mills consolidated through the 1880s and 1890s into thirteen 
centrales, many of them drawing cane from such colonias. Capital-intensive sugar mills were 
better poised to withstand economic depression and recover at the expense of both antiquated 
sugar estates and the ravaged coffee sector.  Table 4.1 below shows the status of ownership 
of sugar cane agribusiness in the Guantánamo district immediately after the Little War: 
Table 4.1 
Guantánamo, 1881-1882: Rural Estates: Sugar Ingenios, and Trapiches 
Number Name of Sugar 
mill 
Where located within the 
municipio 
Name of owner 
1 Esperanza Sigual D. José Baró and his sister 
2 Ysabel Jamaica D. Sucesión Limonta and 
Associates 
3 San Miguel Camarones D. José [illeg.] Bueno 
4 Soledad Jamaica D. Brooks and Associates 
5 Sta. María Arroyo Hondo D. Fernando Pons 
6 Los Caños Camarones D. Brooks y Ca. 
7 Confluente Camarones D. Rosa y Da. Leticia Bueno 
8 Santa Cecilia Arroyo Hondo D. Arturo C. Simon 
9 Santa Rosa Camarones D. Sucesión Jay 
10 Santa Fé Camarones D. Sucesión Faure 
11 San Carlos Arroyo Hondo D. Mestre y Gorgas 
12 San Yldefonso Camarones D. J. Bueno y Ca. 
13 Romelié Rio Seco D. Santiago MacKinlay and 
Associate 
14 San Antonio Rio Seco D. Luis Redor y Lescaille 
15 San Emilio Casisey D. Emilio Charlot 
16 San Vincente Jamaica D. Sucesión Rancole 
17 La Luisa Casisey D. Emilio Larlabous and 
Associate 
18 San José Camarones D. Sucesión Fournier 
19 Perseverancia Camarones D. Manuel Masferroll 
20 Montesano Camarones D. Ruperto Ledesma 
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Number Name of Sugar 
mill 
Where located within the 
municipio 
Name of owner 
21 San Pedro Yndios D. C. Brauet y Ca. 
22 San León Palma S. Juan D. Félix Parrtó [illeg.] 
23 La Unión Palma S. Juan D. Juan Díaz García 
Trapiches 
24 “ Ysleta D. Duran Renda 
25 “ Yndios D. José de los Reyes  
Gonzáles 
26 “ Tiguabos Da. María Pérez Olivares 
Source: Data from Expediente manuscrito que contiene una relación detallada de los ingenios 
y trapiches existents en el municipio de Guantánamo, 21 November 1881, AHPSC, GP, leg. 
300, no. 6, año: 1881-1882, materia: Centrales. 
 
These twenty-three sugar mills were connected to markets through the Brooks and Company 
that continued to operate the district’s railway line and shipping piers and port facilities on 
Guantánamo Bay at Caimanera.   
Gradually, the merchant house began to extend their land holdings. An example of 
this consolidation was the sugar estate Los Caños at the northern shore of Guantánamo Bay 
late in the Ten Years’ War and the social disruptions and sugar slave resistance of the Little 
War.  Despite the trocha erected by the Spanish military, and the use of armed guards at the 
sugar estates, there were cases of cane fires directed at the mills during the latter part of the 
Ten Years’ War and successive Little War.  In February 1877, for example, insurgents 
burned standing cane and some buildings on the sugar property of Juan Rancole, who was 
indebted to the banking house operated by Brooks and Company.360 The mobility of slaves 
bought and sold during the conflict that extended the possibility of abolition provoked unrest.  
In November 1878, five months after the Pact of Zanjón went into effect, and the Ten Years’ 
War had ended with amnesty for rebels including those of slave origins, seven slaves from an 
                                                
360 See Abelardo Padrón Valdés, Guillermo Moncada (Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1980), 42 for 
information on the fire. Ownership information, and a destructive fire in 1877 along with the subsequent 
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estate near Santiago de Cuba to the ingenio– Cirilo, Santiago, Joaquín, Luis, Mamerto, 
Eusevio, and Rita by name – ran away from Los Caños.  A patrol of the Civil Guard 
recaptured two near Tiguabos, but there is no indication of what fate befell the remaining 
five, who may have secured their freedom by flight from their new owner.361 The sugar estate 
and its remaining dotación was sold off to the expanding Brooks and Company holdings in 
the llano.  
By the conclusion of the eleven-month Little War in 1880, the Brooks family bought 
out Los Caños and adjacent properties, two nearby colonias, Las Lajas and Santa Cecilia—
both former ingenios subsumed by the new operation—creating one of the largest sugar 
estates in the region.  To improve the yield of cane in the arid and saline upper portion of the 
bay, an extensive irrigation works was constructed.   A spider-web of narrow-gauge rails 
with a private fleet of small locomotives laced through the vast cane fields, and a shipping 
pier, warehouse, and lighters to take the cargo to steamers was erected on the upper part of 
Guantánamo Bay.  Another linchpin of Brooks and Company sugar production, the Soledad 
central and other mills similarly underwent transformation and upgrades of the physical 
plant.  A similar island-wide pattern resulted in the first substantial inroads by North 
American and British capital investment.  Increasingly, foreign ownership of sugar 
production in British, Spanish, and American hands became a pattern in the industry. Cuban-
born planters were becoming sidelined by the sophisticated capital-intensive cultivation 
system gradually taking root atop the earlier plantation economy. 
                                                
 
361 “Expediente manuscrito que contiene la denuncia hecha por Juan Rancole sobre la fuga de los 
esclavos de su ingenio ‘Los Caños’ Guantánamo, Cuba, 2-28 Noviembre, 1879,” no. 28; AHPSC, GP, leg. 299, 
año: 1853-1878, materia: Esclavitud. 
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Los Caños produced over a $70,000 sugar crop in 1892, 1893, and 1894.  The last 
sugar harvest, or zafra in 1895, the first year of the War of Independence, commanded 
$82,000, a record for Los Caños, while the Brooks & Co. ground large crops at their 
consolidated holdings such as Soledad, Romelié and Isabel sugar mills too.362 The change in 
social composition of ownership included a diminution of French presence. Cubans of 
French ancestry became somewhat less of a separate group as numbers of frequently poor but 
ambitious Spaniards immigrated permanently or came seasonally to Cuba, establishing 
themselves as proprietors where possible, but also performing wage labor on sugar mills, in 
cigar factories, and other employments in the 1880s.  In the sugar llano of Guantánamo, an 
1890 American magazine article reported 
M. Truy, French consul at Santiago de Cuba, says … the cultivation of 
the sugar cane in the eastern portion of the island of Cuba is almost entirely 
confined to the districts of Santiago, Guantanamo, and Manzanillo. This 
cultivation, although it has experienced some extension of late years, is not in 
the flourishing condition it was twenty years ago [i.e. 1870]. This falling off is 
due to the civil war, which ruined many planters and discouraged others. The 
profits, however, realized for some time past by those planters who had 
sufficient credit, or confidence in the future, to continue to engage in this 
industry, have given a stimulus to the cultivation of the cane.  
Sugar factories have been established in many parts, particularly in the 
district of Guantanamo and Manzanillo, old factories have been supplied with 
fresh plant, and planters, encouraged by high prices recently realized, have 
hastened to get their ground ready for cultivation. […] The [Santiago de] 
Cuba market was some years ago controlled by French merchants, who owned 
the greater part of the sugar factories of the province, but since the civil war 
many planters sold their estates and retired to France. 
A few estates, however, are still owned by Frenchmen, at Guantanamo 
especially. Those known as Sainte Marie, Sainte Cecile, and San Antonio [de 
Redor] are directed or owned by Frenchmen.363 
 
                                                
 
362 Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, Claimants’ and Government Briefs (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1903), 9: 4. [hereinafter cited as Briefs.]   
 
363 “Sugar and Sugar Cane in Cuba.” Scientific American V. LXIII, No. 17 (October 25, 1890): 265.  
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The settlement of the frontier of easternmost Cuba that had once attracted planters from Ste. 
Domingue and the sugar plantation model in the early nineteenth century, underwent 
transformation from extension of the central system of the latter part of the century.  The 
increasing prominence of sugar in the life and culture of the district would shortly arouse 
keen interest from the separatist movement. After the doldrums and downturns of the 1880s, 
prosperity seemed destined to return in the 1890s.  The total Cuban sugar harvest of 1894 
was the first over a million tons, and Guantánamo planters likewise had done well.364 
  
Separatism and State Formation 
 As the Cuban economy developed ever-stronger ties with U.S.-based investors and 
other sites in the North Atlantic system, the island itself was inundated by Spanish 
immigration. Immigration and population figures suggest a stream of 224,000 Spaniards, 
often Galicians, Asturians, and Catalans, coming as sojourners and permanent settlers 
between 1882 and 1894, and resulting in a situation where island-wide approximately one in 
four or one in five inhabitants were Spanish born.365  Peninsular versus Creole conflicts 
became exacerbated. Nativism among the Cuban-born population grew. The demographic 
shifts were more pronounced in the west, where there was usually greater economic 
dynamism as a pull factor for immigration.  With the decline of the African descended 
population, and the rise of significant influx of Spanish immigration—a pattern to which the 
island would return in the opening decades of the twentieth century, Cuba underwent a 
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demographic “whitening” of the population.  A net effect, as Tone has emphasized, was to 
make the division of the island between west and east, reinforced by the military trocha 
barrier to separate the two sides, even starker.366 He provocatively asserted that to separatists 
the War of Independence beginning in 1895 was “at least in part,” the means to “halt this 
process” as much as it has become laden with Martí’s concerns over absorption by a North 
American cultural and economic juggernaut.367 
Defeat for separatist insurgents in the earlier wars had indeed been bitter, but it had 
also introduced a range of tactics that had not been taken to their full extension.  The strategy 
of invading the west, first modeled by the somewhat stillborn invasion of the Guantánamo 
district in Gómez’ 1871 offensive, for example, assumed a crucial focus among separatists in 
exile.368 Accelerating changes in military technology strongly augured an unconventional 
warfare strategy emphasizing economic targets as concrete links of the colonial system.  To 
many separatists the very wealth, prominence, and way in which sugar mills dominated 
certain areas of the island symbolized the very epicenter of Spanish control and source of 
revenue.  The great disparity in power between the colonial edifice supported by the Spanish 
military along with their volunteers and locally recruited guerrillas, and the insurgent 
movement recommended to separatist rebels the trajectory for future revolt drawing on the 
earlier experience.  Past wars had seen the fortification of estates and their use as bases by the 
Spanish.  As the decade wore on without Spanish promises of political reform becoming 
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realized, planning for another uprising against the colonial system assumed a renewed 
urgency.  The absence of unity within the separatist movement, and the relatively unformed 
composition of national identity, came under scrutiny as did the blinkered tactical and 
strategic vision of past wars.  If the uprising being planned failed to bring about Spanish 
capitulation or collapse swiftly, there was no alternative envisioned to the total war strategy 
of economic warfare and wholesale disruption of life on the island.  The failure of the past 
armed movement seemed contingent on the confinement of the insurgency to the relatively 
unimportant eastern provinces, where, faced with the greater weight and resources of Spain 
exhaustion and attrition defeated the insurrection.   
In the unequal contest between poorly equipped, outnumbered mambises versus 
Spanish troops and militia, the rebels refined hit-and-run irregular warfare, economic 
sabotage, and the use of arson.  Dispersed throughout the eastern countryside, insurgents 
operated in small bands to harass the heavily armed but cumbersome Spanish military and 
evade the locally recruited integralist guerrillas, such as the Squadron of Guantánamo, who 
often knew the terrain as well as the anticolonial rebels.  Insurgent forces could try to 
temporarily coalesce into larger groups in order to execute ambushes and attacks, but major 
operations carried great risk of being exposed, isolated, and wiped out by superior Spanish 
strength.  Spanish social order could draw support from sources beyond the capability of the 
separatists, including from among significant numbers of pro-colonial Cubans and Spanish 
peninsular migrants.  In a pattern that prefigured many postcolonial twentieth-century wars 
of national liberation, the declining colonial power still possessed resources and capabilities 
far beyond the emergent nationalist movement.   
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Importantly, a hallmark of the Spanish imperial system was its system of taxation 
geared to supporting the metropolis at the expense of the colony.  In fact, an onerous direct 
feature of this exploitation was to force the Cuban colony to cover the added expenses 
incurred from putting down the insurrection.369  This large odious debt, which would be 
canceled by the United States after 1898, seemed to separatists and many autonomists an 
ever proliferating and crushing burden that foredoomed Cuba as long as it remained tied to 
Spain. 
Separatists imagined that the total cessation of production was utterly essential in 
order to exhaust and defeat the Spanish colonial state and force as quick a capitulation as 
possible.  If the coming war could not be won relatively quickly, it was thought that the 
economic warfare strategy of the past conflict applied on a larger scale would change the 
balance of forces so that attrition would be favorable to the insurrection rather than the 
colonial metropolis.  Economic warfare became an essential element in the calculations of 
separatists planning the future insurrection.   
A profound discomfort with the ramifications of the maximal employment of 
property destruction led to disagreement within remaining internal splits and divisions of the 
exiled separatist movement.  Some veteran leaders such as Gómez came to favor a flinty and 
uncompromising vision of the use of economic pressure in its most complete manifestation 
against Spain and, by extension, since the war would be fought within the colony itself, 
Cuban society.  If the planned future rebellion to be carried through by a simultaneous 
uprising by separatists in all provinces of the isle faltered, which was precisely what would 
occur in early 1895, then outright destruction of economic support for the colonial state, and 
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a principled refusal to enter into agreements with planters to safeguard property would be, 
according to this view, the most efficacious method to overthrow the colonial order.  As 
Gómez once described the underlying rationale for a total war strategy of complete economic 
disruption and property destruction, “[t]he chains of Cuba have been forged by its own riches 
and it is necessary to put an end to this in order to finish soon.”370 Other leaders, especially 
exiles in the United States, vainly hoped that destruction could be minimized.  They banked 
on a spontaneous insurrection supplied by anticolonial landowners and sympathetic foreign 
governments that could sustain the cause.  As plans for an uprising against Spanish control 
matured, it was often thought that property could be saved, provided that planters were not 
actively supporting Spain and recognized Cuban insurgent authority.   
In Guantánamo, this internal conflict among separatists played out amid the terrain 
that had earlier undergone the 1871 invasion.  There, by the end of 1895, a revolutionary 
general strike would counter the pro-Spanish Squadron of Guantánamo and local guerrillas 
and assail Spanish, Cuban, French, and British planters as pillars of Spanish colonial 
institutions.  While the Liberation Army remobilized and organized a column to invade the 
western districts of the island, the separatist military leaders planned to extract the payment 
of war taxes from planters.  As a state in formation, or would-be independent and sovereign 
state, the insurgents viewed matters through the lens of statecraft and its abstractions and 
nationalist calculi of means and ends. They would demand obeisance to their authority and 
criteria by the threat of sanctions in the form of Ten Years’ War-style scorched earth tactics.  
As before, the rebels would confront insuperable logistical difficulties, and a paucity of 
weapons, which would necessitate a thorough re-evaluation of political and military failure in 
                                                
370 In Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 133.  
  
 200 
the past wars of independence.  Such assessment came to include local manifestations of the 
need to paralyze the most profitable economic activity of the region, supply the insurrection, 
and to draw resources far beyond those of the earlier anticolonial conflicts. 
An augury of this enfolding conflict, and perhaps an early model of how to 
expropriate funds from hesitant or recalcitrant landowners backed by the policing and 
military institutions of the colonial state, arose from the aforementioned phenomenon of 
social banditry.  The long wars of the nineteenth century had created many men, and even 
entire isolated rural communities, skilled at living by their wits and securing what they 
demanded at the edge of a machete and the barrel of a gun.371  Rural people had pursued their 
own objectives internal to the political motives of the competing sides.  Some were not 
disposed to a return to civilian avocations, and harbored latent political motivations or 
justifications for their deeds.  Robberies, kidnappings, and other extortions were frequent.  
By the early 1890s, Polavieja as captain-general embarked on a sustained anti-brigand 
campaign, noting 
 A truly exceptional situation has crossed this island. It is neither a state of  
peace nor of war; it sustains the absence of tranquility and tests the prudent 
and rational means to return the country to public repose; nor have the prisons 
worked for those with more or less wisdom branded accomplices, nor the Law 
of banditry and the recent lessons in the crimes covered by that law—nothing 
as given the healthy example that might have been expected.372 
 
Polavieja vowed to “destroy and exterminate the parties of malefactors” with bodies of 
troops, volunteers, and the Civil Guard at his disposition. He warned against the provocations 
that would result from “transgressions against the country people” by pro-Spanish militia; if 
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well treated, civilians could provide intelligence against bandits or even be allied in pro-
colonial guerrilla units. He stressed “the bandit in Cuba, as already stated, represents the 
primary obstacle to Spanish dominion, serving to maintain constant alarm and a nucleus for 
new separatist ventures,” so that the anti-banditry campaign was the exercise of social control 
over latent forms of resistance.  He imbued the policy with a sense of destroying internal 
rivals to colonial authority, and thus, it was a form of state making.373  Such moves against 
the threat posed by bandits, presumed to be a nascent “primitive rebel” threat to the social 
order resembled some features of the earlier struggle against maroons.   
Spanish forces captured or killed many.  In late 1891, forces from the Squadron of 
Santa Catalina killed “the bandit Juan Cufé, who formed part of the gang of Chino 
Velázquez” as well as “Magdaleno Moya Centeno … last of a party of bandits that prowled 
the jurisdiction of Guantánamo.”374  The attempt to re-extend colonial authority into the 
countryside encountered ample resistance.  Nevertheless, as a fragile peace settled over the 
rugged, forested interior of the district, farming in remote areas and isolated valleys began to 
recover.  One facet of this pattern was among the ruined cafetales in the mountains that 
elicited the entrepreneurial appraisals of Samuel Hazard in the 1860s and Reimer in the late 
1880s. 
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The monte: Postemancipation Labor and Coffee—The Colonato System  
As the consular official noted, the coffee sector began a halting, capital-scarce 
recovery from the devastations sustained during the war, and by the shift in labor after Cuban 
separatism had belatedly embraced an unambiguous overthrow of slavery and invaded the 
district in 1871.  Ada Ferrer has written about post-war Santiago de Cuba province and 
Puerto Príncipe, the Spaniards in authority undertook some resettlement efforts. Model 
villages and re-populated towns were founded for veterans of the conflict, including 
demobilized Spanish regulars who decided to settle within the colony, integralist volunteers, 
and even ex-rebels.375 Apparently many of the new and re-founded towns erected for 
displaced persons and settlers were concentrated in the western departments of Oriente where 
fighting had been the most protracted and where many residents had gone over to Céspedes’ 
uprising early in the conflict. Thus areas between Santiago de Cuba, Bayamo, Manzanillo, 
and points further west including Las Tunas obtained an influx of inhabitants and small 
settlement towns.  This belated post-war attempt to realize long dormant colonization 
schemes such as that of the Count of Mompox y de Jaruco and others that sought to settle the 
area and hold it for the empire through soldier-farmers failed to bring about the restoration of 
the colony and resumption of loyalty to the metropolitan state.  Ferrer has convincingly 
pointed out that this attempt to bring social control and state authority to bear at the local 
level of isolated communities in eastern regions devastated by the war provoked unintended 
consequences of further alienating local inhabitants.376 
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In the case of Guantánamo, colonial authorities permitted some coffee farms to be 
rebuilt and even extended. Cafetales “Valparaiso,” “El Perú,” and “La Loli” were authorized 
to resettle and resume cultivation in Yateras in 1881, and Don Eugenio Rousseau returned to 
the cafetal “Alabama.”377 Former slaves in many cases responded to their new status as freed 
people in the local time-honored fashion long familiar to a society that historically had a 
large free population of color, namely a quest for security provided by an autonomous, 
independent economic venture in the form of a farm or artisanal job, and access to wage 
labor to generate income. Such patterns of autonomy constrained by laws preventing them 
from certain professions and by the social stigma associated with darker skin underwent 
transformations at precisely the same time that abolition took effect.  
Many freed people pursued subsistence farming supplemented by wage work on 
different estates, including the sugar mills.  The population worked on their own in farming 
and ranching, rented land, squatted on vacant properties, or made various tenant farming or 
sharecropping arrangements with landowners.  Dispersal of settlement patterns away from 
the confines and supervision of plantations characterized many free and freed rural denizens.   
Still other free people of color worked as artisans and laborers, following a readily emulated 
model of social mobility already long established in many cases. Since eastern society 
remained largely pre-literate and many arrangements were made by verbal agreements 
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instead of formal contracts, precise reconstruction of the arrangements made by peasant 
cultivators, colonists, displaced refugees, and dispossessed rural proletarians is difficult. 
Nevertheless, legal depositions made in the early twentieth century and preserved within the 
Spanish Treaty Claims Commission Records offer some insights into colono contracts and 
tenancy arrangements in postemancipation coffee fincas. These depositions are from close to 
Santiago de Cuba, but may reflect some of the prevailing systems of cultivation and rural 
labor in eastern Cuba, and can be generalized through techniques of “up-streaming” from the 
dates contained in the brief narratives of the testimonial records.  That is, while the 
depositions were made in the early twentieth century, the respondents dated their tie to the 
verbal colono contract to the 1880s. The labor systems that replaced bond servitude in coffee 
farms can thus be reconstructed to a degree through their stories. 
In February 1906, stenographers and lawyers recorded testimony concerning the 
destruction of the cafetal San Juan de Buenavista at the hands of the Spanish army in 1895, 
owned by a 48-year old widow and mother of seven children, Carmen de Villalon de 
Quesada. She had married Esteban Quesada, originally from Bayamo west of Santiago in 
New York in 1883.378 She had left with her husband for Cartagena de los Indios in Colombia 
when the Cuban War of Independence broke out in 1895.  Villalon filed a claim over the 
destruction of their 334 hectare coffee and cacao estate, inherited from her father, that had 
also included a 300 hive apiary to produce honey and beeswax, and over five hundred fruit 
trees cultivated by 42 colono families since 1884.  The cafetal was located on the northern 
slope of the Sierra Maestra mountains, just northwest of Boniato near Santiago de Cuba. 
Among the witnesses from whom testimony was taken were three coffee colonos, or 
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sharecroppers, Telesforo Curubero, Epifanio Rizo, and Aniceto Marques—46-years old, 60, 
and 73-years of age respectively. All were illiterate or semi-literate since their testimony was 
read back to them, and they signed their depositions with an “X.”379   
It was impossible to determine their race, or if they were libertos since much 
information remained ambiguous. Nevertheless, they were from a region that 
demographically had a saliently black majority population.  The eldest, Marques, would have 
been born in 1833.  Therefore, he would have been 35 in 1868 and 62 in 1895. He responded 
to the query about what he did when the war broke out in 1895: “as I had been an insurgent I 
immediately went to the camp.”  He was asked “Do you mean that you had been an insurgent 
in the first insurrection?” to which he replied “Oh yes sir, in ‘68.”380  
Rizo would have been born in 1846, and Curubero in 1860. They reported that they 
began work at the cafetal in 1885, which would be the year before the final abolition of 
slavery with the end of the patronato apprenticeship system—freeing the last remaining 
25,000 slaves in Cuba, of which, however, fewer than 800 were to be found in Oriente since 
slavery had been less prominent in the east apart from Guantánamo and Santiago de Cuba.  
The deposition of 46-year old merchant Stephen de Quesada reported that in 1871, when he 
would have been eleven, his mother, grandmother, and two siblings were exiled to the United 
States because their surnames were Quesada and Céspedes. All members of the land-owning 
family had been “in the war of 1868” but “not so in ‘95.”381 
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San Juan de Buena Vista was re-started in 1884, at which time there were already 
some colonos living on the estate. The owners lived part of the time in Santiago de Cuba, and 
at other times they moved to a two room thatched roof house with a parlor in the center, a 
porch, and some more expensive trappings such as ironwork. The floor of the house was the 
earlier concrete structure of an abandoned coffee drying terrace. The 42 colonos on the estate 
lived in individual thatched huts with their families. Instead of a closely supervised village 
tied to the estate, which would have reflected the pattern during slavery, each colono “built 
his own house” with materials taken from “the woods on the plantation.”382 For that reason, 
Curubero explained, if the colono left the finca, the house would belong “to the owners of the 
land, and as all the materials came from the plantation, they had to be left there—that is the 
custom here.”383 Each colono had a private kitchen, a hen house, and their own cultivation 
grounds where, according to a saddler that grew coffee and cocoa from age fifteen through 
twenty-five, until the war broke out again in 1895 and he left, each colono “procured the 
vegetables themselves—biscuits also … minor products [cassava, boniatos and other food 
crops], and of course it was to their interest to push the work so as to get corn” while the 
owner provided them with salt cod, meat, rice, salt, oil or lard while the land was cleared for 
planting.384  
The colonos reported the value of the estate to the lawyers by remarking on the palm 
groves and fruit trees that included oranges, mamey zapotes, anónes (cherimoyas), 
avocadoes, mangoes, plums, lemons, grapefruit, and coconuts in addition to the coffee and 
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cocoa grown for market.385 In trying to assess the value of the estate, destroyed and burned by 
Spanish troops during the 1895-1898 war, questions turned repeatedly to the trees, which 
none of the colonos had ever bothered to count, quantify, and affix a cash value to. Expert 
witnesses tabulated the expense of the apiary, while workers such as Marques who had lived 
on the grounds since the mid-1880s had never counted the hives “because he was very much 
afraid of” the bees.386  
Some workers paid yearly rent of $50 on a caballería of land, approximately 33.2 
acres, while others paid no rent, but grew coffee and cocoa on shares.  Each would clear two 
or three carreaux for the coffee and cacao trees—each carreau was about three and a third 
acres or one-tenth of a caballería—all of which would go to the colono until the trees reached 
maturity and peak fertility after a period of years, sometimes up to nine.  Cacao took three to 
four years to bear fruit, while coffee from a seedling required two years, or four to five years 
if grown from a seed.  Coffee trees bore cherries for about twenty years, while the green, 
brown, and orange cacao pods were borne by each tree on the cacaotal for almost a 
century—ninety years.387   
The sharecrop system called for two-thirds of the harvest to go to the owner while the 
colono kept a third.  Beasts of burden to haul and market the crop were rented in cash, or 
deducted from the share. According to Quesada, the estate workers had to supply their own 
tools, but they often supplemented their income as charcoal burners, a product that would 
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then be sent to kitchens of towns and cities for “direct money without having to wait for 
anything.” From the stunted coffee trees grown on two carreaux, or six and a half acres of 
land, the colono family could expect yields in good years with plenty of rain of 
approximately twenty to twenty-two quintals (a quintal was about a hundred pounds, so two 
thousand pounds of green coffee beans would be a good harvest) of coffee and 1500 to 
1600lbs. of cacao beans.388  
Coffee production nearly collapsed in the early 1880s, but began to recover by mid-
decade.  In the aforementioned letter on coffee production emanating from Santiago and 
Guantánamo Reimer claimed: 
In 1886 coffee cultivation increased, owing to the high prices 
prevailing. Prices as they now stand leave more than a handsome profit to the 
coffee planter, but capital is wanting to restore the old plantations. … The 
French Creoles at that time entirely controlled the coffee industry of this 
district, and their estates produced a high grade of coffee, which found its way 
to France and thence to Austria and Russia. Then the grades and classes of 
coffee were many, and the small amounts shipped to the United States were 
invariably of superior quality. …The cultivation of coffee is still in the same 
primitive state in which it was years ago. … I would state that the shipments 
from here and Guantanamo during the past year amounted to 1,550,627 
pounds; the local consumption in both places I estimate at 300,000 pounds. 
This makes a total of 1,850,627 pounds, which, allowing 10,000 pounds to the 
caballería (33 1/3 acres), would show about 6,100 acres under cultivation. 
This small area does not supply the island consumption.389 
 
In his report he explained that an ideal site for a coffee farm lay at 1,000 to 3,000 foot 
altitude.  Many coffee growers favored steep hillsides since it was thought to help shield the 
coffee trees from the fearsome Caribbean sun.390 The presence of certain trees such as “lance-
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wood, redwood, and olive-wood” served “as a never failing proof that the land is adapted for 
the cultivation of coffee.”391 Candela and the machete served as the pacific means to prepare 
the ground for cultivation, not just the wartime means of destruction: “larger trees are burned 
out and the smaller trees and brush chopped down with ax and machete” while a range of 
other cultigens such as “corn, plantains, and all kinds of vegetables” would be grown.392  In 
addition, much like Hazard described two decades before, “at intervals between the rows, 
cacao, which however, does not yield a full crop until the coffee plant is exhausted, say, in 
ten or twelve years” would be planted to shade the coffee trees and serve as a further source 
of production for the estate.  After stunting the coffee tree, by the “third year it [coffee] 
yields a half crop; on the fourth year a full crop, which runs from 10,000 to 60,000 pounds of 
coffee ready for the market, according to the condition of the soil.”393 During harvest season 
from August to December, colonos or hired field hands were  
paid for picking and delivering the berry at the secadero (a large platform  
made of stone, covered and smoothed with cement) 50 cents per bag. It is 
calculated that 100 pounds of berries yield 15 pounds of marketable coffee. 
Each bag of berries delivered at the secadero must contain 200 to 300 pounds, 
and a good workman can pick three bags per day.394  
 
In Hazard’s day technological inputs had begun to make inroads, but after the war the crude 
means of St.-Domingue-era coffee bean preparation persisted.  The beans were dried, then 
put into an ox or mule-powered, “molina de pilar” where a rough wheel hewn from hard 
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wood, “the rim plated with metal,” overrode the beans in a cement “circular trough” to 
remove the berry hulls. This process frequently crushed some of the beans, which reduced 
their market value.  After being thus cleaned, they were sometimes returned to the coffee 
pulping mill “to be polished, sometimes with charcoal added.”395 Other processes redolent of 
past practice included the shipment by mule train.  Reimer illustrated the crisis of coffee 
cultivation with “the following statement of coffee shipments from the port of Guantanamo” 
here reproduced as Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2 
Shipments of coffee [in lbs.] from Santiago and Guantánamo for 1867 to 1886 
Year Island of 
Cuba 
United 
States 
France Mediterranean 
Ports 
Spain Great 
Britain 
Sundries Total 
1867 4,089,120         2,980 1,540560 1,781,000 506,480 13,000 10,300 7,944,340 
1868 5,616,380  1,300,240 1,283,000 85,560   8,287,840 
1869 6,103,180  1,809,640 1,533,000 666,680   10,112,500 
1870 5,466,980       64,980 863,800    942,000 268,040  10,000 7,620,800 
1871 3,192,980  499,940  70,400  1,260 3,764,580 
1872 2,673,660  20,800  1,200 2,600 3,480 2,701,740 
1873 1,658,340            300 55,800     1,714,440 
1874 2,392,920  32,000    5,600 2,430,520 
1875 1,788,780         1,800 190,200  1,000  5,100 1,986,880 
1876 1,119,700         1,000 90,000     1,210,700 
1877 1,487,140         2,000 33,360  2,600   1,525,100 
1878 1,521,560     7,400 25,800 1,554,760 
1879 1,285,000  31,314  800  5,000 1,323,114 
1880 1,201,800  19,300  2,600  1,800 1,225,500 
1881    464,340         2,500   4,200  2,300    473,340 
1882 1,683,640         1,100 102,400  28,380  600 1,816,120 
1883    401,662  19,100  2,200  1,200    424,162 
1884    660,200           660,200 
1885    504,340         1,531   2,864  1,900     510,635 
1886 1,542,360            600   6,100  1,567 1,550,627 
Source: U.S. Congress. House. Production of and Trade in Coffee, 116.  
 
As may be seen, the separatist strategy against the economic life of the region had reduced 
coffee from 10,112,500 pounds in 1868 to 2.7 million pounds by 1872.  By the Little War 
quantities exported were sharply reduced.  Historian Hugh Thomas thought that the 
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overthrow of coffee by sugar left “a discontented class of rural gentry” that viewed their 
ruination as caused “by sugar.”396  To him, those coffee growers who did not also have a 
stake in sugar properties formed a base of support for separatism in the Ten Years’ War.  In 
the case of Guantánamo, it seems that such a revolutionary propensity was formed during the 
1880s as sugar became a focus of economic organization, while coffee foundered after its 
destruction between separatist and integralist armies.  
Certainly this rural society proved to be susceptible to the entreaties of separatists 
when the war for independence began again in 1895. The mountainous zones appeared to be 
aligned against Spain to an extent greater than in the late 1860s.  Most of the rural colono 
workers at San Juan de Buenavista cited above expressed fear of Spanish soldiery in their 
depositions.  Some went over to the insurgency early, others did so later.  In cases such as 
Rizo’s, perhaps too old, or simply cautious, for the life in the manigua among the rebels, he 
limited his participation to bringing clothes and supplies to a friend in their ranks.  As will be 
seen, the changes in class structures, increased complexity of society, and subtle re-
configurations of racial constructs after abolition shaped the way the next separatist uprising 
developed within the district.397  
During the interwar years Guantánamo received an influx of population including 
migrants and relocated orientales; dispossessed families, libertos, and veterans of the 
fighting moved to the southeastern frontier to start over.398 Migrants and peasant colonists 
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tried to put the war behind them, but often harbored resentments towards Spain.  Displaced 
veterans uneasily re-assimilated into colonial society, but continued to evince pro-
independence political stances.  Guantánamo’s coat of arms still bore the device with the 
motto of “loyal ayuntamiento,” but groups such as these sustained ideals of a future republic, 
and laid the groundwork for the renewal of the revolution in 1895.399 
 
War of Independence 
 By 1894, fourteen years since the end of the Little War, and after the stagnation and 
depression of the 1880s followed by heady sugar boom years of the early nineties, came the 
crash.  Economic downturn in the United States spiraled into the production of commodities 
exported from Cuba, and jarring hardships.  The United States imposed new tariffs on sugar 
imports from the isle. Sugar plantation owners prepared for the harvesting and grinding 
season of 1895 with foreboding.  The timing was now opportune for Cuban insurrectionists, 
recently unified by José Martí’s Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) in New York, leavened by 
supporters within exile communities, cigar workers in Tampa, and separatists throughout 
Cuba, to re-initiate the long deferred uprising against Spanish control. 
 Necessary elements—strategic and tactical, logistic and political—had been 
elaborated since their often fitful, piecemeal introduction during the failed earlier 
rebellions.400 Cuban insurgents analyzed and studied past defeat.  Many of the problems had 
                                                
 
399 Pérez, “Vagrants, Beggars, and Bandits: Social Origins of Cuban Separatism, 1878-1895.”  
 
400 Tactical innovation in the new insurrection appeared slight. The exaction of payments and war taxes 
by the Liberation Army from planters had been undertaken earlier. See Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 1878-
1902, 126. The Spanish military archives contain evidence of cane fires during the Ten Years’ War, as has been 
seen, and also a ciphered telegram where, during the Little War, “José Maceo asks each ingenio that it will not 
be destroyed if twelve thousand cartridges and two hundred ounces [payments of specie or money]” would be 
given to the rebels. See Telegrama cifrado del Jefe 1a. Brigada del día 19 Enero 1880 desde Guantánamo, 
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been ignored, could not be readily overcome, or proved insuperable.  In some cases, an 
attitude became manifest that no longer would partisans of Cuba Libre altogether cater to 
immediate interests of large landowners and other powerful sectors in the execution of 
policy, and the prosecution of the war against the colonial metropolis.  The composition of 
elite sectors had undergone shifts during the intervening decade and a half.  To many rebel 
military leaders, demands of the struggle came before any other consideration.  Past defeat 
after sustained sacrifice in the face of total war in a colonial context had galled earlier Cuban 
separatists; the earlier failed efforts had radicalized some insurgents’ political attitudes.  
Somewhat as before, political ends of the future republic remained vague, social policy hazy 
and ill defined, but revolutionary means were legitimated for the struggle with greater clarity.    
The economic warfare strategy by veterans of the past wars conflicted with many 
civilian leaders of the new unified PRC embarking on a project of national liberation. In 
contrast with a movement toward the policies structured by reverses in the field, the 
articulation of attacking the economic base of the colony was explicit, direct, and immediate. 
The case for attacking the colonial economy directly and in pressing planters to provide 
essential resources to the anticolonial effort had been earlier advocated by Gómez and other 
leaders.  Their thoughts may be further inferred from an 1894 letter where Gómez wrote, 
“rich people will never enter the Revolution” instead, insurgent plotters “must force the 
situation – precipitate the events.”401 The rebels of the 1890s prepared for upcoming uprising 
against Spanish control informed by the earlier hard lessons of lack of internal unity, and 
being isolated for the most part to the eastern third of the island. By 1895 they had elaborated 
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plans to extend armed struggle throughout the island. Towards that end, a more flexible 
strategy against large property holdings in eastern Cuba had been developed, but it was 
ambiguous and ambivalent in many of its insurgent revenue generating dimensions. 
 The War of Independence began on 24 February 1895 with uprisings in Guantánamo, 
Baire, and other locales throughout the island.  As during the Ten Years’ War, Spanish 
colonial authorities and their local supporters concentrated in the west quashed the rebellion 
swiftly in Havana and Matanzas. Only in Oriente did the insurrection meet with significant 
popular support and avoid being suppressed by the internal social control mechanisms of the 
colonial state.  On orders from the PRC in New York, and a pre-arranged plan from Antonio 
Maceo and other leaders, Pedro Agustín Pérez and about one hundred other pro-
independence guantanameros read aloud the proclamation starting the revolt at the La 
Confianza estate near Guantánamo City, and then split up into various groups to begin 
operations.  The intent of the initial actions was to clear almost deserted, remote coast of 
Spanish troops so supply expeditions and principal insurgent leaders in exile, including José 
Martí and Gómez, could securely disembark and march inland.  
Pedro A. Pérez had defected to the separatist cause in the Little War after an earlier 
career as a member of the pro-Spanish Squadron of Santa Catalina during the Ten Years’ 
War along with many family members, including his notorious maroon-hunter uncle and 
godfather Miguel Pérez Céspedes.  Other Guantánamo insurgents in the initial uprising 
included Prudencio Martínez Hechavarría, a worker at the central Confluente near 
Guantánamo, Evaristo Lugo, a carpenter at the ingenio Monte Sano who fought in all three 
wars, and Enrique Thomas y Thomas, an administrator from Santa María sugar estate.402 
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Some planters and other members of the middle classes had separatist sympathies, often 
framed in light of inadequacies and frustrations with the prevailing colonial system.  
Members of this group included Frenchman Arturo Simón, an owner and manager at Santa 
Cecilia and Enrique Brooks, a stockholder in Brooks and Company and a cousin to Theodore 
Brooks who was one of the managers of the firm and a consular official for Great Britain.  
The initial cohort of nationalist insurgents had a varied local coalition of supporters 
across class lines poised to implement insurgent tactics from the earlier wars in flexible, 
nuanced fashion—even if other elements were anything but subtle—keeping strategic 
necessities of the anti-colonial movement in view.  The separatist network was far more 
rooted in popular support by the 1890s.  A hallmark of irregular and guerrilla warfare was the 
intimate knowledge of the local terrain by the insurgents. In the case of Guantánamo, 
insurrecto familiarity extended from the monte to the llano and into the cane fields and 
operations of sugar estates at every level.  It was no longer the case, as it had been in the Ten 
Years’ War that the rebels were largely from outside the district.  The planters too, had not 
been idle. They faced the prospect of rebellion with alarm, but were prepared to attempt a 
difficult process of preserving their estates by trying to play rebels off against Spanish 
authorities.   
Leaders of the new insurrection included both old members from the earlier 
independence effort and newer positivist, progressive, and romantic nationalist ideological 
currents from the time period.403  Poor blacks and whites, libertos and their descendants, 
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small holders, artisans, and proletarian communities in Florida and within Cuba, who often 
strongly identified with Cuban nationalist sentiments, formed the social base of Cuba Libre.  
Unlike the Ten Years’ War, which had emanated from “the top down, that is why it failed” 
the newer, more explicitly revolutionary movement “surge[d] from the bottom up, that is 
why it will triumph”  in the words of Gómez.404 
At the outset the conspirators had to initiate the uprising and mobilize the Liberation 
Army anew. The first operations attempted to secure safe base areas to operate in, seize 
stocks of weapons, and to prepare the way for exiled leaders such as Antonio and José Maceo 
and supply expeditions emanating from abroad to arrive. In Guantánamo, twelve conspirators 
led by Enrique Tudela captured a Spanish sentinel position, a blockhouse near the coast at 
Jatibonico, seizing six Mauser rifles from the guard detachment.405 Other separatist groups 
attacked Spanish posts within the region; Enrique Brooks’ unit fired on the Civil Guard 
barracks that supplemented the Squadron of Santa Catalina in internal social control 
functions against bandits and anti-colonial conspiracy.  
There had been desultory rebellions and political unrest alongside banditry since the 
Little War, but the 1895 uprising was organized differently and occurred at the start of the 
long sugar harvest.  In Guantánamo, the zafra cane cutting and grinding season typically 
began sometime in December or January, and finished up by May, so area planters caught by 
the timing of the uprising were particularly concerned to secure their valuable crop and finish 
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the season without undue complications.  Delays to the completion of the harvest occurred 
with the onset of martial law and increased Spanish military activity in response to the 
rebellion.   
Newspaper accounts initially disputed the effectiveness and extent of the revolt and 
its extent. Four days after it started, a New York Times article, citing sources in Cuba 
including pro-Spanish accounts, argued that “bands of insurgents” in Oriente had  
become thoroughly discouraged through lack of leaders” while the “entire 
island condemns the revolt and overwhelmingly approves the attitude of the 
Government. … rioters in Baire, Precinct of Santiago de Cuba, have signified, 
through their leader, Rubi [sic, Jesús Rabí], that they would like to arrange an 
interview … They profess a desire to discuss the reforms for which they took 
up arms as cover for a request for clemency.406  
 
By March, rebels farther west in Matanzas and Jagüey Grande surrendered, while 
autonomists who had formerly been rebels were importuned to discuss terms with those who 
had risen in arms. As for Guantánamo, the New York Times, quoting sources on the island, 
reported that 
Several members of Pedro Perez’s band have surrendered to the authorities. 
The officials of the district assert that the rebel force there numbers 180 men, 
who are poorly armed, and are unable to do much fighting, as their supply of 
ammunition is becoming low. 
It is presumed that they expect a fresh supply from abroad and 
warships are cruising along the coast in order to intercept any vessels that may 
bring ammunition for the rebels.407 
 
The imminent surrender of insurrectionists in western Oriente was anticipated. By March 13, 
a “dispatch from Guantanamo” reported that Pedro Pérez’ group had been dispersed, while 
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the Spanish authorities reported that they were confident of stamping out the revolt.408 They 
were mistaken. 
By April 1895 Antonio Maceo and a group of separatist leaders including Flor 
Crombet, many of them veterans of the Ten Years’ War, landed from a schooner at a beach 
in Duaba near Baracoa on the north coast. The small party narrowly eluded patrols of local 
militia, including “Indians from Yateras,” led by coffee planters and integralist veterans of 
the Ten Years’ War, in this case guerrilla leaders Pedro Garrido and Félix Lescaille.409 The 
militia from Guantánamo killed Flor Crombet during the pursuit. Also in early April, 
Guillermo Moncada, one of the main separatist conspirators, and the nemesis of Miguel 
Pérez during the Ten Years’ War, succumbed to tuberculosis while in the field with rebels 
under his command.  After a series of skirmishes and narrow evasions of Spanish and 
integralist troops, Antonio Maceo arrived in a relatively secure zone in the environs of 
Guantánamo.  News spread by word of mouth rapidly of the arrival of Maceo.   Although he 
had been in exile in Central America for many years after the first insurrection’s defeat, his 
sense of purpose, tenacity, and principled refusal to surrender at Baraguá in 1878 during the 
Ten Years' War without having secured either independence for Cuba or the immediate 
abolition of slavery had made him a larger than life figure to many Cubans—especially 
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1897, in AHPSC, GP, leg. 742, no. 39, año: 1897, materia: Guerra del 1895. 
 219 
among people of color.   Many guantanameros promptly downed tools and headed to the 
manigua and the insurrection since he had first risen to national prominence during the 
fighting there after 1871. Reunited with Pedro A. Pérez, Jesús Sablón Moreno Rabí, and 
other veterans of the past independence struggles, and daily receiving new recruits, Maceo 
began a swift campaign throughout the province designed to organize and prepare the mambí 
army to carry the war into western districts.  By devastating the west, it was thought, the 
Liberation Army might defeat the Spanish as quickly as possible. 
That same month, 11 April 1895, José Martí and Máximo Gómez landed on the far 
southeastern coast near the Punta de Maisí at Cajobabo to begin an arduous trek inland to 
reunite with separatists operating in the east. By the 24th they had contacted José Maceo in 
the hills above Guantánamo, and in early May, convened a meeting with Antonio Maceo and 
other rebel leaders.  By that time Martí would be dead, killed in a May 19 skirmish with a 
Spanish patrol near Dos Ríos between Santiago de Cuba and Bayamo.  With the death of 
Martí, who had organized and prepared the national liberation struggle more than any other 
figure, leadership of the PRC in New York fell to a U.S. citizen, Tomás Estrada Palma, while 
Gómez continued as commander-in-chief of the Liberation Army.  Gómez and his group 
entered Camagüey and began to organize additional Liberation Army groups while Maceo 
led continuous feints to draw off Spanish forces.  These mutually supportive operations came 
to characterize large-scale insurgent movements, especially during the western invasion.    
In some isolated regions of eastern Cuba, generalized support for the insurgent forces 
was such that José Grave de Peralta, Guantánamo City's mayor, “lamented that the few 
faithful subjects who remained dared not contradict such [pro-independence] assertions” 
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since pro-Spanish elements were completely isolated.410 Some guantanamero insurgents 
formed up with units in nearby Santiago de Cuba, while others followed the personal 
leadership of Maceo as a charismatic caudillo figure.  Still others remained in the district in 
two proto-regiments of the Liberation Army: some ex-integralist volunteers, including 
apparently, some Yateras Indians, signaled their break with Spain by adopting the name 
“Hatuey” after the sixteenth-century Taíno chief who chose to death at the stake at the hands 
of Spanish conquistadors rather than submit to conversion to their god.   A second was 
named “Pineda” after the local ex-bandit rebel Rustán, who had died in 1872 during the Ten 
Years' War.411  
By the end of April, Antonio Maceo and other insurgent commanders had set about 
organizing, recruiting, training, and equipping the First Corps of the Liberation Army in 
eastern Oriente, and a Second Corps in the west of the province.  Insurgent decrees forbade 
communication and commercial contact with the revolution's enemies and prohibited 
transport of cattle to towns or camps held by the Spanish.  At Arroyo Hondo, quite close to 
the ingenio Santa Cecilia and north of one of Los Caños’ sugar cane colonias, General José 
Maceo, the younger brother of Antonio who had nearly been killed back in the 1871 
invasion, and who had commanded rebels in the district during the Little War, together with 
approximately 200 mambí combatants ambushed and defeated a Spanish column of 600 
soldiers of the Simancas Battalion operating from the city of Guantánamo.  José Maceo also 
successfully supported Gómez and Martí's trek into Oriente after their landing on the coast, 
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and intercepted a valuable supply expedition.  Through May, rebels in Oriente began to 
prepare the army of invasion.  Military actions focused on improving the training, mobility 
and tactics of Liberation Army units, and as always, to obtain more weapons, horses, and 
equipment.   
 
Organizing the Army of Invasion 
Throughout the War of Independence, as in the past conflicts, there would always be 
far more potential combatants than available weapons.  Carlos “Guariche” Rodríguez who 
had been an overseer on Brooks and Company and Santiago Forbes MacKinley’s estates 
before becoming an insurgent officer, addressed the typical scarcity of arms among 
insurgents in 1904 testimony before the U.S. Spanish Treaty Claims Commission.  He 
recalled having fifty men under his command, but only “15 at most” were armed: some with 
“single and double barrel guns, and some Remingtons [Model 1871 breech-loading, single-
shot rifles]” and “[m]achetes yes, that goes without saying.”412 In a similar statement Colonel 
Enrique Tudela claimed that “[o]n few occasions half” of the combatants “were armed. 
Whenever we had arms we lacked ammunition. The best arms and the greater part of the 
ammunition were always at Calixto García's Headquarters [in 1896-1897] around Tunas [in 
northwestern Oriente].”413 The logistical problem of securing weapons and ammunition 
remained an urgent priority through the war.  Supplying the movement required weapons in 
greater quantity than could be seized from colonialist forces and cached in the countryside; 
                                                
412 Deposition of Carlos Rodríguez, pp. 2-4, 6-7, 11, Claim no. 120 (Sheldon); USNA, RG 76, Entry 
352.     
413 Deposition of Enrique Tudela, p. 5, Claim no. 120 (Sheldon), USNA, RG 76, Entry 352. See also 
Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, Briefs, 9: 39-40.  
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stocks of ammunition, rifles, and other ordinance formed a problem that was to be assuaged 
by arms purchases abroad using insurgent funds to be smuggled to the island.    
It was also in May 1895 when Antonio Maceo implemented a newly refined 
governmental function vital to securing improved supplies, weapons, and resources for the 
mambises.  Since the separatist military in the field required funds far beyond what could be 
gathered from contributions abroad and supporters in the field, remittances from planters 
would prove vital.  Taxes would be levied irrespective of political orientation or reluctance to 
support the insurgents’ nationalist goals.  As Cuban insurgents prepared to contest the 
colonial Spanish army amply supplied with modern weapons, furnished by a national 
treasury, supported by a large and influential constituency within Cuba itself, and typically 
manned by poor peasant conscripts, the leadership of both the Liberation Army and the PRC 
in exile imposed taxes on property owners.  In Guantánamo, insurgents taxed coffee farms in 
the monte and the growing sugar estates of the llano. 
 Faced with the scarcity of weapons, paucity of resources, and the military need to 
extend the revolution clear across the island because it had failed in the west, Antonio Maceo 
demanded support from eastern Cuba’s property owners.  He circulated a communiqué 
indicating that planters were subject to war taxes and liable to provide supplies to the 
insurrection.  Unlike later decrees, Maceo’s initial circular implied that production could 
continue, provided a proportion of the proceeds went to the Liberation Army. Some planters, 
including those sympathetic to the rebellion, but also others hedging their bets between the 
Spaniards and the Cuban forces, convened several secret meetings to discuss the implications 
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of Maceo's order.414 As some employees and acquaintances of landowners had already gone 
over to the rebellion, all that was needed to establish communication was a trustworthy 
intermediary known to all parties.   
  A group of planters, including apparently, sugar colono Miguel Labarraque, Arturo 
Simón (Santa Cecilia), Felix Begué (Bella-Vista coffee farm), Eugenio Redor (San Antonio), 
Fernando Pons (Santa María sugar mill and the Grignon and San Fernando coffee estates) 
and Santiago F. MacKinley (Romelié) found Emilio Lateulade as the go-between.415 Emilio 
Lateulade, a Ten Years’ War veteran, and familiar with many of the regional sugar planters, 
served as the local financial delegate of the insurgent treasury with the mission to “collect at 
all hazards” the taxes demanded by the revolution. His profession had earlier been a 
mechanic at both local coffee estates and a sugar boiler in the mills.416 Skilled workers in the 
agricultural exports of the region commanded some of the highest salaries in the district, 
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which made him a relatively privileged person. The start of the war found him installing 
machinery at a coffee finca.417 During the insurrection, because of his acquaintance with the 
sugar industry and coffee growers, he could facilitate gathering war taxes to benefit the 
Cuban Liberation Army while recognizing tensions and obstacles planters faced.     
In late May, Maceo confirmed Lateulade in the position of district delegate to collect 
taxes.  Maceo had operated throughout southeastern Cuba seventeen years before, and knew 
it well.  His proposal was to secure it as a base area for the army of invasion being readied to 
carry the war across the largest fortification erected by Spain in the Americas: the military 
trocha dividing the island in half at the narrows between Ciego de Ávila, Morón, and Jucaro.  
During the war, operating between the civilian insurgent authority, the mambí army, and the 
planters, Lateulade kept well away from large concentrations of enemy and allied troops with 
an armed escort of five or six men.  Sums were paid to him directly, or through the PRC 
leadership abroad.  Maceo had already made other Guantánamo district planters aware of 
insurgent taxation directly. 
On 13 May 1895, Cuban insurgents took Ernest Brooks, the English manager of the 
Soledad sugar plantation northeast of Guantánamo, before General Maceo.  During this phase 
of insurgent activity in Oriente province, a battle involving 400 Spanish troops occurred at 
Jobito astride the road between Tiguabos and Guantánamo quite close to the ingenios San 
Idelfonso and the Brooks and Company-owned Soledad.418  Ernest Brooks and others from 
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the plantation rode into the cane fields to see what the insurrection portended for their sugar 
harvest still underway due to delays.419 His answer came from the top.  Antonio Maceo 
needed funds, weapons, and equipment for Cubans joining the insurgency.  Maceo told 
Ernest Brooks and other area sugar planters and coffee growers that they could continue to 
grind and collect the year's harvest, provided they contributed taxes on its total value, 
including five cents per bag of refined sugar.  If the tax was not paid, or through other actions 
there was evidence of alliance with the Spanish, there would be reprisals, including the 
burning of fields and the destruction of buildings.    
 Guantánamo planters were by no means the only ones subject to insurgent taxation.  
Similar arrangements were made throughout Oriente province, the heartland of the rebellion.  
In Guantánamo, the demands led to negotiations with the planters until the invasion of the 
west in October of 1895, whereupon insurgent policy shifted to completely disallowing sugar 
grinding and other production, and levying taxes on the physical plant and buildings of area 
estates.  It was this policy of impeding production, enforcing payment of war taxes and 
forced loans to the movement, that came to characterize insurgent attitudes toward the sugar 
sector and foreign owners in the Guantánamo district.  
There were now two power centers vying for allegiance.  The colonial state would 
redouble its efforts, and, much as it did in the Ten Years’ War, would use its resources to 
recruit additional local forces to reinforce troops sent from Iberia.420  Social control would be 
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420 Fighting at Sao del Indio, campaign reports, unit histories, casualty lists, recommendations for 
promotions compiled by month, year, and province without an index appear in “Operaciones de Campaña—
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primarily a military counterinsurgency policy for the duration of the war.  On the other hand, 
the separatist polity would assert its rights to coerce demands from the population as though 
it were a constituted, established, and sovereign nation state.  Upon forming a provisional 
government and civilian structure nominally in charge of the insurgent military and rebel-
held prefectures, a Treasury Department that included delegates for each district took over 
the bulk of revenue collection activities.421  Funds were obtained through contributions within 
Cuba and those made abroad to the PRC, via taxes on the total worth of property, and later 
through a forced war loan at six percent annual interest until the Republic of Cuba was 
constituted.  The amount of the loan was reckoned at some 2 percent of property value.422 As 
with Céspedes’ attempts to convene an orderly and graduated abolition, the situation on the 
ground would soon render problematic the extension of a dual authority replete with the 
power to tax. 
 The Spanish military tried to shut the insurgents out of each plantation and town, and 
attempted to interdict support and supplies from reaching the rebellion.  Much as they had in 
the Ten Years’ War, an architecture of social control and the surveillance and management of 
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space was contrived by trying to fortify important sites: in most cases, a blockhouse was 
erected at each valuable estate giving visible manifestation of defending the prevailing social 
relations.  In time, the Spanish forces and local militia compelled the abandonment of some 
estates, while most others had large defensive works erected.  In the case of La Esperanza 
sugar mill owned by José Baró just north of Guantánamo City, where Chinese estate workers 
had rebelled before the Ten Years’ War and later slaves had struck for their autonomy and 
some measure of control over their labor, seven stone blockhouses from the first insurrection 
were refurbished.   
As the harvest and grinding of sugar was completed, the batey of each sugar mill was 
ringed with barbed wire and blockhouses around the outskirts.  Structures outside the 
perimeter were demolished, clearing fields of fire.  The blockhouses typically were situated 
on rising ground or built atop an earthen mound, with a lower story of masonry or heavy 
timber filled with gravel or rammed earth, and each had an upper story with a roof-top 
parapet for a sentry.  Between five to seven blockhouses were typically erected on a given 
estate, with a squad of seven to ten soldiers posted in each.423 At Los Caños, surrounded by 
flat terrain far from the rising ring of hills surrounding the valley, only four surrounded the 
sugarhouse and factory buildings along a rough square 300 meters to a side.  The scale house 
was converted into one of these bastions, while a fifth, smaller post guarded the shipping pier 
on the shores of the broad bay at the end of the mill’s railway track.424  
As in the past conflicts, taxation was supplemented by direct expropriation and by 
supporters diverting goods to the rebellion.  In a 29 September 1895 proclamation, the mayor 
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of Guantánamo restricted sales of clothing, provisions, and even salt—of which the district 
had plenty given the sea salt works at Caimanera—in order to deny material aid to the 
insurgency.425 In at least some cases estate managers provided the Spanish military with lists 
of the inhabitants so population movements could be controlled and quantities of food 
measured out to ensure that it was not being diverted to insurgents.426 No longer could 
recruits go off to join the insurrection as readily as they had in May, when they requisitioned 
horses and mules at Soledad, helping themselves to supplies in the canteen, and committing 
other depredations against plantations.427  
With the tightening of martial law, restrictions, and regulations, insurgents pressed 
their demands for funds from prosperous landowners.  In the case of the Brookses, they 
responded by attempting to secure protection from the Spanish authorities, calculating that 
the Spanish military was stronger than the rebels, and to reduce the amount of their 
assessments by going over the heads of the insurgents in the field by appeals and negotiations 
with the PRC in New York.  Antonio Maceo received a letter from PRC head Tomás Estrada 
Palma in September 1895 regarding payments made for the Brookses’ properties in 
Guantánamo: 
  Mr. Alfa [Paul Brooks] has received a letter from his partner there in  
which he is assured that you threaten to destroy his properties if he does not 
deliver a considerable sum which he considers impossible. He has promised to 
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contribute around $2,500 annually for each of his sugar mills; that this is as 
much as he can pay, that he, in different ways, has aided the cause from the 
start, that he is putting into play here his influence with members of the 
Congress and with prominent people all this he claims he is doing in an effort 
to aid our cause [sic]. He is of the opinion that the destruction of properties 
must produce a bad effect on the outside without in any way benefiting the 
patriots.428 
 
The promised payments of $2,500 a year for the four Guantánamo area estates, the colonia of 
Santa Cecilia north of Los Caños and the railroad line connecting Caimanera with 
Guantánamo, Soledad, and Jamaica subjected the Brooks & Co. to pay a total of $15,000.429 
 In October 1895, José Maceo wrote “Citizen Secretary of Hacienda,” Severo Pina, the 
criteria for levying taxes on sugar mills while carrying out decrees of a programmatic 
campaign of economic sabotage. He had to honor the most recent orders of Gómez to halt 
economic activity that might benefit Spain in some way, but also secure support for the 
invading columns heading into the west commanded by his older brother to carry out the 
destruction of the island’s economic core.  As a result, the ability of the Liberation Army to 
carry out its threats had to be demonstrated, while at the same time, payments had to be 
assured.  Communications between the field and the PRC offices in New York ensured that 
there was considerable room for planters such as the Brookses to try to minimize or evade 
payment of all the sums.   
A report from José Maceo on the imposed contributions from estate owners in the 
region of operations of the First Division of the First Corps of the Liberation Army listed the 
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names of fincas, the name of owners, the amount paid to insurgent coffers, and the amount 
due.430 A “verified” amount of 45,000 pesos from seven Guantánamo sugar mills from their 
“representative” code-named “A.l.f.a.”—Paul Brooks—was the first item, followed by a 
detailed list of fincas large and small.431  The figure $60,440.15 was assessed, with $46,294 
in arrears for 282 owners of a variety of estates, coffee farms, ranches, and the seven sugar 
ingenios.432  
Eventually General José Maceo implemented the threatened property destruction 
against obstinate planters while his brother led the “army of invasion” into the west with 
Gómez.  Antonio Maceo had written a letter to Brooks and Company demanding their 
“transaction” be carried out or retaliatory measures would follow “in the manner which I 
made known to you [Ernest and Paul Brooks] . . . if you do not decide to preserve your 
interest by the help of the Revolution which I direct in this Department.”433 José Maceo 
reiterated the demands, and insurgents demonstrated their capability for sabotage against the 
railway, forcing the Spanish to build a line of blockhouses every half-mile along its entire 
length, and to principally rely on large convoys to supply their garrisons.   
 As Maceo and Gómez’s insurgent columns crossed into the western provinces and 
fighting spread to all parts of the island, Liberation Army units remaining behind sought to 
harass as many Spanish troops as possible to force them into physically occupying and 
defending towns and estates.  The mambí troops remaining launched their own offensive 
aimed at those local planters who directly or tacitly supported the Spanish.  The 
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noncompliance of Brooks and Company caused the insurgents to target their estates just as 
Theodore Brooks arrived from Santiago de Cuba to replace his American uncle Paul as the 
director of the company's Guantánamo operations in November.   
 
Guantánamo Between Two Fires 
The night of 18 December 1895, three days after Antonio Maceo and Gómez 
destroyed a Spanish column at Mal Tiempo in Santa Clara north of Cienfuegos during their 
invasion of the west, while a ball was being held at the Spanish Club of Guantánamo in 
honor of a visit by the commander of Spanish forces in eastern Cuba, officers and local elites, 
along with many town residents, saw the sky lit up by a distant cane fire.434 The conflagration 
emanated from the cane fields of the Los Caños and other sugar mills in the region, including 
some owned by the Brooks and Company, the “leading sugar planters as well as leading 
bankers of Eastern Cuba.”435 During the day the wind shifted direction, strewing burned 
cane-straw, ash, and soot on the town “like a snow storm with black snow instead of 
white.”436 Just two days earlier, a North American newspaper had reported, “In Guantanamo, 
in the heart of Eastern Cuba, grinding will commence in a few days. Confidence is returning, 
and if present indications hold, Cuba will make a full crop. It must be made if her economic 
balance is to be maintained.”437 The centrality of sugar to the island economy made it the 
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target of the rebellion.  The arson of cane fields was visible manifestation of an economic 
balancing act of a different sort. 
Theodore Brooks, the manager of the Brooks-built railway and vice-consul of Great 
Britain, knew the fire portended retaliation by Cuban insurgents who had demanded prompt 
payment of the considerable war taxes levied against the firm. The “full amount asked for by 
them [the Liberation Army] was never paid, and it was on this account … burning of the cane 
fields began.”438 Then too, his nephew who had joined the rebels from the outset, Enrique 
Brooks, had told his superiors “that his Uncles were Spaniards at heart.”439 
If the Cuban Liberation Army assailed the Brookses as foreign capitalists beholden to 
Spain, the Spanish military penalized the family-owned firm for making contributions to the 
Cuban separatists. A month earlier, another member of Brooks and Company who served as 
consul of China, Robert Mason, had called on a Spanish general on behalf of an arrested 
manager of the Guantánamo Railroad foundry.  Interrupting the general’s breakfast, “as 
Mason entered the room the General began to insult him, and also the Messrs. Brooks, 
accusing them of helping the revolution with money.”440 Mason had had to leave without 
resolving the case.   
The British Consul for the nearby capital of the eastern province Santiago de Cuba, 
Frederick Ramsden, another “managing partner of the firm of Brooks & Co.” also 
experienced difficulties with the same general.  It had been at his orders the Spanish had 
drafted many of the plantation laborers remaining after others had “taken to the woods” and 
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joined the insurrection, as well as because of the “tribute” the company paid: “Gen. Canellas 
… had evidently not forgotten that the Captain of Maceo’s sharpshooters, Henry Brooks, was 
at one time a member of the firm, and one of the first men of the island to take up arms in the 
present struggle.” Undeterred, Consul Mason pleaded for another arrested Brooks railroad 
employee, an Englishman who had  
lived many years in China, and, according to Mr. Mason, lost his right to 
claim British protection by his acceptance of a commission in the Chinese 
Corps of Imperial Engineers for the building of a railroad in North China. Mr. 
Mason’s efforts, however, were unavailing, as the Spanish commandant 
quoted an old treaty between Spain, Holland, and China to the effect that no 
Chinamen outside of the territory of the Celestial Empire without a pigtail 
should be entitled to the protection of Chinese Consuls.441 
 
The Brooks and Company, and indeed, all of Guantánamo, found themselves between two 
fires: the insurgent movement prepared to exact retribution for failing to heed their 
pronouncements, and a Spanish military that would retaliate if one did.  As with their 
entreaties to Spanish officials, the Brooks and Company managers addressed the insurgents 
to ameliorate the situation faced by their sugar mills caught between the contending armies 
 In February 1896, two months after the December fire, and after additional cane fires 
in January, Lateulade wrote General José Maceo requesting an urgent interview concerning 
the sugar mills in Guantánamo.442 “The landowners do not comprehend how it is that I am 
carrying quantities of money” his missive began “when the General of the Brigade orders 
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that all their cane fields be destroyed.”443 He desired to know whether to continue collecting 
taxes “in order not to receive the reproaches of the landowners” hurled at him during 
meetings with them, especially in view that they had made arrangements with the 
Revolutionary Junta in New York. The Brookses had written to the PRC in New York, while 
Soledad, Isabel, and Romelié had paid $7,500: “I have collected $34,000 until today.” Before 
the letter abruptly ended without a closing, he added, “I have $10,000 in my power; what 
should I do with the sum, to whom do I send it?”444 
  
Cuba Libre vs. Cuba Española, 1895-1898 
In the unequal contest between the cumbersome but numerous Spanish military 
forces, leavened by “as many Cubans as” the Liberation Army had in its ranks but “who were 
Guerrillas [pro-Spanish militia]” dedicated to enforcing social control and upholding the state 
within the colony, the insurgents not only a tried to avoid being captured or killed, but 
generally halted production through enforcement of no-grind orders, sabotaged estates, and 
levied a war tax against often recalcitrant regional planters.445 As in past conflicts, the 
Spanish and their militia allies targeted a suspect population that supported an irregular 
opponent either willingly or through compulsion, and an elusive, highly mobile foe; the 
Liberation Army could often select the timing, nature, and location of confrontation with an 
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enemy increasingly confined to fixed garrisons and patrolling areas of civil population under 
their direct supervision.   
As the war progressed and its grim tempo of raids, reprisals, and the burning of towns 
and estates accelerated and intensified, initiative slipped from the grasp of the Spanish 
military. The insurgents, often derided in contemporary accounts for their ragged condition, 
paltry weapons, and maddening refusal to join battle with the vastly superior Spanish could 
quite often employ greater economy of force.  The incendiary's torch again became an iconic 
weapon to insurgents and a scornful emblem of rebel perfidy and vandalism to many, 
including the enemy colonialist army.      
Sugar cane fields were often burned over with a controlled fire at harvest time to 
remove undergrowth and excess vegetation prior to cutting, stacking, and hauling the stalks.  
But fire was more frequently an enemy—too much heat, and the ample sucrose content 
ensured a hotter and longer fire that could char the cane rendering it useless for grinding.446  
Since fire posed such a threat to the sugar harvest, planters and sugar workers meticulously 
prepared and drilled fire prevention plans.  Firebreaks at least 10 yards wide separated cane 
fields to permit ox carts to haul cane to train collection points at harvest time, but also to 
minimize and contain wild fires.  Work regimens included strict prohibitions on smoking 
while in the fields.  A rather breathless description of fighting cane fires from Matanzas, 
written in the early 1870s by a post-Civil War Louisiana sugar planter's wife who also 
weathered the terrible hurricane of 1871, demonstrated responses to the fire hazard faced by 
sugar ingenios: 
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  The first shout of “Fuego!” and a loud peal of the bell, started everyone to  
his feet. Several horses were kept saddled, and others hitched under the sugar-
house shed, for such emergency. So well did they know the signal of the bell 
at an unusual hour, that with the first taps they were frantic to start, and, if a 
rider did not immediately appear, sometimes broke loose and ran at the top of 
their speed in the direction of the fire. [. . .] I snatched the key from its hook 
and hurried to unlock the store-room where Ciriaco [the Chinese cook] and 
Martha [an African American house worker] stood ready, each side of the 
door, to distribute machetes (cane-knives) – always kept in reserve for such an 
emergency – to the men who were at work about the sugar house. Those first 
ready mounted the tethered horses, sometimes two or three on one animal, and 
were off like the wind. It was an unwritten law that a fire-alarm must 
command an immediate response from laborers, white and black, on every 
plantation in sound of the bell. [. . .] Steam is shut off, fires hastily raked from 
under the sugar kettles, and all work at the sugar house abandoned. Every 
hand that could wield a machete sped to the fiery fields, only a few white 
employés remaining in the vicinity of the buildings.447 
 
Insurgents from peasant and sugar work backgrounds knew first-hand the susceptibility of 
cane fields to fire, and with many men mobilized into the ranks of either the insurgent army 
or in Spanish militias, there would be fewer workers on hand to effectively combat the blaze.  
Spanish troops could not risk leaving their posts to fight the flames, lest the fire had been set 
as a ruse designed to draw them into ambush.  
Insurgents often sabotaged production by removing cattle essential for haulage and by 
burning crops.  Many rebels served far away from their home areas; others remained 
relatively close by estates that they had worked on or were familiar with.  Examples of the 
cross-class composition of the Liberation Army may be seen in the depositions in the 
property destruction case of Los Caños sugar mill brought before the Spanish Treaty Claims 
Commission in the early twentieth century.  Enrique Brooks kept insurgent leaders apprised 
of his “pro-Spanish” uncles managing the Brooks and Company; Lateulade had worked at 
Isabel and various other estates; Carlos Rodríguez, a former overseer, led the operations that 
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burned the cane fields there; Agustín Charon, supervisor of the Las Lajas colonia, eventually 
joined the insurrection where he operated in Holguín, but also returned to Guantánamo to 
forcibly remove cattle from the estate.448  
From late 1895 through early 1896, repeated fires destroyed much of the sugar cane 
at the Los Caños estate. Other blazes were set during the same period at Isabel, Romelié, San 
Antonio de Redor, San Carlos, Santa Cecilia, Soledad, Esperanza, and at various colonias.449 
The conflagrations were frequently timed with shifting high winds to maximize 
destructiveness.  At night, the remaining workers were locked inside the gates of the 
militarized ingenios, thereby unable to combat the cane fire outside the batey and the forts.  
Later deliberate fires were set to destroy patches of unburned cane, and to further scorch and 
char stalks that, while damaged, could have been ground.  Even in cases where cane was 
salvageable, the fire could disrupt the organization of labor for the harvest season.  Years 
later, Theodore Brooks recalled that the torch came because the “full amount asked for by 
them [the Cuban insurgents] was never paid, and it was on this account . . . burning of the 
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cane fields began.”450 Tomás Padró Griñán, part of José Maceo's general staff, similarly 
recalled from his perspective that Brooks and Company “resisted a great deal and we had to 
threaten them with the destruction of some of their property in order to make them pay 
up.”451  
Understandably, Theodore Brooks complained to authorities about the lack of 
protection afforded the valuable crop, fuming at the inability of the Spanish to guarantee any 
meaningful security despite the quartering of troops in the blockhouses.  Privately, a Spanish 
officer sounded out Brooks about whether he had made arrangements to pay the insurgents, 
expressing that “the sooner” done, “the better.” Other officers told Brooks to make the 
demanded outlay since the detachments in the blockhouses were a static guard, under orders 
to not pursue raiders, “but to pay as little as possible.”452 In 1896 agents for Brooks and 
Company made payments to armed insurgents in the field such as Guantánamo Brigade 
commander Pérez and via the PRC in New York.  
In 1896, Cuban forces operating in the district mostly halted grinding at sugar mills 
that were not immediately controlled or in close proximity to Spanish garrisons at 
Guantánamo and the town of Jamaica to which it was connected by rail.  Spanish patrols and 
local militia vainly searched for insurgents.  In a reprise of the wars sixteen years before, 
sometimes they located and destroyed rebel prefectures.  Frequently the opposing forces 
vented their frustration on suspect civilians.  The contending parties burned farms to deny 
them to the opposing side.  A cycle of public violence, reprisals, and retribution accelerated.  
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Once again, more exposed small holders and coffee farms frequently faced the brunt of 
military actions.   
The example of mambises overwhelming small, isolated garrisons acutely concerned 
planters who had rebuffed insurgent demands.  In 1896 Theodore Brooks visited an 
acquaintance's ruined property: 
 In the same way there were villages which were surrounded by four  
block houses with the same number of men that we had on [Los Caños], that 
were destroyed. And in the mountains adjoining here every coffee estate 
which did not pay tribute to the insurgents had its buildings destroyed. Some 
of them had no troops on them, but one adjoining the village Felicidad . . . had 
a garrison and four block houses similar to the ones on our estates. That coffee 
estate and the adjoining village were burned down. Another coffee estate near 
here called the Cubana and belonging to Garrido the Commander of the 
Spanish irregular forces in this district [the Escuadras de Santa Catalina], was 
defended by spanish [sic] troops in its block houses, and its buildings were 
also destroyed, the troops being in the block houses at the time.453 
 
While the insurgents doubtlessly lacked the capability to overwhelm larger Spanish forces, or 
to threaten directly more heavily defended estates, they could increasingly wage war on their 
own terms, evading Spanish patrols while probing for weaknesses.  Both sides despoiled the 
countryside.  Destroying the coffee farms of pro-Spanish leaders such as Pedro Garrido and 
Félix Lescaille and those of planters refusing payments arose as a means of targeting those 
considered enemies of the revolution or out of retaliatory motives for attacks on the property 
of insurgent supporters.454 A thick list of burned fincas compiled in February 1898, on the 
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eve of U.S. entrance into the war, showed a staggering 262 destroyed properties for 
Guantánamo, without including data from the northern coast.  Among them were those 
owned by eighteen Frenchmen, one British subject (Santiago MacKinley), and 243 
Spaniards—each with a number of workers thereby bereft of employment—all torched by the 
insurrectos alone.455 As in the Ten Years’ War, the conflict swiftly devastated rural districts.   
Seemingly unlike in the past wars, insurgents collected far greater sums of taxes from 
property owners fearful of seeing their valuable estates suffer a similar fate.  The Spanish 
military frequently intercepted communications regarding payments, so they were well 
apprised of these arrangements.  Elaborate security precautions for sending messages 
developed. Theodore Brooks received letters from “a negro boy, sometimes, by an old 
woman, generally by someone perfectly unknown” to him.456 Over the course of the war, 
finance delegate Lateulade collected sums from many landowners, although the amounts 
received in Guantánamo or abroad were never as great as those levied.  Lateulade 
increasingly assessed the planters for the payment of regular sums on the physical buildings 
and equipment of estates, while simultaneously enforcing the no-grind decrees emanating 
from headquarters.457 In the case of Los Caños, the amount charged increased to $8,000 in 
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late 1896; the amount went up to $10,000 by early 1897. A Liberation Army expropriation 
decree of 4 July 1896 backed up the financial delegate's demands: 
 All lands acquired by the Cuban Republic either by conquest or  
confiscation, except what is employed for governmental purposes, shall be 
divided among the defenders of the Cuban Republic against Spain, and each 
shall receive a portion corresponding to the services rendered. . . . All lands, 
money, or property in any an all forms previously belonging to Spain, to its 
allies, abettors, or sympathizers, or to any person or corporation acting in the 
interest of Spain or in any manner disloyal to the Cuban Republic are hereby 
confiscated, for the benefit of the Cuban Army and of all the defenders of the 
Cuban Republic.458 
 
Lateulade mentioned similar decrees and issued threats of more immediate destruction in 
letters sent out regarding nonpayment.  Delegate Lateulade’s own book, published in 1930, 
detailed the total loans, taxes, and other monies collected at $341,817.12 from the 
Guantánamo district.  He stressed that collection had been made possible through 
considerable negotiating skill, and a measure of voluntarism from planters, although only a 
few years after the war he claimed that tax payers and donors “paid because the revolution so 
demanded it, under the penalty of having their property destroyed.”459  
Destruction both wanton and deliberate escalated as the war progressed while owners 
attempted to reduce required outlays demanded from both the Spanish and Cubans.  Brooks 
and Company ultimately contributed $12,375 under duress to the insurgent state-in-formation 
for the Los Caños sugar central alone.  After the cane fires the company petitioned the 
Spanish for exemption from taxes given the inability to grind and the straitened 
circumstances of the firm, indicative of the effectiveness of the rebel policy of economic 
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warfare.460 North American property owners reacted with indignation to the losses.  In an 
1897 magazine article, “The Wanton Destruction of American Property in Cuba,” Fernando 
Yznaga wrote that coverage of the “story of Cuba, as reported by the press, is a conflicting 
statement of glorious victories claimed by both parties” in which “while other points remain 
in doubt, authenticity of the accounts of the burning of plantations and farms has been 
established beyond question.” 
Many provinces of the island have been absolutely wasted; and the 
work of destruction is energetically going on. It has even been announced, as 
a grand exhibition of patriotism, that the insurgents will sacrifice everything 
rather than have the Spaniards succeed, and will leave them a heap of ashes as 
the prize of victory. […] From the proximity of Cuba, and the fact that we are 
by far the greatest consumers of its products, American capital has been one 
of the greatest factors in [Cuban] development. Many plantations belong to 
Americans; and debts, created by advances to make the sugar crops, have 
made them the owners of a still greater number. It is Americans who, in the 
majority of cases, are really the victims. 
 
The writer then turned to the cruelty of total warfare itself within an agrarian society: 
 
But there is a still more serious result. Engaged in the insurgent army 
there are perhaps 50,000 men. Of the remaining million and a half of 
inhabitants, nothing is told. Of their misery, of their poverty, of their actual 
starvation, no mention is made. […] the real sufferers are the very great 
number of the inhabitants who must remain at home, unoccupied, helpless, 
and called upon to face the slow misery of starvation.461 
 
His indignation turned on rebel actions and their effects on the vulnerable civilian populace, 
and the inadequate preparation the movement seemed to have given to form a government 
capable of addressing the problems of the island.  His ire then returned to an oft-repeated 
prognosis that the salient black population would inhibit the island’s viability as an 
independent state.  Could there be, he posed, “any possibility of such a government growing 
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from this foundation of destruction and desolation?”  To him, and members of his readership, 
the “Latin races in this continent have shown a distinct incapacity for self-government. The 
history of the several republics that have succeeded Spanish rule has been one of constant 
revolutions and disorders, with interludes of despotism.”  But: 
In Cuba the difficulties would be even greater, owing to the presence 
of the large negro element. The danger of this domination has always been felt 
by the white leaders in the insurrection. It was one of the causes that brought 
to an end the previous revolution. Should the Spanish inhabitants of the island 
emigrate,—as many of them undoubtedly would, should the insurgents 
succeed,—the two races would be nearly equal in number. The Cuban negro is 
a much later importation and is therefore much less civilized than his brother 
in this country. Many of them came from warlike tribes. The mulatto element 
is intelligent and ambitious. For years a negro republic, to include Cuba, St. 
Domingo, and Jamaica, the so-called Republic of the Antilles, has been 
spoken of. Without a great preponderance, it would be impossible for the 
whites to control this element. The same favorable conditions—the warm 
climate, the impenetrable forests, the abundance of food,—that favor the 
present uprising would render the suppression of revolt and the maintenance 
of order difficult if not impossible. From all indications, the future of the 
island under a native government would be even less favorable to our interests 
than under the present one. 462 
 
The author urged that only “annexation to the United States” could ameliorate the situation, 
indeed, the island would open a “vast field for American enterprise and capital” and could 
“easily produce not only all the sugar we consume but, in a few years, all the coffee” in 
keeping with consul Reimer’s pre-war appraisal of southeastern Cuba.    
If American sentiment was divided over aiding a kindred liberal republican 
movement proposing to eject Spanish sovereignty from the island versus concern over the 
damage the struggle incurred to U.S. interests, for their part insurgent officers, notably 
Gómez, resented the payments of taxes and protection money, seeing in them a potential 
source of corruption reminiscent of the currying of planter favor that had interfered with the 
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prosecution of the earlier wars.  In correspondence between the commander-in-chief and 
Tomás Estrada Palma, Gómez once wrote that he “value[d] much the Cuban blood that is 
being shed because of sugar, and if the amount is not collected soon, the torch will adjust it 
all.”463  
Gómez’ intransigent and uncompromising attitude toward privileged sectors hardened 
during his experiences in western Cuba.  To him, as before in the Ten Years’ War, the 
property destruction strategy came to include both a means and an end.  Fighting in Las 
Villas in the west in 1897, he expressed his rationale in a letter as including an explicit 
leveling and redistributive purpose beyond his declaration about the invasion of Guantánamo 
back in 1871: 
When I put my hand on the suffering heart of the working people, and I felt it 
wounded with grief; when I touched, next to all that opulence, around all that 
astounding wealth, such misery and such moral poverty; when I saw all this in 
the house of the tenant, and found him brutalized by the cheating he endures, 
with his wife and children dressed in rags, living in a wretched hut erected on 
another’s land, when I asked about schools and was told that there had never 
been any … then I felt enraged and profoundly disposed against the upper 
classes of the country, and in a moment of fury at the sight of such utterly 
melancholy and painful inequality, I cried out: ‘Blessed be the torch.’464 
 
Other leaders were concerned, in a fashion similar to Yznaga’s magazine article, with 
looming issues of post-war recovery and the awesome destruction caused by rebel strategy 
and Spanish countermeasures.  Given the absolute devastation and wholesale ruination 
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threatened by the nature of the war, the separatist gambit to bankrupt Spain and its local 
allies into quitting the island doubtlessly seemed mad, indiscriminate, and even suicidal.  
Generally, insurgents in Cuba relied on their own efforts to oust the Spanish army and eject 
colonial rule while exiled leaders hoped to influence foreign governments into recognizing 
Cuban belligerency.  
Mambises on the island appeared to think that only a greater supply of weapons and 
ammunition was required to expand the Liberation Army’s ranks from among the 
unemployed, and with it, broaden the struggle.  Exiles in the United States, however, found it 
difficult to counter anti-insurgent propaganda that portrayed them as wanton arsonists and 
saboteurs willfully wrecking valuable properties and setting the stage for permanent wrack 
and ruin.  In a letter to insurgent commander Calixto García in 1896, PRC head Estrada 
Palma wrote of the advantages, as he saw them, to ongoing negotiation and the collection of 
taxes: 
On the one hand, this sum of taxes paid right now will effectively aid the swift 
triumph of our arms; on the other hand, we will save from destruction many 
millions in properties that will immediately serve after the triumph, as the 
pacific occupation of the immense majority of our soldiers.465 
   
Oriente province in general, and Guantánamo particularly, demonstrated that the collection 
of funds figured as an attempt to support the all-important war effort in the west.  The PRC 
purchased quantities of munitions abroad, sometimes only to be interdicted by the U.S. 
Treasury as violating the Neutrality Act, or impounded after Spanish agents alerted foreign 
authorities to the war-making cargo of supply ships.  As conditions in Cuba grew ever more 
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desperate, the total eradication of the island’s exports became increasingly imperative to the 
rebels. 
 The campaign against property produced several other effects, as was intended.  
Sometimes civilians remaining in plantation towns subject to Spanish occupation, or in 
pitiable condition on idled or wrecked estates, joined the insurgency directly, fleeing to 
prefectures hidden in remote, inaccessible areas to harvest food crops for themselves and the 
Cuban forces.  As in the Ten Years’ War, this precarious and often dangerous existence 
reinforced insurgents with food, staff for impromptu hospitals, new recruits, and some 
makeshift manufactures such as cartridge belts, hats, and weapon repairs.  Inhabitants of 
these prefectures carefully kept lookout for roving Spanish patrols, prepared to scatter further 
into the woods when danger threatened under the protection and control of rural guardians.  
Living in hastily constructed huts, usually for only one harvest season, such male and female 
pacíficos were often compelled to move to ever more remote locations.  As before, men, 
women, and children in these prefectures formed the impedimenta of the Liberation Army, 
frequently following an armed band to perform guard functions, cook, forage, run errands, 
and deliver messages.  Recent arrivals, internal refugees, convalescing soldiers, and cattle 
herders driving requisitioned oxen, mules, and horses also temporarily populated these 
insurgent held zones.   
Eventually, the Spanish military embarked on a counterinsurgency strategy designed 
to separate the civilians supporting the rebels from combatants.  They began enforcing 
population removal—the campaign known as reconcentración—in the district by late 1896 
and early 1897, driving the rural population into towns, cities, and sugar mills under their 
control and systematically burning homes and farms outside the perimeter, Cubans were 
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often forced to decide between the two extreme environments: that of an impoverished Cuba 
Libre in the prefectures hidden away in the hills or a Cuba española in the towns.  In the case 
of the Los Caños estate, many residents did not wait for captain-general Valeriano Weyler’s 
reconcentration orders to be carried out locally.  Marcos Murgadas, the Spanish company 
storekeeper at Los Caños, moved his family to Caimanera early in the war.  He claimed that 
only two hundred people remained at the mill by spring 1896 out of a normal complement of 
six to seven hundred men, women, and children.  Left without food or work, all but ten or 
twelve old men “took to the field” going over “to the Insurrection, that's understood.”466 
Since military labor and soldiering were male gendered occupations thought 
unsuitable for women, there was a tendency for insurgents’ families to be shielded from the 
rigors of life in the manigua that subjected them to perhaps a similarly miserable existence 
remaining behind in towns and mills.  Clandestine visits occurred despite the efforts of the 
Spanish army to prevent them.  Usually, food, clothing, and supplies were scarce and 
expensive, but frequently people left under Spanish control would divert what they could to 
those hiding out in the hills and forests.  Of greater concern to the occupying Spanish 
garrison, those residing in towns could provide intelligence on troop movements and social 
conditions.  Some measure of collaboration between town residents was perhaps inevitable, 
but the Spanish and their local allies attempted to prevent it as much as possible through a 
system of military passes, restrictions on movement, and other strategies.  The rigid 
constraints of the former slave barracks could no longer be replicated, however, and 
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insurgents not only penetrated the sugar zones with greater facility than they ever had in the 
Ten Years’ War, they increasingly contested the actual sugar mill itself.467 
There are some examples in Guantánamo of how altered class relations in the sugar 
industry enabled pro-insurgent workers to sabotage mills from within and even assist the 
insurgents directly, including the damaging of machinery, signaling the rebels, and gathering 
and imparting intelligence to the Liberation Army in contravention to the social control 
prerogatives of the military situation. At the guarded Santa María estate, owned by Fernando 
Pons, the processing and grinding of sugar cane in contravention to Gómez's work stoppage 
orders was disrupted for ten days when a worker “maliciously mixed in with the bagasse” a 
steel slug which damaged the axle of the main crushing wheel.468  
Within the batey enclosed by barbed wire and Spanish blockhouses, the loyalties of 
workers were a constant source of preoccupation.  Collaboration with insurgents transpired 
despite the presence of guard detachments.  In the case of the Isabel sugar estate, in early 
1896, a group of mounted insurgents showed up early one morning demanding five teams of 
oxen.  Records of a military trial of two morenos, overseer Victor Bombalé and Primitivo 
Wilson (Güilsen), revealed that some workers on plantations cooperated with armed parties 
out of fear, while others, including three morenas, Celestina, Glandina Güilsen, and María de 
la Cruz Crucenque, often smuggled food and clothing past guards to the rebels before the 
morning bell sounded because their men folk were with the mambises.  In the trial testimony 
of Bombalé and Wilson for complicity, collusion, and collaboration with the rebels, 
including depositions by morenos Benito, Mauricio, and Salvador Brook, the accused offered 
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as defense that it was generally understood within the sugar workers’ barracks that 
insurrectos visited their families on the estate.  Before the military tribunal the defendants 
argued that the insurgents coerced them into providing the estate's oxen.  They clearly could 
not alert the corporal in the nearest blockhouse if armed insurgents were hidden in the cane 
fields.469 As social control revolved around military situations, supporters of Spain could only 
redouble their coercive measures by penalizing workers for giving aid to the insurrection 
irrespective of political sympathy, family ties, or fear. 
On Los Caños, Agustín Charon, the main colono who directed the Las Lajas colonia 
and its sixty workers at the western margins of the estate, joined the insurrection in early 
1896.  His decision was motivated, he said, “Because they [the Spanish and their militia] 
considered all native born as a mambic [sic, mambí] or an insurrecto and they had no more 
consideration for those who did not go to the fields than they did for those who remained” so 
that he “did'nt [sic] care to wait for them.”470 From an overseer on a cane colonia, his nativist 
reaction to the conflict led him to becoming a rebel lieutenant directing operations nearby.  
He led raids on the corrals of the sugar mill, carrying off oxen to his comrades-in-arms.  At 
times cattle were seized in full view of the blockhouses, but the Spanish troops could only 
trade shots with the raiders rather than give pursuit.471  
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 Agustín's brother, Víctor Charon commanded the group that burned down the colonia 
of Santa Cecilia in early 1896.  He appeared with eight men and a signed order from General 
José Maceo to destroy the entire colonia by fire.  The manager attempted to stop the action, 
but, in the face of the signed order and armed retinue, could not persuade them to spare the 
property.  The insurgent band initially left some quarters for laborers and the canteen 
unburned, but returned some days later and torched the canteen as well.472 
 By February 1896, Spanish General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau became captain-
general of Cuba, with the mission to defeat militarily the insurrection with all means at his 
disposal.  Vowing to “fight war with war” he prepared to implement brutal 
counterinsurgency strategies equal to the scale of the methodically conceived task that lay 
before his commanders, namely, how to deprive the insurgents of combatants, supplies, food, 
and supporters in order to crush the separatist movement.473 Towards this end, most of the 
island's population was to be placed under direct Spanish supervision, while the thorough 
ruination of the countryside would be completed at the Spanish military’s hands to deny 
sustenance to the rebels.  The Spanish military intended to place all Cuba under siege in 
country and in town.  Cubans would be forced into Spanish controlled cities and estates 
surrounded by a garrison, while rural districts were burned and cleared.  Patrols would search 
for any groups failing to respond to the order.  Little provision had been made for the influx 
of dispossessed people in the towns; disease, hunger, and misery killed approximately ten 
percent of the island’s population, perhaps an even greater proportion.474   
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The grim policy was first undertaken in the west of Cuba, where Antonio Maceo and 
his orientales operated, before being applied to Guantánamo by late 1896 and early 1897.  
Weyler had been informed of the payment schemes worked out between willing, unwilling 
but also hapless planters in Oriente and the insurgents.  Now Spanish authorities forbade the 
sugar harvest of 1896-1897 to deprive the insurgents of revenue while striking at their 
popular base and attacking the columns of Maceo and Gómez in the west of the island.475 
Geographic proximity in Oriente province was enough for support for the rebels to be 
assumed.    
Reconcentration had been foregrounded against the first insurgency and rural 
inhabitants in Oriente during the Ten Years’ War; this time the draconian population removal 
and social control strategy effected the entire island, starting with the west.  Weyler's plan 
was to first renovate and reinforce two fortified, 200 meter-wide trochas bisecting the island 
at its narrowest points. Equipped with an armored train, ringed with forts, barbed wire 
entanglements, and watch towers, the first such line west of Havana extending from Mariel to 
Majana would try to contain and isolate Antonio Maceo and his Sixth Corps in Pinar del Río 
in the far west.  Sizeable Spanish columns would hammer Maceo's troops against the anvil of 
the trocha.  Weyler sought to defeat the insurgency and reverse its trajectory: whereas the 
Cuban forces had arisen in the east and invaded the west, he proposed starting farthest to the 
west, intending to roll up the island from west to east.  If the insurgency could again be 
contained east of the earlier constructed Júcaro – Morón trocha, a process of attrition similar 
to the Ten Years’ War would lead ineluctably to insurgent defeat. 
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After the death in combat of José Maceo at Loma del Gato near Santiago de Cuba on 
5 July 1896, Calixto García led a column through Guantánamo and other parts of Oriente to 
reinvigorate and reorganize insurgent forces.  The war entered a crucial new phase as Weyler 
prepared to defeat the Cuban insurgency, backed by the government of conservative prime 
minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo who staked Spain’s relatively weak status and position 
among European powers to the maintenance of colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, 
and who countenanced waging war in Cuba to “the last man and the last peseta.”476 
  
Through 1898 and the U.S. Intervention 
Prior to enforcing Weyler's reconcentration decree in Guantánamo, it appears the 
Spanish expanded troop levels and mobilized more Cubans into local militias.  Security 
functions on many estates would now be relegated to movilizados, a hastily formed ad hoc 
force controlled by pro-Spanish volunteers.  Continuous reinforcements of regular soldiers 
and conscripts arrived by steamer at the port of Caimanera.  Spanish troops forced civilians 
in outlying areas into the towns of Guantánamo, Jamaica, Felicidad and Perseverancia as 
well as the sugar estates of Esperanza, Santa Cecilia and three Brooks & Co. mills astride the 
railway: Soledad, Isabel, and Romelié.477 Infantry patrols and pro-Spanish guerrillas combed 
the rural districts, razing crops, farms, and homes.   
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Civilians faced a difficult choice.  They could move to the centers of reconcentration, 
where food already had grown scarce, and there confront hunger, disease, and possible abuse 
at the hands of voluntarios or Spanish soldiers, or they might try to elude population 
removal, fleeing to the prefectures of Cuba Libre ahead of any Spanish troops who might 
discover them.  In an April, 1897 letter, Theodore Brooks described the imposition of 
Weyler's decree to his mother living abroad, Mariane Elisa Adams:  
The “Reconcentration” orders of Weyler, of whose effects in the other 
provinces you will have read, is being carried out here and is causing immense 
misery – The only estates in which inhabitants are allowed, besides the most 
indispensable employés are Soledad, Esperanza, Romelie, Ysabel and Sta. 
Cecilia – The people from the other estates . . . are forced into these already 
overcrowded estates, so that you can easily imagine the misery that prevails, 
made worse by the prevalence of small-pox everywhere. Many of these 
people, as was to be expected, have already taken to the woods, and doubtless 
more will follow – preferring the hardship of that life to the almost certain 
death from starvation in the towns.478 
 
Brooks went on to describe three suicides in town including an old carpenter who hanged 
himself; another man first killed his wife, then himself.  Brooks wrote that from five to six 
people died per day.479 
The majority dispossessed by reconcentration could only watch as their homes and 
unmovable belongings were destroyed, and trek to the nearest Spanish controlled zone.  In 
effect, the depopulated countryside had been converted into a free-fire zone. Anyone 
resisting the reconcentration decree could be severely punished, even killed as a suspected 
rebel.  Many who had cautiously avoided taking sides in the conflict, hoping to preserve 
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themselves, their families, and their property from harm, now had to choose between two 
painful alternatives: the occupied town or the manigua.   
Due to the hilly, broken terrain, many small valleys, and the relative strength of the 
insurgency, displaced civilians and mambises could resist reconcentration and evade 
detection.  In an insurgent census prepared for the PRC and Estrada Palma in late 1897, over 
120,000 rural supporters of the Liberation Army were reported in the prefectures of Oriente 
province.480 At least twenty concealed rebel cultivation zones existed in the mountains to the 
northeast and southwest of Guantánamo, some quite close to Soledad sugar mill.481  
Life in rebel prefectures was difficult and harsh.  María de los Reyes Castillo Bueno 
recalled family oral histories about Cuba's thirty-year struggle for independence from before 
she was born in 1902.  Her paternal grandfather was killed in the Ten Years’ War.  Other 
relatives fled to Jamaica during the War of Independence. Two died in prison at Ceuta in 
Spanish Morocco.  Several others served in the Liberation Army.  Her mother, Isabel, lost 
her oldest son to smallpox.  Following a mambí column, Isabel became the partner of Carlos 
Castillo Duharte – María de los Reyes' father – with whom Isabel had three children during 
the conflict.  None of these children survived the war years.482 
Despite the harrowing troubles of life in encampments concealed in the mountains, 
the women and men in the prefectures potentially had greater access to food.  The crops 
grown in the manigua by those noncombatants not following insurgent parties as 
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impedimenta could often feed dispersed groups somewhat better than people in the crowded 
towns and cities.  Hunger and privation worsened due to the nature of the conflict.  By late 
1896, insurgents carried off the last remaining herd of oxen in the district from Soledad.  
Theodore Brooks received a message from his half-brother Ernest that the Spanish cavalry 
posted at the sugar mill had been redeployed.  The opportunity was immediately seized by 
Cuban troops who carried off five hundred oxen and cows, fifty mules, and at least thirty 
horses from the mill.483 The cattle raid not only stole the largest store of meat in the district 
away from the Spanish and the civilian population relocated in the mill town, it also 
disrupted any future sugar production at Soledad.  Even though people driven to the 
plantation because of reconcentration might have been able to work the zafra under guard, 
the large numbers of oxen required to haul sugar cane to the railcars and mill were gone.   
By 1897 the bulk of Guantánamo insurgents operated outside the jurisdiction, many 
reinforcing Liberation Army forces near Holguín in northern Oriente.  After the Spanish 
imposition of reconcentration locally, some 1800 combatants within the district and 
numerous unarmed camp followers under General Pérez attempted to contest control of the 
district against several thousand Spanish troops and militia.484 Despite the disparity in troop 
strength, command of the district eluded the Spanish because the greater part of the soldiery 
occupied the towns and civilian population zones, and manned blockhouses, including those 
around estates and towns, as well as those built every half-mile along the railway leaving 
fewer to patrol against the rebels.  Urged to undertake more aggressive, offensive activity by 
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commanders, much of the Guantánamo City garrison left for operations around the town of 
Jamaica, leaving a formidable body of volunteers and militarized firemen to guard the 
defenses.  Some two hundred Cuban insurgents led pack mules over the city moat, cut the 
barbed wire fence, and sacked two stores of supplies.  The group proceeded to march on the 
jail, but when heavy firing broke out, the raiders successfully fought their way out of the 
city.485  
Similarly, very late in 1897, fifty insurgents entered Caimanera past a blockhouse in 
which the volunteers went over to the insurrection.  They expropriated three cash boxes and 
other supplies, remaining in the town for fifty minutes and leaving with numbers of 
townspeople who defected from the Spanish side.486 The insurgents were becoming bolder.  
Spanish garrisons were pulled back from outlying areas to shorten their supply lines and 
concentrate troops into less exposed and isolated positions.   
Weyler's policy to deny the insurgents material aid and popular support, including 
prohibiting grinding to try to prevent payments to insurgents, had exacted heavy tolls.  
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Antonio Maceo had been killed 7 December 1896, and the rebellion had been suppressed in 
much of the west, leading to numbers of desertions.  Nevertheless, in central and eastern 
Cuba, it would appear that the insurgency controlled much of the countryside, and evaded the 
Spanish army.  Popular unrest in Spain itself mounted, given the scale of the death toll 
disease produced in the ghastly colonial war in the tropics. Spanish troops died in large 
numbers in Cuba, and Guantánamo was no exception.  Historian Tone’s study of the war 
found that Spain dispatched to Cuba a large conscript army of 190,000 backed by some 
60,000 Cuban auxiliaries against the poorly armed rebels, who they outnumbered ten to one.  
Total Spanish combat casualties numbered 4,032 battlefield deaths and 10,956 wounded, but 
tropical diseases ultimately claimed fully twenty-two percent of the Spanish colonial army in 
Cuba, a toll of over 41,000 soldiers.487 During the summer drought of 1897 Theodore Brooks 
wrote, “Fully 60% [of Spanish soldiers] are down with fevers and dysentery. I fear that when 
yellow fever begins it will assume an epidemic form and play great havoc among the poor 
men.”488 The Spanish army may have had a near inexhaustible pool of peasant conscripts, and 
far greater quantities of modern armaments than the Cuban separatists, but a wholly 
inadequate medical system and barely competent commissary, increasingly incapable of 
keeping the army fed, paid, or in the field were leading to disaster and defeat.   
Proximity to the United States and porous Caribbean borders allowed the rebels to 
smuggle in weapons and supplies.  Funds paid by supporters and taxes exacted by the 
movement paid for much of this materiel.  Of forty-five total supply expeditions, fifteen 
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landed successfully in 1896; another ten eluded Spanish patrol boats in 1897.489 Little by 
little the insurgents were accumulating a few heavier weapons to supplement the small arms 
most boats brought in. Some small Hotchkiss cannon and Sims-Dudley pneumatic dynamite 
guns that lobbed “aerial torpedoes,” manned by North Americans and Cubans, began to be 
employed to take towns in eastern Cuba, such as Jiguaní and Las Tunas in mid-to-late 1897. 
Dramatic as such insurgent battlefield successes were, the aggregate of many small 
actions of sabotage, arson, and harassing ambushes such as typified the experience in 
Guantánamo wore down the Spanish military.  Total war in Cuba produced frightful 
suffering and privation, but Spanish control could no longer be assured.  The Liberation 
Army's ability to remain in the field, combined with the near-collapse of the island's strained 
economy and the tremendous expense for Spain to maintain 200,000 troops across the 
Atlantic in inhospitable tropical conditions and extended occupation, sapped the colonial 
power's ability to prosecute the war.  A new Spanish government recalled Weyler, replacing 
him with Ramón Blanco as captain-general, extending overtures of autonomy to the colony.  
 It was at this point, with autonomy was in the offing, that Spanish military authorities 
in Guantánamo rescinded their prohibition on cultivation and harvest, and prepared to allow 
sugar estates to grind again.  The proscription on the harvest had not appreciably dried up 
sources of supply to the insurgents, but had materially diminished the amount of revenue 
extracted from the colony. “The Captain General has issued an order to local bosses to do all 
in their power to protect planters and assure the sugar crop being made” wrote Theodore 
Brooks, but “[a]t present I do not see what they can do to help us in this district, so we can do 
                                                
 
489 Raúl Izquierdo Canosa, Días de la guerra (Havana: Editora Política, 1994), 133; César García del 
Pino, Expediciones de la Guerra de Independencia. 1895-1898 (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1996), 
claimed a total of 48 expeditions that disembarked 2,146 men, about 27,000 small arms, fourteen cannon, and 
18,800 pounds of dynamite, among other supplies.  
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nothing but fold our arms and wait.”490 Notwithstanding the enhanced security at Soledad, 
well protected by seven blockhouses and frequently a detachment of cavalry, insurgents 
again torched cane fields.491 
The Spanish zone of control extended no further than their perimeter guarded by 
frequently ill, unpaid soldiers.  Spanish troops and local militia in fortified towns and 
plantations “were almost impregnable” while Cuban insurgents in control of the rural 
districts “were virtually unconquerable.”492 More and more, however, the insurgents began to 
test weaknesses in the defensive system.  Able to harass convoys provisioning estates farther 
out, insurgent actions provoked the Spaniards to recall and pull back garrisons.  Spanish 
supply and communication lines grew shorter, but their zone of control diminished still 
further.   
 As the sugar-grinding season for 1897-1898 drew near, the Spanish, committed now 
to safeguarding the harvest in the face of deepening paralysis, hastened to rebuild the local 
fortified trocha from the Ten Years’ War around the llano to at least shut out the 
insurrectionists from the sugar zones that had then existed relatively unmolested.  The effort 
came too late.  The Spanish and local supporters, falling back on their former methods, 
intending to replicate past successes, now only reinforced failure.  
Local planters and members of the business community remaining in Guantánamo 
seemed to have lost faith in the Spaniards’ abilities to guarantee meaningful security.  They 
despaired of being able to restart cultivation, fearful of further losses. Destruction of fields, 
                                                
490 Theodore Brooks to his mother, 17 November 1897; BPL, Letters of Theodore Brooks. 
 
491 Deposition of Ernest Brooks, p. 11, Claim no. 120 (Sheldon); USNA, RG 76, Entry 352.  
 
492 Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 168.  
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irrigation, railway facilities, and livestock had rendered production a difficult, near 
impossible proposition.  The threat of losing the core factory buildings and sugarhouses 
easily worth a quarter of a million dollars or more, as had happened in many cases farther 
west, was unthinkable.  Planter payments to the insurgents and the purchase of bonds from 
the PRC in New York were expensive, but surer, options than relying solely on Spanish 
security as evidenced by their inability to vanquish the insurgency and stop cane fires, cattle 
raids, and many other damages inflicted by the warring parties. 
 At a public meeting, the Spanish commander assured Guantánamo planters that every 
effort would be made to help them grind the crop.  Theodore Brooks, and other attending 
business representatives, explained that the promised protection and assistance were 
insufficient.  Ernest Brooks from Soledad, the British Consul Theodore Brooks, the French 
Consul, and two other planter’s counsels formed a delegation to negotiate with the 
insurgents, receiving passes from the Spanish to travel.  They met with General Pérez of the 
Guantánamo Brigade in an encampment of five hundred people southwest of the city to ask 
whether insurgent policy could be modified to allow cultivation.  But with victory seemingly 
on the horizon, the insurgents maintained their no-grind policy.  Bans on economic activity 
useful to the colonial metropole were more firmly enforced.  Permission to grind was denied 
and Pérez reiterated that attempting to grow or harvest the patches of cane maturing in many 
fields not overgrown with weeds and scrub would result in the destruction of the batey itself 
of an offending estate.493 There was to be no change in insurgent policy.  Only after the 
                                                
493 Deposition of Theodore Brooks, pgs. 110-111, Claim no. 120 (Sheldon); USNA, RG 76, Entry 352. 
The pass for Ernest and Theodore Brooks, Vicente Venet, Agustín Saavedra, and others to pass “to the enemy 
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enemiga de Teodoro Brooks y otros, 14 January 1898; see also the late March 1898 summons to Theodore 
Brooks “to deal with important business concerning la Hacienda Pública and the interests of all the sugar fincas 
in the perimeter of Guantánamo, it is indispensable that on 10 April that you attend the General Quarters of the 
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unequivocal, complete constitution of Cuban independence would production resume.  
Cuban sovereignty seemed to have been extended de facto if not de jure in the hesitancy of 
the planters to give credence to Spanish claims and offers. 
 Insurgents had effectively applied tactics both new and from the Ten Years’ War 
including dispersal of forces and civilian supporters in remote camps, the exaction of war 
taxes from planters, and the sabotaging of production.  Much of Guantánamo and indeed, 
most of the island, lay in smoldering ruins.  But before the flag of the Republic of Cuba could 
be raised, North American intervention drastically changed the factors conditioning 
independence, greatly shifting the balance of forces.  The entry of the United States into the 
war was ostensibly to halt the fighting and suffering just off American shores, but the timing 
suggests that intervention was designed to ensure a guiding U.S. presence at the outset of 
Cuban independence.   The Liberation Army warily awaited the coming of the North 
Americans while the pro-Spanish party reacted with fury at news of war between Spain and 
the United States over Cuba in the spring and summer of 1898. 
                                                                                                                                                  
1st Division with out any excuse {save illness} where we will meet General Pedro A. Pérez, Col. Tomás Padró 
Griñan, Lt. Col. Dr. García Vieta, the administrator of Hacienda for the state of Oriente, Comandante Rafael 
Pullés Palacios, and I, the writer” also in ANC, Documentos del Museo Nacional, caja: 11, no. 48.  
  
 
CHAPTER V: 
1898—U.S. Intervention and the First Occupation 
It has not been known by Army Officers, nor by the people of the United States, why the seven 
thousand Spanish Regulars, and Guerillas [sic] stationed in and about Guantánamo City, 
during the War, never marched to the Relief of Santiago ...  
The late General [William R.] Shafter, a few weeks before his death [in 1906], said to me in 
Santa Barbara, in the course of conversation: ‘ I never understood why those Spanish troops 
at Guantánamo did not attack my rear at Santiago.’ I was, of course, very pleased to explain 
how much the Nation is indebted to a small force of Cubans – about a thousand in all – for 
having, with assistance from my forces, ‘contained’ such a large contingent of the enemy so 
near to Santiago; rendering them innocuous and useless in the campaign. And as the world is 
in ignorance of the magnificent work of this detachment, I am happy to tell the story, if only 
to do tardy justice to our Cuban Allies. 
-- Bowman Hendry McCalla, commander USS Marblehead.494 
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Cuba, caja: 5797.  See also General Félix Pareja’s cable to Ramón Blanco, AGM-M, Sec. Capitanía General de 
Cuba, leg. 67, car. 18 and Cándido Pardo González, La brigada de Guantánamo en la Guerra Hispano-
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Ragged, tired, and filthy, seventy Cuban insurgents and two fishermen from 
Caimanera in whaleboats and launches led by Colonel Enrique Thomas y Thomas 
approached the unarmored cruiser USS Marblehead and the light-house tender Suwanee off 
the western shore of Guantánamo Bay.495  The Cubans had force-marched from Tiguabos for 
more than a day, briefly stopping to consume meager rations – perhaps some mangos or a 
sweet potato or two – and to rest before starting out again just after midnight toward the 
coast.  They had come quickly on receiving orders to reinforce American marines who had 
landed the day before on the eastern side of the bay. As the U.S. sailors pulled the boats 
alongside the Marblehead, Captain Bowman McCalla waved his cap and shouted “Viva 
Cuba Libre!”  The mambises returned the cheer enthusiastically. It was an auspicious 
beginning of joint Cuban and U.S. military operations against Spanish forces in the 
district.496  
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496 McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 4-5. José Sánchez Guerra and Wilfedo Campos Cremé, La batalla de 
Guantánamo 1898 (Havana: Ediciones Verde Olivo, 2000), 69-71 [hereinafter cited as Sánchez and Campos, 
La batalla]. McCalla – who together with García Vieta had summoned the Cuban troops – learned Spanish and 
French at the U.S. Naval Academy, and had served in the Caribbean and off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of 
Latin America for much of his lengthy navy career.  He had called regularly at Havana during the Ten Years’ 
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paternalism perhaps—maybe even a latent “anti-colonial imperialism” long imagined by North Americans with 
regard to Cuba—but nevertheless earnestly expressed in the correspondence appearing in his memoirs.  Aboard 
the side-wheel steam frigate Powhatan he had even called at Guantánamo Bay in the summer of 1880 during 
the Little War while the U.S. North Atlantic Squadron steamed around Cuba “in consequence of complaints ... 
that Spanish Guerrilla [sic] were interfering with [U.S.] merchant shipping.”  The Powhatan had not stayed 
long: yellow fever aboard a Spanish frigate at anchor curtailed the visit. McCalla also had prior experience 
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 Once aboard the Marblehead and the Suwanee, naval personnel served their Cuban 
allies lunch.  Someone aboard the Suwanee took a photograph showing curious U.S. sailors 
crowding around while the Cubans ate. Afterwards, they were issued white cotton canvas 
suits, new shoes, rifles and ammunition from navy stores “in place of the rags which they 
wore” but retaining “the very good straw hats which they brought with them.”  Already 
aboard, the habanero Lieutenant Colonel of Sanitation Dr. Gonzalo García Vieta with “his 
little soldier servant” – his young black batman – and the New Orleans-born Cuban pilot, 
Colonel Alfredo Laborde, served as interpreters.497   
 Thus began a largely forgotten sideshow in the 1898 U.S. intervention into the 1895-
1898 Cuban separatist rebellion against Spanish colonial rule: the joint U.S. and Cuban 
collaboration in the seizure of the lower portion of Guantánamo Bay. For the Spanish army 
defending the district, the Cuban separatist insurgents were opponents they had faced in the 
1870s and again from 1895-1898 as we have seen. The North Americans were another 
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the Windward Passage is mentioned in ch. IX, 13.   
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Spanish Army officers of having asistentes – typically black men – to cook, forage, carry equipment, and build 
encampments remained commonplace throughout Cuba’s nationalist rebellions. Compare observations of 
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matter. It had been 157 years since the summer of 1741, when, during the Anglo Spanish 
War of Jenkins’ Ear, several hundred colonists accompanied Vice Admiral Edward “Old 
Grog” Vernon and General Thomas Wentworth’s invasion force of “8 warships and 40 
transports, 4,000 soldiers, [and] a troop of 1,000 blacks from Jamaica” at “Walthenam Bay 
[sic, a corruption of Guantánamo]” and “Cumberland harbor”—named for a son of the 
British monarch.498 In that earlier failed invasion the British intended to outflank Santiago’s 
harbor defenses and wrest control of the largest Antillean isle, or at minimum, eastern Cuba 
and the Windward Passage with it, from their imperial adversaries. Harassed by Spanish 
crown militia and felled by yellow fever, malaria, and dysentery while the British and 
colonial levees attempted to build a suitable overland road to the main objective, Vernon and 
Wentworth’s expedition ended in failure. 
 Over a century and a half later, the U.S. military intervention into the ongoing 
colonial war placed three militaries—Spanish, Cuban, and U.S.—with competing and 
conflicting aims and national interests in very different circumstances. In 1898, the U.S. 
Navy’s task of creating a base and coaling yard for the Caribbean blockade squadron led to a 
small battle that would have unforeseen and portentous consequences.  The lower part of the 
bay would eventually be site of an enduring U.S. military installation of periodic notoriety.  
In addition, the intervention into a revolution that had targeted local elites as pillars of 
colonial rule with the extraction of war taxes—and raising the specter of postwar land and 
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wealth redistribution as seen last chapter—the United States replaced Spain as guarantor of 
social stability and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the skewed distribution of wealth on the 
island.  Indeed, the U.S. would come to restore in many cases the status quo ante for certain 
members of the oligarchy.  
  
1898 
In the wake of war-fever in the United States after the USS Maine explosion in 
Havana harbor 15 February 1898, the U.S. military prepared for a ground campaign in Cuba, 
and naval actions in the Caribbean and Pacific against Spain and its colonial possessions.  
U.S. officials dispatched the Maine to Havana upon the January request of U.S. Consul 
Fitzhugh Lee after pro-colonialist peninsulares and Volunteers had rioted against liberal and 
autonomist newspaper and political offices.  This instability came amid fears stridently pro-
Spanish elements might target North American symbols too, after a new government n 
Madrid announced their intention to grant autonomy to the island, and the recall of Weyler as 
captain-general. The mysterious and shocking explosion of the U.S. battleship and tragic 
deaths of 260 crewmembers came while the United States and Spain were locked in a 
diplomatic imbroglio over the status of Cuba. The loss of the warship and much of its crew 
was, for the United States’ public, a precipitous causus belli.   The source of urgency to 
government leaders was the prospect of a Cuban separatist resurgence in the face of belated 
and faltering Spanish reform efforts designed to salvage whatever authority Madrid had left, 
and assure the continued prominence of the island’s bourgeoisie.  American public outrage 
placed constraints on U.S. government leaders’ range of actions and responses that already 
had narrowed precipitously after Cuban insurgents had weathered Valeriano Weyler’s “war 
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with war” repressive strategy and prepared to go back on the offensive confronting Spanish 
overtures of autonomy and home-rule. 
Conditions on the island after three years of war were such that the separatists refused 
to recognize the belated autonomous government; they held out for victory and 
independence, ignoring captain-general Ramón Blanco’s unilateral cease-fire proclamation.  
By 11 April, U.S. President William McKinley requested the power to intervene from 
Congress “to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of 
Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable 
government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations.”499  
After a week of debate, the U.S. Congress passed the Joint Resolution calling for the future 
independence of Cuba as a general principle, and furthermore demanding that Spain 
“relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and 
naval forces.” It also granted war powers to the President, and lastly, through the Teller 
Amendment, promised to leave Cuba in the control of its inhabitants once conditions there 
had been settled, thereby prohibiting U.S. annexation of the island.500  In effect, the Joint 
Resolution was tantamount to a statement of hostilities, but the actual declaration came on 
the 25 April, after shots had been fired three days before by a navy flotilla off the northern 
cities Cárdenas, Matanzas, and Havana to halt shipping to and from those ports.    
U.S. intervention in the ongoing and protracted Cuban War of Independence first 
assumed the form of this naval blockade of the island’s north coast starting on Friday, 22 
April.   These hostile actions were followed by reciprocal declarations of war from Spain and 
                                                
499 In Pérez, The War of 1898, 19.  
 
500 Pérez, The War of 1898, 21.  
 268 
by the United States.  Meanwhile, the U.S. Army precipitously readied expeditionary forces 
at camps in the south and in Florida to invade Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, starting 
with Cuba.   
In order to carry out naval operations in the Caribbean and Atlantic, the U.S. Navy 
implemented contingency war plans drawn up against Spain between 1894 and 1897.501  A 
corollary to these various scenarios called for coaling stations, repair yards, and warehouses 
to be established in order to supply the ships for extended duty.  The search for a suitable 
harbor in a strategic location was to have important and lasting ramifications for the 
Guantánamo region because of its ideally sheltered bay. Given that the U.S. Army faced 
grave shortages of equipment and difficulties in mobilization, most staff officers envisioned a 
summer campaign in eastern Cuba, to be followed by an offensive directed against Puerto 
Rico.  After the end of the rainy season and, it was hoped, the period of greatest susceptibility 
to yellow fever, a final main effort with the bulk of the U.S. Army commanded by General 
Nelson Miles would be launched together with Máximo Gómez’s insurgent forces against 
Havana in western Cuba.  Thus, the U.S. Navy was faced with defeating the Spanish fleet 
and conducting multifarious complex operations in the Atlantic and Caribbean.   Aside from 
improving logistics, a forward safe harbor and base close to the principal theaters of action 
would provide shelter for vessels should the war last into the autumn hurricane season.    
The task of creating such a base and coaling yard for the Caribbean blockade 
squadron during the war of 1898 directly led to a joint Cuban-American operation in 
Guantánamo that has been largely overlooked or misunderstood by historians.  At the time, 
the 10 June landing of U.S. forces at Guantánamo Bay – the first U.S. troops to set foot in 
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Cuba during the war – elicited interest from the press.502  Much U.S. newspaper coverage, 
however, was devoted to the Pacific and Commodore George Dewey’s 1 May 1898 one-
sided naval battle of Manila Bay.  The chaotic landings of the 17,000 troops of the Army 
Fifth Corps at Daiquirí and Siboney on 22- 24 June and subsequent encirclement and siege of 
Santiago de Cuba then eclipsed Guantánamo as the main story in the Cuban theater of 
operations.  What transpired elsewhere, much less at Guantánamo constituted facts that 
would receive little attention and scant retrieval. To paraphrase from historian Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot’s observation on written history and uneven archival power, figuratively 
“unearthing” the collaborative aspects of the battle, and situating it within a regional context 
required putting extant facts culled from national, regional, and military archives into a “new 
narrative” that brings Cuban, Spanish, and North American historical agency into a more 
complete sequence.503 
Competing nationalisms and even branches of service have heretofore sidelined 
aspects of 1898 in historical narratives. Amidst the furor that summer, an initial American 
enthusiasm for cooperation with the Cuban insurrectos was among the first casualties.  On 
arrival in Cuba, U.S. troops largely responded to the poverty, threadbare conditions, and 
large preponderance of blacks in Cuban insurgent ranks with racist disdain and frequent 
hostility.  Both Cuban and American societies were acutely racist as a result of their heritage 
of chattel slavery, but as has been seen, exhibited specific manifestations and idiosyncrasies.  
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In the military sphere, a racially integrated and poorly armed irregular force – and one in 
which black officers exercised command in many cases – encountered a standing 
professional, if antiquated, regular army that practiced racial segregation in its ranks.  Such 
factors, combined with the language barrier, unfamiliar cultural norms, and differing 
conceptions of a postwar Cuban state fomented and exacerbated mutual suspicion, 
misperception and miscommunication.  Of course, a pragmatic collaboration between United 
States forces and Cuban separatists initially promised a workable and satisfactory alliance, 
but over time irreconcilable national interests sundered any such expectations given the 
differing purposes and motives of a great power bent on exerting control over Cuba and an 
internally divided separatist movement combining tendencies ranging from annexationism to 
differing strands of independentista nationalism. The latter groups were often committed to 
total victory that would result in independence and uncompromised sovereignty after decades 
of anti-colonial organizing, mobilization, and sacrifice.  Ultimately there would be a 
complete rift between the two erstwhile allies, punctuated by General Calixto García’s letter 
to U.S. Fifth Corps commander, General William Rufus Shafter, when the Cuban forces were 
excluded from the Spanish surrender negotiations and prohibited from entering Santiago de 
Cuba at the end of the war.504   
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Hindsight indicated that irreconcilable national interests and greatly unequal power 
relations militated against cooperation. At the time the events unfolded, sources of tension 
included very different aims and ways of waging war.  To mambí sensibilities, shaped by 
years of irregular warfare, frontal attacks against the modern repeating rifles of the Spanish 
seemed a suicidal strategy, wasteful of soldiers’ lives.  To North Americans, avoiding 
sustained contact with the enemy in favor of stealthy ambushes and attacking property was 
un-soldierly and un-manly – even barbarous.  Cuban tactics reminded U.S. regulars of their 
Apache Indian opponents in the recently concluded wars on the western frontier.  George 
Kennan, who arrived with the American Red Cross to alleviate the suffering of 
reconcentrados and war refugees described Cuban mambises near Siboney—“Cuban 
insurgents from the army of Garcia, and dirty, tattered refugees ... attracted to the beach by ... 
the prospect of getting food”: 
 They did not, at first sight, impress me very favorably. Fully four fifths of  
them were mulattoes or blacks; the number of half-grown boys was very 
large; there was hardly a suggestion of a uniform in the whole command; most 
of the men were barefooted, and their coarse, drooping straw hats, cotton 
shirts, and loose, flapping cotton trousers had been torn by thorny bushes and 
stained with Cuban mud until they looked worse than the clothes that a New 
England farmer hangs on a couple of crossed sticks in his corn-field to scare 
away the crows. If their rifles and cartridge-belts had been taken away from 
them they would have looked like a horde of dirty Cuban beggars and 
ragamuffins on the tramp. I do not mean to say, or even to suggest, that these 
ragamuffins were not brave men and good soldiers. They may have been both, 
in spite of their disreputable appearance. When, for months together, a man 
has lived the life of an outlaw in the woods, scrambling through tropical 
jungles, wading marshy rivers, and sleeping, without tent or blankets, on the 
ground, he cannot be expected to look like a veteran of the regular army ... 
The Cubans disappointed me, I suppose, because I had pictured them to 
myself as a better dressed and better disciplined body of men, and had not 
                                                                                                                                                  
start in and rob one another. ... I have a great deal more confidence in the Spaniards than I have in the Cubans.” 
“Americanize Cuba, Says General Young. Cubans Thriftless and Incapable of Self Government, He Says.,” 
Brooklyn Eagle, 6 August 1898, p.3. 
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made allowance enough for the hardships and privations of an insurgent’s 
life.505  
 
Furthermore, from initial shock and mistrust, relations frequently moved to outright 
deprecation and disdain. There would be numerous cases of Spanish and North American 
fraternization postwar in which the two former foes “share[d] their scorn for the colonists as 
inferior people.”506  During the Santiago campaign in eastern Cuba, U.S. soldiers ordered 
Cubans about, reacting in exasperation and later with anger to demands for provisions, 
clothing, and weapons; inter-service rivalry seemingly blinded the army to the fact that the 
navy had been supplying armaments and rations collected from the Cuban Revolutionary 
Party (PRC) and supporters in the United States along Cuba’s coast.507  
Cuban histories found instances of collaboration between Cubans and Americans to 
be problematic, implicating, as they did, many Cuban separatists’ alignment with some U.S. 
                                                
 
505 George Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba (1899 reprint; Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 
1971), 90-92.  
 
506 Freidel, The Splendid Little War (NY: 1958 reprint; Short Hills, NJ: Burford Books, 2002), 236; 
Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 284-285. See also Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 213-4, 217.  
 
507 Initial U.S. strategy contemplated – and quickly rejected – recognition of Cuban belligerency, and 
supplying Gómez and the Liberation Army in Las Villas. A classic “blue-water strategy,” the plan called for the 
navy blockading Cuba and engaging the Spanish fleet while the Liberation Army would be reinforced as the 
land force. Another early plan called for 6,000 U.S. troops to be landed near Trinidad on the south coast of Las 
Villas province to link up with Gómez, while still another emphasized invading western Cuba and besieging 
Havana. While the U.S. Army was directed to prepare an expeditionary force, there were some landings of 
weapons and supplies for the Cuban insurgents in Banes and other locations. The Banes landing deposited four 
hundred Cuban exiles, ammunition, weapons, provisions and clothing for the insurrection, see Collazo, II: 5-8; 
Freidel, 40. For one such expedition of the Cuban-American Maine Brigade, mostly Tampa cigar-rollers led by 
PRC chiefs, that included a contingent of black troopers from the 10th U.S. Cavalry and their white officers in 
late June 1898, see N. G. González, In Darkest Cuba. On early U.S. war plans for Cuba, see Peter S. 
Kindsvater, “Santiago Campaign of 1898: Joint and Combined Operations,” Military Review (January, 1993): 3-
5; and Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States in the Spanish-American War (1971; 
reprint. College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1998), ch. 3. The light-house tender, Suwanee landed at least 
“70,000 rounds of ammunition, 5,000 rifles, 1,000 carbines, 2,000 machetes and hundreds of pounds of bread, 
bacon and other provisions” on the 4th and 8th of June. “All Cuban Cables Are Now Severed,” Brooklyn Eagle, 9 
June 1898, p.1; “Marines are Safe,” Brooklyn Eagle, 15 June 1898, p. 1. 
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objectives.508 Often stung and appalled by the postwar political settlement, frequently 
underscored by marginalization and high-handed dismissal of Cuban sacrifices and claims 
after thirty years of anti-colonial struggle, some Cuban nationalist historians tended to 
downplay such instances that occurred of pragmatic collaboration between the Cuban 
Liberation Army and the United States during 1898 in favor of narratives in which the 
Spanish had already largely been beaten during the previous three years of warfare.509 Cuban 
historiography highlighted Cuban contributions, but tended to focus on leaders of the 
Liberation Army such as Gómez and García.  To be sure, like U.S. historiography, the first 
generation of Cuban historians writing about the war included many participant observers 
with first hand experiences and members of the general staff, such as Enrique Collazo, 
Cosme de la Torriente, and José Miró y Argenter.510  Their accounts often reflected a 
nationalist hagiography and romantic historical basis to the recently formed independent 
                                                
 
508 Lillian Guerra, The Myth of José Martí: Conflicting Nationalisms in Early Twentieth-Century Cuba 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 13-18. Guerra persuasively argues that mostly white, 
educated professionals and middle-class exiles who openly emulated and admired the United States, formed a 
constituency for a Cuban “pro-imperial nationalism.” Revolutionary nationalists, including many insurgent 
officers, in the separatist camp favored a “top-down, state-engineered approach” to social and political change. 
In her schema, blacks, mestizos, veterans, the working class, and many women constituted a third “popular 
nationalism.” In contrast to her tripartite classification, I would posit that pro-imperial nationalists were often in 
conflict with revolutionary nationalists while both were subjected to periodic popular nationalist pressures from 
historically marginalized sectors of the population, and separatist supporters from the lower classes.  
Nevertheless, in my view, the general absence of programmatic forms among many of those groups renders 
their classification as an entirely distinct and separate third nationalist tendency problematic.  
 
509 As but one (early) example, the dedication to Enrique Collazo’s book, Los Americanos en Cuba, I: 
5, read “A weak people who confer to a powerful and strong neighboring people the defense of their liberty and 
rights deserve to be, and will be, slaves. We learn from the history of our past not to confide in our humanitarian 
protectors, seeking in peace the development of our riches in order to make ourselves strong in order to 
conserve the absolute independence and freedom for which we have struggled half a century.” See also Emilio 
Roig de Leuchsenring, Cuba no debe su independencia a los E.U. (Havana: Sociedad Cubana de Estudios 
Históricos e Internacionales, 1950).  
 
510 Succinct appraisals of Cuban historiography on the process of Cuban independence and the 1898 
war include Duvon C. Corbitt, “Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba’s Struggle for Independence,” 
Hispanic American Historical Review V. 43, No. 3 (August, 1963): 395-404, and Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba: 
Between Reform and Revolution 2nd ed., 425-527, especially 437-42, and 453-9 and The War of 1898, 159-168.  
See also the revisionist history by Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba. 
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nation that has not been superceded by post-1959 historiography.  A further tendency in 
some Cuban scholarship pointed to the exhausted condition of the Spanish Army after three 
years of war, which clearly underlay the relative ease and short duration of the U.S. invasion, 
but downplayed how the U.S. intervention hastened the surrender and removal of that 
defeated army – and how it negated Spain’s sea power much the same way the United States 
was indebted to the intervention of the French fleet in 1781 contributing to the American 
victory at Yorktown.  Cuban nationalist trends arguing that the Ejército Libertador could 
have vanquished the defeated Spanish army without direct North American intervention 
amplified the role of commanders such as García in achieving victory, yet they muted the 
case of collaboration that resulted in what became, after 10 December 1903, the site of the 
first permanent extra-territorial U.S. Navy base and enduring physical symbol of the Platt 
Amendment’s constraints on the exercise of Cuban national sovereignty and independence of 
action.   
Not only competing nationalisms and national interests with resultant friction 
between Cubans and North Americans, but also inter-service rivalry within military 
institutions, became reflected in curiously blinkered historiographies that obscured those few 
cases of pragmatic collaboration such as occurred for a few weeks at Guantánamo.  After the 
war, the military historiography in the United States downplayed, denigrated, or ignored 
Cuban contributions to the outcome. The emphasis on decisive battles reflected the 
overwhelming naval victories of Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba that destroyed Spain’s 
Pacific and Caribbean squadrons, and the 1 July land battle at San Juan Hill and El Caney 
that ultimately led to the surrender of Spanish troops at Santiago de Cuba and gubernatorial 
and vice-presidential ambitions for Colonel Theodore Roosevelt of the 1st U.S. Volunteer 
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Cavalry, popularly known as the “Rough Riders.”511  Focus upon the war’s major naval 
battles, won at virtually no cost to the United States, and romanticized versions of the costly 
infantry attacks at El Caney, Kettle and San Juan Hills obscured widespread ineptitude and 
command failures; the Spanish Army’s baffling inability to capitalize on several potentially 
disastrous U.S. Army gaffes, and their own tactical and strategic blunders created an 
enduring paradigm of the war of 1898 as something of an opera bouffe.  By-and-large what 
transpired in other parts of the world during the conflict, let alone in nearby areas of Cuba, 
was ignored.  The events at Guantánamo lacked the strategic significance of the former naval 
engagements, and the heavier casualties of the crucial land battle: signal events in what has 
been remembered, after all, as a relatively brief “splendid little war.”512   
 
Guantánamo Bay: June-July 1898 
The discord that waited in the immediate future was less evident in mid-1898.  
Segments of the Liberation Army, including commanding General Máximo Gómez in Las 
Villas, analyzed U.S. actions in recognizing neither the Cuban Army nor Provisional 
Government with increasing alarm.  Some insurgent leaders saw in U.S. intervention a means 
of shortening the war against Spain while radical separatist leaders including the late José 
Martí and Antonio Maceo had long warned of the dangers attendant with North American 
                                                
 
511 For a succinct review of the historiography of Spain’s year of el desastre, the United States’ 
“Spanish-American War” and the Cuban guerra hispano-cubano-norteamericana see Duvon C. Corbitt, 
“Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba’s Struggle for Independence,” Hispanic American Historical 
Review 32 (August 1962): 395-404; Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of 
American Imperialism 2 vols. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); John L. Offner, An Unwanted War: 
The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1992); indispensable to any survey of the literature is Pérez, The War of 1898. See also, Tone, 
War and Genocide in Cuba, Preface, chs. 1, 2, 3, and 18. 
 
512 Freidel, 1, citing the U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom John Hay in a letter to Theodore 
Roosevelt; Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 282.   
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involvement.  Separatist leaders in exile, however, had lobbied the U.S. Congress to accord 
the Liberation Army belligerent status.  The radicals wanted to rely on their own efforts to 
defeat the colonial regime, while many exiles and some soldiers in Cuba favored North 
American support, forming an influential body of what historian Lillian Guerra has termed 
“pro-imperialist nationalists” that undercut any unified nationalist responses to what historian 
Victor Kiernan has named the United States’ proselytizing and missionary “anticolonial 
imperialism.”  The United States, for such pro-imperial nationalists, was a model to be 
emulated, an incontestably powerful ally to be enlisted in ejecting Spanish control, even a 
deus ex machina to salvage or assure their political position postwar.  The separatist civilian 
leader Bartolomé Masó welcomed a “magnanimous” U.S. intervention as assuring the 
victory of Cuban arms.513  He later strenuously opposed the Platt Amendment, and the lease 
on Guantánamo Bay, but at the time, buoyed by the anti-annexationist language of the Joint 
Resolution and the Teller Amendment, he and other separatists overlooked any cross-
purposes and aims to United States government policy. In Oriente, General Calixto García 
ordered his forces to fully cooperate despite darkening misgivings about the onset of U.S. 
intervention.  For the time being, overtures of assistance and alliance were extended against 
the Spanish and their supporters.514  
On May 28, after the Spanish fleet of Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete had been 
sighted in Santiago’s harbor, U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Long cabled Commodore 
Winfield Scott Schley to remain in position off eastern Cuba. Also included in the 
                                                
513 Gott, 101.  
 
514 Collazo, I: 210-11.  
 277 
communication came the order “Can not you take possession of Guantanamo [and] occupy as 
a coaling station? [sic]”515  
By 7 June 1898 U.S. Admiral William Sampson ordered McCalla to assist the 
converted passenger liner St. Louis in cutting the transatlantic cables as part of the blockade 
of the island.516 The St. Louis and the tug Wompatuck had earlier been driven from 
Guantánamo Bay by hostile fire from shore and the tiny Spanish guardacosta gunboat 
Sandoval.517 The Marblehead together with the schooner-rigged auxiliary steamer Yankee 
bombarded the “antiquated” Spanish sand fort situated at the narrowest choke point of the 
inner bay at the peninsula of Cayo Toro and the fortifications of Caimanera.518 “The 
insurgents co-operated on the land side,” noted a press account.519 The U.S. ships could not 
maneuver in the narrows because of the forty-six “Bustamante torpedoes” or anti-ship mines 
that Spanish engineers and the crew of the Sandoval laid from the very day President 
                                                
 
515 Heinl, 19; Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba, 69. On the chronology and timetables of Cervera’s fleet 
and other movements, see Felipe Martínez Arango, Cronología crítica de la guerra hispanocubanoamericana 
(Havana: Cuadernos de Historia Habanera, 1950, reprint; Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1973), 66.  
 
516 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain (1899, reprint; Freeport, NY: Books for 
Libraries Press, 1970), 138, 172-174.  
 
517 Campaña contra los Estados Unidos: Partes de los sucesos ocurridos en Guantánamo desde el 
comienzo de la campaña hasta la capitulación. Abril a Julio 1898. División de Cuba/ 2a. Brigada – Ejército de 
Operaciones, in AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 5797, asunto 5797.1, pp. 4-22, 21 May 1898 report 
by General Félix Pareja. 
 
518 Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 275, citing Cándido Pardo González, La brigada de 
Guantánamo en la Guerra Hispano-Americana: Notas de mis cartera de campaña AGM-M, Microfilm, roll 60, 
correctly noted that the forts “defending the mouth of the harbor” did not impede the U.S. Navy. He wrote that 
the defenses at the mouth of the bay included relics from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
Unaccountably, he failed to address the sand fort at Cayo Toro with its armament, about which more later.  
Perhaps it is a moot question, since the Spanish were in fact quite outgunned with the arrival of the Marblehead 
and the Yankee.  Nevertheless, the sea mines emplaced at Cayo Toro were a curious omission since they 
certainly did impede any immediate U.S. advance on Caimanera or into the inner bay—the ensenada de Joa.  As 
for the Yankee, it was one among numerous civilian ships commandeered by the U.S. Navy during the war for 
use as auxiliaries: in this case, the Southern Pacific screw-steamer El Norte.  
 
519 “All Cuban Cables are now Severed,” Brooklyn Eagle, 9 June 1898, p.1.  
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McKinley had declared the blockade around Cuba in late April.   The U.S. flotilla’s heavy 
bombardment chased the outgunned Sandoval into the mouth of the Guaso River at the upper 
part of the bay. The Spanish General Félix Pareja reported to his superiors that the Americans 
fired one thousand shells in six hours while the fort at Cayo Toro’s gun crews manning 
obsolete 160mm brass muzzle-loaders responded with five rounds and with a further eight 
from a more modern 90mm Krupp gun.520  The St. Louis cut the westbound cable to Santiago 
at 7:30 a.m.; the Marblehead’s boat cut the eastbound cable to Haiti and thence France by 
11:00.521  Obeying orders from General Calixto García, two Cuban officers including García 
                                                
 
520 The fort at Cayo Toro had a battery of three antiquated bronze muzzle-loading 6.4-inch (160mm) 
cannons, rifled with three grooves, and two modern Krupp rifled-guns – a 3.5inch (90mm) and another 3-inch 
(76mm) – in sand batteries. Two obsolescent muzzle-loading field guns guarded the minefield. During the battle 
for the bay the Spaniards apparently added some 80mm mountain guns from the seven based in Guantánamo 
City. Another battery of three muzzle-loading 6.4-inch rifles was emplaced at Caimanera along with bomb-
proofs, trenches, and the blockhouses built at the start of the war against the separatist insurgents. The Scottish-
built 117-foot Sandoval had a 57mm gun and a Maxim one-pounder automatic cannon and a crew of twenty-
one. Together with the forty-six contact mines or “Bustamante torpedoes,” these forces made up the sea 
defenses of Guantánamo Bay. McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 10-12. 
In 1892 Spanish military engineers had carried out elaborate survey work and military architecture 
drawings to design three modern forts, never realized or built, that would have placed the entrance of the bay 
under a formidable crossfire. The plans may be found in the AGM-M together with topographical maps, 
soundings and depth charts of the entire bay.  
 
521 The Spanish account of the cable-cutting operation and bombardment lists six wounded, two at 
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in AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 5797, asunto: 5797.1, doc. 3, p. 27-41, 30 June 1898. McCalla 
had performed a similar cable-cutting operation 11 May 1898 at Cienfuegos with the Marblehead, Nashville, 
and Eagle sending out crews in launches and boats with hacksaws to cut them. The ships fired shells and 
machineguns over their heads to suppress the Spanish positions, but ten U.S. sailors and marines in the boats 
were wounded, two fatally.  This action led to the largest number of U.S. Congressional Medals of Honor for 
the war being bestowed.  McCalla also delivered food, supplies, dynamite, arms and ammunition to Cuban 
insurgents from separatists in Key West after he exchanged intelligence with five Cuban soldiers who rowed out 
36 hours from the west of Cienfuegos. See McCalla, III: ch. XXI, 6-18. See also Willis Boyd Allen, Cleared for 
Action: A Story of the Spanish-American War of 1898 (New York, E.P. Dutton, 1899), ch. IX, which used the 
device of a letter exchange between a sailor on the Eagle, “Dave R.” and his sister “Annie, aka Anemone” to 
portray operations off Cienfuegos and gendered expressions of nationalism and patriotism on the U.S. home 
front; Evelyn M. Cherpak, “Cable Cutting at Cienfuegos” Proceedings – United States Naval Institute 113 
(February, 1987): 119-22. 
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Vieta joined McCalla to serve as liaisons between the insurgents under the guantanamero 
Pedro Pérez and the North Americans. 522  
 McCalla had also been ordered to land U.S. Marines on the eastern shore of the 
lower part of the bay to establish a coaling station and logistics base for the blockading navy 
ships.  Approximately a hundred marines from contingents aboard the Marblehead, Oregon, 
and New York landed to complete the destruction of the cable station and carry out a 
reconnaissance of possible landing sites while the main force disembarked from Tampa, 
Florida.           
Three days later, on Friday, 10 June 1898, 647 marines from the first battalion – one 
fifth of the entire U.S. Marine Corps, commanded by grizzled U.S. Civil War-veteran 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington, landed at Fisherman’s Point on the arid eastern 
shore of Guantánamo Bay from their civilian transport Venezuela, rechristened with the more 
bellicose name Panther.523  While the Marblehead, Yankee, and the Civil War-era monitor 
Yosemite shelled known and suspected Spanish positions, the U.S. troops burned the ruins of 
the fishing village, a Spanish blockhouse, and the French-owned telegraphic cable station as 
a precaution against yellow fever.  Later they erected a tent encampment around the ruins of 
the hilltop blockhouse dubbed “Camp McCalla,” raised the U.S. flag and naval ensign, and 
built entrenchments to protect it. As stated previously, this force constituted the first the 
United States landed in Cuba.  Amid the thorny scrub, cacti, and brush, the Americans were 
far from home. The army’s Fifth Corps destined for Santiago de Cuba was still milling in 
confusion and loading transports in Tampa Florida and their landing in eastern Cuba at 
                                                
 
522 Coletta, 92 citing Marblehead’s log; Heinl, 20. 
 
523 Heinl, 20, claimed the Panther, commanded by Civil War-veteran, G.C. Reiter was originally the 
S.S. Venezuela.  
 280 
Daiquirí and Siboney remained two weeks away; only the ships and the Windward Passage 
lay behind them; inland there were only unknown numbers of Spanish troops and, farther out, 
Cuban insurgents.524   
During the night of Saturday 11 June, starting about 5:00pm, the marines received 
their baptism of fire. Five hundred Spanish soldiers from the Simancas and Príncipe 
regiments and the Squadron of Santa Catalina, together with 100 reinforcements including 
irregulars from the sugar mill-town Romelié, attacked the beachhead during a rainsquall.525  
The Spanish could not spare more troops because they manned the numerous blockhouses 
dotting sugar mills, and much of the landscape, including those that had recently been 
reconstructed around the eighty-kilometer trocha around the llano and its cultivation zone 
from the period of reconcentration.  The attempt to defeat Cuban insurgency and restore the 
colonial regime had created an extensive architecture of outposts and communications that 
required a substantial garrison.   
                                                
 
524 North American accounts include John D. Clifford, “My Memories of Cuba,” Leatherneck 12 (June 
1929): 7, 54-55; Stephen Crane, “Marines Signaling under Fire at Guantanamo,” McClure’s Magazine 12 
(1898-1899): 332-336, “War Memories,” Wounds in the Rain (London: Methuen and Company, 1900), and 
“The Red Badge of Courage was his Wig-wag Flag,” reproduced in R.W. Stallman and E.R. Hagemann, eds. 
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La batalla, 60-64; Carolyn A. Tyson, ed., The Journal of Frank Keeler. Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 1898 
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from the Hatuey and Guantánamo infantry regiments and 1300 North Americans including the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps. See Sánchez and Campos, La batalla, 143-4. 
 
525 AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 5797, asunto: 5797.1, doc. 4, p. 41-50, 20 July 1898. It 
is likely that most of the personnel in the Squadron of Santa Catalina and irregulars from Romelié would have 
been pro-Spanish Creoles meaning that Cubans were involved as combatants on both sides.  
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The 600 Spanish regulars and local militia sent to dislodge the Americans began 
shooting from the thickets of brush and thorn-scrub in a night attack against the beachhead.  
The Spaniards were the first enemy using smokeless powder faced by the U.S. Marines, 
which made them difficult to spot; the marines responded to the harassing fusillade in some 
confusion.  They returned fire from field guns and rifle volleys, while signaling to the flotilla 
of ships for support.  The Marblehead and the dispatch ship Dolphin scanned the shore with 
powerful searchlights and fired their cannon. Smoke wreathed in the glare of the lights, 
lending an eerie quality to the scene.526  Journalist Stephen Crane wrote of “a thousand rifles 
rattling ... field-guns booming ... diabolic Colt automatics clacking” together with “the roar 
of the Marblehead coming from the bay, and, last, with Mauser bullets sneering always in the 
air a few inches over one’s head” – by which sound all knew the Spaniards were “on three 
sides of the camp.”527 In his memoirs McCalla recalled that from his vantage point on the 
Marblehead he bemoaned the lack of “fire discipline shown by the Marines, in the trenches 
on McCalla Hill” as the Americans shot at shadows, and responded to the distinctive sound 
of the Spaniards’ Mauser rifles with “a roar of musketry” so that “there was an almost 
incessant roll of rifle fire, mingled with the reports from automatic and three-inch guns.”528 
He estimated that in a single night the 650 Marines had “expended between thirty and forty 
                                                
 
526 The USS Dolphin was a three-mast schooner-rigged steel dispatch boat launched in 1884. Capable 
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thousand rounds.”529 A correspondent in the press dispatch boat Dauntless wrote that “given 
a free rein with repeating rifles, 500 nervous troops can waste 10,000 rounds of ammunition, 
killing shadows, in a single night, and not think even then that they have done much 
shooting.”530  
The following morning allowed the American invaders to survey the damage. There 
were nineteen wounded, a sergeant killed, and two dead marines – possibly victims of so-
called friendly fire.531 In addition, the popular navy surgeon John Gibbs had been killed 
outside his tent.532 The bodies of the two marines had been abandoned for a lengthy period 
and rumors and press dispatches initially misreported that Spanish irregulars had mutilated 
the bodies.533 The marines thought they had beaten off the attackers with heavy losses, but 
                                                
529 This trigger-happy behavior may have indicated panic from unseasoned troops in unfamiliar terrain. 
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Col. Enrique Thomas claimed, in Collazo, Los Americanos en Cuba, I: 213, that his men recovered the body of 
a marine sergeant and that Spaniards had taken his weapon and ammunition. 
 
532 It may be the death of either Gibbs, Sgt. Smith, or Sgt.-Major Goode that Crane wrote: “He was 
dying hard. Hard. It took him a long time to die. He breathed as all noble machinery breathes when it is making 
its gallant strife against breaking, breaking. But he was going to break. ... Ultimately he died.” See “War 
Memories” in Wounds in the Rain, 238 and Stallman and Hagemann, eds., 268.  
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Spanish reports indicate they had a soldier and sergeant from the Príncipe unit “mortally 
wounded” and twelve wounded or injured in the dark.534 The Spaniards settled upon such 
harassing night attacks, probing the lines for weak spots and denying their enemies rest in 
subsequent days. 
In view of the unsettled and perilous situation support was required. Marine Major 
Cochrane later “described the fight” to Red Cross official Kennan: He “said that he slept only 
an hour and a half in four days ... many of his men” were “so exhausted that they fell asleep 
standing on their feet”; indeed some marines under the harassing fire “slept only two hours 
out of one hundred and fifteen.”535  García Vieta, the Cuban liaison, agreed with McCalla 
that Cuban troops should reinforce the marines’ positions.536 
                                                                                                                                                  
533 Lurid and sensationalist accounts of the war included stories that insurgents obtained footwear by 
lopping off the feet from fallen soldiers and the like. The Brooklyn Eagle “Our Marines at Guantanamo” 13 
June 1898, p.6 reported the mutilation of privates William Dumphy and Charles McColgan, stating that the 
“dead were chopped with machetes and stripped of shoes” only to retract the story later. See “No Mutilation at 
Guantanamo.” 23 June 1898, p.6. Spanish records at AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 5797, asunto 
5797.1, doc. 4, p. 45, 20 July 1898 reported that two of three American outposts or sentries were killed by 
Spanish troops, and that their weapons, munitions, etc. were taken. This removal of equipment and the number 
of bullet wounds may have been the source of the mutilation rumors. The Spaniards fired on the conspicuous 
white tents throughout the night. Spanish Army casualty lists accompany this document. The U.S. Navy 
Department requested confirmation of the mutilation story, and Admiral Sampson replied: “I have to report that 
a careful investigation has been made and it is reported to me that the apparent mutilation was probably due to 
the effect of smaller caliber bullet fired at short range and I withdraw the charge of mutilation. SAMPSON 
[sic].” Brooklyn Eagle front page “Sampson Withdraws Charge of Mutilation of Bodies.” 25 June 1898, p.1. 
The same paper, in its retraction, published “Though we hear much of Spanish treachery, it must be owned that 
since the blowing up of the Maine our foe has conducted himself with the same courage and uprightness that we 
would have expected of the French or the Germans. ... It is a pleasure to know that we are not dealing with a 
people who resort to mean or underhand measures to gain their ends.” “No Mutilation at Guantanamo.” 23 June 
1898, p.6.  
 
534 AGM-M, Fondo: Documentación sobre Cuba, Caja: 5797, Asunto: 5797.1, doc. 4, p. 46-50 and 
accompanying casualty list, 20 July 1898.  
 
535 Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba, 71, 263.  
 
536 Allen, Cleared for Action, 233, cited a journalist who wrote, with some melodramatic hyperbole, 
“how long is this gallant company of first class fighting men [the marines] to be left to withstand assaults of 
four times their number...?” As we have seen, the Spanish garrison in Guantánamo was of formidable size, but 
the troops detached to the mouth of the bay were roughly equal in number to U.S. forces.  
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García Vieta was typical of Calixto García’s staff officers: white, highly educated in 
the United States, proficient in English.  An example of historian Guerra’s “pro-imperial 
nationalist” after his years of living abroad, he had been active in Cuban exile circles and the 
Department of Expeditions, arriving in Cuba on 30 May 1896 in one of the supply landings 
of the small wooden ship Three Friends.537 A medical doctor, he was first the head of 
military sanitation under General García before going back to New York to arrange the 
delivery of artillery supplies to the Liberation Army. In Cuba in May 1898, he had met with 
Enrique Collazo and U.S. General Nelson Miles’ emissary Lieutenant Andrew Rowan to 
facilitate coordination and collaboration between Cuban and U.S. forces.  Familiar with the 
United States and its dominant ethnic and class norms of masculine comportment, he was 
chosen to arrange collaboration between the insurgents in Guantánamo under the command 
of General Pérez. 
Such officers formed a means of bringing insurgent chiefs directly under García’s 
control and achieving unity of command while the insurgent headquarters moved closer to 
where the U.S. Fifth Corps intended to land at Aserraderos on the southern coast just to the 
west of Santiago de Cuba in the Sierra Maestra mountains. It also served to impose a white 
leadership on the racially heterogeneous eastern Cuban Army.  Social control prerogatives 
became remanifested as Spain’s defeat neared.  The higher education of these officials 
commended their advancement, but in many cases less educated black officers with longer 
combat experience and seniority of rank viewed their sidelining with disfavor.538 
                                                
 
537 Escalante, Jiménez, et. al.; García del Pino, 79.  
 
538 See, for example, Ada Ferrer “Rustic Men, Civilized Nation: Race, Culture, and Contention on the 
Eve of Cuban Independence.” Hispanic American Historical Review 78 (1998): 663-86 for an account of the 
black santiaguero General Quintín Bandera [also rendered as Banderas] being removed from command in Las 
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Cuban separatists had mobilized blacks and whites in pursuit of an equal citizenship 
in a common project of a future progressive Republic. In separatists circles, an inclusive and 
color-blind nationalist rhetoric cohabited uneasily with long-held racist notions from a 
presumption of inherent racial inequality to euro-centric norms of civility leavened by 
positivist and Social Darwinist doctrines, and among a few Cuban whites, even an imagined 
postwar “white man’s nation” resembling the separation and segregation practiced in the 
United States.539 As termination of the war neared, in ways subtle and explicit, the irregular 
forces attempted to adopt the trappings and manifestations of a fully constituted nation-
state—one in which white leadership patterns and prerogatives often became re-asserted. 
García Vieta relayed written orders to the white cobrero Colonel Thomas in Tiguabos that 
included the following: 
I must advise you that the troops and officers under your command will have 
the honor to cooperate with the brilliant American Army. Furthermore, the 
regiment that has disembarked here is the most brilliant of marines that they 
have; in consequence it is most important to correct any indiscipline among 
our troops. It is urgent that all together we leave a good impression and 
account of ourselves in the name of our beloved homeland. I do not refer to 
acts of valor ... I refer to details like salutes and other actions that are common 
among our troops540   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Villas for failing to prosecute the war with sufficient vigor, and for living with his mistress during this same 
later phase in the war. See also Scott, Degrees of Freedom, 152; Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 147, 202 on 
Bandera, and 69, 91, 94, 139, and 179-80 on racism in Cuba and within the social composition of the Ejército 
Libertador, see also Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 95. 
 
539 On racially egalitarian features of Cuban nationalism in internal opposition to racism, see Ferrer, 
Insurgent Cuba, and Helg, Our Rightful Share. See also the only extant memoir by a black mambí soldier, who 
served mostly in Matanzas: Ricardo Batrell Oviedo, Para la historia: Apuntes autobiográficas de la vida de 
Ricardo Batrell Oviedo (Havana: Seone y Alvarez, 1912). Note that while some scholars would characterize 
certain nationalist constructs as “racially inclusive” others would suggest that they could also rhetorically serve 
“racially evasive” ends. See also, Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 94-5, 139-41.  
 
540 Sánchez and Campos, La batalla, 68-69, cites Enrique Thomas’ diary of operations in Enrique 
Collazo, Los americanos en Cuba, I: 211-12.  
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The anxieties and sense of inadequacy among middle-class white Cubans interacting with 
North Americans and the disheveled and disorderly realities of their native land were keenly 
felt.  Crane later described Cuban insurgents – “a hard-bitten, undersized lot, most of them 
negroes, and with the stoop and curious gait of men who had at one time labored at the soil ... 
in short ... hardy, tireless, uncomplaining peasants” being “adjusted one by one at the 
expense of considerable physical effort” by Cuban officers with “an idea that their men must 
drill the same as marines.”541  
Officers such as García Vieta tasked with working together with the two allied armies 
were similarly awkwardly positioned before the technological might and professional 
organization and disciplined regular U.S. military in comparison with the penury and poverty 
of their own Liberation Army. In McCalla García Vieta had a sympathetic American 
interlocutor. The U.S. Navy captain was receptive when García Vieta suggested that men 
experienced with Spanish small unit tactics could be provided, but that the U.S. armed forces 
would have to clothe, provision and “give them arms and ammunition, as only a small 
portion [of Cubans] had rifles.” McCalla noted with satisfaction in his postwar memoir “co-
operation between us was most perfect.”542 
 Thomas carried out the order, and a group of insurgent veterans and men familiar 
with the waters of the bay were dispatched rapidly. After being armed by the navy, and 
completing a few hours of drill, Thomas—who had been an administrator at the Guantánamo 
sugar mill Santa María before the war—conveyed to McCalla through García Vieta that as 
“decided patriots” and “men of honor” he promised to change the situation within three days. 
                                                
 
541 Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 141-42. 
 
542 McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 2.  
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If not, it would “be because no Cuban remains alive.”543 The Spanish had regrouped and 
attacked again during the night and earlier in the morning, intending to seize or spike the 
U.S. Marines’ Hotchkiss field pieces and two machine guns.  Some advanced American 
pickets were cut off for a time and had to be relieved.544  A total six marines died: three Irish 
immigrants, one Canadian and two U.S. “American born and bred.”545 The marines shifted 
the campsite closer to the bay and supporting naval flotilla on the other side of the hill’s crest 
away from the Spanish line of fire.  Once again the artillery from the ships impeded the 
Spanish, who could not launch a heavier attack on the beachhead without risking prohibitive 
losses. They sustained one killed and twenty-nine wounded, but continued to fire desultorily 
on the U.S. encampment.546     
 The U.S. ships shelled the heights around and above the camp, driving off and 
scattering the Spanish troops there while the Cubans “dressed in the white duck clothes of the 
American jack-tar ... some” with new “shoes slung around their necks with a string” landed 
at Fisherman’s Point.547 They “quickly built themselves comfortable huts, from the palms 
and trees along the shore” before moving out as skirmishers and flankers in pairs, “burning 
the brush and undergrowth as they advanced.” 548  McCalla “felt great relief” because “the 
                                                
 
543 Collazo, I: 213; Sánchez and Campos, La batalla, 72. On Enrique Thomas’ pre-war position at 
Santa María, see José Sánchez Guerra, El azúcar en el valle de los ingenios guantanameros, 46.  
 
544 Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 171-72.  
 
545 “Marines are Safe,” Brooklyn Eagle, 15 June 1898, p. 1.  
 
546 AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 5797, asunto: 5797.1, doc. 5, p. 61-76, 20 July 1898.  
 
547 Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 141.  
 
548 McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 5-6. See also Sánchez and Campos, La batalla, 37 and Martínez Arango, 
74-75 and 154-155. These secondary works cite a 23 July 1898 speech at the parting of the allied force in which 
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Cubans with their knowledge of the ways of the enemy” augmented the U.S. troops: “The 
example of assuredness shown by the Cuban contingent” proved “beneficial ... after the night 
of the twelfth [of June], the fire control in camp, was perfect.”549 The value of Cuban 
reinforcements—“mostly negroes, with Cuban officers”—in “pointing out” Spanish “tricks” 
was noted approvingly in North American press accounts.  
Spanish dead recovered after night attacks were found wearing the issue straw hat and 
blue and white pinstriped rayadillo tropical army uniform, but during the day they adopted 
camouflage developed from the long irregular struggle against the Cuban insurgents.  
Spanish and Creole troops “wore scarcely anything except big plantain leaves bound around 
their foreheads in lieu of hats. ... an effective disguise in the bush.” While others were found 
“stripped to a pair of dirt colored trousers, [and who] tied branches around their waists, 
reaching shoulders high, ... they could even cross open ground without being detected” still 
others made screens “of two or three big palm leaves, almost impossible to detect where 
stunted palm everywhere rises out of the chaparral.”  In a post-war short story Crane would 
later write that the marines’ Creole opponents “had schooled from the Cubans insurgent to 
Spain. As the Cubans fought the Spanish troops, so would these particular Spanish troops 
                                                                                                                                                  
Commander Bowman McCalla, USN, commented that he could not thank the Cubans enough for their timely 
assistance to the American beachhead, avoiding a possible disaster in the face of harassing Spanish night 
attacks. 
 
549 McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 5-6. The Spanish were also loath to continue the attack because they lacked 
artillery while the Americans had heavy fire support from the ships. AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 
5797, asunto: 5797.1, Doc., 5, p.65-68, 20 July 1898. From an encampment near the Fifth Army Corps base in 
Tampa, Florida, Narciso González – a Cuban-American journalist of the Democrat paper The State of 
Columbia, South Carolina – wrote 15 June 1898 that “The cheerful idiots who a few weeks ago were boasting 
that one American could whip ten Spaniards, that the United States could wrest Cuba from the Spanish in a 
fortnight with 10,000 or 15,000 men, and who sneered at the long and patient operations of the insurgents, are 
beginning to be shocked, I observe, at the reported loss of four American marines [sic] at Guantanamo and at 
the fact that the Spanish made a 13-hour guerrilla fight against the landing party.” See Gonzáles, In Darkest 
Cuba, 57. [See photo “Hoisting the flag at Guantánamo, June 12, 1898.]  
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fight the Americans. It was wisdom.”550 The Cuban troops, “hawk eyed woodsmen, breaking 
even with the Spaniards in every device of bush craft” gained the confidence of the marines, 
who, “at first, were inclined to discount them. But this morning they spoke enthusiastically of 
the auxiliaries for their daring.”551 
 
 Fight at Cuzco Well  
The cooperation of the Cuban insurgents had other immediate benefits as well.  On 
the recommendations of the Cuban Colonels Thomas and Laborde, a combined U.S. and 
Cuban force, with assistance from the gunboat Dolphin, moved against the well at Cuzco – 
five miles southeast of the allied base, and the only water source within twelve miles of the 
eastern shore.  The plan of action called for the joint allies to destroy the well there in order 
to inhibit continuing Spanish operations against the base of operations at the bay’s entrance. 
With the well filled in, “an arid zone almost twenty miles wide between the enemy and the” 
Cuban and U.S. “base camp” would render further Spanish offensive actions much more 
difficult.552  On 14 June 1898, marine captains George F. Elliot of Company C, and William 
F. Spicer of Company D, and Cuban Col. Thomas led two hundred and thirty men – two 
companies of marines and fifty Cubans – in two columns, converging on the ruined estate 
defended by six companies of Spanish and Creole soldiers – five hundred in all – from 
Simancas, Príncipe and the Squadrons of Santa Catalina.  New York World correspondent 
                                                
 
550 Crane, “The Sergeant’s Private Madhouse,” in Wounds in the Rain, 147.  
 
551 “Ships Demolish Caimanera Forts,” Brooklyn Eagle, 16 June 1898, p.1.  
 
552 Crane, Wounds in the Rain, 251. 
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Crane accompanied the column as “sailor-clad Cubans moved slowly off on a narrow path 
through the bushes, and presently the long brown line of marines followed them.”553   
Scouts apprised the officers of the whereabouts of the Spanish troops in a valley on 
the other side of steep hills.  Both contending parties attempted to scramble to the high 
ground near Cuzco, but the Cubans and Americans reached it first, “tearing themselves on 
the cactus and fighting their way through the mesquite.”  “The brown-clad marines and the 
white-clad Cubans were mingled in line on the crest” of the dominating hill; “The marines 
were silent; the Cubans were cursing shrilly.”554 Firing along the line soon became general. 
Crane wrote “the rifle locks were clicking incessantly, as if some giant loom was running 
wildly, and on the ground among the stones and weeds came dropping, dropping a rain of 
rolling brass shells. ... Two hundred yards down the hill there was ... a thicket whose 
predominant bush wore large, oily, green leaves. ... alive with the loud popping of the 
[Spaniards’] Mausers.”555  
The Dolphin provided artillery support corrected by flag signalers in the sharp battle 
for the hilltop.  At one point, the Dolphin’s gunners began to shell unwittingly a marine 
position. Marine sergeant John Quick stood conspicuously on the crest line with an 
improvised semaphore flag made from “a blue polka-dot neckerchief as large as a quilt ... on 
a long, crooked stick,” thereby exposed to considerable rifle fire in order to communicate 
with the ship and correct its aim – a deed which earned him the Medal of Honor.556  
                                                
553 Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 142.  
 
554 Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 144.  
 
555 Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 145. 
  
556 Crane, Wounds in the Rain, 184-89; Heinl, 20, 95. 
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The U.S. Marines had been provided thoughtfully with khaki uniforms modeled on 
British colonial practice in India, but campaign hats were in short supply, and many had been 
left aboard the Panther. With only their round blue undress caps suitable for parade-ground 
drill available to curb the fierce Caribbean heat on “a blazing, bitter hot day” twenty-two 
marines and Captain Spicer himself “were prostrated by the effect of the sun.”  Crane wrote, 
“everybody’s face was the colour of beetroot and men lay on the ground and only swore 
feebly when the cactus spurs sank into them.”557 McCalla wrote that two Cubans were killed 
in the battle: one among the three wounded brought aboard the Dolphin died, while another 
reportedly died on the field, uttering the last words: “Viva Cuba Libre!” Two marines were 
wounded by Spanish fire.558  
Once again, as in repulsing the earlier night attacks, the artillery support supplied by 
the gun crews of the U.S.N. ships was too heavy for the Spaniards to withstand.  In the three 
previous years of irregular warfare, Cuban insurrectos had used their scarce ammunition 
parsimoniously. The use of artillery, especially in quantity, was unprecedented. Eventually 
groups of Spanish troops broke from the thicket and ran, exposing themselves to American 
and Cuban small-arms fire from the hill a few hundred yards away. “Cubans to the number of 
twenty chased on for a mile after” them, according to one of Crane’s accounts.559 The U.S. 
forces thought they had driven the Spanish back towards the city of Guantánamo and the fort 
at Cayo Toro “with a loss from forty to sixty killed and wounded; capturing one officer and 
                                                                                                                                                  
  
557 Crane, Wounds in the Rain, 250. 
 
558 Crane, Wounds in the Rain, 185; McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 6-8. McCalla repeated this story to George 
Kennan, see Campaigning in Cuba, 73. Clifford claimed that USMC losses at the “Battle of Cuzco Well” were 
five killed in action and eleven severely wounded, but this likely represented a conflation of total casualty 
figures for the campaign. 
 
559 Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 147.  
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seventeen men” – one of whom, it was claimed, said it was unfair for the Americans to “have 
shot so fast.”  Actually, while the Spanish had been ejected from the area, they reportedly 
sustained casualties of thirteen dead, and thirty-four wounded.  The eighteen captured were 
initially listed as missing [see photo “Spanish prisoners aboard collier Abarenda at 
Guantánamo June 14, 1898].  In field reports, the Spanish commander claimed his men 
eventually re-took Cuzco when it was abandoned by the allies, but noted that the well had 
indeed been destroyed, along with the heliograph tower communicating with Caimanera and 
Guantánamo City.   
As expected, this battle forced the Spanish to abandon the area near the base and 
fortify Dos Caminos to prevent possible enemy movement against Guantánamo itself.  
Spanish scouts could only operate in the vicinity of the U.S. positions burdened with several 
lengths of bamboo cut to hold two liters of water, on top of their regulation water bottle and 
wine-sack.  With “Cubans” going “far out in the chapparal” few would have wanted to be so 
encumbered.560 The U.S. Navy ships provided the allies – reinforced by a further hundred 
Cubans sent by General Pérez – with food rations and distilled water.561   
 Spanish forces retreated to Caimanera.  There they assisted in the evacuation of the 
civilian population to Guantánamo City aboard Brooks & Co. railroad trains, which had 
previously been removed from such an exposed position down the sixteen-miles of track 
                                                
 
560 “Campaign in Eastern Cuba,” Brooklyn Eagle, 19 June 1898, p.4.  
 
561 Accounts of the battle for Cuzco Well taken from Crane; Heinl; McCalla, III: ch. XXII, p. 6-8; 
Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 140-54; AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja 5797, asunto 5797.1 doc. 
6, p.77-86, 20 July 1898; Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba, 71-3. Also, see Murphy, The History of Guantanamo 
Bay, 4. Clifford’s brief 1929 account claimed North American casualties of five killed and eleven wounded, 
along with two Cuban dead and two wounded. See Tyson, ed., The Journal of Frank Keeler. Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, 1898, 16-18. Sánchez and Campos cite Spanish losses of thirty dead, seventy-two wounded, and twenty-
eight prisoners, Cuban casualties of six killed, nine wounded, and U.S. casualties of two dead, two wounded, 
and the twenty-three heat stroke cases. See Sánchez and Campos, La batalla, 77-8. 
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guarded by thirty-six blockhouses.  The battle for the lower half of the bay had been won by 
the U.S. Navy, Marines, and the Cuban Ejército Libertador.  The Spanish garrison remained 
in the forts surrounding Guantánamo City and various mill towns swollen with 
reconcentrados and refugees, and the cultivation zone ensconced within their reinforced 
trocha.    
The three year separatist insurrection tied down the 200,000-strong Spanish army in 
Cuba—noted by no less than U.S. General Nelson Miles in his retrospective of the U.S. 
Army’s performance in the field, but a decisive factor overlooked in much subsequent 
writing about 1898. Guantánamo suggested to some at the time that joint actions could also 
hasten U.S. victory.562  After the first week of fighting, the North American press noted that 
“General Peirce [sic, Pérez], commanding the eastern division of the insurgent army, called 
on Captain McCalla of the Marblehead yesterday [Thursday, 16 June] and reported that he 
had three thousand men, of whom twelve hundred would reinforce the marines in a few 
days.” The paper noted that the “insurgent forces, ... armed and equipped by Captain 
McCalla, not only prove to be daring scouts, but turn out to be brave fighters and good shots 
with the Lee-Metford rifles [sic, actually 6mm-caliber Model 1895 Winchester-Lee repeaters, 
and obsolescent single-shot .45-70-caliber Model 1873 Springfield weapons]. Our own men 
                                                
 
562 Schoultz, 140-1. The Guantánamo campaign and other instances of collaboration should qualify the 
statement “[Calixto] García agreed to provide covering fire if needed during the U.S. landing east of Santiago 
[i.e. Daiquirí and Siboney], but beyond that there was no joint activity.” Similarly, it is my contention that 
contra Tone, 274, that it is perhaps not “an exaggeration to say that Cuban forces had the Spanish ‘pinned 
down’ at Guantánamo or anywhere else in Oriente...” Tone asserted that Pareja could have moved his over 
7,000 men had he chosen to do so, and that neither the Cubans nor U.S. troops could have prevented it. He 
simply remained inert, passive, and on the defensive.  Tone noted that the Cubans prevented communications 
between the Santiago garrison, assailed by the U.S. Fifth Corps, from reaching Guantánamo.  That these 
communications precisely ordered Pareja to do just what Tone argued he could have done, had he decided to 
disobey his last orders, strike this writer as somewhat tendentious.  One could similarly counter-factually argue 
that the U.S. Marines, unassisted, would have prevailed in any case against Pareja’s Spanish troops.  Fair 
enough. But surely the campaign could have proved longer, bloodier, and with unforeseen developments arising 
without Cuban cooperation. 
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are warm in their praise and look for unexpectedly strong co-operation upon the part of the 
Cuban army.”563 Crane disparaged the Cubans’ marksmanship, claiming they could not “hit 
even the wide, wide world” but did not impugn their courage as he would later with the U.S. 
Army at Santiago: “As for daring, that is another matter. They paid no heed whatever to the 
Spaniards’ volleys.”564 A range of opinions appeared in Kennan’s dispatch: After “the 
marines were joined by eighty or a hundred Cuban insurgents” North American “opinions 
differ as to the value of the latter’s coöperation” with some speaking “favorably of them, 
while others said that they became wildly excited, fired recklessly and at random”—an 
                                                
 
563 “Campaign in Eastern Cuba,” Brooklyn Eagle, 19 June 1898, p. 4.  
 
564 Crane in Stallman and Hagemann, 146-7; Compare this statement with Crane’s notorious 
description of U.S. Army Fifth Corps officers’ and soldiers’ “most lively contempt” for Cubans operating near 
Santiago, 181-82. Crane’s opinion changed during the lull in fighting: “[At Guantánamo] Cubans built 
themselves a permanent camp and they began to eat, eat much, and to sleep long, day and night, until now, 
behold, there is no more useless body of men anywhere! ... So much food seems to act upon them like a drug. 
Here with the army the demoralization has occurred on a big scale. It is dangerous, too, for the Cuban. If he 
stupidly, drowsily remains out of these fights, what weight is his voice to have later in the final adjustments? ... 
The situation needs a Gomez. It is more serious than these bestarred machete bearers know how to appreciate, 
and it is the worst thing for the cause of an independent Cuba that could possibly exist.” This critical statement, 
of course, understated and reflected dismissive U.S. attitudes of the Cuban Provisional Government and 
Liberation Army, which lay behind the breakdown of cooperation and surely constituted a more profound 
source of demoralization that the sudden availability of food. The U.S. intervention itself had taken the “cause 
of an independent Cuba” out of their hands.  At a certain rupture, U.S. national interests proved incompatible 
with Cuban separatist goals. Cuban insurgents were often ill disposed to accepting a client role vis-à-vis their 
powerful and ambitious neighbors. In fact, Col. Thomas refused an overture of U.S. General Miles to provide 
the expeditionary force destined for Puerto Rico with interpreters and scouts. See Sánchez and Campos, La 
batalla, 94-5. And, it must be said, Crane’s and other North American’s disparagements rather ignored and 
understated the widespread privation and hunger within Cuban ranks. The USMC and Navy halted their 
offensive operations once the base was established, and the Cuban army lacked the heavier weapons to drive on 
the Spanish fortified positions on the llano. Therefore a lack of offensive activity came to characterize the wait 
for the war to be settled elsewhere on the Santiago front.  Attempting to smooth-over such conflicts, Kennan 
wrote of the Liberation Army that “As a whole, they have rendered good service, and it is much to be regretted 
that correspondents unable to distinguish between an army corps and a brigade, and to make allowances for 
differences of character and methods, condemn them as lazy and worthless. No doubt they do smoke cigarettes 
in the shade, consume a good deal of food, of which they have long had only too little, and that blankets and 
equipment left by the wayside do disappear, as they would under like conditions in New York. Their 
disinclination to work in the trenches and their inability to fight well in masses do, no doubt, tend to exasperate 
hardy and active soldiers from the North, unaccustomed to the ways of Spanish speaking peoples; but men who 
for three years have, under the most unfavorable conditions, resisted the great Spanish army cannot be wholly 
worthless” in Kennan, “Our Cuban Allies” New York Observer and Chronicle V. 76, No. 20 (July 28, 1898):  p. 
106.  
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attribute leveled at the marines as we have seen—“and were of little use except as guides.” 
After Cuzco well “Captain Elliot, who saw” the Liberation Army “under fire, reported that 
they were brave enough, but that their efficiency as fighting men was on a par with that of 
the enemy.”565  
The stage was set for the siege of the eighty-kilometer trocha around the llano’s sugar 
mills, with U.S.-supplied insurgents under General Pérez’s command pressuring the line 
from the west, and the U.S. Navy continuing to attack the sea defenses and build up their 
base.  The Spanish Army and Volunteers controlled the towns and zones of reconcentration 
via their hastily reconstructed trocha from the Ten Years’ War extending some 240 square 
kilometers, while small units of insurgents operated in the hills and on all sides of the 
plain.566  The Spaniards could not counterattack the invaders successfully without artillery. 
Meanwhile, the limited U.S. effort to establish a base and remove the seaborne defenses had 
largely succeeded, so the allies were content for the moment to reconnoiter Spanish 
positions.  For the U.S. Navy the militarily significant geography was the sheltered cove for 
warships at the lower part of the broad and deep bay. For the Spanish and their remaining 
adherents, it was the upper part of the bay, the llano studded with mill towns, and the land 
itself that constituted the prime objective. 
                                                
 
565 Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba, 73.  
 
566 A perhaps optimistic or idealized 240 square kilometer “post-reconcentration” Guantánamo 
“cultivation zone” (zona de cultivo) from late 1897 during the time of Weyler’s recall from Cuba, appears in 
AGM-M. Among a list of such zones throughout Cuba for reconcentrated civilians in Spanish held cantonments 
was one enclosing Caimanera, the Santa Catalina railroad to Guantánamo proper, the margins of the bay, and 
the sugar mills San José, Santa Fé, La Esperanza, Santa Isabel, and San Antonio de Redor found in the printed 
circular “ZONAS DE CULTIVO” in AGM-M, caja: 4204, Alzados y Presentados (1895-1898), exp. 2, no. 16, 
Ejército de Operaciones de Cuba-EMG, Presentados (A.G.), Auxilios que deben recibir en las fincas y zonas de 
cultivo.—Derechos y deberes. Mes de noviembre de 1897.  
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The overall U.S. theater commander General Shafter had studied the 1741 British 
debacle in attempting to take Santiago de Cuba by landing in Guantánamo Bay and then 
marching almost seventy miles overland.  His staff’s grave concerns with malarial and 
yellow fever outbreaks convinced them to land much closer to Santiago. The main U.S. 
Army and Navy attack would be directed forty miles away at eastern Cuba’s largest city and 
capital, Santiago de Cuba, the base where the bulk of Spanish troops and the Caribbean fleet 
were located.  That the Spaniards had also given some thought to the eighteenth-century 
battle was evident in the reinforcement of the Guantánamo garrison from 2,000 troops in 
October 1897 to double that number by November, and up to seven thousand men at arms by 
April 1898.567 Nevertheless, the sea defenses remained feeble and antiquated apart from the 
sea mines.  The Spanish garrison in the Guantánamo district remained cut-off in a pocket of 
their own making, harassed from without and effectively isolated.  Commentators then, and 
contemporary historians, have been baffled by the “timid, irresolute, or demoralized” 
behavior of the garrison: “If General Parrajo [sic, Pareja] had had a little pluck and self-
reliance, and had used his seven thousand men, as he might have” to attack General Shafter 
and the U.S. Fifth Army Corps “it might ... have changed the whole course of the 
campaign.”568  
 
                                                
 
567 Kennan, “The Regeneration of Cuba: V. A Few Days in Guantanamo” Outlook V.61, No.17 (April 
29, 1899): 957 [hereinafter cited as Kennan, “The Regeneration of Cuba.”]. 
  
568 Ibid; see also Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 274-76, who argues that while Spanish military 
institutions did not go to war with the United States convinced beforehand that defeat was a foredoomed 
inevitability, nevertheless ascribes “poor military performance” to “the lack of strategic imagination displayed” 
by officers. The Liberation Army and U.S. forces could not have stopped Pareja’s break-out “if he had tried” 
and therefore the isolation of the garrison was somewhat self-imposed.  The Spaniards themselves abandoned 
much of the countryside to the Cuban insurrectionists, as we have seen, and communications proved impossible 
between the isolated commands.  Thus, as will be seen, this narrative is at some variance with Tone’s analysis.    
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The Blockade 
Much abuse and severe criticism were heaped upon the Cuban Army, whose co-operation 
our Commanding General earnestly sought, before and after War was declared. I believe 
these strictures to have been unjust, and to have been made by superficial observers; or by 
persons who had a motive in disparaging the patriotic efforts, which the Cubans continued 
for many years in the hope of gaining their freedom.569  
-- Bowman Hendry McCalla. 
 
 At Guantánamo, your cooperation was so useful, in every way, that the task given to 
General Pérez by General García was made easy, and was crowned with success; 
principally owing to the base, which your ships gave to all our manoeuvres, which otherwise 
and perhaps with any other officer without your constant zeal and extraordinary tact and 
knowledge of the Cubans; the cutting off of the Guantánamo Spanish Forces would have 
been another lamentable source of unnecessary friction between Cubans and Americans...570 
-- Postwar letter from G. García Vieta to McCalla. 
 
 
The U.S. Navy lodgment secured from land attack, the ships of McCalla’s command 
turned their attention to the remaining shell-cratered and battered Spanish positions at 
Caimanera and Cayo Toro at the narrows between the lower and upper parts of the bay.  
American colliers and supply ships could begin to call at Guantánamo Bay, while the siege of 
Spanish forces, townspeople, and reconcentrated civilians grew ever tighter.  
At 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, the 15th of June, the day after the battle of Cuzco well, 
the Americans reduced and razed the remaining Spanish defenses of Guantánamo Bay, which 
had been hastily repaired since the bombardment of 7 June that accompanied the telegraph 
cable cutting and initial mine clearance operations.  The Marblehead, joined by the ill-fated 
Maine’s sister-ship USS Texas, and the lighthouse tender Suwanee, bombarded the fort at 
Cayo Toro and “the brick fort and earthworks at Caimanera.”571  Spanish after-action reports 
                                                
569 McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 1.  
 
570 Cited in McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 29.  
 
571 “Ships Demolish Caimanera Forts,” Brooklyn Eagle, 16 June 1898, p.1.  
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seeking commendations and medals for meritorious service, including for an officer 
convalescing from yellow fever who had returned to his post, indicated that the crews of the 
muzzle-loading guns managed to respond with six shells before they were knocked out, while 
the more modern Krupp fired only five.572 One of the muzzle-loader’s seventy-pound “lead 
studded shells” skipped like a flat stone across the water in front of the Marblehead. It 
continued “ricocheting slowly half a dozen times at shorter and shorter distances,” only to 
finally sink some ten yards from the ship’s hull. More alarmingly, the crew found that a snag 
picked up while the ship closed on Caimanera proved to be one of the Spanish mines.  It was 
hoisted aboard where it was discovered that the detonator had not been struck hard enough to 
set it off.573 The Texas similarly had a mine glance off its hull without exploding.574 
 While the U.S. flotilla destroyed the fort’s gun emplacements by 6:00pm, and 
damaged the piers and railway of Caimanera, the Spaniards’ land defenses around the llano 
of Guantánamo came under insurgent attack.  The nature of the Cuban attacks remains 
unclear, perhaps limited to volleys fired at blockhouses accompanied by shouted insults from 
emboldened hidden rebels; nevertheless they reinforced the defensive attitude of the Spanish 
and Volunteers manning the trocha.  The blockhouses afforded the Spaniards and Volunteers 
                                                
 
572 AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 5797, asunto: 5797.1 doc. 7, p. 95-107, 20 July 1898.   
 
573 McCalla, III: ch. XXIII, 17. [See photo “USS Texas, Spanish mine taken up in Guantánamo Bay”] 
Medal of Honor recommendations were ultimately made to four crewmembers of the Marblehead for mine 
clearance operations. See “Medal of Honor, announcement and recommendations for 4 crewmen of U.S.S. 
Marblehead for disarming harbor mines at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (S.l.: s.n.), 1898. Congressional Information 
Service, U.S. Executive Branch Documents, 1789-1909: no. N113-1.500. 
 
574 “Campaign in Eastern Cuba,” Brooklyn Eagle, 19 June 1898, p. 4. Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba, 
74, claimed that the firing mechanism of the mines was eroded and covered with “marine growth during their 
long immersion” but the photograph of the mine raised by the Texas does not indicate very many barnacles and 
the mines had only been in the water since late April.   
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protection from small-arms fire, but they surely knew that the increasing use of artillery by 
insurgents and the U.S. military in other parts of the island rendered them vulnerable.  
General Pareja’s last order before the cable had been cut on 7 June told him to defend 
and hold the Guantánamo region. Pareja could not contemplate dislodging the marines from 
their foothold without reinforcements and artillery.  In addition, such an offensive move 
implied the abandonment of much of his position. These same conundrums prevented any 
attempt to come to the aid of Santiago de Cuba later that month.575  The U.S. fleet wreaked 
havoc in the bay.  American weapons and equipment reinforced Pérez’s insurgents enabling 
them to press some land attacks.  On the 17 and 18 of June insurgents attacked the fortified 
ingenios Santa María, San Vicente and San Carlos; the Spanish reports expressed disquiet 
among pro-separatist sympathizers and reconcentrados within the towns with the insurgents 
so near, and with political conditions appearing to shift decisively against the continued 
viability of the colonial regime in the immediate future.576 
This siege characterized the situation in Guantánamo for the remainder of the brief 
war in the summer of 1898.  As the main forces of the U.S. Fifth Army Corps commanded by 
General Shafter besieged Santiago de Cuba in late June and early July, the Spaniards there 
attempted to contact in vain the seven thousand troops in Guantánamo to march to the aid of 
the capital of Oriente province. By 1 July the U.S. Fifth Corps launched a frontal attack 
designed to take the main city, but encountered stiff resistance at the stone fort of El Caney 
and the blockhouses and trenches at San Juan heights in Santiago’s outskirts.577 Spanish 
                                                
575 Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 276.  
 
576 AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 5797, asunto 5797.1, doc. 8, p. 137-212, 25 July 1898.  
 
577 Part of the U.S. Army’s motive in attacking Caney was to block a possible move from 
Guantánamo, which of course, did not occur.  
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resistance there was overcome, but the losses convinced Shafter to try to lay siege to the 
city—now brought within artillery range—where he calculated that lack of food and threats 
to bombard the town would force a surrender without further costly attacks, and (it was 
vainly hoped) before malaria, yellow fever, and other tropical maladies began seriously to 
deplete U.S. ranks in much the same way they had the Spanish over the years.  With the city 
and harbor within artillery range, captain-general Blanco transmitted orders for Admiral 
Pascual Cervera y Topete to attempt to break out of the U.S. blockade and run along the 
southern coast to Cienfuegos.  On 3 July, Admiral Cervera, knowing that the mission was 
practically suicidal, carried out the sortie rather than surrender the fleet without a shot fired.  
The entire Spanish squadron of four decrepit armored cruisers and two torpedo boat 
destroyers was smashed at a cost of 321 dead, 151 wounded and 1,813 sailors captured.578 
The U.S. blockading fleet that annihilated the Spanish ships trying to escape from Santiago’s 
harbor sustained a single fatality. Throughout these primary offensive efforts by the North 
Americans and Cubans against Spanish troops that would settle the outcome of the brief war, 
a similar siege took place in nearby Guantánamo.  
The U.S. sea blockade interdicted attempted communications coming by boat, while 
the Cuban insurgents intercepted and shot or hanged between ten and fifteen messengers as 
spies.579  As Santiago became surrounded, and the siege tightened, the commanders there 
                                                
 
578 Some standard accounts of the Santiago campaign from Cuban, Spanish, and U.S. sources include 
José Müller, Combates y Capitulación de Santiago de Cuba (Madrid, 1898); D. Víctor M. Concas y Palau, La 
Escuadra de Almirante Cervera (Madrid, 1900); Severo Gómez Núñez, La Guerra Hispano-Americana 
(Madrid, 1899); Dierks, A Leap to Arms: The Cuban Campaign of 1898; A.B. Feuer, The Santiago Campaign of 
1898 (Praeger, 1993); Freidel; Tone; Trask; Gustavo Placer Cervera, Guerra hispanocubanonorteamericana: 
Operaciones navales (Havana: 1997). 
 
579 McCalla, III: ch. XXI, 39. AGM-M, Documentación sobre Cuba, caja: 5797, asunto: 5797.1 doc. 
11, p. 146-7, 15 August 1898. See also “Campaign in Eastern Cuba,” Brooklyn Eagle, 19 June 1898, p. 4. 
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attempted repeatedly to signal the beleaguered garrison of Guantánamo, but to no avail. 
Cuban insurgents’ relatives apparently slipped information to their kin, or to political allies, 
providing intelligence on Spanish actions and social conditions. The Liberation Army also 
shared with U.S. forces the messages taken from the hapless couriers.580 Pro-Spanish spies 
and scouts supplied General Pareja’s command with intelligence, but the information often 
only confirmed the growing desperation of their position.  By 17 June, five days before the 
main Fifth Corps landings at Daiquirí and Siboney some fifteen miles from Santiago, the 
Oregon, St. Paul, and eleven auxiliary vessels and colliers joined the Marblehead, Dolphin, 
and Suwanee in the lower part of the bay.581 
The naval blockade around the island, combined with the shrinking area of Spanish 
control, combined to make food, never in good supply during the war, ever scarcer.  Cuban 
and U.S. forces were appraised of intelligence of growing desperation: “Advices received by 
Commander McCalla of the Marblehead, from the City of Guantánamo, show that the deaths 
from starvation there average fifteen daily. General Pérez ... has given up hope of succor, and 
the town could readily be taken were it worthwhile to risk the lives of the American troops” 
read one Associated Press dispatch by 8 July.582  For Spanish troops and inhabitants of the 
towns and mills at the start of hostilities between the United States and Spain there was little 
to eat but some rice, salt cod, and such local produce as coffee, sugar, and aguardiente.583 An 
                                                                                                                                                  
  
580 One such message translated to English appears in “Starving Spaniards, Only Enough Supplies at 
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informant was later to tell Kennan that “the supply of food became so reduced that a single 
tin of sardines and one pound of rice constituted five days’ rations.”584  The Spanish 
commander had ordered that soldiers who had been peasants and farmers before their 
conscription into the army should plant extra food crops and animal fodder in the cultivation 
zone, but by 20 June, six days after the battle at Cuzco well, the garrison went on half rations. 
After 27 June no bread or biscuit could be supplied, while the civilians under their 
control were reduced to worse levels of privation.  Theodore Brooks and the Spanish 
commander conceded free passage on the trains for civilians to the shores of the bay to fish 
and hunt for land crabs or the mambí staple, the jutía, to eat.  There was little to be had. 
During a postwar visit to Guantánamo, journalist and Red Cross official Kennan wrote: 
 Not only did [people in Guantánamo] eat horses, mules, and even dogs, but  
the poorer people and the reconcentrados were eventually forced to go to the 
woods and hunt for land-crabs, which, when caught, they brought back to 
their homes and made into a stew with grass, herbs, or such edible roots as 
they were able to get. Finally, when crabs began to be scarce and hard to find 
in the woods adjacent to the town, and when the strength of the half-starved 
crab-hunters had so failed that they could not walk to fresh fields or range 
over a wider stretch of country, the Caimanera Railway Company began to 
carry them to and from the more distant woods in a special free train ... At a 
stated hour every day six or eight hundred emaciated and half-starved people, 
with empty sugar or rice sacks slung over their shoulders, assembled at the 
railway station and took this train for the marshy woods and jungles near the 
head of the bay, where crabs were still comparatively abundant. ... There is no 
other instance, I think, in history where people living in a fertile and fruitful 
country, and in a town not attacked nor closely besieged, have been reduced to 
such extremities ... But the country around Guantanamo, fertile and fruitful 
although it was, had been reduced by Weyler’s reconcentration policy, and by 
the operations of the insurgents, to an uncultivated and uninhabited 
wilderness.585 
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In his memoirs McCalla reported that:  
the most popular duty among the Spanish soldiers was to be stationed at an 
outpost, quite near to the North shore of Guantánamo Bay, from which, at 
night, during our occupation, they could forage for, and eat the food thrown 
from our ships at anchor in the Bay, and which was left on the beach by the 
action of the wind and tide.586 
 
In a letter to his sister just before the 17 July Spanish capitulation to the United States at 
Santiago de Cuba, businessman Theodore Brooks described the grave lack of food. Hundreds 
of people had fled to the devastated countryside, nearly every palm tree had been cut down to 
extract and chew the heart of palm inside.587   Two days after the Spanish fleet under Admiral 
Cervera y Topete had been destroyed attempting to break out of the U.S. blockade of 
Santiago, on 5 July, Spanish troops in Guantánamo received no rations at all.  They resorted 
to green corn and the meat of their horses and mules.  A cable from Pareja to Blanco after the 
surrender concisely and depressingly clipped out: “Resources gone, embargo on commerce. I 
used horses, mules, green corn to feed forces. Privations all around, especially outer trenches, 
mortality rising terrible rate. From May end July 756 dead rising this month 400 result work 
[and] poor diet. Nine emissaries sent Santiago giving account situation hanged. I knew 
                                                                                                                                                  
585 Kennan, “Regeneration of Cuba: V. A Few Days in Guantanamo.” Use of the train for foraging 
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nothing until July 25 when I received order from General Toral to capitulate name of 
Government and Your Excellency. I obeyed lack of means subsistence.”588 
 The U.S. fleet dominated the entrance to Guantánamo Bay, from where the 
expedition to invade Puerto Rico on 21 July 1898 was organized, while the insurgents, few in 
number certainly, threatened the district except for the Spanish-controlled railway, sugar 
mills, and coffee plantations along with the towns of Guantánamo and Caimanera.  Militia 
guards at the Los Caños sugar mill, described by Theodore Brooks as “mostly colored men, 
and naturally one might say sympathizers with the insurrection” deserted the blockhouses of 
the plantation, going over to “the insurgents, carrying off everything they could lay their 
hands on on the estate.”589 Extreme privation, the scarcity of food and the continued spread 
of disease ravaged the population remaining under Spanish control until well after the 12 
August 1898 armistice between the United States and Spain that followed the surrender of 
Spanish forces in eastern Cuba at Santiago on 17 July.  
While the guards at the Brooks and Co. estate may well have been “sympathizers 
with the insurrection,” sensing that the political winds were blowing favorably for the 
separatists with the U.S. intervention, they may have thought that food was more available.  
News must have spread quickly that “from Point Leeward, twenty miles from the Cuban 
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Camp” the Americans not only “communicated with General Pérez; arranged for co-
operation” but also “landed food, medical supplies, arms and ammunition.” 590   
Well before the U.S. expeditionary force bound for Cuba had been assembled, Clara 
Barton of the Red Cross had proposed delivery of “food to the starving people of Cuba,” in 
particular the reconcentrados, “under the flag of the Red Cross, the one international emblem 
of neutrality and humanity known to civilization.”591 She had obtained “permission to take 
and distribute food to the suffering people in Cuba” from the Spanish government in Madrid, 
but had asked permission from the State and Navy Departments prior to asking Spanish 
authorities in Havana.  Rear-Admiral Sampson, however, in carrying out the blockade 
deemed it “unwise to let a ship-load of such supplies be sent to the reconcentrados,” because 
they might “be distributed to the Spanish army.”592 Both General Shafter and Admiral 
Sampson conceded to the Red Cross permission to relieve Cuban civilians and refugees 
behind US lines once hostilities commenced.593The Red Cross Steamer State of Texas landed 
near US Army Fifth Corps’ positions on June 25 and inquired of Sampson if conditions 
permitted them to begin landing supplies. He advised that the ship should go “to Guantanamo 
Bay, where Captain McCalla had opened communications with the insurgents under General 
                                                
 
590 McCalla, III: ch. XXII, 2.   
 
591 Letter quoted in Kennan, “George Kennan’s Story of the War: Under the Red Cross Flag” Outlook 
V.59 No.4 (May 28, 1898): 215.  
 
592 Quoted in ibid. 
 
593 For Shafter’s remarks, see Kennan, “George Kennan’s Story of the War: Introductory Letter from 
Key West” Outlook V. 59, No. 3 (May 21, 1898): 167. For Sampson and the Navy Department, see above.  
 306 
Pérez, and where” it was presumed the humanitarian organization “should probably find 
Cuban refugees suffering for food.594 
The Americans had seen the ragged and impoverished condition of Cuban insurgents, 
and the needs of civilian populations became evident as well.  The State of Texas “entered 
the beautiful Bay of Guantanamo about half-past five o’clock on Saturday afternoon” June 
26, and steamed past the “white hospital steamer Solace ... the Dolphin, the Eagle, the 
Resolute, the Marblehead, and three or four large black colliers from Key West.”595 The 
following morning Kennan of the Red Cross found McCalla—who he had met before the 
war—regaling fellow navy officers about the Marblehead’s narrow escape after being fired 
upon by the blockading squadron outside Santiago as a misidentified Spanish torpedo boat.  
In person, Kennan “almost failed to recognize” McCalla “in his Cuban costume” of 
“undershirt, canvas trousers, and an old pair of slippers.”596  McCalla had distributed “all the 
food he himself could spare” but thought that via the command of General Pérez, with whom 
he “was in almost daily communication,” supplies could be delivered to “a large number of 
people who had taken refuge in the woods north of the bay and were in a destitute and 
starving condition.”597 Prompt arrangements were made, and “a special courier from the 
detachment of Cubans then serving with the marines” took the Red Cross letter to Pérez.598  
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In his postwar memoirs, McCalla wrote of the distribution of “the first Red Cross supplies for 
the starving Cubans, in that part of the Island”:  
having been given by Miss Clara Barton, President of the Red Cross society, 
and Mr. George Kennan, who, owing to a suggestion from Admiral Sampson, 
had come to Guantánamo in charge of the steamer State of Texas, after vainly 
endeavoring to supply the suffering Cubans, at other places on the coast. The 
news of the landing of these provisions spread far and fast; people came from 
points ninety miles distant to obtain them, and as we had transported many 
tons, it is difficult to overestimate the great good that Miss Barton did at this 
time. Even after hostilities had ceased, mere skeletons of women and children 
found their way into Guantánamo City on foot, in quest of these supplies – the 
saddest evidence of the terrible straits to which they had been subjected during 
the last days of the struggle for freedom. Curiously enough, what was most 
wanted were salt and soap; then clothing for women and quinine; and my wife 
to whom I had written of these needs, was able to obtain large quantities of 
these necessities from friends, and from some of the merchants of Newport 
[Rhode Island], where she was ...whence they were transferred to General 
Pérez for distribution.599 
 
Clara Barton herself sent a telegram on 15 July from Guantánamo’s Playa del Este detailing 
the urgent need for provisions, clothing, and medicines for civilians streaming towards 
United States and insurgent lines.  Later, other centers for the distribution of relief supplies 
had been set up at El Caney, Siboney, and other towns surrounding Santiago.  She added that 
“Commander McCalla of the Marblehead called ... for 100,000 rations, medicine and 
clothing for the refugees in the woods and country surrounding Guantanamo.”600  
The understated but plaintive description of grim privation and widespread starvation 
could be generalized for other parts of Cuba after three years of war as well.  The Cuban 
separatists under Máximo Gómez often had vowed to raise the banner of a free and 
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independent Cuba even over ashes and ruin.  Such seemed the situation by 1898 indeed, 
except for the complication that the United States had moved in.  In the district of 
Guantánamo, neither warring side was strong enough to directly attack the other without 
reinforcements.  In the meantime, starvation and disease moved to force the issue.  
Developments in nearby Santiago de Cuba and the wider war soon overtook the local 
situation. 
 
The Spanish Surrender, U.S. Occupation, and Theodore Brooks 
Surrender negotiations with the U.S. military began 19 July in the midst of looming 
catastrophe from the lack of food and spread of disease.   As soon as General Linares at 
Santiago surrendered all troops in eastern Cuba to the U.S. General Shafter, a French cruiser 
– the Amiral Rigault de Genouilly, named after Napoleon III’s Minister of the Marine and 
Colonies who had led the invasion of Vietnam in 1858 – arrived to remove “indigent French 
subjects” trapped in Guantánamo.  The ship had been dispatched at the news that the U.S. 
Navy had severed the international cable to France.  Permission to take the French citizens 
was denied as was an attempt to supply their nationals with food, but the French Consul and 
the Catholic bishop of Guantánamo City who had come down from the upper part of the bay 
in the Sandoval’s launch were at least able to receive news reports of the surrender at 
Santiago.601  It may be that the French Consul informed the Americans of the conspicuous 
role he and the British Consul in Guantánamo had played in bringing the Little War to a 
close in 1880.  
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The Spaniards and civilians in the llano had but fifteen to twenty days of food stocks 
left when a U.S. launch under a white flag of truce opened surrender negotiations at 
Caimanera.  A host of ships had come and gone through Guantánamo Bay, including those 
bearing the captured Spanish sailors from Admiral Cervera’s hapless fleet to prisoner camps 
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  By mid-July there were large numbers of U.S. troops and 
ships gathered at the base in Guantánamo, including General Nelson Miles himself, preparing 
to steam to the new front in the Caribbean theater: Puerto Rico.  The main Spanish garrison 
defending Santiago de Cuba had surrendered.  During the ceremony, the U.S. forces refused 
to permit the entrance of Cuban troops into the city, which led to the resignation of General 
Calixto García after he wrote a sharp letter to the American commander in protest.602  
A delegation of Spanish officers accompanied by the British Consul, Theodore 
Brooks, went to meet Commander McCalla and later Rear Admiral William Sampson too, 
under a similar flag of truce from Caimanera. The U.S. officials showed the Spaniards 
foreign newspaper accounts describing the surrender, but General Félix Pareja demanded to 
receive a first-hand account directly from his headquarters, dispatching three officers to 
Santiago for verification.  After repeated refusals, the Spanish accepted an offer of food aid 
from the Americans, who delivered 559 bags of wheat flour by 24 July.603  General Pareja 
ordered these taken to Guantánamo where the town bakers made bread for distribution to the 
population.  Apparently an unscrupulous group among “the public bakers of Guantanamo 
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attempted to steal and sell for their own benefit a part of the very first flour that was sent to 
them to be made into bread for the relief of the hungry, sick, and dying people” but were 
prevented by one U.S. Lieutenant Frazer of the commissariat under Lieutenant-Colonel Ezra 
Ewers “who enforced his demands with a Colt’s revolver.”604 Postwar, the North Americans 
would determine that the death rate “among the townspeople increased from an average of 
195 per month in February, March, and April to 332 in July and 431 in August, while the 
death-rate among the Spanish soldiers in the overcrowded barracks was even greater.”605  
There was some indication that Spanish troops had not received any food since the 20th of 
July. Some were so weak they were allowed to sit while on guard duty. Others collapsed 
while trying to reinforce trenches.606 During the first months of occupation it was estimated 
that in the “summer months of July and August, 1898, there perished in the town and 
garrison of Guantanamo no less than 1,539 persons, or more than ten percent of the whole 
population.”607 
Illness abounded.  An Associated Press correspondent wrote that “To grim famine in 
Guantanamo City and its environs is added the ravages of yellow fever, which seems to be 
much more virulent in type than it is further westward,” adding that fatalities “from yellow 
jack average fifteen per day. This report is official and from Porez [sic, Cuban General 
Pérez] himself.”608  To all manner of tropical maladies such as paludismo or malarial fevers, 
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dysentery, and yellow fever was added smallpox and other contagions.  Still another press 
dispatch claimed “1,700 of the Spanish troops of the Guantanamo district are on the sick 
list.”609  As for the townsfolk, “the half-starved and enfeebled survivors” were unable to 
“care for the thousands of sick, or even to bury the dead, and the sanitary condition of the 
place became shocking beyond description.”610 
Meanwhile, the U.S. and Cuban forces were separated, foreshadowing the statecraft 
of Spain and the United States over Cuba.  The Spanish would not contemplate surrender to 
an insurgent force, one whom they had long dismissively termed bandits, but only to another 
recognizably state-organized power.  The United States desired the largest sphere of action 
possible, much as it had illustrated in the carefully worded declaration of war, unconstrained 
by considerations of belligerent rights, recognition of potentially radical political movements, 
or even, apparently, any possible interference generated by inclusion of the colonial subject 
peoples including Cubans, Puerto Ricans and Filipinos.  The exclusion would be long 
remembered.  The main Spanish garrison in eastern Cuba defending Santiago de Cuba had 
surrendered to the United States not the Cuban Liberation Army. At Guantánamo U.S. forces 
would take over the trocha from the Spanish, while the Liberation Army would remain in 
their camps in the denuded landscape of the manigua. The ouster and denial of the Cubans at 
Santiago would be replicated; the Spanish Army would surrender to the Americans only.  
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The Spanish waited for confirmation from headquarters. U.S. occupation forces readied the 
arrival of special “immune” troops out of the fear of yellow fever prevalent in the zone.  
Restive Cubans awaited the determination of their status by insurgent leaders in Cuba and 
abroad, amid the uncertainty of impending U.S. occupation. 
McCalla did not explicitly refer to the nature of the Spanish surrender and the 
sidelining of Cuban participation in his memoirs, but some of his statements suggest that 
disquiet was not wholly confined to Cuban ranks alone. Earlier, after the battle of Cuzco 
well, General Pérez had visited the Marblehead to meet and confer with the navy 
commander, and to review the Cuban troops he had dispatched to fight alongside the North 
Americans.  McCalla flew the Cuban flag from his ship’s mainmast, and greeted Pérez in the 
manner befitting a general, complete with “his men drawn up as a guard of honor.” Standing 
at attention, in their new uniforms, Pérez asked McCalla in jest “who” these mambises 
“were!”  McCalla complained that “sea lawyers” protested his actions “for in their opinion I 
had recognized a New Nation [sic], by thus honoring the Emblem, under which the Cubans 
had fought for so long – and they said that my action was in violation of International 
Law.”611  As the forces split up 23 July, McCalla gave a brief speech of thanks to the soldiers 
of the Liberation Army, remarking that although they arrived practically naked and unarmed, 
they had helped stiffen allied resolve in the face of a perilous situation.612 
Apparently cognizant of the diminution of the Cuban role and participation in the 
War of 1898 in postwar narratives, McCalla offered an assessment of the insurgents in his 
memoirs from the vantage point of his retirement from active duty: 
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  It is true that the Cuban soldiers were in rags. Many were without any  
clothing; ammunition was scarce; a large proportion were only armed with 
Machetes ... All were starving; and such food as they were able to obtain, 
consisted of edible grasses, wood rats [sic, jutías], wild fruits, and an 
occasional sweet potato. But their spirit and discipline were good; many of 
their officers were highly educated, accomplished in their professions and 
excellent soldiers. ... to be captured was certain death; - to be found ill in an 
extemporized hospital, by the Spaniards or the Guerrillas [irregular troops], 
was to be butchered in their hammocks; and their mothers, wives and 
daughters, surprised in their villages and camps, in the absence of their 
relatives, by this same soldiery, were brutally murdered, or suffered a worse 
fate ... the characteristic quality of courage cannot be denied to either the 
Cuban men or the Cuban women, who at all times, have encouraged and 
helped their soldiers, as women have done in all ages.613 
 
Further, using language similar to Garcías protest to Shafter, he wrote that Americans should 
consider how it would have been if, after Yorktown, the French had excluded the patriots for 
similar concerns as those expressed by Shafter and the Spanish Army.  As to the fears of 
reprisals and killings, he described that at Gibara, on the north coast of Oriente province near 
Holguín, that the Spanish had in fact abandoned their sick and wounded to Liberation Army 
forces under García; they were well cared for in liaison with the U.S. Navy commander of 
the Nashville: “all was satisfactory, until part of one of our Regiments of Immunes, from the 
south side of the Island appeared on the scene, several months after García’s arrival; they 
occupied the city, seized the Red Cross stores, and from want of tact and consideration, 
created confusion and distrust among the Cubans and Spaniards alike.”614  McCalla may have 
been venting against the army in the inter-service rivalry tradition to a degree in writing the 
statement.  He also might have been expressing a thinly veiled racism if the “immunes” in 
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question were black American troops.  But his rejection of the widespread disdain and 
disregard of Cuban insurgents contrasted with many standard U.S. accounts. 
The Spanish officers returned to Guantánamo from Santiago de Cuba on 25 July 
confirming the surrender.  Conditions in the capital were atrocious, but compared favorably 
with those prevailing at Guantánamo.615  Indeed, during the US occupation Kennan “was not 
a little surprised to learn” from Theodore Brooks and Colonel P.H. Ray that Guantánamo 
“although not directly attacked or besieged by the American army, suffered even more, 
perhaps, from hunger and disease than Santiago.”616  Three days later a small group of U.S. 
troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel P.H. Ray of the Third Volunteer Infantry and 
Lieutenant Colonel Ezra P. Ewers of the Ninth Infantry together with Lieutenant Colonel 
Bisbee of the First Infantry headed up the railway from Caimanera to Guantánamo proper 
before the main U.S. Army occupation troops arrived.617 In the meantime, the marines that 
had landed 10 June boarded another transport 5 August for duty off Manzanillo to the west.  
The marines would return to Portsmouth, New Hampshire by the end of the month.  By 8 
August, two companies of U.S. Army troops commanded by Lt. Col. Ewers took up positions 
along the trocha and railway between the insurgents and the mills and towns, replacing the 
Spanish garrisons that concentrated at the Confluente and Santa María sugar mills, awaiting 
ships to take them to Spain on the 1st of September.618  
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Previously, the Spaniards had disarmed and disbanded the numerous formations of 
Volunteers and irregulars, including the recently formed Hussars of Pando made up of urban 
merchants and shopkeepers, and the old Squadrons of Santa Catalina del Guaso who had 
enforced social control in the district for much of the century – both Spain’s control over the 
colony itself, and the maintenance of hierarchies within it.  The Cuban insurgent forces 
remained at camps close by, but were forbidden to enter the towns – where many insurgents’ 
relatives lived among Spaniards, Volunteers, and refugees alike – because of the same fear of 
reprisals that Shafter had argued at Santiago.  Spanish General Pareja seemingly played to 
this fear when he requested, without success, that Ewers deploy troops in the thirty-six 
blockhouses guarding the railway track between Guantánamo and Caimanera lest “the 
Cubans should attack the trains carrying the Spanish troops to their Transports [sic].”619  
It was during this period that Theodore Brooks of Brooks and Co. was appointed 
agent for the U.S. Navy.  His duties included accompaniment of Ewers to prepare for the 
U.S. occupation and the evacuation of the Spanish garrison.  In addition, when an irate 
McCalla discovered that the Spanish lieutenant of the Sandoval had scuttled his small ship 
rather than turn it over to the victorious Americans, Brooks provided him with sugar lighters, 
used to transport sugar from the railway pier to ships, to assist in raising and restoring the 
trophy vessel to seaworthiness.620  
Theodore Brooks’ enlistment by the U.S. military was a practical matter insofar as he 
was the head of the railway, and representative of several large estates, where, after all, much 
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of the civil populace had been relocated.  He had been regarded with suspicion by the 
Spanish military authorities and insurgents alike.  They had subjected his firm to increasingly 
ruinous demands for support and the payment of war taxes.  But as a result of his position 
between the warring sides he knew the local district as well as anyone, and had had dealings 
with key figures in the warring camps.  Then too, he spoke Spanish, French, and English, 
was Vice-Consul of Great Britain, and a nephew of Paul Brooks, who had been the last U.S. 
consular official for the district. 621  But his new role also gave concrete form to the passing 
of the regional elite from Spanish to United States hegemony and auspices.  The symbolism 
was reinforced with the triumphal entry into Guantánamo on 10 October, the thirtieth 
anniversary of Céspedes’ Grito de Yara at La Demajagua, of General Pérez—shortly to be 
appointed mayor by the U.S. authorities—and other insurgent leaders together with Colonel 
Ray underneath a victory arch constructed by Brooks & Co. to honor the uncertain beginning 
of United States occupation and future Cuban independence.622 As crowds variously cheered 
“Viva Cuba Libre! Long live General Pérez! ... the Liberation Army! ... the United States! ... 
absolute independence” and other cries, they melded with the din from the sounding of “the 
sirens of the Esperanza, San Carlos, Santa Cecilia, Santa Maria, and Confluente sugar mills” 
along with the steam-whistles of the trains in the rail yard.623  
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Also late in 1898, George Kennan of the Red Cross returned to see how the US 
military occupation was coming along. He had left the Santiago district’s war zone in August 
for New York, stricken with “calenture, or Cuban malarial fever.”624 His post-bellum arrival 
began much like that of Samuel Hazard’s 1860s antebellum visit in Chapter II.  His steamer 
entered Guantánamo Bay, “past the now abandoned camp of the marines on the hill back of 
Fisherman’s Point,” to lay anchor off “the wretched little village of Caimanera...seaport for 
the inland town of Santa Catalina de Guantanamo [sic].”625 He “was surprised to see such an 
amount and such a varied assortment of merchandise landed at Caimanera, for a town as 
unimportant—not to say insignificant—as” he “supposed Guantanamo to be” as the ship off-
loaded 275 tons of goods, while some passengers disembarked for the trip up the railway line 
to Guantánamo proper.  On their return “they were accompanied by Mr. Theodore Brooks, of 
the well-known and long-established Anglo-Cuban firm of Brooks & Co., and by Colonel P. 
H. Ray of the Third U.S. Volunteers.”626 Colonel Ray had enlisted after marching “eleven 
hundred miles up the valley of the Yukon” and commanded an “immune” regiment of troops 
mostly from Georgia and Louisiana.  
Like Hazard some three decades before him, Kennan’s return on “the steamer 
Thomas Brooks” from Santiago to Caimanera and left him to make the brief train trip, in this 
case with Lt. Colonel Wylly the US commandant of Baracoa, past “the dreariest, most 
unhealthful, and most uninteresting country” on another of the “hot, sunny days which are so 
                                                
 
624 Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba, 220-21; “The Regeneration of Cuba: I. Santiago de Cuba 
Revisited” Outlook V. 61, No. 9, (March 4, 1899): 497.  
 
625 Ibid.  
 
626 Ibid.  
 318 
common in southeastern Cuba” past abandoned blockhouses to the train station.627 He called 
on Ray and Ray’s wife for meals, as well as “Mr. Theodore Brooks” of “Brooks & Co., 
which has been engaged in business in Santiago and Guantanamo for three generations, and 
which owns or manages several of the largest sugar plantations in the province.”628 The 
Oxford-educated Brooks, “A man of high literary culture as well as of practical business 
ability” along with “his mother and sister, in a large and comfortably furnished house ... 
filled with evidences of English taste and culture” such as “a large and well-selected library 
of standard and modern books in English, German, and Spanish” told Kennan about life 
during “the insurrection, and” discussed Kennan’s travels, together with “books, art, music, 
Russia, the Santiago campaign, the Cuban character, and the Baracoa trail.”629  They related 
to Kennan important details of the catastrophe occasioned by the war, including statistics of 
civilian deaths, which appears in Table 5.1 below: 
Table 5.1 Deaths in Guantánamo Civil Population, April 1896-October 1898 
1896 
Date Total Deaths 
April 76 
May 66 
June 79 
July (Weyler’s first concentration) 131 
August (concentration) 174 
September 114 
October 89 
November 119 
December 117 
                                                
 
627 A composite of Kennan’s train trips, the first with Lieutenant Laird prior to his overland trip to 
Baracoa, and his later trip to Guantánamo from “The Regeneration of Cuba: II. A Horseback Ride to Baracoa” 
Outlook V. 61, No. 11 (March 18, 1899): 627, and “The Regeneration of Cuba: V. A Few Days in 
Guantanamo.”  
 
628 Kennan, “The Regeneration of Cuba: V. A Few Days in Guantanamo.”  
 
629 Ibid.  
 319 
Date Total Deaths 
Total in nine months 965 
1897 
January 111 
February 70 
March 79 
April 66 
May (Weyler’s second concentration) 100 
June (concentration) 134 
July 165 
August 187 
September (missing) No data 
October  125 
November 109 
December 164 
Total for twenty months 2,275 
1898 
January 158 
February 111 
March 104 
April 100 
May (establishment of U.S. blockade) 153 
June 209 
July (period of starvation) 332 
August (starvation) 431 
September (after American occupation) 70 
October (after American occupation) 50 
Total for thirty months 3,993 
Source: George Kennan, “The Regeneration of Cuba: V. A Few Days in Guantanamo” 
Outlook V.61, No. 17 (April 29, 1899): 957 citing record kept by Mr. Theodore Brooks, and 
furnished by him to the American Marine Hospital Service. 
 
Kennan wrote, “at the time of my visit there was still a great deal of sickness, suffering, and 
destitution” and that food aid in quantity was being distributed “to the indigent and the 
reconcentrados.”  He described the “condition of many of the children in Guantanamo” as 
particularly grave: 
I should have thought it impossible that childish faces—faces of boys and 
girls only five and six years old—could so completely lose every vestige of 
youthfulness, and acquire such an expression of apathy, debility, and 
decrepitude. ... pale, anaemic children, who could not have been more than 
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five years of age, but who looked like worn, sickly dwarfs of fifty. ... I have 
since seen, in other parts of Cuba, more emaciated children, and children 
nearer, perhaps, to death; but never elsewhere have I seen children with the 
five-year-old bodies and the fifty-year old faces of the children in 
Guantanamo.630 
 
In the countryside was evidence of gradual recovery. Kennan “was glad to see so many 
evidences of industry and thrift and so many indications that the rural population of eastern 
Cuba is slowly but surely getting on its feet.”  Many had “been robbed and harried almost 
incessantly for two years or more by both Spaniards and insurgents” but he was sure that 
“American administration and control” would allow Cubans to prosper.631  Like many 
Americans, including as we have seen, McCalla, his humanitarian impulses were often 
inextricably interwoven with a profound desire to exert “American methods of control and 
direction” forming a liberal humanist desire to promote reform, but also Kiernan’s 
anticolonial imperialism.  Kennan was gratified by evidence of agricultural production and 
economic activity from “diminutive donkeys laden with bags of charcoal or small bundles of 
firewood ... led into the city by half-naked children from palm-thatched huts in the bush” and 
black “truck-farmers, with baskets of lettuce, radishes, and string-beans on their heads ... 
from their little gardens four or five miles away” to the larger sugar enterprises of “great 
economic importance, and” source of “occupation to a very considerable part of the local 
population ... protected from the torch of the insurgents and ... now in active operation.”632   
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Conclusion 
Memory of hostilities in Guantánamo receded quickly with the coming of peace 
between the United States and Spain and the onset of the U.S. occupation.  McCalla and 
other U.S. troops were sent to the Philippines after February 1899 for the burgeoning post-
occupation conflict that assumed form as the Filipino-American War—understood at the time 
as the “Philippine Insurrection.”  The battle had begun with the Spanish military corralled 
within the trocha surrounding the arable and flat plain of Guantánamo with its large capital-
intensive sugar mills linked by rail to the shipping pier at Caimanera.  U.S. involvement in 
the war initially assumed the form of blockading the port, and later cooperating with 
insurgents in landing marines at the lower part of the bay.  At the time, North Americans 
were conscious of the role played by the Cuban Liberation Army in securing the outcome.  In 
later years, the Cuban role receded or disappeared from published U.S. histories.   
The battle proved somewhat peripheral to the outcome of the war itself, and the 
emphasis on operational histories rendered it all but forgotten apart from rather myopic 
lenses devoted to the immediate marine landings and the actual territory of the navy base 
itself.  U.S. Navy vessels used Guantánamo Bay as an important station throughout the war, 
and it served as the base of operations against Puerto Rico, but the U.S. occupation appeared 
unremarkable.  Precisely how the U.S. Marines knew that the estate of Cuzco contained the 
only fresh water supply, as but one example, or why the numerically strong Spanish garrison 
could not launch a more robust counterattack, and similar questions simply remained 
unasked, or explained handily by presumptions of Spanish incompetence, demoralization or 
timidity; the political and social aspects of the so-called “Spanish War” in the colonies where 
it was fought remained unexamined. For these reasons, the preceding chapter has offered a 
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chronologically driven military history through the lenses of a social and cultural historian, 
seeking to highlight overlooked aspects of this admittedly small part of the War of 1898. 
As peace negotiations between Spain and the United States were underway in Paris, 
without representation of the former colonial peoples themselves, much of “Uncle Sam’s 
‘Quaker colored’ [the leaden, oatmeal gray wartime paint scheme] war fleet” languished in 
southeastern Cuba, during which time it grew abundantly clear to many “officers of the 
North Atlantic squadron” that “there [was] not an anchorage [in the U.S. South or the West 
Indies] that can compare with” Guantánamo’s broad and deep bay.  The idea of retaining the 
bay in perpetuity by the U.S. Navy gained adherents among officers immediately.633 
Their opinions apparently were a consideration to Alfred Thayer Mahan and the 
Naval War Board who sent a 15-20 August 1898 report to Secretary of the Navy John Long.  
Between Santiago and Guantánamo Bays “the Board” found it “very difficult to choose ... it 
suggests that before a decision is reached” about which inlet to retain as a coaling station, 
“the advice of officers experienced in entering and using both harbors be taken.”634 Mahan 
urged, “it must be remembered that the Windward Passage, between Cuba and Haiti, is the 
great direct commercial route between the whole North Atlantic coast and the Isthmus. No 
solution of the problem of coaling and naval stations [for the U.S. Navy] can be considered 
satisfactory, which does not provide for military safety upon that route.”  As a result, when 
“Cuba becomes independent, the United States should acquire, as a naval measure, one of 
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these ports, with a portion of adjacent territory.”635  The Board recommended four coaling 
stations in the Pacific, with a further two acquisitions near Central America’s isthmus and a 
further two in the Caribbean.  At the time, Guam, Manila, Subic Bay, and/or all of Luzon in 
addition to one of the Chinese islands near the mouth of the Yangtze River, and Pago-Pago in 
Samoa were included as the desired locales in the Pacific.  On the Pacific coast of Central 
America an island in the Gulf of Fonseca “belonging to the Republic of Salvador” or two 
sites in Costa Rica would be forward operating bases near a future canal.  On the Caribbean 
side, Almirante Bay was mentioned, while in the Caribbean Sea, the “east end of Cuba, 
embracing Santiago or Guantanamo Bays, and preferably including the Bay of Nipe,” and 
lastly, either St. Thomas in the Danish Virgin Islands, Samaná Bay in the Dominican 
Republic or Culebra Island—in short, the Windward and Mona Passages.636  In 1910 as the 
trans-isthmian canal neared completion, and while a retired McCalla was writing his 
memoirs in California, Mahan wrote from Long Island that in a possible future conflict a 
“fleet pivoted on Guantanamo covers effectually the whole Gulf coast” and that “having 
regard to the military, commercial, and industrial interests” of the expanding United States 
“and to its security, there are five principal naval positions to be maintained as naval stations: 
New York, the Chesapeake, Guantanamo, Puget Sound, [and] Guam” along with the 
additions of “Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, and Key West.”637   
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<><><> 
On 1 September 1898 Spanish authority and sovereignty left the Guantánamo region 
as the soldiers departed along the very railway built by slave and indentured labor in the 
1850s to transport agricultural exports from the district’s plantations.  This last garrison had 
been built up progressively to contain the separatist insurgency that had disrupted the earlier 
pattern of colonial social control based on maintenance of racial hierarchy, and a specialized 
militia oriented to slave patrols.  After the resumption of armed conflict between separatism 
and integralism both contenders demanded allegiance from the region’s denizens.  The sides 
attempted to exert control over society, and their efforts intruded into most facets of life, 
work, and culture.  The rapidity with which conditions of food crisis and disease emerged in 
1898 indicated the degree to which the island had been despoiled by the conflict prior to 
North American intervention.    
With peace, a period of recovery and rebuilding could begin, but since it coincided 
with the U.S. military occupation and the resultant formation of Cuba as a quasi-independent 
nation state or U.S. protectorate, the questions of social control and restarting export 
production once again came to the fore.  Insurgents had disrupted and largely halted 
production as a plausible means to achieve nationalist ends: the liberation of the island from 
Spain.  The questions of labor, social order, and production loomed large for the region’s 
elite.  The difficulties and solutions to these dilemmas are explored in the following chapter 
on postwar recovery, heavy U.S. investment, and nation-state formation in the early twentieth 
century. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER VI: 
 
CONCLUSION—“On Trial Before the World”: 
Social Control and Public Violence in the Mediated Republic 
 
Señor Perez, the new Mayor of Guantanamo, called upon Gen. [Leonard] Wood and 
reported his experience during the first day of his Mayorality. Gen. Wood said to him in the 
course of the interview: 
“You Cubans are now on trial before the world, and you must show what you are able to do 
in the matter of self-government. The Americans would be pleased to give a stable 
Government to Cuba in the course of a twelvemonth. Let us see if the Cubans are able to 
govern themselves, or if it will be necessary to make some other arrangement…” 
—“General Wood’s Inspection Tour” New York Times, 12 November 1898638 
 
Cuba is going to offer the last great industrial opportunity of this century, and so 
soon as the Spanish flag ceases to float there tens of millions of money and tens of millions of 
men will rush to its exploitation. In my judgment Americans, and not the Cubans, will be the 
greater gainers. The Cubans will satisfy their sentiment – they will have liberty, but the 
Americans will make the money. 
—Nestor Gener Gonzalez, 26 May 1898.639 
 
The Republic of Cuba last May [May 20, 1912] was in the throes of a lawless 
uprising that for a time threatened the destruction of a great deal of valuable property—
much of it owned by Americans and other foreigners—as well as the existence of the 
Government itself. The armed forces of Cuba being inadequate to guard property from attack 
and at the same time properly to operate against the rebels, a force of American marines was 
dispatched from our naval station at Guantanamo into the Province of Oriente for the 
protection of American and other foreign life and property. The Cuban Government was thus 
able to use all its forces in putting down the outbreak, which it succeeded in doing in a 
period of six weeks. The presence of two American warships in the harbor of Habana [sic] 
during the most critical period of this disturbance contributed in great measure to allay the 
fears of the inhabitants, including a large foreign colony. 
—William Howard Taft, 1912 State of the Union Address. 
 
 
                                                
638 “Gen. Wood’s Inspection Tour” NYT, 12 November 1898, p. 3. 
 
639 Nestor Gener González, In Darkest Cuba, 52. 
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Guantánamo emerged from the grip of thirty years of anti-colonial revolutions and 
entered the twentieth century under U.S. military occupation.  Some Spaniards retained 
control of political offices, while others came under the purview of certain ex-insurgent 
leaders such as Pedro Agustín Pérez.  Colonel William Ray, the U.S. official responsible for 
the district, appointed Enrique Brooks as head of the Rural Guard, a constabulary designed to 
serve in parapolice functions in some ways similar to the recently disbanded Squadron of 
Santa Catalina.640 Pérez assumed the role of mayor after the departure of Spanish forces 
September 1, 1898.641 A small force of Cubans and Americans jointly occupied the battery in 
Guantánamo Bay temporarily, while some twenty Cubans and the Cuban flag were posted at 
the main fort in Guantánamo.  On 11 November, the U.S. Governor of the Military 
Department of Santiago, General Leonard Wood, who would govern all of Cuba for much of 
the 1899 to 1902 military occupation after replacing General John Brooke, made a tour of 
inspection of the district, visiting the town of Jamaica and two sugar plantations recently 
vacated by Spanish troops and now under U.S. military supervision, and where he made the 
comment in the epigraph of the chapter above to Pérez.642  He entertained suggestions from 
the U.S. Third immune regiment that they be allowed to play an American football match 
against U.S. soldiers based in Santiago, quoting the “Duke of Wellington that the battle of 
Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton.”643 His visit encountered “not only the 
                                                
640 Expediente manuscrito que contiene la relación de los jefes, oficiales, clases y soldados del Ejército 
Libertador que desempeñan empleos en la administración municipal, entre los que se encuentran el mayor 
General Pedro A. Pérez ocupando el cargo de alcalde municipal y el tte. General Emilio Giró Odio, como 
recaudor, Guantánamo, Marzo 3 de 1899, in AHPSC, GP, leg. 515, no. 31, año: 1899, materia: Ejército 
Libertador, contains the list and salary of Liberation Army veterans employed by the municipality.  
 
641 Theodore Brooks to his mother, 9 August 1898; BPL, Letters of Theodore Brooks.  
 
642 NYT, 12 November, 1898, p.3.  
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fearful effects of the last three years of internal struggle, but also the prosperity that is 
gradually returning.”644  According to the brief New York Times article, Wood was headed to 
Jibara, but Rebecca Scott found that on 14 November, the Santiago de Cuba Rural Guard had 
a fatal skirmish with Louisiana African American “immune” volunteers in San Luis over the 
theft of a pig that necessitated the urgent return of the American general.645  Guantanameros 
faced prodigious difficulties that had arisen from the devastation and grim consequences of 
the war.  In much the fashion as after the earlier revolutions, motivations centered on access 
to adequate food and wage labor, as Rebecca Scott has written.646 
The prevailing social conditions were frightful, and the ability to revive production 
would prove to be slow and halting. As soldiers demobilized, and the reorganization of 
production was contemplated, the sheer scale of destruction and impediments to recovery 
became apparent.  Eventually, other U.S. forces from the 8th Cavalry and the 5th Infantry 
regiments arrived later to bolster U.S. authority, spread thinly though it was.  These forces 
remained on occupation duty as part of the overall 1899-1902 occupation of Cuba until 1900, 
when the 10th U.S. Negro Cavalry replaced them for the last two years of the first American 
intervention in the island.647  
As may be seen, Cuban War of Independence came to an end with a potential social 
revolutionary component directed against area landowners curtailed by the U.S. presence and 
                                                                                                                                                  
643 Ibid.  
 
644 Ibid.  
 
645 See Scott, Degrees of Freedom, 175-78.  
 
646 Scott, Degrees of Freedom, ch. 6.   
 
647 Letter of George Leland Dyer to his wife, 19 March 1899, p.4, Eastern Carolina University, J.Y. 
Joyner Library, Manuscript Collection; George Leland Dyer Papers, Record Group 340, Correspondence, folder 
#340.14. Hereinafter cited as ECU.  
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the realignment that transpired in its wake.  A conflict in which insurgent tactics against 
property, both human chattel and access to fertile farmland, developed over the course of 
separatist wars in the 1870s had been refined and used to great effect against Spain in a 
destructive colonial war by the end of the nineteenth century.  Final, outright victory had not 
come about, however, after Cuban insurgents' three-years' efforts and the culmination of 
thirty years of struggle.  Instead, the end-result was imposed from without through the 
intervention and occupation of the United States.648 It would be inevitable that the problems 
assailing the early formative years of state formation at the outset of the republic would be 
viewed as missteps out of kilter with the promises and aspirations that had served as 
motivations during the dark, dismal years of warfare. 
A painful recovery began.  The U.S. authorities swiftly demobilized the Cuban 
Liberation Army, paying veterans $75 dollars for turning in their rifles.  In place of the army, 
U.S. officials put a carefully vetted Rural Guard in its place.649  The United States military 
would assume the primary role of defending Cuba, particularly as the 1901 Platt Amendment 
that placed significant constraints on the exercise of sovereignty by an independent Cuba 
                                                
 
648 On the U.S. occupation see Collazo, Los americanos en Cuba; Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-
American War and the Birth of American Imperialism; Helg, ch. 3; Gott, 104-112;  Sir Harry Johnston, “An 
Englishman’s Impressions of American Rule in Cuba” McClure’s Magazine New York (September 1909): 496-
505; Pérez, Cuba Between Empires; Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 188-217; “Insurrection, 
Intervention, and the Transformation of Land Tenure Systems in Cuba, 1895-1902” Hispanic American 
Historical Review 65 (2), (1985): 229-254; “The Pursuit of Pacification: Banditry and the United States’ 
Occupation of Cuba, 1889-1902;  Thomas, Book IV. 
 
649 For the Cuban Rural Guard see Allan R. Millett, “The Rise and Fall of the Cuban Rural Guard, 
1898-1912” The Americas, V. 29, No. 2 (October 1972): 191-213. The disbandment of the Cuban Liberation 
Army, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Lords of the Mountain, 63 and Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902, especially 
chs. 12-13 for the dissolution of the insurgent military and ch. 18 for the creation of the Rural Guard. Insurgents 
were obligated to turn in guns to receive cash payments and other assistance during the early occupation. A list 
of 216 firearms handed over may be found in Expediente manuscrito relativo al estado demostrativo de las 
armas del Ejército Libertador existentes en Guantánamo, que por orden de la secretaria de estado y gobernación, 
deben ser remitidos al chief adenaunce [sic, ordenance?] office de Stgo. de Cuba. Guantánamo, Septiembre 11 
de 1899, AHPSC, GP, leg. 515, no 9, año: 1899, materia: Ejército Libertador. 
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went into effect.  It was a sign of protectorate status to North Americans.  For many Cubans 
it would be a sign of intermeddling by the colossal neighbor to the north.  The coastal 
artillery batteries designed by Spain to defend Havana harbor would suffice for Cuba’s 
military forces: the U.S. occupiers organized an artillery unit for that purpose.  Cuba would 
shelter behind the U.S. fleet, according to this U.S. Navy strategic view, operating from the 
Guantánamo coaling station as an important forward base in the Caribbean basin and 
guardian of the future Panama Canal.  In the countryside, however, insecurity was rife.  
Rumors circulated—and were given continual substance—about groups of insurgents, 
bandits, and ex-integralist irregulars refusing to disarm and return to civilian life. Bands 
would kidnap people for ransom, set fire to cane fields, extract the payment of protection 
money, and destroy property.  The destructiveness of the insurgent economic warfare policy, 
the armed general strike against production, and property destruction tactics, loomed large in 
the minds of area planters gripped with uncertainty in the new order.   
In Guantánamo in late December 1898, not too long after General Wood’s brief tour 
of the district, Lt. Col. Ray encountered a conflict with a Cuban subordinate, Colonel 
Francisco Valiente, “Chief of Gendarmerie” who was accused of lax security over arms that 
had been diverted into the hands of bandits: 
 Major Harris, representing Lieut. Col. Ray at Sagua de Tánamo,  
…[promised to supply rations to Valiente, who] turned over to several Cuban 
Captains  the … rifles that were stacked by his men when they were disarmed. 
[…] Col. Ray says the course taken by Col. Valiente explains the existence of 
the troublesome bands of robbers who have infested the district around 
Guantanamo. In one case a Cuban Major went so far as to order the 
proprietors of a sugar estate not to grind. Col. Ray sent a company of United 
States troops to guard the estate, whereupon the Cuban Major took to the 
woods with a band of men, who ever since have been robbing and pillaging 
estates near by. As a result of this condition of things Col. Ray’s entire 
regiment, with the exception of two companies, is now scattered about the 
country guarding private property.  
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Col. Ray told Valiente he had the names of several prominent Cubans 
who had censured Valiente for turning over his arms to Cubans. Valiente 
replied that he had the arms under guard, and would keep them safe until it 
was seen what the United States would do. [Ray] intends to mount some of his 
own men and to capture the robber chief. Meanwhile, except on the guarded 
estates, work in his district is practically at a standstill.650   
 
The social control concerns that had persisted through the early nineteenth century with slave 
resistance through flight into the inaccessible interior, the rise of banditry, and finally, the 
emergence of anti-colonial insurgency persisted.  In 1899, an Associated Press correspondent 
tried to debunk the unsettling stories of insurgents refusing to disband and go back to work in 
an article “Cuban Canards. Untruthful Reports of Disturbances in Guantánamo – Thousands 
of Insurgents at Work”: 
There has been rumors [sic] of organized bands of insurgents refusing to 
disarm, of some of them banding together for the purpose of burning the cane, 
and so on, [. . .] Even prominent business men residing in Guantanamo, of 
American sympathies, owning large estates in the country, have been led to 
believe that their plantations are in danger, and have asked Col. Ray for 
protection.  [. . .] A visit to the plantations themselves, and long talks with the 
managers and with ex-insurgent officers, give convincing proof that there is 
practically no trouble worth mentioning in the district of Guantanamo. One 
plantation alone, that belonging to the Brooks Brothers at Soledad, managed 
by Ernest Brooks, employs some 500 men, every one of them was in the 
insurgent army. These men seem perfectly contented with their lot, and from 
what Mr. Brooks and his assistants say, are only too happy to be once more 
earning their livelihood. At other plantations within a radius of ten miles of 
Guantanamo there are in the neighborhood of 5,000 ex-insurgents at work, 
and nine out of thirteen are convinced that the reports of trouble are entirely 
without foundation.651  
 
Nightmare visions of property destruction and insurgent mobilization continued for some 
time, being given continual substance by repeated deliberate fires at different estates.  In 
                                                
650 “The Guantanamo Bandits.” NYT, 26 December 1898, p.2.  
 
651 Newspaper clipping, Correspondence of the Associated Press, “Cuban Canards: Untruthful Reports 
of Disturbances in Guantanamo – Thousands of Insurgents at Work.” n.d. Found in Letters of Robert Mason, 
BPL.  
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several cases, unemployed veterans and former pro-Spanish irregulars turned to banditry.  
Property destruction had been a drastic means to achieve political ends: the overthrow of 
Spanish colonialist control and the establishment of a Cuban Republic.  Now, with the 
independence envisioned thrown into doubt with the nature of the post-war settlement, and 
U.S. occupation amid continuing hardship in the region, disillusioned armed men employed 
property destruction for their own private uses, extorting ransoms through threats against life 
and property.   
 Whatever worry existed about banditry was greatly magnified in contemplating 
continued political unrest and the potential challenge to elite prerogatives aroused by popular 
mobilization during the war.  Cuban separatists had created a rebel army to attack private 
property as the most direct means of defeating Spanish political control.  The United States 
intervention frequently gave pre-war elites an escape hatch from any post-war redistribution 
or reckoning with small holders, peasants and mill workers that may have arisen.  Fears of 
expropriation were voiced in private conversation.  While having his hair trimmed in early 
1899 in Santiago de Cuba, the North American Navy officer George Leland Dyer talked with 
Theodore Brooks about their shared dim views of an independent Cuba.   
[Theodore Brooks] is much concerned about the condition of affairs in Cuba. 
He with all others having interests here, does not know what to do. He even 
says he would prefer to this uncertainty to have the Americans withdraw and 
let the surely ensuing conflagration commence. Then the American 
sentimentalists and emotionalists would see the utter futility of the attempt at 
self government by the Cubans and interfere with a strong hand. I agree with 
him. . . . We will clean the island, get the finances in order, suppress 
brigandage, and [start] a comprehensive system of public works and then we 
will see. I don't care a cent for the island or its worthless inhabitants, . . .  Mr. 
Brooks wants to go ahead and plant cane and introduce some more machinery 
into his mills but he dares not and all others are in the same position, others 
who have interests. The mass which has no property want us to leave to give 
them a chance to make the property owner divide. There is the possibility of a 
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very ugly state of affairs growing out of this early attempt to establish a Cuban 
gov’t. and the uncertainty the situation imposes.652  
 
This idle barbershop conversation revealed the grave misgivings, even disdain, shared by 
both North Americans and many regional elites towards Cuban self-government and the 
potential disruption of the resumption of work and investment.  As it happened, the sugar 
mills of Guantánamo restarted cultivation and production greatly hampered by the 
destruction wrought by the war, the almost total lack of domesticated animals, and a scarcity 
of almost everything but able to gradually repair the links of the sugar enclave with infusions 
of outside capital. 
By 1900, as planters continued to revive sugar production, eleven of Oriente's twenty-
four reconstructed sugar centrals were within the region of Guantánamo.653 Sugar mills 
reassumed a central role in the economic life of the district, and were an important source of 
wages, even if miserly, for many of the regions inhabitants.  And as in the 1880s, coffee 
cultivation and production began again, although it would remain a shadow of what it had 
been previously until later in the twentieth century.654  For now, sugar would reemerge as the 
commanding heights of the district’s agricultural export economy.  In this, Guantánamo 
shared a postwar trend where principally enormous U.S., but also other foreign investment, 
would remake eastern districts, especially the terrain around Manzanillo, Holguín, the Bay of 
                                                
652 Letter from George Leland Dyer to his wife, 1 April 1899, pgs. 5-7, ECU, Manuscript Collection; 
George Leland Dyer Papers, Record Group 340, Correspondence; folder #340.14.  
 
653 Hoernel, “A Comparison of Sugar and Social Change in Puerto Rico and Oriente, Cuba: 1898-
1959,” 84.    
 
654 Expediente que contiene un inventario de los rendimientos y costos de los cafetales de la provincia 
de Oriente. Además tiene informes de la producción de café y cacao del termino de San Luis, in AHPSC, GP, 
leg. 176, no.9, año: 1901-1902, materia: Café. 
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Nipe, and Camagüey.655  This transformation of land tenure frequently meant the 
dispossession of rural peasants from eastern districts, as sugar and other agribusinesses, 
frequently vast in scope, engrossed much of the arable, readily cleared, farmlands.  In the 
case of Guantánamo, U.S., French, and Spanish investors would implant early on atop the 
pre-existing sugar enclave built up in the late nineteenth century.  Guantánamo Bay would 
become a strategic asset of the United States for hemispheric defense, exercising control over 
the Panama Canal once it was completed by 1914, and for intervening in Cuba and other 
Central American and Caribbean island nations.  The land at the lower part of the bay would 
be negotiated as site of the United States Naval Station, formally negotiated as paragraph 
seven of the Platt Amendment agreements curbing Cuban sovereignty in 1901 and additional 
treaty arrangements in 1903.656   
Postwar land speculation, the American Guantánamo & Western Railroad Company, 
and the acquisition and merger of several Brooks and Company estates by the new 
Guantánamo Sugar Company (GSC) by 1905 exemplified the transformations underway in 
the early Cuban republic.  The enormous sugar-trust of B.H. Howell & Son—the National 
Sugar Refining Corporation of New Jersey (NSRC), in turn, controlled the North American 
GSC, which was grafted onto the roots of the early sugar enclave built up since the creation 
of the railway connection to Caimanera by Brooks and Company in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Under President James Howell Post and its Vice President Theodore Brooks, the 
former manager of the Anglo-Cuban Brooks and Company, the Guantánamo Sugar Company 
as part of the NSRC reflected a local manifestation of a new resultant hybrid in Cuba: part of 
                                                
655 Hoernel, “Sugar and Social Change in Orient, Cuba, 1898-1946.”  
 
656 Gott, 111.  
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what historian César Ayala has termed “the American Sugar Kingdom” of the twentieth 
century.657 Table 6.1 below shows the first sugar harvest in Guantánamo after the end of the 
first U.S. occupation, just before the onset of the GSC acquisitions. 
Table 6.1   Guantánamo Zafra of 1903-1904 
Sugar Mill Owner Arrobas of 
cane ground 
Sugar  
sacks 
Arrobas Sugar 
from 
syrup 
Total Sacks Total  
Arrobas 
Confluente  J. Sánchez de 
Toca 
869,200 6,760 85,852 759 7,519 95, 491 
Esperanza E. Brauet 
& Co. 
4,700,535 33,323 426,534 3,560 36,883 472,102 
Isabel Sucesión 
Jorge 
Nariño 
[Brooks & 
Co.] 
5,900,000 48,999 621,287 2,910 51,909 658,244 
Los Caños Brooks & 
Co. 
2,159,840 14,100 180,480 2,250 16,350 209,280 
Romelie Brooks & 
Co. 
3,903,989 30,879 302,163 3,179 34,058 432,526 
San Antonio Luis 
Redor 
3,686,900 27,100 346,880 3,900 31,000 396,800 
San Carlos José 
Gorgas 
2,120,120 11,100 140,970 1,815 12,915 164,020 
Santa 
Cecilia 
Arturo 
Simon 
1,500,000 11,375 145,600 2,443 13,818 176,870 
Santa Maria Fernando 
Pons 
2,050,000 14,242 120,911 1,938 16,180 195,523 
San Miguel Suc. J. 
Bueno Y 
Co. 
2,038,100 13,360 170,911 2,100 15,460 207,791 
Soledad Brooks & 
Co. 
5,764,600 43,990 558,673 2,700 46,690 592,963 
Source: AHPSC, GP, leg. 304, no. 1, año: 1904, materia: Centrales. 
 
 
 
                                                
657 César J. Ayala, American Sugar Kingdom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 
80-81. See also Zanetti and García, Sugar and Railroads, 232-233. The NSRC also controlled the New Niquero 
Sugar Company, and the enormous Cuban American Sugar Company, who operated the largest sugar mills in 
the world during the first decades of the twentieth century—the Chaparra, and Delicias in Puerto Padre—that 
“produced 77,246tons and 68,413tons respectively” and along with Central Boston and Preston of the United 
Fruit Company were the four largest mills in twentieth-century Cuba. See Ayala, American Sugar Kingdom, 
208-210.     
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<><><> 
The story began with colonial ruling class social control concerns.  In southeastern 
Cuba, the crown created a militia geared for slave patrols and paramilitary functions, the 
Escuadras de Santa Catalina del Guaso, or the Squadron of Guantánamo to inhibit and 
control slave flight and rebellion, and thus destroy internal rivals and the prospect of possible 
challenges to colonial rule and social control. This rural gendarmerie came into conflict 
against the first Cuban insurrection in the nineteenth century, becoming a counterinsurgent 
militia.  As Cuba recovered from that protracted struggle, and capital-intensive sugar mills 
extended in the region, a former commander of this unit went over to the Cuban separatists, 
becoming a local insurgent chief by the 1895-1898 renewal of armed conflict.  The U.S. 
occupation authorities, in turn, appointed him the first mayor of the city of Guantánamo, a 
post he held during the 1912 peasant rebellion or “Race War” when the recently constituted 
Cuban Permanent Army, the Rural Guard, and regional militia violently suppressed rural 
society and manifestations of political rebellion in the early years of the Cuban Republic.      
This dissertation has argued that the social control over this remote, sparsely 
populated frontier district relied on a variety of enduring structures.  Among them were racial 
constructs and forms of racial oppression that privileged persons with salient European 
features as “whites” over persons with African features as either “non-white” or “of color” or 
even “black.”  These racial constructs, once legacies of slavery and its social relations in the 
Caribbean and wider African Diaspora, have proved persistent and frequently pernicious.  
Social control initially centered on maintaining control over the colony against imperial 
interlopers during the period of rivalry in the Caribbean by European empires.  In this setting, 
with its emphasis on military security, people of color could achieve advancement as an 
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indispensable social control stratum.  When the French Revolution led to the St.-Domingue 
slave uprising and resultant Haitian Revolution, the free population of color in eastern Cuba 
became subject to greater scrutiny and urgent attempts at control.  As the model for colonial 
Cuban society and economic prosperity followed the exploitation of African and Creole slave 
labor cultivating, harvesting, and processing agricultural exports, and replacing Haiti as a 
leading sugar and coffee producer, the geographic peculiarity of the Guantánamo region led 
to the establishment of a rural militia as a prop for planter authority and Spain’s imperial 
control.  Guantánamo remained a small backwater, but its emphasis on slave-based 
development, originally in indigo, cotton, coffee and sugar like Ste. Domingue, but 
increasingly just coffee and sugar, made it distinctive in comparison with other districts of 
Oriente that maintained a more diverse picture of variegated land tenure patterns, types of 
farms, and cattle ranching.      
The paramilitary militia, reconfigured during the rise of colonial plantation 
agriculture within the island as a whole, and in the immediate vicinity of southeastern Cuba 
to suppress maroons, became a counterinsurgency unit for the Spanish during the first wars 
of independence, and also operated against the endemic banditry encouraged by the terrain 
and demography of the zone.  And yet, eventually, some of the locally prominent rebel 
leaders would stem from this same body of militia.  That first war of independence did much 
to overturn and disrupt slavery, first in the coffee sector, later, and belatedly in the sugar 
mills of the district.  A contention of this study is that an optic geared to a regional level in an 
understudied part of Cuba allows historians to recapture a keener texture of how local 
divergences within the overarching history played out during the waning years of Spain’s 
control and the rise of Cuban nationality during the thirty year process of independence. 
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Guantánamo would remain an understudied and peripheral region that would elicit 
little sustained attention from scholars.  Seemingly of little relevance to the overall trajectory 
of Cuban historiography with its emphasis on western sugar monoculture, only its geography, 
the presence of the all-important bay, and the U.S. development of the naval base there 
generated much scholarly interest.  Little about the immediate hinterland of the base 
appeared remarkable.  The base itself drew numbers of British West Indians as laborers in a 
twentieth-century inter-Caribbean migration pattern.  As seen in Chapter V, the story of U.S 
entry into the bay, and the Cuban War of Independence, was rather more complex than the 
military histories of 1898, with their emphasis on U.S. action and agency, might suggest.  In 
fact there was considerably more Cuban involvement, both in crucial provision of 
intelligence and support, but in other dimensions of collaboration as well.  And Cuban 
integralists resisted the intrusion of the North Americans alongside the Spanish in much the 
same fashion that they had long assisted in the suppression of separatist and black political 
rebellion.  The base itself would become a salient component of U.S. strategy in the 
Caribbean, from planning against European rivals, to a role in securing the trans-isthmian 
canal, to future interventions by the United States in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, and Cuba itself.  In 1912, U.S. Marines would take the train from Caimanera 
under the command of Colonel Lincoln Karmany to Soledad and other sugar mills during the 
violent suppression campaign known as the “Race War.”658 
On 20 May 1912, the tenth anniversary of Cuba’s belated independence from the 
United States—thirteen years after separation from Spain—a small independent black 
political party, the Partido Independiente de Color (PIC), outside the established Liberal and 
                                                
658 “Fighting in Cuba; U.S. Marines Go” NYT, 24 May 1912, pp. 1-3.  
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Conservative party system that had arisen during the U.S. occupation, ill-advisedly launched 
an “armed protest” against the proscription of the party by a law passed by the black Liberal 
senator Martín Morúa.659  Leaders of the party included two veterans of the lengthy struggle 
against Spain from the War of Independence: Pedro Ivonnet and Evaristo Estenoz.  Police, 
the Rural Guard, and the post-1909 Permanent Army, supplemented by volunteer militia 
quashed the rebellion swiftly at the behest of José Miguel Gómez, the Liberal Party president 
of Cuba who viewed it as a threat to his term of office and a possible incitement to bring 
about unwelcome U.S. intervention.660 Soldiers were dispatched to Oriente from Havana in 
warships under the command of José de Jesús (“Chucho”) Monteagudo.661 Quite apart from 
the revolt of the Independientes, elements of peasant insurgency came to characterize 
responses to the outbreak in Guantánamo.  As has been recently argued by Rebecca Scott, it 
was the salient black majority in regions of the east such as San Luis, Alto Songo, El Cobre, 
and Guantánamo, that lent them the character of serving as a potential enduring base of 
support for the party.662  It was in the east, in areas north of Santiago de Cuba, and 
surrounding the cuenca of Guantánamo where the response of military, police and militia to 
desultory instances of looting, fires against public buildings, stores, and shops, and cases of 
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assaults and cane fires were met by an indiscriminate response by roving groups of 
government forces that killed between 3,000 to 6,000 mostly black orientales even though 
some of the adherents to the rebellion were mixed-race or whites. In Oriente, the underlying 
social and economic sources fueling rebellion were separated from the immediate racial and 
political causes of the Independiente revolt. They were rooted in the drastic transformations 
occurring in the war-ravaged landscape during a steep rise in the birth rate in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, and declining access to small properties during the land 
speculation and infusions of foreign capital and expanding monoculture during the period.663 
The long rebellious history of Oriente in the nineteenth century, from the palenques 
of fugitive slaves to the thirty-year independence struggle, and into the twentieth century had 
a salient influence in the Cuban state’s responses to the region when rebellion again seemed 
in the offing.  While the tragic events and appalling massacre of 1912 have received much 
recent scholarly attention, this study suggests that the social control concerns elicited by the 
region and the sheer destructiveness of the preceding decades clearly influenced the Cuban 
government response, particularly when the national leadership and many people at the 
provincial level were veterans of the wars of independence. It is therefore the case, as George 
Reid Andrews has recently written, that the massacre of 1912 certainly was terrible, but it 
was, perhaps, unsurprising that the Cuban government “resorted to such savage repression to 
put down the rebellion” when  
with the arrival of U.S. sugar companies, the stakes at play in such rebellions 
were higher than ever before. Peasants in arms threatened not just public order 
and security; by placing in jeopardy tens of millions of dollars in foreign 
investments, they directly threatened Cuban national sovereignty as well. 
During the years of the export boom, the United States sent troops repeatedly 
                                                
 
663 Pérez, “Politics, Peasants, and People of Color,” 509-539.  
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into Caribbean nations, including Cuba. The most frequent justification for 
those interventions was the protection of American economic interests, and a 
peasant rebellion aimed at U.S.-owned sugar companies obviously endangered 
such interests. The Gómez administration therefore had to repress the revolt 
immediately and remove the threat of future such uprisings.664 
 
In preparing to not only destroy the PIC for rebelling against the authority of the government, 
and extirpate the threat posed to the newly constituted republic by rural rebellion with a long 
nineteenth-century lineage, old racist stereotypes and notions of savagery and barbarism were 
consciously employed to justify the actions of the military and volunteer formations, but also 
the actual memory of lived experience through the war of 1895-1898 clearly played a role.  
For it was not just the ideology accompanying the daily structural violence of slavery and 
economic exploitation that had carried over into independent Cuba, but also the total war that 
had seen competing forces target civilian supporters of the enemy, burn villages, and torch 
properties.  If the events of 1912 in Guantánamo implicitly were a denouement of leveling 
and redistributive aspirations carried over by black Cubans from the independence struggles 
that many of them had sustained during the armed struggle, they also drew on the legacies of 
continuous resistance to attempts to enforce social control and exert highly unequal power 
relations over the land and its residents.    
                                                
664 Andrews, 132.  
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1. Mapa histórico de Carlos Manuel de Céspedes: Centenario de su caída, 1874-1974. 
(Havana: Imprenta Federico Engels, BNJM, ANC, 1974). The tree and gear wheel at La 
Demajagua appear on the left, the plantation bell appears to the right. 
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2. Cafetal Isabelica.  This nineteenth-century cafetal, abandoned in the Ten Years’ War, had 
a dotación of approximately 40 slaves. It is located at Gran Piedra to the east of Santiago de 
Cuba. Today the site forms part of the UNESCO World Heritage Slave Trade project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s collection, summer 2003. 
 
3. Arms of Guantánamo, “The most illustrious and loyal ayuntamiento of Guantánamo” 
adopted in 1870.  It depicts a beehive surrounded by sugar cane, tobacco, and coffee.  
Source: Author’s collection. 
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4.  St.-Domingue, “Ancient mill of the French for crushing the exterior covering of the 
coffee berry.” Source: U.S. Congress. House. Production of and Trade in Coffee. 
 
 
5. Coffee pulping mill, Cafetal Isabelica, Santiago de Cuba.   
Source: Author’s collection, summer 2003. 
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6. Santa Catalina, District of Guantanamo, Cuba.—From a Painting by Captain P. 
Jackson.  Source: Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization V. XIII, No. 627, New York 
(Saturday, January 2, 1869), 13. 
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7. Octagonal towers for Guantánamo, 1874. 
 
 
Source: AGM-M, 059-070. América Central/ Cuba no. 12727 Torres octogonales para 
Guantánamo. Año: 1874.  
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8. Spanish Blockhouse from Cuba’s Wars of Independence, Central Argeo Martínez 
(formerly Esperanza).  Source: Author’s collection, summer 2003. 
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9. Ruin of San Ildefonso, site of surrender of Guillermo Moncada and José Maceo, 
Little War, 1880, Guantánamo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s collection, summer 2003. 
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10. Map of Isabel Sugar Mill, ca. 1880 (Brooks and Company). Neighboring estates 
appear around numbered cane fields and other lands. A blockhouse appears on western bank 
of river NW of batey.  Source: Author’s collection. ANC Mapoteca. 
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11. Upper part of Guantánamo Bay, showing railway from Caimanera to Guantánamo 
and forts, 1897.  The railway line branches east to Jamaica along the northern edge of the 
map.  Los Caños estate is visible on the northern shore of the Bahia de Guantánamo. 
 
 
Source: Ejército de Tierra, Servicio Geográfico del Ejército, Madrid. Atlas correspondiente a 
la memoria presentada por el capitán de EM D. Salvador Salinas. 1897. Croquis de los 
alrededores de Guantánamo. Scale: 1:50,000 
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12. Zone of Cafetales around Felicidad, Yateras, Guantánamo 1897.  Note the Cafetales 
Griñán, Diamante, Monte Alto, Santa Rita, Bella Vista with heliograph tower, Virginia, and 
the forts around Felicidad and at La Piedra. 
 
 
Source: D. Salvador Salinas, Croquis de los alrededores de Guantánamo in Atlas 
Correspondiente a la memoria presentada por el capitán de E.M. D. Salvador Salinas, 1897 
in Ejército de Tierra, SGE, Madrid. Scale 1:50,000. 
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13. Sugar Ingenios North of Guantánamo, 1897. Moving north, then east along the 
railway, Confluente, Sta. María, Esperanza, Sta. Rosa, San Ildefonso, and Soledad may be 
seen. Note the heliograph tower NE of Soledad and forts along the main road. 
 
 
Source: Ejército de Tierra, Servicio Geográfico del Ejército, Madrid. Atlas correspondiente a 
la memoria presentada por el capitán de EM D. Salvador Salinas. 1897. Croquis de los 
alrededores de Guantánamo. Scale: 1:50,000 
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14. USS Marblehead in Guantánamo Bay, 1898. 
Source: Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, available online 
<www.history.navy.mil/danfs/m4/marblehead-ii.htm> (14 May 2005). 
This illustration shows the wartime gray paint scheme of the warship. 
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15. Captain McCalla at the Time of the Spanish War. 
Source: Bowman Hendry McCalla, “Memoirs of a Naval Career” Library of Congress, 
Manuscripts Division. 
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16. Cuban soldiers having lunch aboard USS Suwanee, 1898. 
Source: Bowman Hendry McCalla, “Memoirs of a Naval Career” Library of Congress, 
Manuscripts Division. 
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17. Hoisting the flag at Guantánamo, June 12, 1898. 
Source: Library of Congress Photographs, American Memory Collection: Touring Turn-of-
the-Century America: Photographs from the Detroit Publishing Company, 1880-1920. 
<http://memory.loc.gov/> (June 17, 2005). 
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18. Marine encampment at Camp M'Calla [i.e. McCalla], Guantánamo, June 1898. 
Source: Library of Congress Photographs, American Memory Collection: Touring Turn-of-
the-Century America: Photographs from the Detroit Publishing Company, 1880-1920. 
<http://memory.loc.gov/> (June 17, 2005). 
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19. Spanish prisoners aboard collier Abarenda at Guantánamo, June 14, 1898. 
Source: Library of Congress Photographs, American Memory Collection: Touring Turn-of-
the-Century America: Photographs from the Detroit Publishing Company, 1880-1920. 
< http://memory.loc.gov/> (June 17, 2005). 
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20. USS Texas, Spanish mine taken up in Guantánamo Bay.  
Source: Library of Congress Photographs, American Memory Collection: Touring Turn-of-
the-Century America: Photographs from the Detroit Publishing Company, 1880-1920. 
< http://memory.loc.gov/> (June 17, 2005). 
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21. Spanish Intrenchments [sic] on Plantation “Soledad,” Guantanamo. 
Source: Harper’s Weekly 11 June 1898, 564. 
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22. Sugar Estate, “Confluente,” Guantanamo, Cuba. 
Source: United States War Department. Annual Reports of the War Department for the 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900. Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army. 
10 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900). 
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23. Boiler House at the Sugar Estate “Confluente,” Guantanamo. 
Source: United States War Department. Annual Reports of the War Department for the 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900. Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army. 
10 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900). 
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24. Suburb of “Soledad” Sugar Estate, Guantanamo Cuba. 
Source: United States War Department. Annual Reports of the War Department for the 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900. Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army. 
10 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900). 
 
 
25. Bridge at Arroyo de los Platanos, Soledad Plantation Railroad, Guantanamo. 
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26. Scene on Soledad Plantation Railroad, Guantanamo. 
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27. Train Load of Sugar Cane Crossing a Bridge, Soledad Plantation Railroad, 
Guantanamo. Source: United States War Department. Annual Reports of the War 
Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900. Report of the Lieutenant-General 
Commanding the Army. 10 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900). 
 
 
 
 
28. (Overleaf) Map Showing Lines owned and operated by The Cuba Eastern Railroad 
Co.  Source: University of North Carolina—Southern Historical Collection, Wilson and 
Hairston Family Papers (#4134).
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